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* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

Shadows of Modernity: Hybrid Identities of *Buraku* Outcastes in Japan

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Abstract

The emergence of modern Japan was a complex process in which burakumin and other minorities were affected differently than the majority culture. Burakumin face discrimination because they traditionally had occupations considered polluted and were outcaste by society. Compared to the institutional discrimination during the Tokugawa period and the social discrimination of the Meiji era, prejudice toward burakumin today is comparatively invisible. As a subculture facing discrimination, the Meiji era moral suasion depicting what was 'Japanese' helped to create a burakumin hybrid identity acclimating to the dramatic changes in social and cultural norms of the time. Similar to the way identity, community, and environmental spaces redefined the characteristics of burakumin historically, these same spaces continue to be deconstructed and reinvented today as new temporal spaces from globalization and technology broaden the opportunities for burakumin in Japanese society.

Introduction

At various locations throughout Japan in the spring of 1875, over 26,000 peasants rioted to demand that the minority group called *burakumin* be relegated back to a social status of being outcaste (Hane 1982, 144; Devos and Wagatsuma 1973, 37). Mob outbreaks such as this occurred sporadically after the Meiji government abolished Japan's official class system with the Emancipation Edict of 1871 (37). The policy promoting social mobility, however, had little to do with civil rights. It was motivated to regulate all landholdings, including the tax-free farmlands occupied by *burakumin*, and bring them under centralized governmental control. (Devos and Wagatsuma 35; Jansen 2000, 459).

The plight of the *burakumin* today is an example of how civil rights can be dramatically affected by social policy. Etymologically, *burakumin* stands for "hamlet people", but there is no biological way of differentiating *burakumin* from majority Japanese; the prejudice that exists is due to the sociocultural factors of ancestry and place of birth (Sugimoto 2003, 189). The *burakumin* face discrimination because they traditionally had occupations considered polluted (e.g. butchers, executioners) and were outcaste by Tokugawa society. Compared to this institutional discrimination during the Tokugawa period and the social discrimination of the Meiji era (despite legal equality), overt prejudice toward *burakumin* today is comparatively invisible (Onishi 2009, 1-3; Neary 1998, 50-78; Sugimoto 190). Due to the nature of this discrimination, official estimates range from 1.2 to 3 million *burakumin* in over 6000 buraku districts throughout the country; this makes them the largest minority group in Japan (BLL 2005, 1; Nishimura 2010, 122). Buraku communities continue to be segregated, and *koseki* (family registries) are routinely used to discover whether a person comes from a buraku neighborhood in order to discriminate against them (Sugimoto 191; Neary 52).

The purpose of this project is to isolate the roles that urbanization, modernity, and globalization are playing in pulling *burakumin* out of the shadows and into the foreground of contemporary Japanese society. This discussion will examine the ways in which coexistence is emanating from within, not outside of, the spaces of identity, community and the environment dominated by majority Japanese. What role do legacy social structures play in continuing to affect *burakumin* because they have been classified as a strategic 'Other' by majority society? Why are they limited access to social resources? How can we use current scholarship to discover ways to deconstruct previously imposed notions of cultural defilement and inferiority?

In order to analyze the role that *burakumin* are playing in bringing broader attention to their sociocultural conditions in Japan, three concerns will receive attention. First, I want to find the tension between majority and minority identities by investigating the mechanisms used to cultivate a national homogenized Japanese identity. This tension is a key factor determining the interdependent reflexive identity established by *burakumin* when choosing their level of assimilation into or exclusion from this national identity based on how much they identify with being *burakumin*. Second, I want to uncover the interplay between various communities in Japan, including urban buraku neighborhoods known as dōwa projects and the many civil rights organizations pushing for change, and the cessation of the Special Measures Law affirmative action legislation in 2003. Finally, I plan to analyze how globalization and information access can bring attention to these issues, such as when historic maps of Tokyo published on Google Earth created a public outcry from many *burakumin*.

Origins

A hybrid culture results from the confluence of previously separate cultural processes synthesizing to create new norms, traditions and practices.[1] The emergence of modern Japan was a complex example of this process, in which *burakumin* and other minorities were affected differently than the majority culture. As a subculture facing discrimination this discrimination created a hybrid identity for *burakumin* acclimating to dramatic changes in social and cultural norms. In order to understand how an ethnically identical Japanese group has become hybridized, it is important to assess the historical influences that were the building blocks of contemporary Japanese society and culture.

Due to the unique dichotomy between Shinto and Buddhism, repugnancy towards death as impure has a long tradition in Japan. The association of killing animals and eating meat with impiety in Buddhism and the correlation of death as defiling and impure in Shinto together stimulated a public opinion that occupations dealing with death were also impious and impure (Jansen 122; Pharr 2004, 134). During the Nara period (710-784 CE), people who worked in occupations considered polluted were called *eta* (extreme filth) or *hinin* (non-human). These people became "specialists in impurity" (Pharr 2004, 134). They had a wide range of vocations that were related to death, considered unclean, or low-ranking; these included butchers, tanners, leather workers, bow-mak-

ers, shrine laborers, beggars, dyers, and producers of bamboo goods (Hane 139-143; Sugimoto 2003, 189). The concentration of *burakumin* in the Kansai region, where the capitals Nara and Kyoto existed, reflects the important role certain *burakumin* played in purification ceremonies for deceased emperors as funeral attendants during this time (Ohnuki-Tierney 1989, 78).

In the Medieval period (1185-1603 CE), *hinin* were a heterogeneous group with sociocultural flexibility who were considered nonresidents exempt from taxes and other obligations (Pharr 2004, 134; Ohnuki-Tierney 84-87). They could traverse regional boundaries controlled by different lords as artists, craftsmen, and religious workers, allowing them more mobility than many other strata within society (Ohnuki-Tierney 87). Occupational specialization during this period had two particular effects on the perception of polluted occupations. First, it separated responsibilities into more finite occupations, thus people who cleaned shrines, cared for the dead, or worked with animal hides became more distinguishable from other artistic and religious occupations and were more easily associated with impurity than before (Ohnuki-Tierney 78-84). Second, increased specialization helped to change the perception of people with these occupations as being polluted themselves (Pharr 134). In other words, it became more difficult for people to leave occupations considered polluted, effectively creating the stratification necessary for the institutionalization of *burakumin* as outcastes in the Tokugawa period.

The central government of the Tokugawa period (1603-1867) institutionalized a semi-feudal caste system consisting of samurai, peasant, artisan, and merchant classes (Neary 55). This policy reinforced the existence of the outcaste *senmin* (humble people), which consisted of *eta* and *hinin*, at the bottom of this hierarchy who filled a societal need for undertakers, *kawata* (leather producers), tatami floor makers, executioners, or certain types of entertainers such as prostitutes (Hane 141; Jansen 123; Neary 54; Nimalka et al. 2007). Due to these rigid class boundaries, it is suggested within existing scholarship that the demand for leather armor created jobs that only *burakumin* could fill, thus creating the vehicle for the populations of *buraku* communities to grow into prominent segregated populations inside increasingly urban environments (Neary 53). The inability of *burakumin* to leave their outcaste status led to perceptions of their impurity becoming coupled less with occupation and more to neighborhood and family ties (Neary 55). The outcaste community was institutionalized by the time of the Meiji restoration; when the government officially abolished the class system, discrimination continued because it was socially ingrained (Hane 144).

Literature Review

In stark contrast to the 1986 proclamation by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro that "Japan has one ethnicity, one state, and one language", the ideology of Japan being a mono-ethnic nation is less supported by scholarship as more research is conducted on the buraku problem, both domestically and internationally (Lie 2001, 1). Although an abundance of scholarship about the identity, civil rights, nationalism, and modernity of Japan has existed for decades,

the concept of minorities as a hybrid culture among a dominant majority is relatively recent in this literature. Within this context, elucidation of several constructed spaces becomes apparent: individual identities, social or group dynamics, and environmental characteristics. A literature review about the multi-ethnicity of Japan is a medium to both highlight interdependence of these spaces and to de-construct them.

Identity is a malleable construction sensitive to the external influences of social values and political atmosphere. A large proportion of scholarship about the individual identity of *burakumin* focuses on how these influences affect a *burakumin*'s accepted identity as being either separate from or part of the majority; this was most prevalent in the Meiji and pre-war policies that still have influence today. This scholarship also supports the idea that *burakumin* and other minorities were used as scapegoats in literature, imagery, advertising, or other mediums to construct a belief that *burakumin* were inferior. After the edicts in 1871, poor peasants in a way had an identity crisis fearing that they would become outcastes themselves. *Burakumin* became scapegoats to vent frustrations about the financial hardships caused from rampant modernization during this time (Devos and Wagatsuma 35). Statements today are not too dissimilar from those that occurred during the peasant riots 130 years ago. Alastair McLauchlan's interviews with several *burakumin* from Osaka in 2001 illustrate the continued identity struggle that many *burakumin* face. One person stated, "Why can't they understand that we are all humans, mainstream and *burakumin*… yet how pitiful to be judged solely on the place we were born in" (McLauchlan 2003).

Aggregated, identity diffuses into a group. It is the construction of this imagined community that most dramatically affects *burakumin* today. Family, community, institutions, and civil rights groups reinforce or attempt to deny the discrimination of *burakumin* in marriage, occupation and education. Supporting the idea that, similar to the United States and Europe, Japan is a multicultural society, contemporary scholarship focuses on civil rights issues within Japan as having parallels to those in other countries (Neary 77; Lie 1; IMADR). Within this scholarship *burakumin* are part of the larger context of analyzing social discrimination throughout the world.

Environmental space is a tangible construction built to embrace the organic community. For *burakumin,* the environmental space is absolutely integral to their current situation because it is not only the protocol for prejudice when using *koseki* (family registries) to discover where someone is from but it is also where the strongest communities of *burakumin* exist (Tomonaga 2007). Scholarship about this space focuses most poignantly on the renovation of *buraku* neighborhoods known as dōwa projects and how the Special Measures Law affects the improvement of the identity and community spaces of *burakumin*. This next section will investigate the causes of a unique *burakumin* identity within majority society.

Identity Constructions – 'Japaneseness'

The construction of identity is a colossal topic within the social sciences. Investigating the mechanisms used to cultivate a national homogenized Japanese identity and

the interdependent reflexive identities established by *bura-kumin* can shed light on the tension between the majority and minority identities. The idea of 'Japaneseness' and the factors of pre-war Japan involved in creating these 'racialized' relations, such as *minzokuron* or *nihonjinron*, further exacerbated the exclusion of certain populations on the basis of characteristics presumed to be inherently Japanese (Sugimoto 2003, 31; Weiner 1998, 1-8). The term *minzokuron* refers to race, ethnicity, or people – *min* meaning 'people', *zoku* meaning 'country', and *ron* meaning 'theory'. This concept became integral to nation-building during the Meiji period and later heavily influenced Japanese literature. *Nihonjinron* (theories about Japanese identity or culture) characterized traits such as ways of thinking, social behavior, or language structure considered uniquely Japanese (Sugimoto 2003, 13-18; Weiner 1998, 2-5).

There was a belief that Japanese people had particularly strong in-group connections, racial uniformity, and harmony with nature as compared to Western societies (Sugimoto 184-185). Further definitions of 'Japaneseness' were broken down into nationality, ethnic lineage, language competency, birthplace, current residence, and level of cultural literacy (187). The Japanese construction of "Otherness" is also strongly tied to the notions of *uchi* and *soto*, or inside and outside. While majority Japanese identity was considered *uchi*, *burakumin*, other minorities, and Westerners were considered *soto* (Neary 1998, 50-78; Ohnuki-Tierney 1989; Creighton 1998, 212-214). The soto explanations of the newfound social mobility and unity of *burakumin* during the Meiji period were as people ethnically different such as being Korean, Christian heretics, or having "one rib-bone lacking" or "distorted sexual organs" (Lie 2007, 122). These were all used to depict an 'Other' by classifying what was or was not Japanese thought and behavior.

Michael Weiner suggests that the imagined community of the nation was conceived domestically during the Meiji period through the use of *nihonjinron* in media to characterize ethnic homogeneity and stimulate a new sense of national purpose and identity in the populace (Weiner 1-8). The moral suasion campaigns during the Meiji period were motivated to compete with the much wealthier Western powers and sought to redefine the character and everyday life of Japanese people (Garon 1997, 8). Although the *burakumin* were only a tiny piece within this broader context, theories of social-Darwinism modeled after Western imperialism proliferated, promoting a consanguineous majority identity that ostracized and looked down upon them as separate, similar to the way blacks were treated in the United States and Europe at the time (Weiner 3-6). The tendency for *burakumin* to be less educated, in poorer health, and with less material development made them inferior in the discourse of what was perceived to be a modern and progressive majority identity (Weiner 11, Lie 2007, 125). While the Japanese academic and intellectual communities pursued ways to identify characteristics uniquely Japanese, political leaders eventually used this perceived hierarchy over groups considered less advanced to justify exclusion of *burakumin*, absorption of the Ainu in Hokkaido, and domination over Korea and Taiwan (Weiner 9-13). In short, state-inspired nationalism offered a definition of a homog-

enous Japanese identity in relation to the West and to other citizens domestically, which marginalized those who were not part of that identity.

Community amidst Discrimination

For *burakumin* today, the most ardent discrimination occurs in marriage, occupation, and education, yet some of these challenges can be allayed with the support of family, the community, and civil rights groups. Having transitioned from the institutional discrimination of the Tokugawa period, where *burakumin* were outcaste as people with occupations considered polluted, and the social discrimination of the Meiji era, where *burakumin* were legally equal yet experienced prejudice based on where they lived, prejudice today is comparatively invisible and *burakumin* are not being wholly outcast (Onishi 2009, 1-3; Neary 1998, 50-78). A study in 2006 discovered that three factors continue to plague *burakumin*: 1) discovery of new buraku lists; 2) propaganda and discrimination on the Internet; and 3) cases of property purchase avoidance and reorganization of school districts to exclude *buraku* communities (Tomonaga 2007). According to the Osaka Human Rights Museum, discrimination is supported by "modern social values such as blood or family lineage, which simultaneously reinforce prejudice and disdain of the public against *buraku*" (Osaka Liberty).

Intermarriage rates are also comparatively low between *burakumin* and non-*burakumin*, despite their being generally physically indistinguishable. Research by sociologist Charlie Morgan suggests that there are three social factors affecting marriage rates between *burakumin* and non-*burakumin*: marriage candidate preference; third parties, such as extended family members; and marriage market constraints (Morgan 40-42, 51). He found that *burakumin* problems parallel those of African Americans in that they experience high levels of residential segregation. It is the social spaces where people meet that in fact has the most influence on intermarriage because, following intermarriage patterns of African Americans, *burakumin* meet less in the traditional spaces of universities and workplaces due to segregation but have a higher tendency to meet in local neighborhoods (Morgan 51). This may or may not be true because people often hide their buraku status. Many people who marry a non-*burakumin* hide their background from their children and family because many potential partners receive strong opposition from family members considering it "unrespectable" (BLL 2005, 1; Nishimura 2010, 134). Another study discovered that many majority parents even prefer their children not to play with *burakumin* because they are fearful that the children's attitudes might instigate intermarriage once they are of age (McLauchlan 2003).

Pierre Bourdieu's "epistemic reflexivity" is the concept of self-reference in sociology where an individual examines and 'bends back on' or refers to the mainstream identity, thus instigating their identity construction.[2] The challenges that people face with their *burakumin* identities are helped by family and community, which eventually become the foundation for building a reflexive identity. Explaining this reflexive identity construction, Christopher Bondy frames it within the *burakumin* paradigm, "a key factor in identity formation and

social interaction comes through the reactions of those from outside [buraku] districts" (Matsushita 2002; Bondy 2002). Represented in the 1987 book *Why the Dōwa are Scary* (*Dōwa wa kowai-kou*), Muichi Maekawa (*burakumin*) and Keiichi Fujita (researcher) showed that many majority Japanese are afraid of *burakumin* and the neighborhoods because of ignorance – holding a belief that *burakumin* are dangerous – and from a few publicized cases of *burakumin* who extort money using perceptions of fear (Nishimura 122).

A study at Osaka Education University interviewed eighteen Japanese youths (18-25 years old) from various occupations and classified buraku identities on a range from strong to complete abandonment/assimilation (Matsushita 2002; Bondy 2002). One of the most interesting discoveries was the correlation of a person's identification as *burakumin* to the reaction from people outside *dōwa* projects, the influence of family support or structure, and the strength of *burakumin* social networks (Matsushita 2002; Bondy 2002). Since the discrimination from outside these neighborhoods tends to be high, only those people with stronger support structures develop a powerful identification to being *burakumin*; other people without these structures in place (e.g. from poorer neighborhoods with less resources) have a tendency to abandon, be conflicted, or maintain multiple identities allowing them to interact with non-*burakumin* (Matsushita 2002; Bondy 2002). All case studies demonstrated this, and one 24-year-old female with a strong identification stated, "I was always told [in school] that those of us from buraku districts had to be responsible; to have pride in who we were, and I came to believe it" (Matsushita 2002).

Despite infighting for authority over *burakumin* issues, many civil rights groups have increased awareness for the buraku problem at the international level. The Buraku Liberation League (BLL) has over 200,000 members in thirty-nine prefectures (Sugimoto 192; Neary 66). The aim of the BLL is to: 1) develop legal solutions to better the lives of *burakumin*; 2) pressure the government to improve environmental conditions beyond urban renewal; and 3) prohibit discrimination by individuals or groups (Neary 70). The BLL is known for being militant and has been effective at creating community awareness by targeting newspapers, magazines, and other media, including authors and journalists, then publicly shaming them or forcing them to give a public apology (Sugimoto 193; Yabuuchi 2004, 285).[3] The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was also influential in improving the *burakumin* paradigm within society. However, due to conflicts with the BLL over educating youth in public schools, the "Yata Incident" in 1969 culminated in several JCP-affiliated teachers getting injured (Pharr 2004, 85-86).[4] Another group named *Zenkairen* (National Buraku Liberation Alliance) separated from the BLL in 1979 and similarly often came at odds with the BLL's aggressive tactics. Despite continued problems in the treatment of *burakumin* today, the *Zenkairen* disbanded in 2004 due to a belief that the *burakumin* issue had been resolved (USJP.org 2005).

Urbanization & Legislation

In 1951, the National Committee for Buraku Liberation (which became the BLL in 1955) pressured the Kyoto government officials to mark on city maps where there were inadequate water supplies, sewage systems, garbage disposal, and fire hydrants, as well as areas that suffered high rates of public health problems. They discovered that all such areas were within the eighteen buraku neighborhoods (Devos and Wagatsuma 76; Neary 61). Similar to "Jim Crow" in the U.S. South, buraku communities were segregated with poor infrastructures and had a lower educated populace with higher welfare dependency rates (Lie 2007, 124). Due to the geographic nature of buraku discrimination, it is an integral characteristic of the *burakumin* liberation movement, and affirmative action legislation pushed by the BLL has been essential to improving the lives of citizens living in *dōwa* projects (Neary 50-78).

Passed in 1969, the SML provided funding for *dōwa* projects classified as needing substantial funding, including policies for new housing, hospitals, small enterprises, agriculture, employment, libraries, or other community services (Neary 64; Paine and Ingersoll 2009). Ending after 33 years in 2002 (with one five-year extension), the SML supplied over 12 trillion yen and dramatically changed the lives of many *burakumin* (Paine and Ingersoll 2009). The Director of the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, Kenzo Tomonaga, projects that the most beneficial future for such legislation is the prohibition of discrimination, effective compensation for victims, and measures at the national level to mitigate discrimination because *dōwa* projects do not disappear despite the changing communities (Tomonaga 2007).

However, much like other affirmative action campaigns internationally, the SML was not without problems. The act was vague regarding who would receive funding, and due to the fact that it is difficult to differentiate a buraku person from a non-buraku impoverished Japanese living in a *dōwa* project, ensuring that SML funding actually went to improving the lives of *burakumin* was not guaranteed (Neary 64). Also, many prominent scholars state that the SML only allocated funding to specific *dōwa* projects, leaving many with little or no help (Reber 1999, 355). The reliance of many *burakumin* on government aid and its perceived unfairness by many non-*burakumin* additionally caused friction between the BLL, local communities, and the government (Reber 355).

Temporal Constructions

Identity, society, and the environment all have a temporal nature due in part to, among many other reasons, globalization improving information access (Tehranian 2006, 79). Today, *burakumin* can deconstruct discriminatory spaces by negotiating new networks, such as online groups or social media, where they can share their identities with less discrimination (INDI 2003). However, this technology can also bring new challenges. A recent example was the release of an historic maps layer of Tokyo published in 2009 on Google Earth which had clearly marked labels of where *eta* villages used to be located (Alabaster).[5] By transposing a contemporary layer of Tokyo today on top, users could easily distinguish the loca-

tion of buraku communities and use it to discriminate against them. There was an outcry by the BLL and other *burakumin* rights groups to have the labels removed because it was believed this new technology could be used to infringe on their rights. The BLL succeeded in getting the references removed and sent a letter stating that Google should "be aware of and responsible for providing a service that can easily be used as a tool for discrimination" (Alabaster; Lewis 2009).

For many minorities in Japan, the bureaucratic limitations of being considered non-Japanese and, more importantly, the inner conflict many face who must hide their cultural background by being "in the closet" is becoming less of a social obstacle today (Lie 2001, 80-82). The most profound example is previous chief cabinet secretary Hiromu Nonaka. Being public about his buraku lineage, he was politically successful in spite of slander from other politicians, such as Taro Aso, who were openly prejudiced against *burakumin* (Onishi 2009, 1). Regardless of discrimination, or more likely because of it, there are many other popular communities that *burakumin* participate with in contemporary society. As Japan urbanized in the 1960s, more people discovered leisure and entertainment. (Lie 2001, 54-58). Members of minority groups including *burakumin*, Koreans, Chinese, Ainu, and Brazilians found solace in the safe havens of sumo wrestling, baseball, enka, television, literature or manga through the 20th century (Lie 2001, 53-82). Kenji Nakagami was *burakumin,* for example, whose work titled "The Cape" won Japan's prestigious Akutagawa Prize for literature in 1976.[6]

Although the Internet is another venue for discrimination to occur, there are many emerging groups to combat this prejudice. As discrimination on the Internet (cyber-discrimination) becomes increasingly common, groups such as the International Network against Discrimination on the Internet (INDI) have responded by contacting the authors, or the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) if necessary, to remove offending content (INDI 2003). While cyber discrimination exists, digital diasporas of *burakumin* using the Internet to create a sense of community have also become a tool for *burakumin* to "come out of the closet" without having to suffer potential social consequences (Nimalka et al. 2007).

The *burakumin* rights movement has also become internationalized by being framed in the context of global civil rights issues that affect every society. The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) was founded in 1988 by *burakumin*, and it has since grown into a network of citizens, committees and partners across the globe (IMADR).[7] IMADR is currently working internationally with other NGOs to defend against human rights violations in Sri Lanka, on literacy campaigns with the UN, and to help create policies that protect migrant workers. Working with other international organizations will make the buraku rights movement stronger.

Summary and Conclusions

The relationship between identity, community, and the environment is causal for the *burakumin*. In Japan, as in other countries, the relationship between minority groups and the majority is always changing and shaping, pressing and pull-

ing; it is in perpetual flux, and this dynamism propels social movements and community construction (Tehranian 2006, 79). Some scholars argue that Japan's socioeconomic conditions are not conducive to a fully liberated civil rights movement because the government provides no legal protection to victims of discrimination. There are also sociological challenges, such as the common belief that the best remedy for the buraku problem is to ignore it (Reber 1999, 355).

While recognizing that challenges continue to exist, as the paradigm for *burakumin* shifts, this research implies that the various constructions are all temporal in nature. Whether it is identity, community, or the environment, change is inevitable. This may include a deterioration of the sense of community as *burakumin* assimilate and disappear into majority society, where the buraku problem will disappear over time or become increasingly silenced because fewer people will be distinguishable as *burakumin* and more non-*burakumin* will inhabit buraku neighborhoods (Tomonaga 2007). A more hopeful outcome is that buraku heritage will be remembered as something uniquely Japanese within the international context of global civil rights movements. Perhaps the future will consist of a cultural renaissance honoring *burakumin* for their important place in Japanese identity and history. Increased media attention, public awareness, and scholarship may also disassociate the perceptions of *burakumin* from being impure and will advocate for equal treatment in society. Abolishing the *koseki* family registries altogether would allow *burakumin* more freedom, reducing the potential of being discriminated against because of where they or their families are from. Identity, community, and environmental spaces redefined the characteristics of *burakumin* discrimination during the Tokugawa and Meiji periods, and these same spaces continue to be deconstructed and reinvented today. As new temporal spaces resulting from globalization and technology are discovered, *burakumin* will have new opportunities to renegotiate the definitions of space in Japanese society.

ENDNOTES

1. For an in-depth explanation of cultural hybridization, please see: Canclini, Nestor. 2005. Introduction: Hybrid Cultures in Globalized Times. In *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*. second ed. xxiii-xlvi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

2. For additional information about 'reflexivity' in the social sciences, please see Maton, Karl. Reflexivity, relationism & research: Pierre Bourdieu and the epistemic conditions of social scientific knowledge. *Space & Culture: International Journal of Social Spaces* 6, (1) (Feb 2003): 52-65.

3. The denunciation tactics of the BLL are widely criticized and often instigate violence between the BLL, the police, and the public (Nishimura 2010, 125). There are many cases of the BLL's extremely aggressive actions; in one case a school principle allegedly committed suicide because he was stuck between the pressure of the BLL and the board of education for having students sing the de facto national anthem *Kimigayo*, which was considered representative of the state's pre-war involvement in education (*Japan Echo* 1999, April 2010).

4. The BLL and JCP had different ideologies about the education of youth: the BLL believed that affirmative action and assimilation would improve the academic achievement of *burakumin* student, and the JCP did not. The "Yata Incident" evolved because school teachers supporting an Osaka Teacher's Union JCP candidate refused to discuss teaching materials that the BLL considered discriminatory. The

events culminated in detainment of these teachers by the BLL for more than a day, forcing them to publically denounce their actions. This was considered a major victory for the BLL because the Osaka High Court supported this behavior as a legal right of protest. See Pharr, Susan. 2004. "*Burakumin* protest: The incident at Yoka high school," 133-146.

5. The digital maps came from the University of California Berkeley collection overseen by David Rumsey, a collector of over 100, 000 historical maps. Rumsey worked with Google to build the new layers and was also ultimately the person to remove the references to eta. Many critics say that this is another example of Google capitalizing on other people's information yet not recognizing the implications of making uncensored information available, such as the way Google Maps street view could be used to invade people's privacy (Alabaster; Lewis 2009). See the Japanese historical map collection of University of California, Berkeley at http://www.davidrumsey.com/japan/

6. *The Cape and Other Stories from the Japanese Ghetto* by Kenji Nakagami (Translated by Eve Zimmerman) draws a dramatic portrayal of what life is like for people living in a buraku community.

7. IMADR is a non-profit organization devoted to eliminating discrimination and racism by empowering discriminated groups to represent themselves, promoting transnational solidarity among these groups, and advocating legislation to eliminate discrimination and racism internationally. IMADR has consultative status to the UN Economic and Social Council. www.imadr.org/

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