



UNIVERSITY of
SAN FRANCISCO

*Educating Minds and Hearts
to Change the World*

A publication of the
**University of
San Francisco
Center for the
Pacific Rim**
Copyright 2009

Editors

Joaquin Gonzalez
John Nelson

**Editorial
Consultants**

Barbara K. Bundy
Hartmut Fischer
Patrick L. Hatcher

Editorial Board

Uldis Kruze
Man-lui Lau
Mark Mir
Noriko Nagata
Stephen Roddy
Kyoko Suda
Bruce Wydick

Asia Pacific: Perspectives
Center for the Pacific Rim
2130 Fulton St
San Francisco, CA
94117-1080

Tel: (415) 422-6357
Fax: (415) 422-5933
perspectives@usfca.edu

Asia Pacific:

PERSPECTIVES

an electronic journal

Volume IX · Number 1 December · 2009

Introduction >>.....John Nelson 1

Grounding Terrorism on Ground Zero: How 9/11 Informs U.S. Press Coverage of Political Violence >>.....Kevin Mack 2

How the West Lost Us: A Critique of Media Coverage of the Mumbai Attacks >>.....Vamsee Juluri 17

An Interview with Vamsee Juluri >>.....John Nelson 19

Profile of the Artist: Shalinee Kumari >>..... 24

Gathering Reactions on the Mumbai Attacks, India's '9/11' on November 26th, 2008 >>.....Lotika Gulvadi 25

Asia Pacific: Perspectives is a peer-reviewed journal published at least once a year, usually in April/May. It welcomes submissions from all fields of the social sciences and the humanities with relevance to the Asia Pacific region.* In keeping with the Jesuit traditions of the University of San Francisco, *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* commits itself to the highest standards of learning and scholarship.

Our task is to inform public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent views and ideas that promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and the dissemination of knowledge unreservedly. Papers adopting a comparative, interdisciplinary approach will be especially welcome. **Graduate students are strongly encouraged to submit their work for consideration.**

* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

Grounding Terrorism on Ground Zero: How 9/11 Informs U.S. Press Coverage of Political Violence

By Kevin Mack

Abstract

This study analyzes the breaking news coverage of the United States press during the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Previously, scholars such as Robert Entman and Elisabeth Anker found that U.S. media melodramatically framed the September 11, 2001 attacks and constructed a “War on Terror” ideology. Working from that theoretical perspective, the author posits this ideology influenced U.S. reporters and their style of reportage about the Mumbai attacks, as did breaking news characteristics and general patterns within journalism, such as regionalization. Research findings suggest that U.S. media localized the Mumbai attacks by borrowing concepts from September 11 and the “War on Terror” frame. U.S. newspaper stories and broadcast reports produced uniform analyses through repetition of precedents such as association of Islam with violence and overreliance on U.S./Western official sources.

Introduction

On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 United States civilians died when two hijacked airplanes slammed into New York City’s Twin Towers. These attacks rattled U.S. society and standard journalistic practices. According to Zelzer and Allen, news organizations lacked a readymade narrative for September 11, which transformed “the everyday contexts within which many journalists routinely operate” (2002, 1). This study asks whether aftershocks from those traumatic events still reverberate in reportage of political violence. If 9/11 symbolizes “a critical cultural shift in the predominant *news frame* used by American mass media [*italics in original*]” (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3-4), would coverage of future political violence employ a similar frame, thereby compromising accuracy and depth?

During November 26-29, 2008, heavily armed gunmen killed more than 170 civilians and security personnel in several locations in Mumbai, India. Like New York City, Mumbai occupies an important financial position in its country (Mukherjee 2008). Similar to 9/11, an Islamic group trained and financed the militants (BBC 2009) who attacked a predominantly non-Islamic metropolitan area. And in terms of bloodshed and sorrow, Mumbai certainly provoked an emotional reaction analogous to Ground Zero. But three major considerations muddy straightforward Mumbai-9/11 comparisons: religious strife in India, proximate national rivalry between India and Pakistan, and a recent history of political violence affecting the region.

Hindu-Muslim friction pervades India’s history after its independence from Britain. Unfortunately, hostilities have not declined the last two decades. In 1992, Hindu militants destroyed the sixteenth-century Babri mosque in Ayodhya and

provoked an anti-Muslim pogrom that left more than 2,000 dead. Ten years later, extremist Hindu nationalism resurfaced in Gujarat state after a railroad carriage fire in Godhra. The incidents claimed 1,000 lives, forced 150,000 Indians into relief camps, and featured atrocities on both sides: a Muslim mob originally attacked the train bearing Hindutva supporters, and the Hindu retaliation persisted for weeks and included many Muslims who were unconnected to the original incident. The Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist organization, dominated Indian national politics through 2004 and illustrates the entrenched difficulties of maintaining a secular constitution.¹ The history of the United States, on the other hand, fortunately lacks religious turmoil on such a terrible level.

Unlike New York City, neighborly political rivalry informs Indian and Mumbai’s society. Thus, Pakistan’s admission that Mumbai’s attackers trained within its borders complicates depictions of the incident (BBC 2009). India, largely Hindu, and Pakistan, vastly Muslim, went to war three times last century. 1947’s Partition of the two nations, remembered for its “climate of fear and hate” and “orgies of physical violence,” instigated communal violence and mass migrations on the scale of 600,000 deaths and the displacement of 14 million people (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, 129-130).² The disputed territory of Kashmir remains an issue “of virtual civil war” on the subcontinent, intensified by an insurgency covertly funded by some Pakistanis and roughly 30,000 deaths since 1989 (Metcalfe and Metcalfe 2006, 267).

Finally, violence and terror have occurred much more frequently against Indians than Americans, particularly during the last five years. On October 29, 2005, three synchronized explosions in crowded New Delhi marketplaces killed 60 celebrants of Diwalhi (Kumar 2005). One year later, seven coordinated bombings on Mumbai trains killed 186 commuters. Mumbai police believed Pakistani militants planned and coordinated those attacks (BBC 2006). Two crude bombs in Malegaon, another city in Western India, killed seven innocents and injured 30 others just months prior to Mumbai’s November 2008 shootings. The Malegaon bombings had followed four bomb blasts to the city in 2006 that had left 31 dead and 300 others injured (Hafeez and Naik, 2008). In comparison, 9/11 marked the first foreign-led attack on U.S. soil in recent history.

Following those considerations, the attacks in Mumbai reflect an unfortunate pattern of violence in India rather than a 9/11-esque “critical cultural shift” (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3). But, as Ghosh noted, many U.S. media pundits ignored those distinctions and referred to the Mumbai attacks as “India’s 9/11,” thereby obscuring India’s political and social complexities (2008). Let us now investigate that claim, and determine whether an imprecise 9/11 mischaracterization actually defined U.S. coverage of November 2008.

Mass Communication and Media Framing

Over the last 100 years, mass media’s importance increased as local communities’ influence waned. Civic engagement declined in the twentieth century, while the role of journalists expanded to define a society’s collective interests and

concerns. Because the contemporary press can reach a greater number of people, media's growth engendered a social force that Wirth had defined by 1948 as being of "incalculable magnitude" (12). Thus, it becomes even more incumbent for scholars to analyze the principles behind media discourse.³ Mass media possess the symbolic power of "speaking for us all" (Couldry 2001, 157), granting news organizations a powerful capacity to subtly define collective reality. International news coverage must be examined with an especially critical eye, because geographically distant or culturally different issues enhance the meaning-making role of the press (Mishra 2008, 156).

"News is a window to the world," and through its framing Americans learn about their institutions, leaders, and other nations (Tuchman 1978, 1) or understand an object or event's social meaning (Goffman 1974). Assumptions of social, political, and media organizations underlie frames, which Entman argues, "*select[t] and highlight[t] some facets of events or issues, and mak[e] connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution [italics in original]*" (2004, 5). Other scholars add that frames actively generate information while screening alternative interpretations (Reese 2001, 13).

Reporters frame events to fit a particular viewpoint and to represent already-shared beliefs rather than communicate new information (Carey 1992; Harcup and O'Neill 2001; Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). Although objectivity funds their profession, journalists must learn early in their careers to polarize issues and define their parameters (Hackett 1984), thus establishing a "frame trap" through arrangement of information in a particular manner to produce predictable results (Goffman 1974, 680).

Adopting a 9/11 Frame

With President Bush's speech on September 12, 2001, the Administration framed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush and government officials consistently voiced the terms "evil" and "war" to portray the attacks melodramatically (Anker 2005), illustrated by Bush's use of the former word five times and latter word twelve times during the 2002 State of the Union Address (Entman 2004, 1). Terrorist enemies were unilaterally evil according to the president: crazy, undemocratic, anti-capitalist, and secretive — in essence, a dark foil to an enlightened nation suffering precisely for its superior virtue (Anker 2005; Entman 2003). Though this characterization invokes a strong and immediate aggressive reaction, it also imprecisely describes who or what the U.S. ought to attack.

Out of other possible solutions, U.S. media framed "pre-emptive strike" as the only logical remedy for September 11 (Archetti 2006, 3). By utilizing a war metaphor, Kathleen Jamieson argues that Bush's definition of 9/11 blocked "alternative language" and other viable responses, such as justice in an international court. Over time, the president's classification pigeonholed discussion. The "'War on Terror' [became] a naturalized, assumed way to describe [the situation]," Hall says. "People don't ask: 'What's the [meaning of 9/11]? What are the implications of using this and not some other vocabulary?'" (*On The Media*, NPR, March 27, 2009). The

frame quietly undercut other responses to 9/11 and fostered homogeneous characterizations of terrorists that dominated discussions of political violence.

A majority of newspapers and other U.S. media obediently adopted the Administration's conclusion, agreeing that 9/11 represented an "Attack on America" (Karim 2002; McKinley and Simonet 2003). By reiterating Bush's stance, the U.S. mainstream press consciously framed the attacks as a declaration of war — a far different decision than that reached in coverage of other terrorist acts (Schaeffer 2002). Eventually, this "War on Terror" (WOT) frame encompassed a global conflict that demanded more than a direct strike at 9/11's alleged perpetrators. The WOT divided the world into good and evil sides, beckoning all freedom-loving nations to relentlessly battle terrorists wherever they may be found (Archetti 2006).

September 11 allowed U.S. social and political leaders to redefine the international worldview of their constituents. As Entman demonstrates, Bush and other government officials effectively defined the causes, effects, solutions, and morality of 9/11 (2004). Most politicians, military leaders, and non-government elites publicly accepted the Bush frame during the following months (King and deYoung 2008, 125) and portrayed the Middle East as a land of violence and fear (Karim 2002). The WOT entered the everyday lexicon of citizens and policymakers, a phenomenon that carried forth "the dominant social order and the values it supports" (Berkowitz 2005, 617). As Schudson observes, "we" and "us" repeatedly turned up in September 11 accounts (2002, 43), and Sreberny found subsequent reportage of political violence more emotionally charged (2002).

9/11 comparisons continue to tinge accounts of political violence. Researchers observe that after a dominant frame's acceptance, succeeding narratives generally fit within that frame's discursive bounds (Berkowitz 2005; Entman 2004; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003) and alternative interpretations are difficult to articulate (Karim 2002). Vujovnic argues that U.S. media failed to construct a "platform for open discussion" after 9/11 (2008). Its legacy still impresses contemporary news reports — four years after 9/11, for instance, the U.S. press associated the London public transit bombings with American patriotism because the attacks "fit well in the framework of the war on terror" (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007, 84).

Regionalization and Cultural Narratives

Despite trends towards global communication, media members still cover events from a local angle within "existing frameworks of nationhood" (Nossek 2004, 364). Post-9/11, "domestic contexts [are] being used to integrate global events in more and more local discourses," a process Volkmer names "regionalization" (2002, 239). When framing an event as locally relevant, reporters put on "domestic glasses" that subordinate professional norms to national identification or morale (Nossek 2004). For example, Schaeffer found that both American and African newspapers, when reporting on domestic or international terrorism, "were ethnocentric in putting their own concerns and structural frames first and not challenging what they already thought about the other" (2003, 110).

Journalists resort to local narratives or frameworks to make events more domestically significant as well (Gurevitch, Levy, and Roeh 1991, 207), especially when reporting on the relatively unknown (Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). Reporters rely upon familiar frames, scripts, and stock characterizations to narrate and evaluate events, using cultural archetypes to distill or reiterate meaning (Berkowitz 2005; Entman 2004; Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). To make their job easier, journalists place atypical events within recognizable scripts or behavioral models (van Dijk 1988) and draw upon “available cultural resources” to quickly make sense of anarchic happenings.⁴ If new facts threaten the conventional account, reporters often construct meaning to restore the traditional interpretation (Handley 2008).

Coverage of Islam epitomizes regional media narratives. U.S. news that references the religion is most often negative, typically associating Islam with violence (Mishra 2008; Karim 2002) or labeling terrorists as Muslim (Nagar 2007). Reports largely fail to illustrate a nuanced picture of the religion and its adherents, preferring polarization and simplicity in description (Karim 2002). As Muslims received greater media attention post-9/11, the WOT frame strengthened those misconceptions by generally representing Muslims as the enemy or connecting them to terrorist organizations (Mishra 2008; Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007). Interestingly, terrorism’s connection to Islam frequently surfaces in reports, while detailed analyses of terror’s causes remain an exception (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007, 73).

September 11 stories initially used previous attacks for orientation or as models for violence and terror (Entman 2004; Schaeffer 2003). Yet once 9/11 assumed its position as an historical breaking point — the moment the world decided whether it was either “with us or against us” (Archetti 2006, 18) — the tragedy created a shift in how U.S. mass media regard terrorism (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Robinson 2008). Editorials and reports tinged by an increased sense of “American-ness” (Hutcheson et al. 2004) decried the U.S.’s loss of innocence and bemoaned a foreboding future (Lule 2002). 9/11 became the U.S.’s barometer for other acts of political violence.

This inclination towards “regionalization” leads to reporting inaccuracies and one-sided, nationalistic stereotypes of other nations. A repeat of regional coverage during the Mumbai attacks would create a flawed portrayal of the shootings and suggest political and social considerations not relevant or even existent in India. To place the November 2008 attacks within U.S. discursive contexts risks unwieldy 9/11 comparisons and false pro-U.S. conclusions, yet previous scholarship suggests its possibility during foreign situations. Regionalist rhetoric increasingly saturates news coverage when reporters strive to make sense of unrecognizable events or make their subjects more salient domestically.

Breaking News Coverage, Simplification, and Reliance on Official Sources

Certain qualities of breaking news coverage often combine to produce unsophisticated frames and one-sided judgments. Journalists rarely review all relevant facts before filing

stories, especially in situations of disorder or hurry (Entman 2004). During the quickened, incipient moments of categorization, journalists restructure their environment around speed (Reynolds and Barnett 2002a) and give short-shrift to deeper considerations, such as motives, goals, or related issues (Entman 2004; Traugott and Brader 2003). CNN’s breaking news coverage of 9/11, for example, narrowly classified the attacks as an act of war necessitating “immediate military retaliation” (Reynolds and Barnett 2002b, 25).

Additionally, reporters generally use a prototypical frame or characterization to make fast-moving events manageable, particularly in cases of terrorism (Berkowitz 2005). Faced with chaos, news by simplification provides “comforting solutions to a complex world” (McKinley and Simonet 2003, 4). The melodramatic style, employed by most U.S. news programming, clumsily defined 9/11’s actors as either villains or heroes (Anker 2005). Despite September 11’s great amount of coverage, most reports, including those of the *New York Times*, did not articulate possible motives for the attacks or their deeper roots (Archetti 2006; Traugott and Brader 2003). A lack of attention, or even concern, for underlying factors produces superficial news accounts.

Because repeatedly citing a specific group promotes its “particular issue definition” (Miller and Riechert 2001, 112), mainstream media often produce one-dimensional, uniform judgments. Along with national identities and interests, official sources shape coverage and media agenda during political crises and constrain journalists’ attempts at in-depth analysis (Nagar 2007, 3). Citations consistently reinforce the same conclusions — during 9/11, for example, Li and Izard found that newspapers and broadcasters predominantly cited official sources (2003). More often than not, these sources focused on “security matters” (Karim 2002, 105). In subsequent breaking coverage of terrorism, political or military leaders often support their nation’s policy or underline their government’s strength (Hutcheson et al. 2004). Indeed, Ruigrok and van Atteveldt write that “selective choice of sources” reinforced the WOT frame (2007, 74).

Breaking news coverage and reliance on official sources exaggerate regionalization and several of its negative tendencies, such as one-sided concern and unrefined illustration of events. Faced with deadlines, journalists often turn to what they already know in order to alleviate “the anxiety of storytelling” — identifying and producing a story in a short amount of time in order to captivate a profitably-sized audience (Schudson 2007). These two broad patterns, if present during November 2008, would engender standardized, superficial coverage of Mumbai.

Research Questions and Methodology

The 9/11 frame’s prevalence and media tendencies during breaking coverage suggest that reporting inaccuracies, nationalistic assumptions about political violence and terrorists, and oversimplification of the attacks’ foreign context characterized November 2008 coverage. Based upon that theoretical framework, this paper proposes that “regionalization” (as Volkmer defines it, 2002) and breaking news characteristics (such as shallow analysis and overreliance on official

sources) persisted during coverage of the November 2008 attacks. I hypothesize, first, that the U.S. press initially used a 9/11 frame to make sense of the Mumbai violence, ignoring distinctions between the two tragedies and encouraging imprecise connections between the two different events. Second, this initial frame for the attacks in Mumbai dominated later reports despite additional time for analysis and deliberation, repeating the stubbornness of early impressions which typified 9/11 follow-up coverage. As a research question, I wish to compare broadcast and newspaper reports to explore if television journalists echoed September 11 more readily than their print media peers.⁵ The study uses content analysis of four well-known media sources. For print media, I selected the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* because each publication sets reporting standards for their field and strongly influences the frames and agendas of other news outlets (Handley 2008, 145). For broadcast media, *CNN* and *Fox News* were selected because the stations rated as the top two cables news networks in November 2008 (Guthrie 2008).

A Lexis/Nexis search of texts which mention "Mumbai" within 25 words of "attack" culled 437 total stories that were published between November 26 and December 10, 2008. From this total, the study used a random sample of 48 articles and transcripts, of which commentaries, op-eds, editorials, non-fact based reports, and internet-only publications were replaced by standard news reports. Twelve reports represented each media organization. To test change over the analyzed two weeks, those stories were divided equally into three time periods: "Breaking" coverage during the attacks, from November 26 to November 30; "Immediate" coverage from December 1 to December 5, allowing for crude analyses of the attacks; and "Extended" coverage from December 6 to December 10, allowing for roughly one week of analysis. Additionally, the study divided its entire 48 story sample into two equal groups of media type, print and broadcast, in order to answer its research question.

I coded each sample story according to eight categories to reveal possible regionalization or simplification (See Appendix for Coding Sheet.) The first, "Primary Frame of the Event," noted the first or most apparent characterization of the attacks in each story: either an unprecedented attack, provocation for immediate reprisal, continuation of pattern, or event necessitating further investigation rather than counterattack. I specifically noted any other frames. Findings would illustrate U.S. journalists' first perception of the shootings and reveal any borrowed analysis from September 11 or other U.S.-specific considerations.

The second category, "Causation," asked how articles and broadcasts explained the tragedy's roots. Did a report stress that immediate causes, such as a security breach, or longitudinal causes, such as a weak infrastructure, enabled the attacks? Or were causes equally considered or not broached at all? I noted every causal possibility present in the articles. If results skewed heavily towards short-term causation, reporters likely eschewed analysis of long-term origins for the event's immediate ramifications, similar to 9/11's coverage. Such findings would also underline breaking news' tendency to disregard complicated, long-term roots of crises.

Third, the "Motives" category sought attributions of political/social motives to the terrorists' actions. The study recorded every possible intention expressed in media coverage. If findings leaned towards little or no attribution, thus continuing the September 11 precedent, the U.S. press unfairly represented the perpetrators in the court of public opinion.

Fourth, "Suspicious," specifically marked the terrorist groups that reporters attached blame. I developed a coding system that noted every referenced group in a story: India/Pakistan terrorist based organizations, Al Qaeda, other terror organizations, and other political/social organizations. If no culprits drew mention, I marked "NO." If results generally cited 9/11's suspects, U.S. media probably turned to the September 11 frame during breaking coverage.

To identify an understated "Hierarchy of Victims," the fifth category, I identified the victim group to whom each story devoted the most coverage: U.S. residents, other Westerners, Indians, or other cultural groups. My analysis also documented stories that mentioned no victims and those which gave no stress to victims' nationality. If U.S. or Western victims received the greatest attention, U.S. media disproportionately represented the scope and nature of Mumbai's losses and regionalized the attacks.

Sixth, the study noted each story's "Sources" based on two considerations: nationality (U.S./Western vs. Indian/Eastern) and status (governmental, bureaucratic, or sanctioned expert vs. non-official). Coding registered the most prevalent source type. According to my review of breaking news coverage, nationalistic considerations likely garnered the highest media attention if U.S. reporters quoted Western and official sources most frequently. Unfortunately, as Nagar argues (2007), such sourcing compromises distanced, holistically accurate coverage.

For "References to Historical Example," I counted allusions to previous attacks within India, 9/11, other previous attacks on Western countries, and any other previous attacks elsewhere in the world. Some samples referenced "none" while others referenced numerous examples from history. Coverage primarily noting U.S. or Western examples would facilitate regional framing and highlight breaking news' tendency to rely upon traditional, domestic narratives.

The eighth and final category, "Treatment of Islam," noted each time the words "Islam" or "Muslim" surfaced in reports and counted the number of those usages that associated Islam with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war. This category tests the persistence of regional media narrative as typified by the traditional characterization of Muslims-as-aggressor.

To discover if the attacks' initial frame dominated later coverage, I looked for categorical data change through the three time periods "Breaking," "Immediate," and "Extended." Deviations between the three phases would illustrate that U.S. media coverage evolved after its initial perspective(s). To answer the research question, I divided print and broadcast stories and compared their data.

Findings

Results strongly supported the first hypothesis. Faced with chaos, U.S. reporters initially framed the Mumbai attacks

in ways similar to 9/11. During “Breaking” coverage, journalists largely framed the attacks as unprecedented in Indian history (Figure 1: *Note that all Figures and Tables follow the Endnotes and References.*) Usage of the “Unprecedented Attack” and “Provocation for Reprisal” frames outnumbered all other media frames through the first five days of coverage.

American journalists suspected that Mumbai’s culprits attacked for the same reasons that animated September 11’s perpetrators. With the exception of Kashmir, during “Breaking” coverage reporters attributed the same impulses to Mumbai’s perpetrators—economic devastation, desire for publicity, and Muslim aggression (Figure 2)—as had allegedly motivated 9/11 attackers (Traugott and Brader 2003). September 11 informed U.S. reporters’ suspicions as well. Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization believed to have orchestrated the September 11 attacks, registered as the most likely culprit among the four media organizations through the first five days of coverage (Figure 3).

“Breaking” reportage also displayed clear characteristics of “regionalization.” Initial coverage overwhelmingly emphasized U.S. or Western victims (Figure 5). For orientation, U.S. media largely favored American or Western sources to grant familiar perspectives to their accounts (Figure 6). This prioritization of U.S. victimization and sources helped strengthen September 11 parallels and localize the geographically and culturally distant tragedy. Additionally, references to Islam or Muslims underlined the 9/11 connection. “Breaking” reports mentioned the religion most frequently and most consistently associated its adherents with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war (Figure 4).

Though 9/11 comparisons typified “Breaking” coverage, however, this initial framing did not define later reports. Rather, news organizations progressively offered more in-depth coverage that stressed the long-term causes and implications of Mumbai, thereby disproving the second hypothesis. Allusion to September 11 as an historical precedent gradually dropped through the three data periods (Table 7). Further, the U.S. press eventually corrected their suspicions, overwhelmingly blaming an unnamed Pakistani group or specifically charging Lashkar-e-Taiba/Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET) for the attacks (Figure 9). The Pakistan-based LET remains the primary suspect of investigators months later (BBC 2009). Yet while LET is an extreme Islamic-inspired organization, references to the religion dropped dramatically through the two weeks of coverage along with its association with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war. Whereas “Breaking” reports made the connection in 68 percent of total references to Islam, stories published during “Extended” coverage connected Muslims to those pejorative concepts in 44 percent of overall mentions (Figure 4).

As the dominant frame of Mumbai evolved from “Unprecedented” to “Investigation Needed” (Figure 1), U.S. media distanced its coverage from a 9/11 perspective in other, more subtle ways. Accounts balanced their portrayals of the tragic losses in Mumbai by favoring Western casualties less frequently (Figure 5). Reporters weaned themselves from U.S./Western sources (Figure 6), consequently giving their stories a less immediate regional spin. After substantially

reporting on immediate explanations for the Mumbai attacks, such as the attackers’ intricate plan or the poor Mumbai security/response, during the first ten days of coverage, the U.S. press turned to long-term causal analysis during “Extended” coverage (Figure 7). U.S. media increasingly gave little attention to short term failings, as they had done during 9/11’s breaking coverage, and analyzed the deeply rooted imperfections and conflicts within the Indian state.

For the research question, findings indicate that broadcast journalists evince both “regionalization” and breaking news characteristics more habitually than print reporters. Broadcast reports emphasized U.S. casualties (Figure 5) and relied on U.S./Western sources (Figure 10) more than print stories. While both media types referenced Islam extensively, CNN and Fox News associated Muslims with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war far more readily than the *Times* and *Post* (Figure 11). Continuing this pattern of stock characterization and narrative, broadcast media generally attributed motives to Mumbai’s perpetrators that smacked of U.S. interpretation, such as economics or a desire to raise the group’s international profile. On the other hand, many print reporters pointed to subcontinental-specific motives such as Kashmir and Hindu-Muslim tensions (Table 3b), granting their accounts a more accurate contextualization. Further, a majority of newspapers framed the attacks within Pakistan-India tensions more regularly than CNN and Fox News, who comparatively favored the 9/11-esque “Declaration of War” or “Provocation for Reprisal” frame (Table 1).

9/11 Narratives as a Response to the Mumbai Attacks

Reflecting Waisbord’s assertion that “journalism resorted to standard formulas and stock-in-trade themes to cover risk after September 11” (2002, 201), U.S. reporters reacted with a 9/11 narrative when faced with attacks on a commercial and cultural center. September 11 remains a touchstone of U.S. journalistic practice and a “critical cultural shift” that informs mass society (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3-4). Only three stories framed the attacks as an example of India’s unfortunate legacy of terrorism (Table 1), perhaps because that explanation did not agree with the U.S. experience of political violence. “All we can say now is this is the worst, most brazen, audacious attacks [sic] in Indian history,” as the *Post* quoted a police official. “It’s a violent situation that’s still ongoing. Mumbai remains at war” (Article I.B.1.b: *Note that Article Key follows Tables and Figures.*) Stories generally favored sources that elicited similarly blatant evocations of September 11.

Likewise, a former resident of Mumbai told the *Post* two days after the attacks, “We can’t believe that this has happened in a place that we thought was so safe” (I.B.2.b). Without questioning this source’s genuineness, such statements mischaracterize India and Mumbai’s history with political violence. Mumbai is not relatively “so safe” when compared to the *Post*’s own country, and the quote’s lack of substantiation within the article reflects journalists’ tendency to not review or report all the facts during breaking news coverage (Entman 2004). Journalists predetermined the Mumbai attacks to be unprecedented in scale, occurrence, and consequences,

thereby supporting Entman's observation that journalists use a script for certain events (2004) and Berkowitz's argument that news reports are often "quickly transposed onto a story framework known in advance" (2005, 608). Though the 9/11 frame faded through the two weeks of studied media content, however, its perspective did not entirely vanish from Mumbai reportage. The "Provocation for Reprisal" frame, the gut-check reaction of Bush-influenced 9/11 journalists (Archetti 2006), paced "Immediate" coverage even as the "Unprecedented" frame declined (Figure 1). "This time the response will be very serious," India's deputy foreign minister told the *Post*, underscoring the article's general subordination of previous Indian political violence (I.B.2.a). Reporters expected (and indirectly encouraged) a similar reaction to what September 11 inspired seven years before.

November 2008's reports also featured stereotypical characterizations of Mumbai's principal actors. Islam's frequent association with violence suggests that U.S. journalists still base their initial coverage on the myth of "Islamic Peril" — Muslim aggression and violence (Karim 2002). U.S. media's portrayals of Mumbai residents during the attacks recalled the standard personas that filled 9/11's storyline. The *Times* profiled "Mumbai's new heroes" — individuals who had "perform[ed] acts of heroism that were not part of their job descriptions" (I.A.2.b) — recalling September 11's celebration of firefighters, police officers and other emergency workers (Lule 2002). In a December 7 piece, the *Post* reported that "images of the Mumbai siege will be imprinted on the memory" of India's children. "As with the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States ... [the November attacks will be] a traumatic backdrop that probably will shape their attitudes for years" (I.B.3.b). In these examples, reporters overlooked the specificities and distinctions between Mumbai and 9/11 in order to construct the traditional terrorist story.

The "War on Terror"

It is imperative to distinguish between the WOT media perspective as a "framing process" rather than a "clearly defined fixed frame" (Archetti 2006, 29). Because frames are always in the process of gaining or losing value (Reese 2003), Mumbai's characterization evolved and took on different meanings during the two weeks of coverage and analysis.

Though U.S. reporters' initial frame of Mumbai as a 9/11 replica faded, U.S. media eventually adapted the Mumbai attacks into the WOT global battle of good and evil. This development mirrors the WOT's own development from a retributive strike against Al Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 into a worldwide conflict encompassing all terrorist fronts (Archetti 2006; Entman 2004). As noted earlier, coverage eventually turned to long-term causal analysis (Figure 7) and framed the Mumbai attacks as events necessitating further investigation (Figure 1). Yet U.S. official sources, used most prominently during the final five days of analyzed coverage (Figure 6), described those causes and investigations in relation to U.S. diplomatic and WOT interests.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, set the media agenda of Al Qaeda suspicion and immediate retributive strike against the attackers (I.A.2.a; I.A.2.d; I.B.2.d;

II.B.2.c), thereby illustrating Nagar's expectation that official sources will shape news coverage "in the case of the war on terrorism" (2007, 3). "Pakistan has a responsibility to act," the *Times* quoted Rice, underlining U.S. officials' intent to broaden the implications of the Mumbai attacks towards U.S. policy considerations (I.A.3.c). Peter Brooks, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, framed the Mumbai investigation within the WOT to *Fox News*: "We'd really like to get our hands on that sort of intelligence that could lead us to Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden, or the head of the Taliban ... you know, clever investigators could get us information that could be very helpful in the War on Terror" (II.B.3.d).

U.S. media generally trusted that its own country ought to spearhead the Mumbai investigation as it did the WOT, and depicted the U.S. as the unquestionably preeminent nation that responded to the attacks. Coverage underlines the observation that the U.S. derives its identity from its perceived "uniqueness" and position as "military, economic, and cultural 'super-power'" (Hutcheson et al 2004, 29). Like the WOT ranked other countries behind the "U.S. superpower" (Archetti 2006, 9), Mumbai coverage stressed the leadership of U.S. officials. The *Times* reported that the attacks "increased the pressure on the United States to find a way to resolve the tensions between Pakistan and India," apparently a dilemma solely dependent on U.S. action (I.A.2.c). *Fox News*'s Heather Nauert asked if "American commandos could go in [the Taj Hotel] and perform any kind of rescue operation, as opposed to having to rely upon Indian forces" (II.B.1.d). The *Post* depicted Rice as a premier arbiter, easing tensions between Pakistan and India on one hand while making "demands on both countries" on the other. Acknowledging that the two nations had nearly gone to war over previous terrorist actions, the newspaper reassured its readers that the last crisis "was averted after U.S. diplomatic intervention" (II.B.2.d).

The perpetrators' motivations received progressively less attention even as they increasingly became identified (Figure 8). The WOT frame gives little shrift to such specificities, supporting the argument that "conventional frames explain and prioritize dominant ways of understanding events while underplaying or discounting others" (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 14). The fact that "inhuman" terrorists had struck against another "dream city" (I.A.2.b) and "democracy" (II.B.1.b) mattered to U.S. reporters; the gunmen's literal motivations has little importance within the overall aim of the WOT to avenge the attacks and eradicate terrorism worldwide. This selective coverage repeats the pattern in coverage of political violence to ignore the goals or motives of terrorist organizations (Paletz, Fozzard, and Ayanian 1982; Traugott and Brader 2003).

Finally, Mumbai's stories also asked if other nations were doing their part in the WOT. On December 1, senior *Fox News* contributor Dan Senor argued, "The Indian intelligence agency should have been on offense, trying to infiltrate these cells" and attack terrorists the way that U.S. counterterrorism officials had been doing (II.B.2.a). Nauert asked if "Pakistan is finally starting to take the war on terror seriously" (II.B.2.d). Two weeks after Mumbai's first gunshots, the WOT's dogged battle against terrorists subsumed the attacks. While the

preponderance of U.S. victim mention declined during the three time periods, selective causal interpretation, lack of attributed motives to attackers, and heavy reliance on official sources strengthened Mumbai's eventual placement within the U.S.'s regional WOT frame.

Print versus Broadcast

Broadcast's coverage suggests an attempt to capture ratings along with meaning-making. As Schudson writes, "The anxiety of journalistic story telling is double. It is not only an anxiety to identify what the story is but to do so in a way that does not lose the audience It is a matter of ... shared human sympathies as they exist in a given society at a given time" (2007, 256). U.S. casualties, the richest source of prospective sympathy, received far greater emphasis in broadcast reports than in print (Figure 5). Television reporters used stock, popular characterizations of Muslims and terrorist villains much more often: *CNN* and *Fox News* negatively associated Muslims far more readily than the *Times* and *Post* (Figure 11) and suspected Al Qaeda involvement more often than their print media peers (Table 4). Newspapers commonly framed the attacks within Pakistan-India tensions, while broadcast journalists embraced the "Declaration of War" frame (Table 1) perhaps for its attention-grabbing tone.

By explicitly translating the Mumbai attacks into the U.S. experience, broadcast media made the events more locally relevant and personally enthralling for its viewers. *Fox News's* "America's News Headquarters" broadcast on November 28 exemplifies television reporters' general insistence on placing Mumbai within U.S. discourse. Guest Danny Coulson alerted viewers that the Taj Hotel negotiations resembled what "we saw at Columbine or Virginia Tech." Foreign affairs analyst Mansoor Ijaz connected the attacks to the WOT's great foil, Al Qaeda. "[Mumbai] represents an evolutionary threat in the way that Al Qaeda operates now. They're trying to find a way to economically disrupt what it is that goes on in these big commercial centers in countries where they want to try and strike out." And former CIA operative Wayne Simmons narcissistically believed that the perpetrators had an U.S. audience in mind. "This was Thanksgiving. It was in the West. It was literally served up on a silver platter knowing that Americans in the West would be totally focused on any type of international news like this that took place" (II.B.1.d).

Significance

On December 6, *Fox News's* Jon Scott asked if U.S. media's domestication of the Mumbai attacks had stepped too far. "First lesson in college journalism is take a story and make it local. I guess that's what some of these papers have been doing. But ... did they cross the line?" (II.B.3.a) Scott's question had followed a widely publicized New York City security scare that coincided with the climax of the Taj Hotel siege, during which Scott's own organization had sent a correspondent to help cover the "uncorroborated and unsubstantiated" threat (II.B.1.d). The host read a few newspaper headlines to illustrate his point: "Mumbai attacks refocus U.S. cities' ... 'Daring Mumbai attacks reveal any city's vul-

nerability' ... 'Terrorist in Mumbai should frighten Americans, too' ... Do you think the press took it too far this time or is this apt?" (II.B.3.a).

This questioning of "regionalization" is especially pertinent when considering political violence. The style of media coverage, the conduit through which terrorists communicate to an otherwise largely unaffected citizen body, becomes significant. Aside from immediate consequences such as loss of life, "political violence also carries a message, which is why media coverage is important for those behind it, both as an end in itself and as a means to other ends" (Nossek 2004, 348). All acts of terror convey an idea that in some instances outweigh the actual attack. In scenarios when the aggrieved nation is a democracy whose voting citizens can influence government policy, symbolic impact carries drastic implications.

As Gamson and Modigliani define them, news frames suggest "what is at issue" during a particular event (1989, 3). A particular frame's selection entails strong meaning-making consequences for a mediated public: for example, attitudes about the terrorist act or its cause, support for the home government's security policies, and reactions such as anxiety regarding one's personal safety (Traugott and Brader 2003, 184). Domestication of foreign attacks fosters inaccurate conclusions in news consumers, thus weakening a nation's political efficiency. It also can lead to erroneous responses, as evinced by the New York City security hoax.

Compounding that danger, the U.S. citizen body has grown progressively uninformed about global affairs (McChesney 2002, 99). U.S. journalism's steady withdrawal from foreign coverage and global politics (Carey 2002; McChesney 2002) only exacerbates the situation. Developments within media organizations such as foreign bureau closures and overreliance on newswires often encourage these uniform judgments and stock characterizations (Rosen 2002, 31). Therefore, media must be increasingly cautious about the news frames its stories employ. Their reports carry mounting authority when fewer stories can offset reporting missteps.

November 2008's coverage featured a more inclusive debate platform than September 11; nevertheless, reporters still used 9/11 as a touchstone, suggesting that future breaking coverage of political violence will still be informed by the U.S. tragedy. Yet while a news organization can fix a premature frame, its audience may have already stopped reading the articles or changed the channel. Though the November 2008 attacks may have differed in execution from previous Indian political violence, calling it "India's 9/11" proposes several politically influential connotations that misrepresent reality.

Conclusions and Further Inquiry

Two weeks of Mumbai reportage illustrate that U.S. journalism has not yet escaped the ideological crisis of September 11. The U.S. had felt insulated from foreign attacks — political violence had seemed to only affect war-torn regions such as the Middle East or pre-industrial areas such as Africa. In the midst of declining knowledge of foreign affairs, September 11 likely represented most U.S. citizens' first extended brush with non-domestic terrorism. Its psychological scars reappear

whenever the topic of terrorism is publicly broached.

To capture readers or viewers and make sense of Mumbai's complexity, U.S. reporters generally turned to what they and their audience understood best to immediately frame the attacks. Once extended analysis rendered 9/11 parallels slightly unwieldy, most U.S. journalists continued viewing Mumbai from an ethnocentric perspective. I posit that the "War on Terror" frame has developed into a catch-all explanation for all acts of terror. While it may correctly explicate certain acts of political violence, its universalism and media-substantiated legitimacy fosters injuriously imprecise assumptions about political violence.⁶

In particular, subtle colonialist attitudes might also explain some characteristics of U.S. coverage. In adapting the shootings into the WOT frame, American journalists consciously selected specific representations for the crisis. But reporters only extracted those details that strengthened their nation's role as an international leader. And in contextualizing the attacks, stories frequently substituted Western voices for local sources — perhaps because U.S. media regarded the latter group as insufficient or lacking in "proper" understanding. In essence, reporters ignored those directly affected and exploited the events in order to advance their own country's agenda. After all, Rice's portrayal as arbiter of South Asia increases the prestige of U.S. diplomacy as it challenges the abilities of Mumbai and India authorities.

In conclusion, several questions remain for a comprehensive understanding of the November 2008 attacks and their place within journalistic practices. First, does U.S. media's occasional negativity towards Islam extend to other non-western religions? While Mumbai reports often associated Islam with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war, future researchers ought to investigate general attitudes of the U.S. press towards Hinduism, Sikhism, and other religions of the subcontinent. Further, would Indian-directed political violence towards Pakistan receive a different reporting frame? Just as Handley proved that U.S. media favor Jewish Israelis as victims and decry Muslim Arabs as aggressors (2008), a Western bias favoring Hindus or Indians could manipulate news reports about South Asia and its cross-national or cross-religious rivalry.

Additionally, further work should examine Indian media's portrayal of the attacks. Though U.S. stories regionalized the attacks, Indian sources often supplied the information to U.S. reporters. New Delhi TV footage, for example, informed *Fox News's* first broadcasts of the shootings.⁷ The Indo-Asian News Sources article "Cowardly terrorist attack in Mumbai just like 9/11" ran in both the *Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* on December 2 (IANS 2008a; IANS 2008b). If Indian media described the attacks as "India's 9/11," and Mumbai residents accepted that definition, U.S. reporters may have been less influenced by 9/11 than I suggest.

Future studies might analyze whether U.S. citizens equated the Mumbai attacks with September 11 after exposure to news coverage, and if the public's perceptions evolved with the attacks' frame. Examination would test Entman's conception of the "cultural logic" of 9/11: the Bush-created definition of causes, effects, ethical judgments, and solu-

tions that persisted through subsequent media coverage and directly promoted future public policy and general cultural understandings (2004, 6-7). If that "cultural logic" defined Mumbai reportage and U.S. popular interpretation, then U.S. journalists are guilty of propagating a monolithic understanding of political violence. If the U.S. and its allies are to combat terrorism successfully, their citizen bodies must own a more nuanced conception of political violence.

ENDNOTES

The author thanks Dr. Bastiaan Vanacker, assistant professor at Loyola University Chicago, for his advice and research suggestions. All errors of interpretation are the author's own.

1. All statistics and interpretations of Indian events courtesy of Metcalf and Metcalf's *A Concise History of Modern India* (2006). For a breezy overview of the last 20 years of Indian history and the political context of the Mumbai attacks, refer to pages 265-304 of the text.
2. Partition statistics courtesy of Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989: 129-131). Other scholars have put the figure much higher; however, no absolute statistical agreement exists as far as I am aware. Please regard the cited figures as a minimum estimate.
3. This extremely brief summarization of mass media's growth relies almost exclusively on the work of other scholars. In particular, Hardt (1992) traces the growth of mass media opposite the decline of civic activity; Tuchman (1978, 183) briefly touches upon the increased function of "Newsworkers" in setting society's agenda of interests after WWII; Gerbner (1967) underlines the rise in sheer numbers of readership to illustrate media power's expansion in the 20th century, supporting the earlier assertions of Wirth (1948); and Reese (2001, 14) introduces his paper, as do I, with a demand for greater attention paid to the interests and decision-making behind media interpretations.
4. Schudson (2007, 254), however, maintains that the covered event usually dictates the media frame a reporter selects. The "anarchic" nature of breaking news, according to Schudson, often necessitates this reliance on cultural resources.
5. According to Li and Izard, television and newspaper reports used slightly different reporting frames during September 11. Broadcasters used a disaster frame in 44 percent of their stories versus 23 percent of newspaper stories (2003, 210).
6. Couldry convincingly argues that mass media's superior possession of "symbolic resources" (2001, 162) occasionally creates "hidden injuries," because of media's "overvaluation" by the public in constructing reality (161). I extend Couldry's argument to Mumbai, stipulating that media influentially misrepresented the attacks, subtly and symbolically harming its principal actors.
7. *Fox News* reports II.B.1.a (broadcast on November 26) and II.B.1.b (November 28) "monitored" New Delhi broadcasts for information during its first three days of Mumbai coverage. Therefore, Indian journalists may have shaped some U.S. reporters' immediate frame of the incident.

REFERENCES

- Anker, Elisabeth. 2005. Villains, victims and heroes: Melodrama, media, and September 11. *Journal of Communication* 55, no. 1 (March): 22-37.
- Archetti, Cristina. 2006. Political actors, the media and 9/11: A model of international frame building based on Bourdieu's Theory of Fields. Paper prepared for the panel Law, Power, and Control in the Politics of Insecurity at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA. May.

- BBC. 2006. Pakistan's 'role in Mumbai attacks.' *BBC News*. September 30. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5394686.stm (accessed April 20, 2009).
- . 2009. Delhi 'answers Mumbai questions.' *BBC News*. March 13. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7942444.stm (accessed March 14, 2009).
- Berkowitz, Dan. 2005. Suicide bombers as women warriors: Making news through mythical archetypes. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (Autumn): 607-622.
- Carey, James W. 1992. Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. *Media and Popular Culture*, ed. David Thorburn. New York: Routledge.
- . 2002. American journalism on, before, and after September 11. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 71-90. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.
- Couldry, Nick. 2001. The hidden injuries of media power. *Journal of Consumer Culture* 1, no. 2 (November 2001): 155-177. <http://joc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/2/155> (accessed September 15, 2009).
- Durham, Frank D. 2001. Breaching powerful boundaries: A postmodern critique of framing. In *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*, ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August E. Grant, 123-136. *Lea's Communication Series*, ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillman. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Entman, Robert M. 2003. Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame after 9/11. *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (October-December): 415-432.
- . 2004. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1989. Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach. *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (July): 1-37.
- Gerbner, George. 1967. Mass media and human communication theory. In *Human Communication Theory: Original Essays*, ed. Frank E. X. Dance, 40-60. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
- Ghosh, Amitav. 2008. India's 9/11? Not exactly. *New York Times*. December 2. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/opinion/03ghosh.html> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Gurevitch, Michael, Mark R. Levy, and Itzhak Roeh. 1991. The global newsroom: Convergences and diversities in the globalization of television news. In *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age*, ed. Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, 195-216. London: Routledge.
- Guthrie, Marisa. 2008. Newsy November juices cables news ratings: Financial crisis, presidential transition and Mumbai terrorist attacks help boost ratings. *Broadcasting & Cable*. December 3. http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/160263-Newsy_November_Juices_Cable_News_Ratings.php (accessed March 29, 2009).
- Hackett, Robert A. 1984. Decline of a paradigm? Bias and objectivity in news media studies. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 1, no. 3 (September): 229-259.
- Hafeez, Mateen, and Yogesh Naik. 2008. Blasts in Maharashtra, Gujarat; 8 killed. *Times of India*. September 30. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Blasts-in-Maharashtra-Gujarat-8-killed/articleshow/msid-3542011,curpg-1.cms> (accessed April 22, 2009).
- Handley, Robert L. 2008. Israeli image repair: Recasting the deviant actor to retell the story. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 32, no. 2 (April). <http://jci.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/140> (accessed January 31, 2009).
- Harcup, Tony, and Deirdre O'Neill. 2001. What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited. *Journalism Studies* 2, no. 2 (May): 261-280.
- Hardt, Hanno. 1992. *Critical Communication Studies: Communication, History and Theory in America*. London: Routledge.
- Hutcheson, John, David Domke, Andre Billeaudeau, and Phillip Garland. 2004. U.S. national identity, political elites, and a patriotic press following September 11. *Political Communication* 21, no. 1 (January-March): 27-50.
- Indo-Asian News Services. 2008a. Cowardly terrorist attacks in Mumbai just like 9/11. *Hindustan Times*. December 2. http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?sectionName=indiasectionpage&id=5ff55dc4-59e9-432a-a2a7-3e103ae96479Mumbaiunderattack_Special&Headline='Cowardly+terrorist+attack+in+Mumbai+just+like+9%2f11' (accessed May 4, 2009).
- . 2008b. Cowardly terrorist attacks in Mumbai just like 9/11. *Times of India*. December 2. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/USA/Cowardly_terrorist_attack_in_Mumbai_just_like_911/articleshow/3783217.cms (accessed May 4, 2009).
- Karim, Karim H. 2002. Making sense of the "Islamic peril": Journalism as cultural practice. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 101-116. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.
- King, Erica G., and Mary deYoung. 2008. Imag(in)ing September 11: Ward Churchill, frame contestation, and media hegemony. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 32, no. 2 (April). <http://jci.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/123> (accessed January 31, 2009).
- Kumar, Hari. 2005. India arrests suspected ringleader in New Delhi bombings. *New York Times*. November 14. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/international/asia/14india.html> (accessed April 22, 2009).
- Li, Xigen, and Ralph Izard. 2003. 9/11 attack coverage reveals similarities, differences. *Newspaper Research Journal* 24, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 204-219.
- Lule, Jack. 2002. Myth and terror on the editorial page: The New York Times responds to September 11, 2001. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 79, no. 2 (Summer): 275-293.
- McChesney, Robert W. September 11th and the structural limitations of US journalism. 2002. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 91-100. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.
- McKinley, E. Graham, and Thomas Simonet. 2003. Myth and hegemony in post-Sept. 11 news coverage. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Diego, CA. May.
- Metcalfe, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalfe. 2006. *A Concise History of Modern India*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, M. Mark, and Bonnie Parnell Riechert. 2001. The spiral of opportunity and frame resonance: Mapping the issue cycle in news and public discourse. In *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*, ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August E. Grant, 107-121. *Lea's Communication Series*, ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillman. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Mishra, Smeeta. 2008. Islam and democracy: Comparing post-9/11 representations in the U.S. prestige press in the Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian contexts. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 32, no. 2 (April). <http://jci.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/155> (accessed January 31, 2009).
- Mukherjee, Kritivas. 2008. Militants, commandos fight on in India's Mumbai. *Reuters*. November 27. <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4AP75520081127?pagenumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true> (accessed March 28, 2009).
- Nagar, Na'ama. 2007. Frames that don't spill: The news media and the "War on Terrorism." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL. February 24.
- Norris, Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just. 2003. *Framing terrorism. In Framing Terrorism: the News Media, the Government and the Public*, ed. Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, 3-23. New York: Routledge.

Nossek, Hillel. 2004. Our news and their news: The role of national identity in the coverage of foreign news. *Journalism* 5, no. 3 (August). <http://jou.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/5/3/343> (accessed February 1, 2009).

Nossek, Hillel, and Dan Berkowitz. 2006. Telling “our” story through news of terrorism: Mythical newswork as journalistic practice in crisis. *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 5 (October): 691-707.

Paletz, David L., Peter A. Fozzard, and John Z. Ayanian. 1982. The I.R.A., the Red Brigades, and the F.A.L.N. in the “New York Times.” *Journal of Communication* 32, no. 2: 162-171.

Reese, Stephen D. 2001. Prologue—framing public life: A bridging model for media research. In *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*, ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August E. Grant, 7-31. *Lea’s Communication Series*, ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillman. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Reynolds, Amy, and Brooke Barnett. 2002a. This just in ... How national TV news handled the breaking “live” coverage of September 11 Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Miami, FL. August 6-9.

———. 2002b. CNN’s framing of September 11: Suggesting an appropriate response to terrorism. Paper submitted for the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Diego, CA. October 27.

Robinson, Laura. 2008. The moral accounting of terrorism: Competing interpretations of September 11, 2001. *Qualitative Sociology* 31, no. 3 (September): 271-285.

Rosen, Jay. 2002. September 11 in the mind of American journalism. In *Journalism after September 11th*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 27-35. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

Ruigrok, Nel, and Wouter van Atteveldt. 2007. Global angling with a local angle: How U.S., British, and Dutch newspapers frame global and local terrorist attacks. *Harvard International of Press/Politics* 12, no. 1 (Winter): 68-90.

Schaefer, Todd M. 2003. Framing the US embassy bombings and September 11 attacks in African and US newspapers. In *Framing Terrorism: the News Media, the Government and the Public*, ed. Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, 93-112. New York: Routledge.

Schudson, Michael. 2002. What’s unusual about covering politics as usual. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 36-47. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

———. 2007. The anarchy of events and the anxiety of story telling. *Political Communication* 24, no. 3: 253-257.

Sreberny, Annabelle. 2002. Trauma Talk: Reconfiguring the inside and outside. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 220-234. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

Traugott, Michael W., and Ted Brader. 2003. Explaining 9/11. In *Framing Terrorism: the News Media, the Government and the Public*, ed. Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, 183-201. New York: Routledge.

Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: The Free Press.

Van Dijk, Teun A. 1998. *News Analysis: Case studies of International and National News in the Press*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Volkmer, Ingrid. 2002. Journalism and political crises in the global network society. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 235-246. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

Vujovnic, Marina. 2008. Editor’s introduction. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 32, no. 2 (April). <http://jci.sagepub.com> (accessed January 31, 2009).

Waisbord, Silvio. 2002. Journalism, risk, and patriotism. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 201-219. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

Wirth, Louis. 1948. Consensus and mass communication. *American Sociological Review* 13, no. 1: 1-15.

Zelzer, Barbie, and Stuart Allen. 2002. Introduction. In *Journalism after September 11*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allen, 1-24. *Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran. London: Routledge.

Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. 1989. *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

DATA TABLES

^ Indicates the category could code a story multiple times

Table 1: Primary Frame of Event

	Unprecedented Attack	Provocation for Reprisal	Continuation of Pattern	Investigation Needed	Other
TOTAL	13	9	3	12	11
Print	7	2	3	4	8
Broadcast	6	7	—	8	3
Breaking	7	2	2	2	3
Immediate	3	5	—	3	5
Extended	3	2	1	7	3

Others: *Tragedy* (Four total/Three Print, One Broadcast/Four Breaking) *Within Diplomatic Tensions* (Six total/Five Print, One Broadcast/Four Breaking, Two Extended) *Hint of Things to Come* (One total/One Broadcast/One Extended)

Table 2a: Causation

	Immediate Emphasis	Longitudinal Emphasis	Equal Emphasis	None
TOTAL	9	21	1	17
Print	4	10	—	10
Broadcast	5	11	1	7
Breaking	5	6	1	4
Immediate	4	7	—	5
Extended	—	8	—	8

Table 2b: Specific Causes^

	Immediate Emphasis		Longitudinal Emphasis		
	Poor Response, Security	Terrorist Plan	Feeble Indian State*	Terrorist Infrastructure+	India-Pakistan Rivalry
TOTAL	6	4	9	12	4
Print	2	2	3	4	3
Broadcast	4	2	6	8	1
Breaking	2	4	4	2	2
Immediate	4	—	5	3	1
Extended	—	—	—	7	1

* Includes — Lack of national security, Feeble justice system, Lack / weakness of intelligence apparatus, and Inadequacy of counterterrorism measures
 + Includes — Long-term planning and Training
 Others: *Hindu-Muslim Inevitability* (One total/One Print, One Breaking) *War on Terror* (One total/One Broadcast, One Breaking)

Table 3a: Presence of Motives

	Attributed	Nonexistent
TOTAL	15	33
Print	9	15
Broadcast	6	18
Breaking	12	4
Immediate	3	13
Extended	2	14

Table 3b: **Specific Motives**[^]

	Hindu-Muslim Tensions	Kashmir	Economically Motivated	Send Message/Raise Profile
TOTAL	4	6	6	2
Print	3	4	2	—
Broadcast	1	2	4	2
Breaking	3	4	6	2
Immediate	1	—	—	—
Extended	—	2	—	—

Others: *Jewish-Islam Tensions* (One total/One Print/One Breaking)
US-India Relationship (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)
Attack Democracy (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)
Pakistan-Indian Tensions (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)

Table 4: **Suspicious**[^]

	India/Pakistan						Al Qaeda	Other Terror.	Other	No
	Deccan M.	Mystery	LET/LIT	Pakistan based	India based	Kashmir based				
TOTAL	3	1	30	6	1	1	12	—	1	8
Print	2	1	14	1	—	—	1	—	—	6
Broadcast	1	—	16	5	1	1	11	—	1	2
Breaking	3	1	6	1	1	—	7	—	—	4
Immediate	—	—	12	2	—	1	4	—	1	4
Extended	—	—	12	3	—	—	1	—	—	—

Other: "Saudi Money Trail"

Table 5: **Hierarchy of Victims**

	U.S.	Western	Indian	No Hierarchy	No Victims
TOTAL	19	2	5	9	13
Print	4	2	5	9	4
Broadcast	15	—	—	—	9
Breaking	9	1	1	2	1
Immediate	7	1	1	4	3
Extended	1	—	3	3	9

Table 6: **Sources**

	Official	Nonofficial	U.S./Western	India/Eastern	No Sources
TOTAL	27	18	23	22	3
Print	15	9	9	15	—
Broadcast	12	9	14	7	3
Breaking	8	8	11	5	—
Immediate	9	7	9	7	—
Extended	10	3	3	10	3

Table 7: **Reference to Historical Example**[^]

	Previous Indian Attacks	11-Sep	Other Western Attacks	Non-western Attacks	None
TOTAL	22	6	1	1	22
Print	13	3	—	1	10
Broadcast	9	3	1	1	12
Breaking	8	3	1	2	6
Immediate	9	2	—	—	6
Extended	5	1	—	—	10

Western Attacks: *Columbine High School & Virginia Tech Shootings* (Same story)

Nonwestern Attacks: *Kabul July 2008* (One total/One Print, One Breaking)
Previous Bombings in Pakistan (One total/One Broadcast, One Breaking)

Table 8: **Treatment of Islam**[^]

	Total References	Association*
TOTAL	50	29
Print	22	5
Broadcast	28	24
Breaking	34	23
Immediate	7	2
Extended	9	4

*Includes — Militancy, Terror, Violence, and/or War

DATA CHARTS

Figure 1: **Main Frames**




Figure 2: **"Breaking" Motivations**




Figure 3: "Breaking" Suspicions




Figure 4: Treatment of Islam over Time




Figure 5: Hierarchy of Victims




Figure 6: Source Material over Time




Figure 7: Causation over Time




Figure 8: Named Suspect vs. Named Motive




Figure 9: **Suspicious over Time**




Figure 10: **Sources by Media Type**





Figure 11: **Treatment of Islam by Media Type**



ARTICLE KEY

The New York Times

- I.A.1.a Terror Attacks Kill Scores In India; U.S. Hostages Reported Held At Hotels /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 11.27.08
- I.A.1.b Indian Soldiers Seek Survivors Of Terror Siege /SOMINI SENGUPTA, KEITH BRADSHER / 11.28.08
- I.A.1.c Crisis May Shift Political Landscape /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 11.29.08
- I.A.1.d Brooklyn Couple Missing in Attacks /FERNANDA SANTOS / 11.28.08
- I.A.2.a A Security Chief Quits as India Struggles to Respond to Attacks /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 12.1.2008
- I.A.2.b For the Heroes of Mumbai, Terror Was a Call to Action /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 12.2.2008
- I.A.2.c U.S. and India See Link to Militants in Pakistan /ERIC SCHMITT, SOMINI SENGUPTA, JANE PERLEZ / 12.3.2008
- I.A.2.d U.S. Tries to Ease India-Pakistan Tensions /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 12.4.2008
- I.A.3.a Mumbai Attacks Politicize Long-Isolated Elite /SOMINI SENGUPTA / 12.7.2008
- I.A.3.b Indian Police Arrest 2 in Mumbai Investigation and Look at Cellphone Link / JEREMY KAHN / 12.7.2008
- I.A.3.c Pakistan's Spies aided group tied to Mumbai Siege /ERIC SCHMITT, MARK MAZZETTI, JANE PERLEZ / 12.8.2008
- I.A.3.d Pakistan Raids Group Suspected In Attacks /Jane Perlez, Salman Masood / 12.9.2008

The Washington Post

- I.B.1.a Dozens Die in Mumbai Attacks; Hotels Under Siege; Gunmen Said to Target Americans, Britons /RAMA LAKSHMI / 11.27.2008
- I.B.1.b Indian Commandos Battle Assailants; Attacks in Mumbai Commercial Center Kill at Least 125 /EMILY WAX / 11.28.2008
- I.B.1.c Virginians Slain in Attacks Lived Out Peaceful Ideals /JERRY MARKON, AMY GARDNER, THERESA VARGAS / 11.29.2008
- I.B.1.d Pakistani Militants At Center Of Probe; India, Its Archrival Vow to Cooperate Amid High Tension /CRAIG WHITLOCK, KAREN DEYOUNG / 11.29.2008
- I.B.2.a Cabinet Minister Resigns Amid Anger in India /RAMA LAKSHMI / 12.1.2008
- I.B.2.b Mumbai Mourns Slain Rabbi, Wife; Prayer Service Honors Couple Held Hostage During 3-Day Siege /EMILY WAX / 12.2.2008
- I.B.2.c Group's Leader Recalls Days of Terror; Members of Va. Foundation Were Among 6 Americans Killed in Indian Attacks /THERESA VARGAS / 12.3.2008
- I.B.2.d As Rice Presses Pakistan, Tens of Thousands Take to Streets in /EMILY WAX, RAMA LAKSHMI / 12.4.2008
- I.B.3.a Indian Official Points to Pakistan; Source Says Intelligence Agency Aided Mumbai Terrorists; U.S. Unconvinced /EMILY WAX, RAMA LAKSHMI / 12.6.2008
- I.B.3.b For Mumbai's Children, No Illusion of Safety; Psychologists Cite Trauma, Insecurity In Wake of Attacks /EMILY WAX / 12.7.2008
- I.B.3.c Indian Minister Says Pakistan Is Using Hoax As Distraction /RAMA LAKSHMI / 12.8.2008
- I.B.3.d In Outcry Over Siege, Two Indias Emerge; The Poor, Hit Hard in Past, Question New Level of Protest After Attacks on Affluent /EMILY WAX / 12.9.2008

CNN

- II.A.1.a Dozens Killed After Terrorists Attack in India /ERICA HILL, ANDREW STEVENS, BARBARA STARR, KELLI ARENA, DAVID GERGEN, ZAIN VERJEE, MALLIKA KAPUR, GARY TUCHMAN / 12.26.2008
- II.A.1.b Coverage of Terror in India /WOLF BLITZER, NIC ROBERTSON, SARA SIDNER, DAVID MATTINGLY, KELLI

- ARENA, PETER BERGEN, ED HENRY, TOM FOREMAN, MATTHEW CHANCE, MARY SNOW / 12.28.2008
- II.A.1.c Terror Attacks in India / DON LEMON, SARA SIDEN [sic], MATTHEW CHANCE, TESS EASTMENT, JACKIE LUCAS, JACQUI JERAS / 12.29.2008
- II.A.1.d Nightmare in Mumbai; Barack Obama's National Security Team; Car Salesmen Blues / DON LEMON, T.J. HOLMES, DAN RIVERS, JACQUI JERAS, NIC ROBERTSON, ANDREW STEVENS, ED LAVANDERA, ED HENRY, SUSAN CANDIOTTI / 12.30.2008
- II.A.2.a Inside the Terror Attack; India Ties Terror Plot To Pakistan; General Jones As National Security Adviser; Making "Team of Rivals" Work / WOLF BLITZER, BRIAN TODD, NIC ROBERTSON, JAMIE MCINTYRE, JACK CAFFERTY, DEBORAH FEYERECK, WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JEANNE MESERVE, LOU DOBBS, SAMANTHA HAYES / 12.1.2008
- II.A.2.b Big Three Bailout; The Pakistan Link to Attack on India / ANDERSON COOPER, DANA BASH, JOHN KING, ALI VELSHI, CANDY CROWLEY, NIC ROBERTSON, ERICA HILL, DON LEMON, DAVID GERGEN / 12.2.2008
- II.A.2.c Autoworkers Meet on Proposed Givebacks to Big Three; Mumbai Terrorist Cooperates in Police Investigation; Obama Introduces Bill Richardson as Future Cabinet Member / KYRA PHILLIPS, BROOKE BALDWIN, NIC ROBERTSON, SUZANNE MALVEAUX, JIM ACOSTA, CHAD MYERS, JACQUI JERAS, RICK SANCHEZ, AMANDER OBER / 12.3.2008
- II.A.2.d Jail Time for "The Juice"?; Nanny Saves Two-Year-Old from Terrorists; Where the Jobs Are; Chicago City Takes Center Stage; Detroit's Big Three CEOs Return to Capitol Hill; Pirates Get Lifeline / JOHN ROBERTS, KIRAN CHETRY, JEFFREY TOOBIN, PAULA HANCOCKS, CHRISTINE ROMANS, ALINA CHO, DAVID MCKENZIE, KELLI ARENA, REYNOLDS WOLF, ELIZABETH COHEN / 12.5.2008
- II.A.3.a Obama Picks Gen. Eric Shinseki for Veterans Affairs; Banking Chair Dodd Wants GM CEO to Move On; Auto Industry Experts Answers Viewer Email on Bailout / NAAMUA DELANEY, BILL SCHNEIDER, KATE BOLDUAN, JOSH LEVS, JACQUI JERAS, AMANDA BURDEN, KASEY JOYCE / 12.7.2008
- II.A.3.b Obama Vows Swift Economic Action; Property Taxes Climb Despite Sliding Home Values; Blackwater Guards Expected to Surrender; Oil Delta Warlords in Nigeria; Suspected Terrorist Mastermind Arrested? / JOHN ROBERTS, KIRAN CHETRY, LISA LING, JASON CARROLL, ROBA MARCIANO, SUSAN CANDIOTTI, ATIKA SHUBERT, SUSAN ROESGEN, ELAINE QUIJANO, BARBARA STARR, GERRI WILLIS, NIC ROBERTSON, KELLI ARENA / 12.8.2008
- II.A.3.c Closing in on a Deal for Detroit; Governor Corruption: Who is Blagojevich?; Talk Show Queen Battles the Bulge / HEIDI COLLINS, SUSAN ROESGEN, GERRI WILLIS, JEFFREY TOOBIN, ROB MARCIANO, TED ROWLANDS, SUSAN LISCOVIC, KATHLEEN KOCH, GARY TUCHMAN, ELAINE QUIJANO, ELIZABETH COHEN, ALLAN CHERNOFF / 12.10.2008

- II.A.3.d Republican Roadblocks to Auto Bailout; President-Elect Remains Silent on Blagojevich Scandal; Calling in Gay / HEIDI COLLINS, BRIANNA KEILAR, SUSAN ROESGEN, ROB MARCIANO, ELAINE QUIJANO, ELIZABETH COHEN, POPPY HARLOW, REZA SAYAH, NEIL CONNERY, AMY LESTER / 12.10.2008

Fox News

- II.B.1.a Terrorists Strike India / ALAN COLMES, RICK LOWRY, JAMES ROSEN / 11.26.2008
- II.B.1.b Terror Siege Continues in India / SEAN HANNITY, ALAN COLMES, GREG BURKE, WALID PHARES, MIKE BAKER / 11.28.2008
- II.B.1.c Black Friday; Terror Attacks in India / BRET BAIER, GREG BURKE, DAVID MACDOUGALL, ANITA MCNAUGHT, MIKE EMANUEL, MOLLY HENNEBERG / 11.28.2008
- II.B.1.d India Terror Attacks; Economic Situation / HEATHER NAUERT, REENA NINAN, MOLLY HENNEBERG, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, LAURA INGLE, GREG BURKE, SCOTT HEIDLER / 11.28.2008
- II.B.2.a America's News Headquarters for December 1, 2008 / BILL HEMMER, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, RICH EDSON, ELIZABETH MACDONALD, HOWARD WOLFSON, GREG BURKE, DAN SENOR, MIKE EMANUEL, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, RICK LEVENTHAL, DOUGLAS KENNEDY, LANNY DAVIS / 12.1.2008
- II.B.2.b Political Headlines / BRET BAIER, CARL CAMERON, MAJOR GARRETT, WENDELL GOLER, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, REENA NINAN, MARIANNE SILBER, BRIAN WILSON / 12.2.2008
- II.B.2.c America's News Headquarters for December 3, 2008 / BILL HEMMER, GREG BURKE, SCOTT HEIDLER, WENDELL GOLER, RICH EDSON, TRACY BYRNES, CHERYLE CASONE, PHIL KEATING, JONATHON MORRIS, DOUGLAS KENNEDY / 12.3.2008
- II.B.2.d America's News Headquarters for December 4, 2008 / BILL HEMMER, RICH EDSON, JEFF FLOCK, ANDREW NAPOLITANO, PETER BARNES, ALEXIS GLICK, SCOTT HEIDLER, DOUGLAS KENNEDY / 12.4.2008
- II.B.3.a Fox News Watch for December 6, 2008 / JON SCOTT, JIM PINKERTON, JANE HALL, ROBERT GEORGE, JUDITH MILLER / 12.6.2008
- II.B.3.b Political Headlines / BRIT HUME, CARL CAMERON, JAMES ROSEN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, SHANNON BREAM, STEVE HARRIGAN, CORINA SONN, CLAUDIA COWAN / 12.8.2008
- II.B.3.c Jesse Jackson Jr. Claims Innocence; Blagojevich Still Has Power to Appoint New Senator; The Safety of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons; Increase of Squatters in Foreclosed Properties / HEATHER NAUERT, MAJOR GARRETT, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, PHIL KEATING / 12.10.2008
- II.B.3.d Political Headlines / BRIT HUME, CARL CAMERON, JIM ANGLE, MAJOR GARRETT, BRET BAIER, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, DAVID LEE MILLER / 12.10.2008

Kevin Mack will graduate with B.A.s in History and Journalism from Loyola University Chicago in May 2010. His research interests include the influence of mass media on the construction of historical narrative.

APPENDIX: CODING SHEET

Coding Sheet

Story ID _____ **Publication** _____ **Date** _____

Primary Frame of Event

Unprecedented Attack	Provocation for Reprisal	Continuation of Pattern	Investigation Needed	Other

Causation

Immediate Emphasis	Longitudinal Emphasis	Equal Emphasis	None

Motives

Attributed	Nonexistent

Suspicious

India/Pakistan	Al Qaeda	Western	Other	None

Hierarchy of Victims

U.S. Residents	Other Westerners	Indians	Other Cultural Groups	No Victim Hierarchy	No Victims Mentioned

Sources: Geography/Status

U.S./Western	India/Eastern	*No Sources*	Official	Nonofficial

Reference to Historical Example

Previous Indian Attacks	9/11	Other Western Attacks	Nonwestern Attacks	None

Treatment of Islam

Total Number of References	Association with "War," "Terror," "Violence"