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Introduction

Welcome to a special issue of *Asia Pacific: Perspectives*, devoted to analysis of media coverage of the terror attacks on Mumbai (Bombay), India in November 2008. The three days of attacks began on November 26th and targeted ten key locations across Mumbai, including the main railway station, two luxury hotels, a religious center, and sites popular with tourists and business people. At least 175 people, including 26 foreign nationals and nine attackers from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba group, were killed by the time Indian forces ended the siege.

One year is an insufficient time to fully comprehend the consequences of and causes for such a violent and horrific event, yet the analysis provided here contributes to understanding on a number of levels.   Both authors, Mr. **Kevin Mack** and Professor **Vamsee Juluri**, direct our attention first to the ways in which media organizations from India and the U.S. reported on and interpreted the attacks. Through the authors' discussion of complex and historically-situated frames employed by both broadcast and print media, readers will also gain insight about the reasons for the attacks and the biases employed in media reporting. Mack's article draws upon comparative data drawn from a variety of U.S. media organizations while Juluri's commentary (published originally in the Huffington Post and used here by permission) and interview constructs an overview for the attacks that positions them within regional and international geopolitical contexts.

We are also fortunate to be able to publish here two graphic works by **Shalinee Kumari**, a young artist from the Indian state of Bihar. Displayed as part of an exhibition of her work at the Frey-Norris Gallery in San Francisco in 2008, the images represent some of the strong emotional and visual themes that were part of the attacks and their aftermath.

Through this special issue and the topics it raises, we hope readers will again consider the role of the media in shaping public perceptions of violent conflict, whether between nations, ethnic groups, or religious organizations. There is always more than meets the eye in these situations, and so an understanding of complex socio-cultural, historical, and ethnic factors seems to be the starting point for assessing issues that have been activated through political violence directed against innocent people. If we are to learn anything from the first violent decade of the 21st century, surely it is that we must do better at addressing and solving the root problems leading self-righteous individuals to injure and kill their fellow human beings.

John Nelson, Co-Editor

Grounding Terrorism on Ground Zero: How 9/11 Informs U.S. Press Coverage of Political Violence

By Kevin Mack

Abstract

This study analyzes the breaking news coverage of the United States press during the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Previously, scholars such as Robert Entman and Elisabeth Anker found that U.S. media melodramatically framed the September 11, 2001 attacks and constructed a "War on Terror" ideology. Working from that theoretical perspective, the author posits this ideology influenced U.S. reporters and their style of reportage about the Mumbai attacks, as did breaking news characteristics and general patterns within journalism, such as regionalization. Research findings suggest that U.S. media localized the Mumbai attacks by borrowing concepts from September 11 and the "War on Terror" frame. U.S. newspaper stories and broadcast reports produced uniform analyses through repetition of precedents such as association of Islam with violence and overreliance on U.S./Western official sources.

Introduction

On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 United States civilians died when two hijacked airplanes slammed into New York City's Twin Towers. These attacks rattled U.S. society and standard journalistic practices. According to Zelzer and Allen, news organizations lacked a readymade narrative for September 11, which transformed "the everyday contexts within which many journalists routinely operate" (2002, 1). This study asks whether aftershocks from those traumatic events still reverberate in reportage of political violence. If 9/11 symbolizes "a critical cultural shift in the predominant *news frame* used by American mass media [italics in original]" (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3-4), would coverage of future political violence employ a similar frame, thereby compromising accuracy and depth?

During November 26-29, 2008, heavily armed gunmen killed more than 170 civilians and security personnel in several locations in Mumbai, India. Like New York City, Mumbai occupies an important financial position in its country (Mukherjee 2008). Similar to 9/11, an Islamic group trained and financed the militants (BBC 2009) who attacked a predominantly non-Islamic metropolitan area. And in terms of bloodshed and sorrow, Mumbai certainly provoked an emotional reaction analogous to Ground Zero. But three major considerations muddy straightforward Mumbai-9/11 comparisons: religious strife in India, proximate national rivalry between India and Pakistan, and a recent history of political violence affecting the region.

Hindu-Muslim friction pervades India's history after its independence from Britain. Unfortunately, hostilities have not declined the last two decades. In 1992, Hindu militants destroyed the sixteenth-century Babri mosque in Ayodhya and provoked an anti-Muslim pogrom that left more than 2,000 dead. Ten years later, extremist Hindu nationalism resurfaced in Gujarat state after a railroad carriage fire in Godhra. The incidents claimed 1,000 lives, forced 150,000 Indians into relief camps, and featured atrocities on both sides: a Muslim mob originally attacked the train bearing Hindutva supporters, and the Hindu retaliation persisted for weeks and included many Muslims who were unconnected to the original incident. The Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist organization, dominated Indian national politics through 2004 and illustrates the entrenched difficulties of maintaining a secular constitution.[1] The history of the United States, on the other hand, fortunately lacks religious turmoil on such a terrible level.

Unlike New York City, neighborly political rivalry informs Indian and Mumbai's society. Thus, Pakistan's admission that Mumbai's attackers trained within its borders complicates depictions of the incident (BBC 2009). India, largely Hindu, and Pakistan, vastly Muslim, went to war three times last century. 1947's Partition of the two nations, remembered for its "climate of fear and hate" and "orgies of physical violence," instigated communal violence and mass migrations on the scale of 600,000 deaths and the displacement of 14 million people (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, 129-130).[2] The disputed territory of Kashmir remains an issue "of virtual civil war" on the subcontinent, intensified by an insurgency covertly funded by some Pakistanis and roughly 30,000 deaths since 1989 (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006, 267).

Finally, violence and terror have occurred much more frequently against Indians than Americans, particularly during the last five years. On October 29, 2005, three synchronized explosions in crowded New Delhi marketplaces killed 60 celebrants of Diwalhi (Kumar 2005). One year later, seven coordinated bombings on Mumbai trains killed 186 commuters. Mumbai police believed Pakistani militants planned and coordinated those attacks (BBC 2006). Two crude bombs in Malegaon, another city in Western India, killed seven innocents and injured 30 others just months prior to Mumbai's November 2008 shootings. The Malegaon bombings had followed four bomb blasts to the city in 2006 that had left 31 dead and 300 others injured (Hafeez and Naik, 2008). In comparison, 9/11 marked the first foreign-led attack on U.S. soil in recent history.

Following those considerations, the attacks in Mumbai reflect an unfortunate pattern of violence in India rather than a 9/11-esque "critical cultural shift" (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3). But, as Ghosh noted, many U.S. media pundits ignored those distinctions and referred to the Mumbai attacks as "India's 9/11," thereby obscuring India's political and social complexities (2008). Let us now investigate that claim, and determine whether an imprecise 9/11 mischaracterization actually defined U.S. coverage of November 2008.

Mass Communication and Media Framing

Over the last 100 years, mass media's importance increased as local communities' influence waned. Civic engagement declined in the twentieth century, while the role of journalists expanded to define a society's collective interests and

concerns. Because the contemporary press can reach a greater number of people, media's growth engendered a social force that Wirth had defined by 1948 as being of "incalculable magnitude" (12). Thus, it becomes even more incumbent for scholars to analyze the principles behind media discourse.[3] Mass media possess the symbolic power of "speaking for us all" (Couldry 2001, 157), granting news organizations a powerful capacity to subtly define collective reality. International news coverage must be examined with an especially critical eye, because geographically distant or culturally different issues enhance the meaning-making role of the press (Mishra 2008, 156).

"News is a window to the world," and through its framing Americans learn about their institutions, leaders, and other nations (Tuchman 1978, 1) or understand an object or event's social meaning (Goffman 1974). Assumptions of social, political, and media organizations underlie frames, which Entman argues, "*selec[t] and highligh[t] some facets of events or issues, and mak[e] connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution* [italics in original]" (2004, 5). Other scholars add that frames actively generate information while screening alternative interpretations (Reese 2001, 13).

Reporters frame events to fit a particular viewpoint and to represent already-shared beliefs rather than communicate new information (Carey 1992; Harcup and O'Neill 2001; Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). Although objectivity founds their profession, journalists must learn early in their careers to polarize issues and define their parameters (Hackett 1984), thus establishing a "frame trap" through arrangement of information in a particular manner to produce predictable results (Goffman 1974, 680).

Adopting a 9/11 Frame

With President Bush's speech on September 12, 2001, the Administration framed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush and government officials consistently voiced the terms "evil" and "war" to portray the attacks melodramatically (Anker 2005), illustrated by Bush's use of the former word five times and latter word twelve times during the 2002 State of the Union Address (Entman 2004, 1). Terrorist enemies were unilaterally evil according to the president: crazy, undemocratic, anti-capitalist, and secretive — in essence, a dark foil to an enlightened nation suffering precisely for its superior virtue (Anker 2005; Entman 2003). Though this characterization invokes a strong and immediate aggressive reaction, it also imprecisely describes who or what the U.S. ought to attack.

Out of other possible solutions, U.S. media framed "preemptive strike" as the only logical remedy for September 11 (Archetti 2006, 3). By utilizing a war metaphor, Kathleen Jamieson argues that Bush's definition of 9/11 blocked "alternative language" and other viable responses, such as justice in an international court. Over time, the president's classification pigeonholed discussion. The "'War on Terror' [became] a naturalized, assumed way to describe [the situation]," Hall says. "People don't ask: 'What's the [meaning of 9/11]? What are the implications of using this and not some other vocabulary?'" (*On The Media*, NPR, March 27, 2009). The

frame quietly undercut other responses to 9/11 and fostered homogeneous characterizations of terrorists that dominated discussions of political violence.

A majority of newspapers and other U.S. media obediently adopted the Administration's conclusion, agreeing that 9/11 represented an "Attack on America" (Karim 2002; McKinley and Simonet 2003). By reiterating Bush's stance, the U.S. mainstream press consciously framed the attacks as a declaration of war — a far different decision than that reached in coverage of other terrorist acts (Schaeffer 2002). Eventually, this "War on Terror" (WOT) frame encompassed a global conflict that demanded more than a direct strike at 9/11's alleged perpetrators. The WOT divided the world into good and evil sides, beckoning all freedom-loving nations to relentlessly battle terrorists wherever they may be found (Archetti 2006).

September 11 allowed U.S. social and political leaders to redefine the international worldview of their constituents. As Entman demonstrates, Bush and other government officials effectively defined the causes, effects, solutions, and morality of 9/11 (2004). Most politicians, military leaders, and non-government elites publicly accepted the Bush frame during the following months (King and deYoung 2008, 125) and portrayed the Middle East as a land of violence and fear (Karim 2002). The WOT entered the everyday lexicon of citizens and policymakers, a phenomenon that carried forth "the dominant social order and the values it supports" (Berkowitz 2005, 617). As Schudson observes, "we" and "us" repeatedly turned up in September 11 accounts (2002, 43), and Sreberny found subsequent reportage of political violence more emotionally charged (2002).

9/11 comparisons continue to tinge accounts of political violence. Researchers observe that after a dominant frame's acceptance, succeeding narratives generally fit within that frame's discursive bounds (Berkowitz 2005; Entman 2004; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003) and alternative interpretations are difficult to articulate (Karim 2002). Vujovnic argues that U.S. media failed to construct a "platform for open discussion" after 9/11 (2008). Its legacy still impresses contemporary news reports — four years after 9/11, for instance, the U.S. press associated the London public transit bombings with American patriotism because the attacks "fit well in the framework of the war on terror" (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007, 84).

Regionalization and Cultural Narratives

Despite trends towards global communication, media members still cover events from a local angle within "existing frameworks of nationhood" (Nossek 2004, 364). Post-9/11, "domestic contexts [are] being used to integrate global events in more and more local discourses," a process Volkmer names "regionalization" (2002, 239). When framing an event as locally relevant, reporters put on "domestic glasses" that subordinate professional norms to national identification or morale (Nossek 2004). For example, Schaeffer found that both American and African newspapers, when reporting on domestic or international terrorism, "were ethnocentric in putting their own concerns and structural frames first and not challenging what they already thought about the other" (2003, 110).

Journalists resort to local narratives or frameworks to make events more domestically significant as well (Gurevitch, Levy, and Roeh 1991, 207), especially when reporting on the relatively unknown (Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). Reporters rely upon familiar frames, scripts, and stock characterizations to narrate and evaluate events, using cultural archetypes to distill or reiterate meaning (Berkowitz 2005; Entman 2004; Nossek and Berkowitz 2006). To make their job easier, journalists place atypical events within recognizable scripts or behavioral models (van Dijk 1988) and draw upon "available cultural resources" to quickly make sense of anarchic happenings.[4] If new facts threaten the conventional account, reporters often construct meaning to restore the traditional interpretation (Handley 2008).

Coverage of Islam epitomizes regional media narratives. U.S. news that references the religion is most often negative, typically associating Islam with violence (Mishra 2008; Karim 2002) or labeling terrorists as Muslim (Nagar 2007). Reports largely fail to illustrate a nuanced picture of the religion and its adherents, preferring polarization and simplicity in description (Karim 2002). As Muslims received greater media attention post-9/11, the WOT frame strengthened those misconceptions by generally representing Muslims as the enemy or connecting them to terrorist organizations (Mishra 2008; Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007). Interestingly, terrorism's connection to Islam frequently surfaces in reports, while detailed analyses of terror's causes remain an exception (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007, 73).

September 11 stories initially used previous attacks for orientation or as models for violence and terror (Entman 2004; Schaeffer 2003). Yet once 9/11 assumed its position as an historical breaking point — the moment the world decided whether it was either "with us or against us" (Archetti 2006, 18) — the tragedy created a shift in how U.S. mass media regard terrorism (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Robinson 2008). Editorials and reports tinged by an increased sense of "American-ness" (Hutcheson et al. 2004) decried the U.S.'s loss of innocence and bemoaned a foreboding future (Lule 2002). 9/11 became the U.S.'s barometer for other acts of political violence.

This inclination towards "regionalization" leads to reporting inaccuracies and one-sided, nationalistic stereotypes of other nations. A repeat of regional coverage during the Mumbai attacks would create a flawed portrayal of the shootings and suggest political and social considerations not relevant or even existent in India. To place the November 2008 attacks within U.S. discursive contexts risks unwieldy 9/11 comparisons and false pro-U.S. conclusions, yet previous scholarship suggests its possibility during foreign situations. Regionalist rhetoric increasingly saturates news coverage when reporters strive to make sense of unrecognizable events or make their subjects more salient domestically.

Breaking News Coverage, Simplification, and Reliance on Official Sources

Certain qualities of breaking news coverage often combine to produce unsophisticated frames and one-sided judgments. Journalists rarely review all relevant facts before filing stories, especially in situations of disorder or hurry (Entman 2004). During the quickened, incipient moments of categorization, journalists restructure their environment around speed (Reynolds and Barnett 2002a) and give short-shrift to deeper considerations, such as motives, goals, or related issues (Entman 2004; Traugott and Brader 2003). CNN's breaking news coverage of 9/11, for example, narrowly classified the attacks as an act of war necessitating "immediate military retaliation" (Reynolds and Barnett 2002b, 25).

Additionally, reporters generally use a prototypical frame or characterization to make fast-moving events manageable, particularly in cases of terrorism (Berkowitz 2005). Faced with chaos, news by simplification provides "comforting solutions to a complex world" (McKinley and Simonet 2003, 4). The melodramatic style, employed by most U.S. news programming, clumsily defined 9/11's actors as either villains or heroes (Anker 2005). Despite September 11's great amount of coverage, most reports, including those of the *New York Times*, did not articulate possible motives for the attacks or their deeper roots (Archetti 2006; Traugott and Brader 2003). A lack of attention, or even concern, for underlying factors produces superficial news accounts.

Because repeatedly citing a specific group promotes its "particular issue definition" (Miller and Riechert 2001, 112), mainstream media often produce one-dimensional, uniform judgments. Along with national identities and interests, official sources shape coverage and media agenda during political crises and constrain journalists' attempts at in-depth analysis (Nagar 2007, 3). Citations consistently reinforce the same conclusions — during 9/11, for example, Li and Izard found that newspapers and broadcasters predominantly cited official sources (2003). More often than not, these sources focused on "security matters" (Karim 2002, 105). In subsequent breaking coverage of terrorism, political or military leaders often support their nation's policy or underline their government's strength (Hutcheson et al. 2004). Indeed, Ruigrok and van Atteveldt write that "selective choice of sources" reinforced the WOT frame (2007, 74).

Breaking news coverage and reliance on official sources exaggerate regionalization and several of its negative tendencies, such as one-sided concern and unrefined illustration of events. Faced with deadlines, journalists often turn to what they already know in order to alleviate "the anxiety of storytelling" — identifying and producing a story in a short amount of time in order to captivate a profitably-sized audience (Schudson 2007). These two broad patterns, if present during November 2008, would engender standardized, superficial coverage of Mumbai.

Research Questions and Methodology

The 9/11 frame's prevalence and media tendencies during breaking coverage suggest that reporting inaccuracies, nationalistic assumptions about political violence and terrorists, and oversimplification of the attacks' foreign context characterized November 2008 coverage. Based upon that theoretical framework, this paper proposes that "regionalization" (as Volkmer defines it, 2002) and breaking news characteristics (such as shallow analysis and overreliance on official

sources) persisted during coverage of the November 2008 attacks. I hypothesize, first, that the U.S. press initially used a 9/11 frame to make sense of the Mumbai violence, ignoring distinctions between the two tragedies and encouraging imprecise connections between the two different events. Second, this initial frame for the attacks in Mumbai dominated later reports despite additional time for analysis and deliberation, repeating the stubbornness of early impressions which typified 9/11 follow-up coverage. As a research question, I wish to compare broadcast and newspaper reports to explore if television journalists echoed September 11 more readily than their print media peers.[5] The study uses content analysis of four well-known media sources. For print media, I selected the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* because each publication sets reporting standards for their field and strongly influences the frames and agendas of other news outlets (Handley 2008, 145). For broadcast media, *CNN* and *Fox News* were selected because the stations rated as the top two cables news networks in November 2008 (Guthrie 2008).

A Lexis/Nexis search of texts which mention "Mumbai" within 25 words of "attack" culled 437 total stories that were published between November 26 and December 10, 2008. From this total, the study used a random sample of 48 articles and transcripts, of which commentaries, op-eds, editorials, non-fact based reports, and internet-only publications were replaced by standard news reports. Twelve reports represented each media organization. To test change over the analyzed two weeks, those stories were divided equally into three time periods: "Breaking" coverage during the attacks, from November 26 to November 30; "Immediate" coverage from December 1 to December 5, allowing for crude analyses of the attacks; and "Extended" coverage from December 6 to December 10, allowing for roughly one week of analysis. Additionally, the study divided its entire 48 story sample into two equal groups of media type, print and broadcast, in order to answer its research question.

I coded each sample story according to eight categories to reveal possible regionalization or simplification (See Appendix for Coding Sheet.) The first, "Primary Frame of the Event," noted the first or most apparent characterization of the attacks in each story: either an unprecedented attack, provocation for immediate reprisal, continuation of pattern, or event necessitating further investigation rather than counterattack. I specifically noted any other frames. Findings would illustrate U.S. journalists' first perception of the shootings and reveal any borrowed analysis from September 11 or other U.S.-specific considerations.

The second category, "Causation," asked how articles and broadcasts explained the tragedy's roots. Did a report stress that immediate causes, such as a security breach, or longitudinal causes, such as a weak infrastructure, enabled the attacks? Or were causes equally considered or not broached at all? I noted every causal possibility present in the articles. If results skewed heavily towards short-term causation, reporters likely eschewed analysis of long-term origins for the event's immediate ramifications, similar to 9/11's coverage. Such findings would also underline breaking news' tendency to disregard complicated, long-term roots of crises.

Third, the "Motives" category sought attributions of political/social motives to the terrorists' actions. The study recorded every possible intention expressed in media coverage. If findings leaned towards little or no attribution, thus continuing the September 11 precedent, the U.S. press unfairly represented the perpetrators in the court of public opinion.

Fourth, "Suspicions," specifically marked the terrorist groups that reporters attached blame. I developed a coding system that noted every referenced group in a story: India/Pakistan terrorist based organizations, Al Qaeda, other terror organizations, and other political/social organizations. If no culprits drew mention, I marked "NO." If results generally cited 9/11's suspects, U.S. media probably turned to the September 11 frame during breaking coverage.

To identify an understated "Hierarchy of Victims," the fifth category, I identified the victim group to whom each story devoted the most coverage: U.S. residents, other Westerners, Indians, or other cultural groups. My analysis also documented stories that mentioned no victims and those which gave no stress to victims' nationality. If U.S. or Western victims received the greatest attention, U.S. media disproportionately represented the scope and nature of Mumbai's losses and regionalized the attacks.

Sixth, the study noted each story's "Sources" based on two considerations: nationality (U.S./Western vs. Indian/Eastern) and status (governmental, bureaucratic, or sanctioned expert vs. non-official). Coding registered the most prevalent source type. According to my review of breaking news coverage, nationalistic considerations likely garnered the highest media attention if U.S. reporters quoted Western and official sources most frequently. Unfortunately, as Nagar argues (2007), such sourcing compromises distanced, holistically accurate coverage.

For "References to Historical Example," I counted allusions to previous attacks within India, 9/11, other previous attacks on Western countries, and any other previous attacks elsewhere in the world. Some samples referenced "none" while others referenced numerous examples from history. Coverage primarily noting U.S. or Western examples would facilitate regional framing and highlight breaking news' tendency to rely upon traditional, domestic narratives.

The eighth and final category, "Treatment of Islam," noted each time the words "Islam" or "Muslim" surfaced in reports and counted the number of those usages that associated Islam with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war. This category tests the persistence of regional media narrative as typified by the traditional characterization of Muslims-as-aggressor.

To discover if the attacks' initial frame dominated later coverage, I looked for categorical data change through the three time periods "Breaking," "Immediate," and "Extended." Deviations between the three phases would illustrate that U.S. media coverage evolved after its initial perspective(s). To answer the research question, I divided print and broadcast stories and compared their data.

Findings

Results strongly supported the first hypothesis. Faced with chaos, U.S. reporters initially framed the Mumbai attacks

in ways similar to 9/11. During "Breaking" coverage, journalists largely framed the attacks as unprecedented in Indian history (Figure 1: *Note that all Figures and Tables follow the Endnotes and References.*) Usage of the "Unprecedented Attack" and "Provocation for Reprisal" frames outnumbered all other media frames through the first five days of coverage.

American journalists suspected that Mumbai's culprits attacked for the same reasons that animated September 11's perpetrators. With the exception of Kashmir, during "Breaking" coverage reporters attributed the same impulses to Mumbai's perpetrators—economic devastation, desire for publicity, and Muslim aggression (Figure 2)—as had allegedly motivated 9/11 attackers (Traugott and Brader 2003). September 11 informed U.S. reporters' suspicions as well. Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization believed to have orchestrated the September 11 attacks, registered as the most likely culprit among the four media organizations through the first five days of coverage (Figure 3).

"Breaking" reportage also displayed clear characteristics of "regionalization." Initial coverage overwhelmingly emphasized U.S. or Western victims (Figure 5). For orientation, U.S. media largely favored American or Western sources to grant familiar perspectives to their accounts (Figure 6). This prioritization of U.S. victimization and sources helped strengthen September 11 parallels and localize the geographically and culturally distant tragedy. Additionally, references to Islam or Muslims underlined the 9/11 connection. "Breaking" reports mentioned the religion most frequently and most consistently associated its adherents with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war (Figure 4).

Though 9/11 comparisons typified "Breaking" coverage, however, this initial framing did not define later reports. Rather, news organizations progressively offered more in-depth coverage that stressed the long-term causes and implications of Mumbai, thereby disproving the second hypothesis. Allusion to September 11 as an historical precedent gradually dropped through the three data periods (Table 7). Further, the U.S. press eventually corrected their suspicions, overwhelmingly blaming an unnamed Pakistani group or specifically charging Lashkar-e-Taiba/Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET) for the attacks (Figure 9). The Pakistan-based LET remains the primary suspect of investigators months later (*BBC* 2009). Yet while LET is an extreme Islamic-inspired organization, references to the religion dropped dramatically through the two weeks of coverage along with its association with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war. Whereas "Breaking" reports made the connection in 68 percent of total references to Islam, stories published during "Extended" coverage connected Muslims to those pejorative concepts in 44 percent of overall mentions (Figure 4).

As the dominant frame of Mumbai evolved from "Unprecedented" to "Investigation Needed" (Figure 1), U.S. media distanced its coverage from a 9/11 perspective in other, more subtle ways. Accounts balanced their portrayals of the tragic losses in Mumbai by favoring Western casualties less frequently (Figure 5). Reporters weaned themselves from U.S./Western sources (Figure 6), consequently giving their stories a less immediate regional spin. After substantially

reporting on immediate explanations for the Mumbai attacks, such as the attackers' intricate plan or the poor Mumbai security/response, during the first ten days of coverage, the U.S. press turned to long-term causal analysis during "Extended" coverage (Figure 7). U.S. media increasingly gave little attention to short term failings, as they had done during 9/11's breaking coverage, and analyzed the deeply rooted imperfections and conflicts within the Indian state.

For the research question, findings indicate that broadcast journalists evince both "regionalization" and breaking news characteristics more habitually than print reporters. Broadcast reports emphasized U.S. casualties (Figure 5) and relied on U.S./Western sources (Figure 10) more than print stories. While both media types referenced Islam extensively, *CNN* and *Fox News* associated Muslims with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war far more readily than the *Times* and *Post* (Figure 11). Continuing this pattern of stock characterization and narrative, broadcast media generally attributed motives to Mumbai's perpetrators that smacked of U.S. interpretation, such as economics or a desire to raise the group's international profile. On the other hand, many print reporters pointed to subcontinental-specific motives such as Kashmir and Hindu-Muslim tensions (Table 3b), granting their accounts a more accurate contextualization. Further, a majority of newspapers framed the attacks within Pakistan-India tensions more regularly than *CNN* and *Fox News*, who comparatively favored the 9/11-esque "Declaration of War" or "Provocation for Reprisal" frame (Table 1).

9/11 Narratives as a Response to the Mumbai Attacks

Reflecting Waisbord's assertion that "journalism resorted to standard formulas and stock-in-trade themes to cover risk after September 11" (2002, 201), U.S. reporters reacted with a 9/11 narrative when faced with attacks on a commercial and cultural center. September 11 remains a touchstone of U.S. journalistic practice and a "critical cultural shift" that informs mass society (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 3-4). Only three stories framed the attacks as an example of India's unfortunate legacy of terrorism (Table 1), perhaps because that explanation did not agree with the U.S. experience of political violence. "All we can say now is this is the worst, most brazen, audacious attacks [sic] in Indian history," as the *Post* quoted a police official. "It's a violent situation that's still ongoing. Mumbai remains at war" (Article I.B.1.b: *Note that Article Key follows Tables and Figures*.) Stories generally favored sources that elicited similarly blatant evocations of September 11.

Likewise, a former resident of Mumbai told the *Post* two days after the attacks, "We can't believe that this has happened in a place that we thought was so safe" (I.B.2.b). Without questioning this source's genuineness, such statements mischaracterize India and Mumbai's history with political violence. Mumbai is not relatively "so safe" when compared to the *Post*'s own country, and the quote's lack of substantiation within the article reflects journalists' tendency to not review or report all the facts during breaking news coverage (Entman 2004). Journalists predetermined the Mumbai attacks to be unprecedented in scale, occurrence, and consequences,

thereby supporting Entman's observation that journalists use a script for certain events (2004) and Berkowitz's argument that news reports are often "quickly transposed onto a story framework known in advance" (2005, 608). Though the 9/11 frame faded through the two weeks of studied media content, however, its perspective did not entirely vanish from Mumbai reportage. The "Provocation for Reprisal" frame, the gut-check reaction of Bush-influenced 9/11 journalists (Archetti 2006), paced "Immediate" coverage even as the "Unprec-edented" frame declined (Figure 1). "This time the response will be very serious," India's deputy foreign minister told the *Post*, underscoring the article's general subordination of previous Indian political violence (I.B.2.a). Reporters expected (and indirectly encouraged) a similar reaction to what September 11 inspired seven years before.

November 2008's reports also featured stereotypical char-acterizations of Mumbai's principal actors. Islam's frequent association with violence suggests that U.S. journalists still base their initial coverage on the myth of "Islamic Peril" — Muslim aggression and violence (Karim 2002). U.S. media's portrayals of Mumbai residents during the attacks recalled the standard personas that filled 9/11's storyline. The *Times* profiled "Mumbai's new heroes" — individuals who had "perform[ed] acts of heroism that were not part of their job descriptions" (I.A.2.b) — recalling September 11's celebration of firefighters, police officers and other emergency workers (Lule 2002). In a December 7 piece, the *Post* reported that "im-ages of the Mumbai siege will be imprinted on the memory" of India's children. "As with the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States … [the November attacks will be] a traumatic backdrop that probably will shape their attitudes for years" (I.B.3.b). In these examples, reporters overlooked the specifici-ties and distinctions between Mumbai and 9/11 in order to construct the traditional terrorist story.

The "War on Terror"

It is imperative to distinguish between the WOT media perspective as a "framing process" rather than a "clearly defined fixed frame" (Archetti 2006, 29). Because frames are always in the process of gaining or losing value (Reese 2003), Mumbai's characterization evolved and took on different meanings during the two weeks of coverage and analysis.

Though U.S. reporters' initial frame of Mumbai as a 9/11 replica faded, U.S. media eventually adapted the Mumbai attacks into the WOT global battle of good and evil. This development mirrors the WOT's own development from a retributive strike against Al Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 into a worldwide conflict encompassing all terrorist fronts (Ar-chetti 2006; Entman 2004). As noted earlier, coverage eventu-ally turned to long-term causational analysis (Figure 7) and framed the Mumbai attacks as events necessitating further investigation (Figure 1). Yet U.S. official sources, used most prominently during the final five days of analyzed coverage (Figure 6), described those causes and investigations in rela-tion to U.S. diplomatic and WOT interests.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, set the media agenda of Al Qaeda suspicion and immediate retributive strike against the attackers (I.A.2.a; I.A.2.d; I.B.2.d;

II.B.2.c), thereby illustrating Nagar's expectation that official sources will shape news coverage "in the case of the war on terrorism" (2007, 3). "Pakistan has a responsibility to act," the *Times* quoted Rice, underlining U.S. officials' intent to broaden the implications of the Mumbai attacks towards U.S. policy considerations (I.A.3.c). Peter Brooks, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, framed the Mumbai investiga-tion within the WOT to *Fox News*: "We'd really like to get our hands on that sort of intelligence that could lead us to Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden, or the head of the Taliban … you know, clever investigators could get us information that could be very helpful in the War on Terror" (II.B.3.d).

U.S. media generally trusted that its own country ought to spearhead the Mumbai investigation as it did the WOT, and depicted the U.S. as the unquestionably preeminent na-tion that responded to the attacks. Coverage underlines the observation that the U.S. derives its identity from its per-ceived "uniqueness" and position as "military, economic, and cultural 'super-power'" (Hutcheson et al 2004, 29). Like the WOT ranked other countries behind the "U.S. superpower" (Archetti 2006, 9), Mumbai coverage stressed the leadership of U.S. officials. The *Times* reported that the attacks "increased the pressure on the United States to find a way to resolve the tensions between Pakistan and India," apparently a dilemma solely dependent on U.S. action (I.A.2.c). *Fox News*'s Heather Nauert asked if "American commandos could go in [the Taj Hotel] and perform any kind of rescue operation, as opposed to having to rely upon Indian forces" (II.B.1.d). The *Post* depicted Rice as a premier arbiter, easing tensions between Pakistan and India on one hand while making "demands on both countries" on the other. Acknowledging that the two na-tions had nearly gone to war over previous terrorist actions, the newspaper reassured its readers that the last crisis "was averted after U.S. diplomatic intervention" (II.B.2.d).

The perpetrators' motivations received progressively less attention even as they increasingly became identified (Fig-ure 8). The WOT frame gives little shrift to such specificities, supporting the argument that "conventional frames explain and prioritize dominant ways of understanding events while underplaying or discounting others" (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 14). The fact that "inhumane" terrorists had struck against another "dream city" (I.A.2.b) and "democracy" (II.B.1.b) mattered to U.S. reporters; the gunmens' literal motivations has little importance within the overall aim of the WOT to avenge the attacks and eradicate terrorism world-wide. This selective coverage repeats the pattern in coverage of political violence to ignore the goals or motives of terrorist organizations (Paletz, Fozzard, and Ayanian 1982; Traugott and Brader 2003).

Finally, Mumbai's stories also asked if other nations were doing their part in the WOT. On December 1, senior *Fox News* contributor Dan Senor argued, "The Indian intelligence agency should have been on offense, trying to infiltrate these cells" and attack terrorists the way that U.S. counterterrorism officials had been doing (II.B.2.a). Nauert asked if "Pakistan is finally starting to take the war on terror seriously" (II.B.2.d). Two weeks after Mumbai's first gunshots, the WOT's dogged battle against terrorists subsumed the attacks. While the

preponderance of U.S. victim mention declined during the three time periods, selective causational interpretation, lack of attributed motives to attackers, and heavy reliance on official sources strengthened Mumbai's eventual placement within the U.S.'s regional WOT frame.

Print versus Broadcast

Broadcast's coverage suggests an attempt to capture ratings along with meaning-making. As Schudson writes, "The anxiety of journalistic story telling is double. It is not only an anxiety to identify what the story is but to do so in a way that does not lose the audience …. It is a matter of … shared human sympathies as they exist in a given society at a given time" (2007, 256). U.S. casualties, the richest source of prospective sympathy, received far greater emphasis in broadcast reports than in print (Figure 5). Television reporters used stock, popular characterizations of Muslims and terrorist villains much more often: *CNN* and *Fox News* negatively associated Muslims far more readily than the *Times* and *Post* (Figure 11) and suspected Al Qaeda involvement more often than their print media peers (Table 4). Newspapers commonly framed the attacks within Pakistan-India tensions, while broadcast journalists embraced the "Declaration of War" frame (Table 1) perhaps for its attention-grabbing tone.

By explicitly translating the Mumbai attacks into the U.S. experience, broadcast media made the events more locally relevant and personally enthralling for its viewers. *Fox News*'s "America's News Headquarters" broadcast on November 28 exemplifies television reporters' general insistence on placing Mumbai within U.S. discourse. Guest Danny Coulson alerted viewers that the Taj Hotel negotiations resembled what "we saw at Columbine or Virginia Tech." Foreign affairs analyst Mansoor Ijaz connected the attacks to the WOT's great foil, Al Qaeda. "[Mumbai] represents an evolutionary threat in the way that Al Qaeda operates now. They're trying to find a way to economically disrupt what it is that goes on in these big commercial centers in countries where they want to try and strike out." And former CIA operative Wayne Simmons narcissistically believed that the perpetrators had an U.S. audience in mind. "This was Thanksgiving. It was in the West. It was literally served up on a silver platter knowing that Americans in the West would be totally focused on any type of international news like this that took place" (II.B.1.d).

Significance

On December 6, *Fox News*'s Jon Scott asked if U.S. media's domestication of the Mumbai attacks had stepped too far. "First lesson in college journalism is take a story and make it local. I guess that's what some of these papers have been doing. But … did they cross the line?" (II.B.3.a) Scott's question had followed a widely publicized New York City security scare that coincided with the climax of the Taj Hotel siege, during which Scott's own organization had sent a correspondent to help cover the "uncorroborated and unsubstantiated" threat (II.B.1.d). The host read a few newspaper headlines to illustrate his point: "'Mumbai attacks refocus U.S. cities' … 'Daring Mumbai attacks reveal any city's vul-

nerability' … 'Terrorist in Mumbai should frighten Americans, too' … Do you think the press took it too far this time or is this apt?" (II.B.3.a).

This questioning of "regionalization" is especially pertinent when considering political violence. The style of media coverage, the conduit through which terrorists communicate to an otherwise largely unaffected citizen body, becomes significant. Aside from immediate consequences such as loss of life, "political violence also carries a message, which is why media coverage is important for those behind it, both as an end in itself and as a means to other ends" (Nossek 2004, 348). All acts of terror convey an idea that in some instances outweigh the actual attack. In scenarios when the aggrieved nation is a democracy whose voting citizens can influence government policy, symbolic impact carries drastic implications.

As Gamson and Modigiliani define them, news frames suggest "what is at issue" during a particular event (1989, 3). A particular frame's selection entails strong meaning-making consequences for a mediated public: for example, attitudes about the terrorist act or its cause, support for the home government's security policies, and reactions such as anxiety regarding one's personal safety (Traugott and Brader 2003, 184). Domestication of foreign attacks fosters inaccurate conclusions in news consumers, thus weakening a nation's political efficiency. It also can lead to erroneous responses, as evinced by the New York City security hoax.

Compounding that danger, the U.S. citizen body has grown progressively uninformed about global affairs (McChesney 2002, 99). U.S. journalism's steady withdrawal from foreign coverage and global politics (Carey 2002; McChesney 2002) only exacerbates the situation. Developments within media organizations such as foreign bureau closures and overreliance on newswires often encourage these uniform judgments and stock characterizations (Rosen 2002, 31). Therefore, media must be increasingly cautious about the news frames its stories employ. Their reports carry mounting authority when fewer stories can offset reporting missteps.

November 2008's coverage featured a more inclusive debate platform than September 11; nevertheless, reporters still used 9/11 as a touchstone, suggesting that future breaking coverage of political violence will still be informed by the U.S. tragedy. Yet while a news organization can fix a premature frame, its audience may have already stopped reading the articles or changed the channel. Though the November 2008 attacks may have differed in execution from previous Indian political violence, calling it "India's 9/11" proposes several politically influential connotations that misrepresent reality.

Conclusions and Further Inquiry

Two weeks of Mumbai reportage illustrate that U.S. journalism has not yet escaped the ideological crisis of September 11. The U.S. had felt insulated from foreign attacks — political violence had seemed to only affect war-torn regions such as the Middle East or pre-industrial areas such as Africa. In the midst of declining knowledge of foreign affairs, September 11 likely represented most U.S. citizens' first extended brush with non-domestic terrorism. Its psychological scars reappear

whenever the topic of terrorism is publicly broached.

To capture readers or viewers and make sense of Mumbai's complexity, U.S. reporters generally turned to what they and their audience understood best to immediately frame the attacks. Once extended analysis rendered 9/11 parallels slightly unwieldy, most U.S. journalists continued viewing Mumbai from an ethnocentric perspective. I posit that the "War on Terror" frame has developed into a catch-all explanation for all acts of terror. While it may correctly explicate certain acts of political violence, its universalism and media-substantiated legitimacy fosters injuriously imprecise assumptions about political violence.[6]

In particular, subtle colonialist attitudes might also explain some characteristics of U.S. coverage. In adapting the shootings into the WOT frame, American journalists consciously selected specific representations for the crisis. But reporters only extracted those details that strengthened their nation's role as an international leader. And in contextualizing the attacks, stories frequently substituted Western voices for local sources — perhaps because U.S. media regarded the latter group as insufficient or lacking in "proper" understanding. In essence, reporters ignored those directly affected and exploited the events in order to advance their own country's agenda. After all, Rice's portrayal as arbiter of South Asia increases the prestige of U.S. diplomacy as it challenges the abilities of Mumbai and India authorities.

In conclusion, several questions remain for a comprehensive understanding of the November 2008 attacks and their place within journalistic practices. First, does U.S. media's occasional negativity towards Islam extend to other non-western religions? While Mumbai reports often associated Islam with militancy, terror, violence, and/or war, future researchers ought to investigate general attitudes of the U.S. press towards Hinduism, Sikhism, and other religions of the subcontinent. Further, would Indian-directed political violence towards Pakistan receive a different reporting frame? Just as Handley proved that U.S. media favor Jewish Israelis as victims and decry Muslim Arabs as aggressors (2008), a Western bias favoring Hindus or Indians could manipulate news reports about South Asia and its cross-national or cross-religious rivalry.

Additionally, further work should examine Indian media's portrayal of the attacks. Though U.S. stories regionalized the attacks, Indian sources often supplied the information to U.S. reporters. New Delhi TV footage, for example, informed *Fox News*'s first broadcasts of the shootings.[7] The Indo-Asian News Sources article "Cowardly terrorist attack in Mumbai just like 9/11" ran in both the *Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* on December 2 (IANS 2008a; IANS 2008b). If Indian media described the attacks as "India's 9/11," and Mumbai residents accepted that definition, U.S. reporters may have been less influenced by 9/11 than I suggest.

Future studies might analyze whether U.S. citizens equated the Mumbai attacks with September 11 after exposure to news coverage, and if the public's perceptions evolved with the attacks' frame. Examination would test Entman's conception of the "cultural logic" of 9/11: the Bush-created definition of causes, effects, ethical judgments, and solu-

tions that persisted through subsequent media coverage and directly promoted future public policy and general cultural understandings (2004, 6-7). If that "cultural logic" defined Mumbai reportage and U.S. popular interpretation, then U.S. journalists are guilty of propagating a monolithic understanding of political violence. If the U.S. and its allies are to combat terrorism successfully, their citizen bodies must own a more nuanced conception of political violence.

ENDNOTES

1. All statistics and interpretations of Indian events courtesy of Metcalf and Metcalf's *A Concise History of Modern India* (2006). For a breezy overview of the last 20 years of Indian history and the political context of the Mumbai attacks, refer to pages 265-304 of the text.

2. Partition statistics courtesy of Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989: 129-131). Other scholars have put the figure much higher; however, no absolute statistical agreement exists as far as I am aware. Please regard the cited figures as a minimum estimate.

3. This extremely brief summarization of mass media's growth relies almost exclusively on the work of other scholars. In particular, Hardt (1992) traces the growth of mass media opposite the decline of civic activity; Tuchman (1978, 183) briefly touches upon the increased function of "Newsworkers" in setting society's agenda of interests after WWII; Gerbner (1967) underlines the rise in sheer numbers of readership to illustrate media power's expansion in the 20th century, supporting the earlier assertions of Wirth (1948); and Reese (2001, 14) introduces his paper, as do I, with a demand for greater attention paid to the interests and decision-making behind media interpretations.

4. Schudson (2007, 254), however, maintains that the covered event usually dictates the media frame a reporter selects. The "anarchic" nature of breaking news, according to Schudson, often necessitates this reliance on cultural resources.

5. According to Li and Izard, television and newspaper reports used slightly different reporting frames during September 11. Broadcasters used a disaster frame in 44 percent of their stories versus 23 percent of newspaper stories (2003, 210).

6. Couldry convincingly argues that mass media's superior possession of "symbolic resources" (2001, 162) occasionally creates "hidden injuries," because of media's "overvaluation" by the public in constructing reality (161). I extend Couldry's argument to Mumbai, stipulating that media influentially misrepresented the attacks, subtly and symbolically harming its principal actors.

7. *Fox News* reports II.B.1.a (broadcast on November 26) and II.B.1.b (November 28) "monitored" New Delhi broadcasts for information during its first three days of Mumbai coverage. Therefore, Indian journalists may have shaped some U.S. reporters' immediate frame of the incident.

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DATA TABLES

^ Indicates the category could code a story multiple times

Table 1: **Primary Frame of Event**

	Unprecedented Attack	Provocation for Reprisal	Continuation of Pattern	Investigation Needed	Other
TOTAL	13	9	3	12	11
Print	7	2	3	4	8
Broadcast	6	7	—	8	3
Breaking	7	2	2	2	3
Immediate	3	5	—	3	5
Extended	3	2	1	7	3

Others: *Tragedy* **(Four total/Three Print, One Broadcast/Four Breaking)**
Within Diplomatic Tensions **(Six total/Five Print, One Broadcast/ Four Breaking, Two Extended)**
Hint of Things to Come **(One total/One Broadcast/One Extended)**

Table 2a: **Causation**

	Immediate Emphasis	Longitudinal Emphasis	Equal Emphasis	None
TOTAL	9	21	1	17
Print	4	10	—	10
Broadcast	5	11	1	7
Breaking	5	6	1	4
Immediate	4	7	—	5
Extended	—	8	—	8

Table 2b: **Specific Causes^**

	Immediate Emphasis		Longitudinal Emphasis		
	Poor Response, Security	Terrorist Plan	Feeble Indian State*	Terrorist Infrastructure+	India-Pakistan Rivalry
TOTAL	6	4	9	12	4
Print	2	2	3	4	3
Broadcast	4	2	6	8	1
Breaking	2	4	4	2	2
Immediate	4	—	5	3	1
Extended	—	—	—	7	1

* Includes — Lack of national security, Feeble justice system, Lack/weakness of intelligence apparatus, and Inadequacy of counterterrorism measures
+ Includes — Long-term planning and Training
Others: *Hindu-Muslim Inevitability* (One total/One Print, One Breaking)
War on Terror (One total/One Broadcast, One Breaking)

Table 3a: **Presence of Motives**

	Attributed	Nonexistent
TOTAL	15	33
Print	9	15
Broadcast	6	18
Breaking	12	4
Immediate	3	13
Extended	2	14

Table 3b: **Specific Motives^**

	Hindu-Muslim Tensions	Kashmir	Economically Motivated	Send Message/ Raise Profile
TOTAL	4	6	6	2
Print	3	4	2	—
Broadcast	1	2	4	2
Breaking	3	4	6	2
Immediate	1	—	—	—
Extended	—	2	—	—

Others: *Jewish-Islam Tensions* (One total/One Print/One Breaking)
US-India Relationship (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)
Attack Democracy (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)
Pakistan-Indian Tensions (One total/One Broadcast/One Breaking)

Table 4: **Suspicions^**

	India/Pakistan						Al Qaeda	Other Terror.	Other	No
	Deccan M.	Mystery	LET/LIT	Pakistan based	India based	Kashmir based				
TOTAL	3	1	30	6	1	1	12	—	1	8
Print	2	1	14	1	—	—	1	—	—	6
Broadcast	1	—	16	5	1	1	11	—	1	2
Breaking	3	1	6	1	1	—	7	—	—	4
Immediate	—	—	12	2	—	1	4	—	1	4
Extended	—	—	12	3	—	—	1	—	—	—

Other: *"Saudi Money Trail"*

Table 5: **Hierarchy of Victims**

	U.S.	Western	Indian	No Hierarchy	No Victims
TOTAL	19	2	5	9	13
Print	4	2	5	9	4
Broadcast	15	—	—	—	9
Breaking	9	1	1	2	1
Immediate	7	1	1	4	3
Extended	1	—	3	3	9

Table 6: **Sources**

	Official	Nonofficial	U.S./Western	India/Eastern	No Sources
TOTAL	27	18	23	22	3
Print	15	9	9	15	—
Broadcast	12	9	14	7	3
Breaking	8	8	11	5	—
Immediate	9	7	9	7	—
Extended	10	3	3	10	3

Table 7: **Reference to Historical Example^**

	Previous Indian Attacks	11-Sep	Other Western Attacks	Non-western Attacks	None
TOTAL	22	6	1	1	22
Print	13	3	—	1	10
Broadcast	9	3	1	1	12
Breaking	8	3	1	2	6
Immediate	9	2	—	—	6
Extended	5	1	—	—	10

Western Attacks: *Columbine High School & Virginia Tech Shootings* (Same story)
Nonwestern Attacks: *Kabul July 2008* (One total/One Print, One Breaking)
Previous Bombings in Pakistan (One total/One Broadcast, One Breaking)

Table 8: **Treatment of Islam^**

	Total References	Association*
TOTAL	50	29
Print	22	5
Broadcast	28	24
Breaking	34	23
Immediate	7	2
Extended	9	4

*Includes — Militancy, Terror, Violence, and/or War

DATA CHARTS

Figure 1: **Main Frames**

*Figure 2:* **"Breaking" Motivations**

Hindu - Muslim Tensions

Kashmir

Economically Motivated

Send Message / Raise Profile

Figure 3: **"Breaking" Suspicions**

Deccan Mujahedeen
Unknown Subcontinental Organization
LET / LIT
Pakistan Based
India Based
Al Qaeda
Saudi
None

Figure 4: **Treatment of Islam over Time**

Association of Islam
Reference of Islam

Number of Stories

Breaking   Immediate   Extended
Time Period

Figure 5: **Hierachy of Victims**

U.S.   Western   Indian   No Hierarchy

Number of Stories

Total   Print   Broadcast   Breaking   Immediate   Extended
Data Group

Figure 6: **Source Material over Time**

U.S. / Western
Indian / Eastern
Official
Unofficial

Number of Stories

Breaking   Immediate   Extended
Time Period

Figure 7: **Causation over Time**

Longitudinal: India Pakistan Rivalry
Longitudinal: Terrorist Infrastructure
Longitudinal: Feeble Indian State
Immediate: Terrorist Plan
Immediate: Poor Response/Security

Number of Stories

Breaking   Immediate   Extended
Time Period

Figure 8: **Named Suspect vs. Named Motive**

Number of Stories

Named Suspect
Attributed Motives

Breaking   Immediate   Extended
Time Period

Figure 9: **Suspicions over Time**

Figure 10: **Sources by Media Type**

Figure 11: **Treatment of Islam by Media Type**

ARTICLE KEY

The New York Times

I.A.1.a   Terror Attacks Kill Scores In India; U.S. Hostages Reported Held At Hotels/SOMINI SENGUPTA/11.27.08

I.A.1.b   Indian Soldiers Seek Survivors Of Terror Siege/SOMINI SENGUPTA, KEITH BRADSHER/11.28.08

I.A.1.c   Crisis May Shift Political Landscape/SOMINI SENGUPTA/11.29.08

I.A.1.d   Brooklyn Couple Missing in Attacks/FERNANDA SANTOS/11.28.08

I.A.2.a   A Security Chief Quits as India Struggles to Respond to Attacks/SOMINI SENGUPTA/12.1.2008

I.A.2.b   For the Heroes of Mumbai, Terror Was a Call to Action/ SOMINI SENGUPTA/ 12.2.2008

I.A.2.c   U.S. and India See Link to Militants in Pakistan/ERIC SCHMITT, SOMINI SENGUPTA, JANE PERLEZ/12.3.2008

I.A.2.d   U.S. Tries to Ease India-Pakistan Tensions/SOMINI SENGUPTA/12.4.2008

I.A.3.a   Mumbai Attacks Politicize Long-Isolated Elite/SOMINI SENGUPTA/12.7.2008

I.A.3.b   Indian Police Arrest 2 in Mumbai Investigation and Look at Cellphone Link/ JEREMY KAHN/12.7.2008

I.A.3.c   Pakistan's Spies aided group tied to Mumbai Siege/ERIC SCHMITT, MARK MAZZETTI, JANE PERLEZ/12.8.2008

I.A.3.d   Pakistan Raids Group Suspected In Attacks/Jane Perlez, Salman Masood/12.9.2008

The Washington Post

I.B.1.a   Dozens Die in Mumbai Attacks; Hotels Under Siege; Gunmen Said to Target Americans, Britons/RAMA LAKSHMI/11.27.2008

I.B.1.b   Indian Commandos Battle Assailants; Attacks in Mumbai Commercial Center Kill at Least 125/EMILY WAX/11.28.2008

I.B.1.c   Virginians Slain in Attacks Lived Out Peaceful Ideals/JERRY MARKON, AMY GARDNER, THERESA VARGAS/11.29.2008

I.B.1.d   Pakistani Militants At Center Of Probe; India, Its Archrival Vow to Cooperate Amid High Tension/CRAIG WHITLOCK, KAREN DEYOUNG/11.29.2008

I.B.2.a   Cabinet Minister Resigns Amid Anger in India/RAMA LAKSHMI/12.1.2008

I.B.2.b   Mumbai Mourns Slain Rabbi, Wife; Prayer Service Honors Couple Held Hostage During 3-Day Siege/EMILY WAX/12.2.2008

I.B.2.c   Group's Leader Recalls Days of Terror; Members of Va. Foundation Were Among 6 Americans Killed in Indian Attacks/THERESA VARGAS/12.3.2008

I.B.2.d   As Rice Presses Pakistan, Tens of Thousands Take to Streets in/ EMILY WAX, RAMA LAKSHMI/12.4.2008

I.B.3.a   Indian Official Points to Pakistan; Source Says Intelligence Agency Aided Mumbai Terrorists; U.S. Unconvinced/EMILY WAX, RAMA LAKSHMI/ 12.6.2008

I.B.3.b   For Mumbai's Children, No Illusion of Safety; Psychologists Cite Trauma, Insecurity In Wake of Attacks/EMILY WAX/12.7.2008

I.B.3.c   Indian Minister Says Pakistan Is Using Hoax As Distraction/ RAMA LAKSHMI/12.8.2008

I.B.3.d   In Outcry Over Siege, Two Indias Emerge; The Poor, Hit Hard in Past, Question New Level of Protest After Attacks on Affluent/EMILY WAX/12.9.2008

CNN

II.A.1.a   Dozens Killed After Terrorists Attack in India/ERICA HILL, ANDREW STEVENS, BARBARA STARR, KELLI ARENA, DAVID GERGEN, ZAIN VERJEE, MALLIKA KAPUR, GARY TUCHMAN/12.26.2008

II.A.1.b   Coverage of Terror in India/WOLF BLITZER, NIC ROBERTSON, SARA SIDNER, DAVID MATTINGLY, KELLI

ARENA, PETER BERGEN, ED HENRY, TOM FOREMAN, MATTHEW CHANCE, MARY SNOW/12.28.2008

II.A.1.c Terror Attacks in India/DON LEMON, SARA SIDEN [sic], MATTHEW CHANCE, TESS EASTMENT, JACKIE LUCAS, JACQUI JERAS/12.29.2008

II.A.1.d Nightmare in Mumbai; Barack Obama's National Security Team; Car Salesmen Blues/DON LEMON, T.J. HOLMES, DAN RIVERS, JACQUI JERAS, NIC ROBERTSON, ANDREW STEVENS, ED LAVANDERA, ED HENRY, SUSAN CANDIOTTI/12.30.2008

II.A.2.a Inside the Terror Attack; India Ties Terror Plot To Pakistan; General Jones As National Security Adviser; Making "Team of Rivals" Work/WOLF BLITZER, BRIAN TODD, NIC ROBERTSON, JAMIE MCINTYRE, JACK CAFFERTY, DEBORAH FEYERECK, WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JEANNE MESERVE, LOU DOBBS, SAMANTHA HAYES/12.1.2008

II.A.2.b Big Three Bailout; The Pakistan Link to Attack on India/ANDERSON COOPER, DANA BASH, JOHN KING, ALI VELSHI, CANDY CROWLEY, NIC ROBERTSON, ERICA HILL, DON LEMON, DAVID GERGEN/12.2.2008

II.A.2.c Autoworkers Meet on Proposed Givebacks to Big Three; Mumbai Terrorist Cooperates in Police Investigation; Obama Introduces Bill Richardson as Future Cabinet Member/KYRA PHILLIPS, BROOKE BALDWIN, NIC ROBERTSON, SUZANNE MALVEAUX, JIM ACOSTA, CHAD MYERS, JACQUI JERAS, RICK SANCHEZ, AMANDER OBER/12.3.2008

II.A.2.d Jail Time for "The Juice"?; Nanny Saves Two-Year-Old from Terrorists; Where the Jobs Are; Chicago City Takes Center Stage; Detroit's Big Three CEOs Return to Capitol Hill; Pirates Get Lifeline/JOHN ROBERTS, KIRAN CHETRY, JEFFREY TOOBIN, PAULA HANCOCKS, CHRISTINE ROMANS, ALINA CHO, DAVID MCKENZIE, KELLI ARENA, REYNOLDS WOLF, ELIZABETH COHEN/12.5.2008

II.A.3.a Obama Picks Gen. Eric Shinseki for Veterans Affairs; Banking Chair Dodd Wants GM CEO to Move On; Auto Industry Experts Answers Viewer Email on Bailout/NAAMUA DELANEY, BILL SCHNEIDER, KATE BOLDUAN, JOSH LEVS, JACQUI JERAS, AMANDA BURDEN, KASEY JOYCE/12.7.2008

II.A.3.b Obama Vows Swift Economic Action; Property Taxes Climb Despite Sliding Home Values; Blackwater Guards Expected to Surrender; Oil Delta Warlords in Nigeria; Suspected Terrorist Mastermind Arrested?/JOHN ROBERTS, KIRAN CHETRY, LISA LING, JASON CARROLL, ROBA MARCIANO, SUSAN CANDIOTTI, ATIKA SHUBERT, SUSAN ROESGEN, ELAINE QUIJANO, BARBARA STARR, GERRI WILLIS, NIC ROBERTSON, KELLI ARENA/12.8.2008

II.A.3.c Closing in on a Deal for Detroit; Governor Corruption: Who is Blagojevich?; Talk Show Queen Battles the Bulge/HEIDI COLLINS, SUSAN ROESGEN, GERRI WILLIS, JEFFREY TOOBIN, ROB MARCIANO, TED ROWLANDS, SUSAN LISCOVIC, KATHLEEN KOCH, GARY TUCHMAN, ELAINE QUIJANO, ELIZABETH COHEN, ALLAN CHERNOFF/12.10.2008

II.A.3.d Republican Roadblocks to Auto Bailout; President-Elect Remains Silent on Blagojevich Scandal; Calling in Gay/HEIDI COLLINS, BRIANNA KEILAR, SUSAN ROESGEN, ROB MARCIANO, ELAINE QUIJANO, ELIZABETH COHEN, POPPY HARLOW, REZA SAYAH, NEIL CONNERY, AMY LESTER/12.10.2008

Fox News

II.B.1.a Terrorists Strike India/ALAN COLMES, RICK LOWRY, JAMES ROSEN/ 11.26.2008

II.B.1.b Terror Siege Continues in India/SEAN HANNITY, ALAN COLMES, GREG BURKE, WALID PHARES, MIKE BAKER/11.28.2008

II.B.1.c Black Friday; Terror Attacks in India/BRET BAIER, GREG BURKE, DAVID MACDOUGALL, ANITA MCNAUGHT, MIKE EMANUEL, MOLLY HENNEBERG/11.28.2008

II.B.1.d India Terror Attacks; Economic Situation/HEATHER NAUERT, REENA NINAN, MOLLY HENNEBERG, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, LAURA INGLE, GREG BURKE, SCOTT HEIDLER/11.28.2008

II.B.2.a America's News Headquarters for December 1, 2008/BILL HEMMER, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, RICH EDSON, ELIZABETH MACDONALD, HOWARD WOLFSON, GREG BURKE, DAN SENOR, MIKE EMANUEL, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, RICK LEVENTHAL, DOUGLAS KENNEDY, LANNY DAVIS/12.1.2008

II.B.2.b Political Headlines/BRET BAIER, CARL CAMERON, MAJOR GARRETT, WENDELL GOLER, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, REENA NINAN, MARIANNE SILBER, BRIAN WILSON/12.2.2008

II.B.2.c America's News Headquarters for December 3, 2008/BILL HEMMER, GREG BURKE, SCOTT HEIDLER, WENDELL GOLER, RICH EDSON, TRACY BYRNES, CHERYLE CASONE, PHIL KEATING, JONATHON MORRIS, DOUGLAS KENNEDY/12.3.2008

II.B.2.d America's News Headquarters for December 4, 2008/BILL HEMMER, RICH EDSON, JEFF FLOCK, ANDREW NAPOLITANO, PETER BARNES, ALEXIS GLICK, SCOTT HEIDLER, DOUGLAS KENNEDY/12.4.2008

II.B.3.a Fox News Watch for December 6, 2008/JON SCOTT, JIM PINKERTON, JANE HALL, ROBERT GEORGE, JUDITH MILLER/12.6.2008

II.B.3.b Political Headlines/BRIT HUME, CARL CAMERON, JAMES ROSEN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, SHANNON BREAM, STEVE HARRIGAN, CORINA SONN, CLAUDIA COWAN/12.8.2008

II.B.3.c Jesse Jackson Jr. Claims Innocence; Blagojevich Still Has Power to Appoint New Senator; The Safety of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons; Increase of Squatters in Foreclosed Properties/HEATHER NAUERT, MAJOR GARRETT, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, PHIL KEATING/12.10.2008

II.B.3.d Political Headlines/BRIT HUME, CARL CAMERON, JIM ANGLE, MAJOR GARRETT, BRET BAIER, JENNIFER GRIFFIN, CATHERINE HERRIDGE, DAVID LEE MILLER/12.10.2008

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Coding Sheet

Story ID_____Publication_____Date_____

Primary Frame of Event

Unprecedented Attack	Provocation for Reprisal	Continuation of Pattern	Investigation Needed	Other

Causation

Immediate Emphasis	Longitudinal Emphasis	Equal Emphasis	None

Motives

Attributed	Nonexistent

Suspicions

India/Pakistan	Al Qaeda	Western	Other	None

Hierarchy of Victims

U.S. Residents	Other Westerners	Indians	Other Cultural Groups	No Victim Hierarchy	No Victims Mentioned

Sources: Geography/Status

U.S./Western	India/Eastern	*No Sources*	Official	Nonofficial

Reference to Historical Example

Previous Indian Attacks	9/11	Other Western Attacks	Nonwestern Attacks	None

Treatment of Islam

Total Number of References	Association with "War," "Terror," "Violence"

How the West Lost Us: A Critique of Media Coverage of the Mumbai Attacks

By Vamsee Juluri, Ph.D.

It started with what, in my view, was an inappropriate preposition. In the end, what Mumbai ended up looking like to viewers and readers in the West was something far removed from the magnitude of its loss, and from the realities of fact and perspective. From the first hours of the attack on the morning (Pacific Time) of Wednesday, November 26, until the siege ended, American television channels like *CNN* covered the attacks live. It was Thanksgiving holiday, and "Terror in Mumbai" became the background in innumerable homes that might have had their televisions on in between meals or naps. It was also on in homes where something like outrage was being felt, at the brazenness of the attacks, and at the vested ignorance tainting its coverage.

"Terror in Mumbai." The emphasis on "in" is not mine nor is it to make a point. That is how *CNN* presented its headline throughout the event. In the following days, even as the networks moved slowly back to their usual Thanksgivingish menu of inspirational and heartwarming stories, the follow-up reports all came back under the same headline. It was used on the local news stations in the Bay Area, and in time, even *The Economist* went with the same words on its cover. Normally, especially in the face of a tragedy of such proportions, one would not bother to fault the media for its choice of words. But the decision to frame the event as "Terror in Mumbai" rather than an "Attack on Mumbai" was not an isolated one. It was merely one part of the broader view with which the media approached it. Nor was it inconsequential. After all, within minutes of the events of 9/11/2001, the American media were calling it an attack "on" America and comparing it to Pearl Harbor, rather than a more recent act of terrorism, the Oklahoma bombing. If the American media rushed to internationalize 9/11, they seemed to be in an equal hurry in the case of 26/11 (as we would call it in India) to domesticize it, as if "terror" is something that happens regularly in India, like water problems, or sly airport touts. It was this prejudice that provided the locus for all else that emanated, from the awkward platitudes of inexperienced anchors filling airtime to even the more erudite writings of experts and commentators.

In the first few hours of coverage, the domestication of the attacks unfolded almost silently, by virtue of the fact that much of the concern seemed to be about the foreign nationals who were reportedly being targeted (see some of the comments posted on this website for SAJA, the South Asian Journalists Association). To a less attentive viewer, it might have well seemed as if the whole drama was about terrorists "in" India attacking hapless Western tourists. Although some

efforts were made in time to address the fact that most of the victims were indeed Indian, those efforts seemed lost in a deeper inertia that seemed to preclude the naming of victims as "Indian," or indeed, the attacks as "on" Mumbai, if not "on" India. Such a step would of course have implied that the media had started to seriously address what was already well established as the likely nationality of the attackers. Instead, there seemed to be something like reluctance in the actions of some of the correspondents. In one of the earliest mentions of the sea-route taken by the attackers, a reporter virtually cried out three times (or perhaps even four) that what she was reporting about the Karachi angle was only an Indian official's accusation. Nothing more. The same sort of journalistic delicacy was also poured on to higher government echelons when a "Counterterrorism Expert" on a news channel wondered if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was having a "knee-jerk reaction" when he mentioned "outsiders."

Naturally, no one would like to see unsubstantiated allegations of such a grave sort reported as fact in the international news media in the middle of an unfolding attack of such unprecedented proportions. But all this hesitation was leading to something which in retrospect Christopher Hitchens would call a "disingenuous failure to state the obvious." Unfortunately though, it wasn't just the silence which was troubling. Even before the siege was formally ended, even as speculation and scrutiny grew, a rather strong group of voices converged in the international press on to what they saw as the obvious issue here: India.

In one of the first stories about the possible nationality of the attackers, the New York Times quoted one such expert, ironically named Ms. Fair, who insisted that "this is a domestic issue" and that it is "not India's 9/11." Interestingly, the same article also got its geography grossly mixed up, reporting that "Deccan" (part of the name that a group claiming responsibility used) was a neighborhood in my Hyderabad ! And with erroneous geography, a history goof-up couldn't be far behind either. An article in the *Telegraph* asserted that Kashmir was gifted to India by the departing British. Perhaps geography and history weren't exactly high on the media's criteria for analyzing the event. After all, most of the experts being quoted were of neither academic persuasion. Instead, we saw mostly security and counter-terrorism experts, including one on television who had dealt with a hotel hostage crisis, somewhere in the United States, sometime long ago.

Trivialities aside, it seemed that the attacks on Mumbai were largely destined to be seen here as a part of "India's increasingly violent history," as the title of an article in the Independent, here, put it. As the days passed, that perception was somewhat complicated, but also, sadly, not really contested, by some of the op-ed pieces that followed in the august pages of the New York Times and elsewhere. Amitav Ghosh, Pankaj Mishra, and Suketu Mehta wrote op-eds which invoked in their opening paragraphs, respectively, the following: a BJP leader's attempts to label the attacks as India's 9/11, the attackers' phone calls condemning injustices in Kashmir and Ayodhya, and that "something" about Mumbai that "appalls religious extremists, Hindu and Muslim alike." In a similar vein, the *Los Angeles Times* published two op-eds in response

to the attacks. Martha Nussbaum's piece acknowledged that the attackers may have come from outside India , but leaps off from that into a critique of what she calls "Indian terrorism." I do not believe she used the term "Pakistani terrorism" anywhere there. Another op-ed in the *L.A. Times* by Asra Nomani expresses her sorrow while reading a newspaper report on poverty among Indian Muslims while residing in, and this seems to be being said without irony, "Room 721 of the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel."

The irony, it seems, is all elsewhere. All the New York Times op-eds which seem to turn a critical eye on Pakistan were written by non South-Asians, like William Kristol and Thomas Friedman. I don't find this ironic in a simply nationalistic sense though. I find the irony in the fact that even progressive critiques sometimes end up with the same effect as mainstream prejudices when not made in the right time and place.

I think that the Western media has persisted for far too long with a framework of reporting that is disconnected from reality, and this showed all too sadly in its approach to Mumbai. It continues an old imperialism, unreflectively enjoying its discursive overlordship over South Asia by presenting India and Pakistan as "rivals," as if that is what a billion and a half people think of all the time. It continues a selfish cold-war era framework of false moral equivalence between India and Pakistan, reporting that the countries have fought four wars without once naming an aggressor, chirpily discounting every Indian grievance with a clever Pakistani government retort (see this piece in Times of India). And it grants a voice it seems, to only one sort of South Asian and South Asianist opinion: one that finds fault in India, even when at least one cause lies elsewhere.

Published originally in *The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vamsee-juluri/how-the-west-lost-us-a-cr_b_151730.html

An Interview with Vamsee Juluri

Vamsee Juluri, Professor of Media Studies, University of San Francisco, is the author of three books, *Becoming a Global Audience: Longing and Belonging in Indian Music Television* (Peter Lang, 2003/Orient Longman, 2005), *The Ideals of Indian Cinema* (Penguin India, forthcoming) and *The Mythologist: A Novel* (Penguin India, forthcoming). His work has been published in journals such as Communication Theory, Television and New Media, European Journal of Cultural Studies, and Critical Studies in Mass Communication and in various scholarly anthologies on globalization, audiences, and Indian cinema. He has also written numerous op-eds and feature articles for the *San Francisco Chronicle, Times of India, India-West* and *Hinduism Today*, among other publications, and is a contributor to *The Huffington Post*. He has been quoted about media matters in the *Christian Science Monitor, India-Abroad, BBC World Service, Al Jazeera Television,* and *KPIX-CBS*, and is a recipient of the College of Arts and Sciences in the Media Award. His teaching areas include Media Audience and Research, International/Global Media, Media, Stereotyping and Violence, and Understanding India, a USF International Program course.

Juluri is interviewed by John Nelson, co-editor of *Asia-Pacific: Perspectives*. Recorded July 14, 2009 in Albany, California.

John Nelson (Nelson): You've written in *The Huffington Post* about the distortions of the Western media discourse on Indian-related incidents of terrorism. Could you explain a little about both the sources and the persistence of these journalistic tendencies?

Vamsee Juluri (Juluri): The really tragic thing about the attacks on 26th November in Bombay was the way they were framed in the U.S. Press. Obviously it was very big news, it was horrifying, it was shocking, it was a terrorist spectacle. The way it was being depicted here in the U.S. pained me almost as much as the actual violence that was unfolding in India. In time it seemed to me that there were a couple of things really wrong with the way the press here was framing terrorism in Mumbai.

In the article that you just mentioned in *The Huffington Post*, I focused on one particular issue which had to do with how the attacks were domesticated in the western media discourse, not in the same way that the article in this volume talks about domestication, but they were domesticated in the sense that they were framed as "terror in India," "terror in Mumbai." That really made me wonder why the discourse wasn't reporting the truth of what was happening, that this was an attack carried out by foreign nationals, by a militant group based in another country, with possible patronage from the government, the state arms of that country. That admission was so slow to come and it seemed so reluctant, I thought it was an injustice. It was poor journalism and a

disservice to truth and, in a sort of sentimental way--perhaps being an Indian myself--I felt it was a disservice to the victims of those attacks.

Nelson: So for you the nuance of that one word, the preposition "in," implies that somehow the terrorism or the violence was domestic rather than coming from outside India, as suggested by the phrase, "terrorism imposed on India"?

Juluri: I think it works on two levels. One is the reality that this was an attack by members of one nationality against members of various other nations, on the soil of one particular nation. I think the national dimension was important and that could be conveyed by the preposition "on," as in "attacks on India." But this also suggests a sort of discursive distancing of those who perpetrate this kind of violence. When you say there has been an "attack on something," maybe the language is also suggesting that this is bad, this is abnormal, this is outside the scope of acceptable humanity. So in that sense, I think both those implications of fact and motive were absent in the reporting, particularly in the first few hours and days after the attacks. Finally it was summed up very aptly by Christopher Hitchens who likened the reporting to an "ingenuous failure to state the obvious." The fact that the media completely avoided naming names at this very important time I think was a failure.

Nelson: Do you think that there could been have some reluctance on the part of the U.S. media to "connect the dots" back to Pakistan? After all, Pakistan was being heavily subsidized by the United States, which was providing military intelligence and weaponry and funding, and that somehow the U.S. would be held complicit in these attacks simply because of the support provided to Pakistan…

Juluri: It is interesting, but nobody really put it in quite that way, so bluntly!

Since the 1990s I think there has definitely been an effort within the United States to recognize certain realities about its relationships with India. The US perception of India till the 1990s was so clouded by the Cold War, and even before that by certain kinds of religious and cultural prejudices stemming from the times of colonialism.

So perhaps there is certain degree of unspoken embarrassment that the U.S.—which has no enmity with India and perhaps even friendship at personal and governmental levels—is actually the financier of a state which, at least some parts of it, seem to have involvement in very terrible and violent actions. So I think basically there is a Cold War framework that is waiting to change in the State department. But when these attacks happened, the press was still in 1955!

Nelson: One of the other things that you wrote about in *The Huffington Post* article is a reference to how the global media responds to terrorist incidents as a kind of a global spectacle, and how media outlets around the world frame these events through the concept of a spectacle. That's a very compelling idea and I'd like to hear your thoughts on that topic. Is terrorism a spectacle? Isn't that kind of media coverage playing into the hands of the terrorist and giving them what they want?

Juluri: At a very general level that is perhaps spiritual or

metaphorical I have been very fascinated of late with the idea of silence. I don't know whether it's a spinoff from something of Gandhi I've been reading, but it seems to me that truth is served as much through silence as it is through words or images. Maybe we can think about that idea in the context of your question about terrorism essentially being a spectacle. So much of terrorist activity appears to be about image, about effect, about publicity. And look at the way different groups take credit every time there is an act of theatrical violence, presumably to improve their social standing within their underground circles.

I keep thinking if only it would be possible for the media to deal with it in a completely radical fashion. Since we are in the Berkeley vicinity as we speak, maybe I'm thinking a little tangently here—but I feel that, in a way, what you said is right. This kind of publicity does feed into the process of creating terror. Certainly there is a lot of speculation in the aftermath of the attacks about the role the news channels played. There is even speculation that the terrorists were watching TV, or they pretty much knew a lot of what was going on because it was all being broadcast.

So in that sense, we need the media to try and find more imaginative ways of dealing with this question. Maybe one of the things that could happen is for the media to examine the elements of its own response. A lot of that was addressed in the article by Mack (see this volume). It was almost like there was a protocol for the news media about how to deal with all these issues. They broadcast the human-interest story, then the what is-the-government-going-to-do story, and so on. In the case of the Indian media, one strange thing that emerged--which was in a way good because it avoided the "communal blame games"--was the media did not frame the attack as a Muslim -Hindu issue. But it did blame the government for its failures. It was almost like a populist whim where you blame the government for its inability to protect the people.

Nelson: But in this case, it wasn't just the common person that was not protected: it was the wealthy and the elite who patronized the Taj and Oberoi Hotels in that part of city. Given the nature of how quickly information travels, and the hunger of a global audience for information, breaking news takes precedence. It just seems like the more sensationalistic or dramatic the incident, the greater a network's ratings will be. I hate to reduce it to just an issue of money and corporate interests, but since the media is a corporation I can imagine that the bottom line drives some of the way reporting is carried out. We sometimes hear about journalists being a fourth pillar of a democratic society, but I wonder if that is really possible anymore. Should I be suspicious about the way media covers these events? Are we really getting a reasonable representation of "the facts?"

Juluri: We may be getting the facts at a superficial level, but it doesn't take much for a journalist to state that I'm standing here in front of the Oberoi Hotel and you can hear the sound of gunfire around me. Maybe the journalist can even show courage and sneak in under the barricade. But ultimately, what is being served when you have this global audience feeding on the phenomenon of breaking news? Are they able

to understand what is happening in the world a little bit better because of the reporting? Or does it become just one more spectacle offering audience participation in some kind of a furious public phenomenon, without really understanding the tragedy of what is going on?

Nelson: I think that's the key: to be able to understand the tragedy what's going on.

Juluri: I think in the case of the Bombay attacks, one of the reasons I was particularly adamant about trying to write about it here in the United States is because this was probably the first news item on India that got three or four days live coverage, 24 hours a day, here in the U.S. I mean, Mother Teresa's funeral (in 1997), since we're talking about global spectacles, came almost as an afterthought a few weeks after Princess Diana's funeral. That was the last time there was sustained media attention to India.

And so I saw the reality of this tragedy, this massacre, taking place within the framework of the commercial media system, which plays up various angles such as, "can it possibly happen here?" But then, they subtly play another angle that, you know, look, of course its going to happen in India; they've got all these problems, they've got the plague, they've got Hindu-Muslim conflicts, they've got class conflict (emphasized by the film "Slumdog Millionaire" which happened to come out a few days before the attacks). So don't worry about the call center, the message seems to be, these guys are always doomed to their own miseries.

So I think at a subtle level one could hope that at the end of some spectacle like this the media contains it in a way.

What the media and journalism could do is to say, all right, this is a tragedy and a massacre and then maybe the next step could be to reel it in somehow, not in an opportunistic way (you know the way Cheney and Bush did after 9/11) but do it a way that some justice to reality, to humanity. And in the U.S. particularly I think that the way that ought to have been done is for the thinking about terrorism in South Asia to acknowledge certain realities.

Nelson: Could you elaborate on these "certain realities?"

Juluri: I think now we get to the "rice of the matter" and may also lead into your next question about nationalism. The way I see the attacks on Bombay is a human issue: violence being committed on innocent people. Let's not forget that, sure, the Taj and Oberoi, the Jewish center and the rabbi, corporate big wigs, Americans visitors, it was very tragic and unfortunate. But there were a lot of ordinary people who were killed. When I saw the image on TV of the people standing at the railway station in Bombay, it was so full of semiotic significance. I remember talking about this to students in my media and violence class and I think some of them have been to India and could understand what I was saying. And when you look at the swarm of bodies, the crowd, the Indian reality which everyone sees the moment you go to India, you see this humanity clearly.

The people in the railway station were working class and lower middle class people. They probably get up at four or five in the morning, commute towards town hanging on the train by a fingernail, held together by the crowd. They go to

work and then come back to see their kids for an hour or two in the evening. I don't mean to romanticize the humanity there, but these were the people who were massacred. The point I made in my class was that the bullets the terrorists used to kill them probably cost more than how much money these poor people make in a day and this is ironic.

So for me it is absolutely important to recognize in whatever way we can the humanity and tragedy what happened, and then maybe we will try to move to analysis. We are trying to talk about why it is happening in South Asia, why is it "on" and not "in," the U.S. Cold War biases, and all these things. Recognizing the humanity of the problem does require us to address the question of postcolonial nationalism. So for me I really did have to see this as an issue of an attack on India, but not necessarily as a Pakistan-India conflict. I don't really buy into the idea of essential conflicts between billions of people, or even states for that matter.

The story of Bombay is one more chapter in the story of India which goes back to colonialism. They don't go back to a Hindu-Muslim conflict lasting thousands of years, or even hundreds of years. At the same time I don't think it began with the BJP toppling the mosque in 1992. Colonialism created a fairly concrete frame for the ways things have developed in this region.

And how did the effects of colonialism play out in India and Pakistan?

I think the reality (which has not been fully recognized over here because it is often too politically contested) is that to a certain extent, the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims in the 1940s was elite driven. I think it was a demand made by a certain section of Muslim elites who had this separatist feeling which, presumably, a lot of other Muslims did not have, Muslims who were perhaps confident enough to be in a democratic, secular India. Given the fact that Pakistan began in that sense, as a modern nation it was entitled to its own sovereignty, its own story, its own dreams--all those things. I would not begrudge anyone or any nation that chance.

But soon after that it got caught up in the calculus of the Cold War.

This is now a well-documented fact that a lot of the cozying up between Washington and Islamabad, brought about at the height of the 1950s and 60s, took place for cultural reasons. At that time, the American view of India was not much of a view, Gandhi notwithstanding. India was a nation of Hindus, cow worshipers, vegetarians, and wishy-washy people used to being conquered in the American view. You know, supposedly "realistic" finger wagging.

Nelson: But at that time they were also allied with Soviet Union, or does that comes a little bit later?

Juluri: That comes later. Very frequently, we tend to think that India allied itself to the Soviet Union and Pakistan with the U.S., and it was all Cold War politics. But looking at the work of some historians of that period, like Andrew Rotter or Ramachandra Guha, it seems that there was already a greater cultural bond between the generals in U.S. and generals in Pakistan. You know there were always these stories about

friendships developed over cigars, golf courses, and F86 sabers. So all this stuff is going on and of course it reached a whole new level in the 1980s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A movie which I saw recently was "Charlie Wilson's War" and it was incredible that (going only by the movie) a tyrant from one nation and a Texan-Christian socialite saw a convergence of interests.

So I think in that sense, I tend to take the view that if you look at all the bombing attacks and the violence going on around the world, or in South Asia, it goes back to colonialism, because in a way, terrorism began or at least is formed from the seeds that were sown by Vasco Da Gama over the years.

In a way terrorism is a successful business model. Maybe it sounds radical, but it worked for the East India Trade company, and it worked for a lot of people at that time. Around the time India got its freedom, there were attempts to change that business model. I think Gandhi was the most radical visionary who saw the whole world and modernity as a manifestation of the terrorist business model having gone too far, and of course, politics had moved far beyond him.

I don't think he could've imagined the India of today. There were people like Nehru who, although he did not share Gandhi's whole critique on modernity, were humanist and universalist in their own right. So at that time, even if there weren't attempts to think through something different in post-colonial India, it was already an ample task for two reasons: an international reason was the fact that Pakistan already formed an elite full of ideas that they were natural rulers, an idea not shared by the large majority of Muslims who stayed in India. So there was an international angle and a domestic angle to this post-colonial reality. The situation in India in the 1940s and 1950s essentially was that the Hindu-Muslim conflict was not the only axis of divisiveness in the country. It was an extremely culturally diverse nation, and still is. Ultimately what we need to remember is that India is far more complex, diverse, and democratic by virtue of its existence, as Sunil Khilnani would say. It is simplistic for us to assume that the Bombay attacks were the continuation of age-old rivalries between Hinduism and Muslims, or even India and Pakistan.

Nelson: Then this would lead to the criticism that you noted about the strategic expert, K. Subrahmanyam, saying that the American establishment, which I guess would include the media, does not "have the mental equipment to help India." So what could the establishment do to acquire or develop the so-called mental equipment that would be helpful to portray an India in all of its complexity, diversity, and democracy?

Juluri: I'll try to find the original line in K. Subrahmanyam's article. It's a great quote and to tell you the truth, I think he actually referred to Americans in general, but I took it to mean the American political establishment. As to what could be done to improve the mental equipment, this ultimately needs to be seen as a humanitarian issue. When we think about the Bombay attacks, or those in other parts of India, Pakistan or elsewhere in the world, one should try to think about these incidents on a universal human level as much as

possible. It is important to do that because until the 1970s, the American apparatus for political thinking was very biased. It was all Orientalism and Cold War thinking, and very ethno-centric in many ways. Then in the 60s and 70s, things changed a fair amount at a human level. Recognizing multicultural-ism and cultural differences became common practices, but some of the old political habits still persist--which is why I'm saying we need a more universal kind of humanitarianism in understanding terrorism. It's a tendency now to think that it's all about cultural differences, or once again about Islam and Hinduism. We perhaps feel guilty about conflicts after 9/11, so we tend to assume that it's a cultural conflict between Muslims and Hindus in India as well.

There are all these dimensions, but at a very general level, if we can try to think (without making too many assump-tions) about what other people's cultures are like and that everyone is human, as well as how these messes were created and how can we get past them, then maybe we will begin to realize there have been many specific gaps or shortfalls in the Americans political establishment's conceptual apparatus, particularly on South Asia.

I think the American view has changed a great deal since the 1990s, ironically, from the time India became a power and conducted its first nuclear test. What has changed is that the US realized it cannot look at its relationship with India through the lens of the Indo-Pak rivalry, so it has changed a little bit, perhaps in the State Department. But this change has not followed in the public consciousness and that's where my whole issue with the U.S. media on Bombay attacks really comes from.

I remember talking to a friend of mine, an American-born Indian who grew up in the U.S. When he was growing up, apart from the usual, occasionally funny comments, like "Do you worship cows?" and that kind of stuff, he told me that he always heard people asking, "Why do your people hate the Pakistanis?"

For a lot of people in the U.S. at that time, the Pakistanis were friends and good people, and there was awareness that Indians were the Pakistanis' enemies. So it was always weird when ordinary Americans suddenly find the Indians here as largely nice and occasionally loud folks.   So maybe there is a need to start thinking about India a little more objectively and not just through the lens of Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

One of the points that I made in an article (Juluri 2008) was that I noticed all the articles in New York Times and Washington Post would inevitably say that the Indians and Pakistani are rivals who have gone to war four times. I know it sounds very juvenile, perhaps even childishly national-istic, but I want to ask who started these wars? At the risk of sounding simplistic, I think the fact was that this kind of writing was part of a political and conceptual framework here in the States. When people write journalistic articles they have to literally find something to say, so these are the familiar clichés. Unfortunately these are real issues which have turned into clichés: the traditional rivals, the nuclear arms rivals, mutual animosity, the Hindu-Muslim enmity, Kashmir, all of these usual things.

I think the last part I want to say is to recognize that

India is a secular, democratic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, multilingual country. It is not a utopian vision as we seen in Gandhi, and neither is it the nasty barbaric place that Kather-ine Mayo and the Indiana Jones movie made it out to be.

One of the things that occurred to me is at what point does the idea of conflict in India get labeled as a Hindu-Muslim conflict? When you think about it, it was only in the last one or two hundred years that the category "Hindu" became widespread. In a way, Hinduism did exist and people were Hindus, but they just didn't see themselves that way, which also meant that they did not think of Muslims and Christians as separate religions. So in that sense, these lines of religious identity were blurred and flexible.

Coming back to a point I wanted to make about changing American thinking…in India, religious identity started to be-come important politically under British colonialism through what Sudipta Kaviraj would call "census, map and museum." Then of course you had the separate electorates and the "divide and rule" policy in India and Pakistan, among other things. I think that a practical solution to try and arrive at a more universal understanding of the Indo-Pakistan situation is to recognize that the general way American people think about the world in terms of religious identity is inaccurate. So for example in the case of India, we see Hindus and Muslims fight during partition, which is true and was a total tragedy, but if you look at the different regions in India, there were only two regions where the conflicts were the greatest.

Nelson: Of course there were other issues that came to the surface and exploded in that particular political context.

Juluri: There were all the princely kingdoms. Hyderabad and Kashmir had their own story and struggles at that time. So I think that the reality of India today is that Hindu-Muslim is not necessarily the sole dimension in which conflict plays out. If we look at the rise of Hindu nationalism in media in the 1980s, it was a very important development, no doubt about it. But then the eighties were also the time when as one group was trying to supposedly unite 80% of Hindus, a lot of other Hindus were uniting politically under caste-based political parties, or language or region-based political parties. Again the diversity is so extreme in India, one way to try and under-stand Indian politics would be to reduce the dependency on thinking in terms of religious identities alone.

Nelson: Excellent ideas. I don't think the U.S. is as diverse as India, but the way that we understand religion to inflame certain ethnic, racial, and even class rivalries has been a huge part of the history of this country. In part, the stability of this country has been getting religion out of the mix of politics and government as much as possible. So we should be able to recognize that same pattern in the affairs of another country, if only the media would help us out by providing more ac-curate analysis.

Juluri: My thinking on all these issues has been informed largely from teaching classes on media and violence over the last few years, and reading Gandhi. I want to make a couple points on what Gandhi taught because I think here in the San Francisco Bay Area, people respect him and a lot of us follow some of his ideas. What is important for us to remember is

that for Gandhi, violence wasn't simply turning the other cheek. We often tend to think that *ahimsa* simply means that if a terrorist attacks you, you do nothing. Or if someone goes to war against you, that you just smile, or if somebody hits you, you don't hit them back. Simon Harak says that defining non-violence as not hitting back when someone hits you is like defining marriage as not sleeping with anybody but your wife. There is a lot more to the philosophy of non-violence. I think the central idea is that there is a connection between non-violence and truth. For Gandhi non-violence was more than just a behavioral code. Non-violence was something that you had to find in your thoughts, words, and actions. In order to do that, you have to recognize the truth. Conversely, if you wanted to understand the truth, you also had to learn to reduce the violence in your thoughts, words, and actions. So in some way, I see this idea as a necessity for improving the media discourse on terrorism. What I felt following the Bombay attacks was that there was so much violence there, it's hard to get to the truth. But as we get closer to the truth, it is my belief that violence will diminish. We need to go from untruth and violence, which is what this world has been built on, to non-violence and truth.

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Mumbai's Taj Hotel in Flames

Terrorism Victorious

Profile of the Artist: Shalinee Kumari

Shalinee Kumari is from a remote village in the Mithila region of Bihar, one of India's poorest and most rural states. For centuries the women of Mithila have adorned their homes with auspicious wall paintings of deities and ritual icons in preparation for engagements, weddings, and other life cycle events. Shalinee continues and expands upon this tradition by depicting current world events as she learns of them, often through BBC radio. She focuses on four global subjects: capitalism, terrorism, environmentalism, and gender equality, all through her vibrantly colored paintings on paper.

San Francisco Curator Wendi Norris learned of Shalinee's paintings through Dr. David Szanton, President of the Ethnic Arts Foundation. Ms. Norris, co-owner of the Frey Norris Gallery, feels the art is directly aligned with her gallery's penchant for showcasing "politically intoxicating art. Shalinee is uniquely positioned as an artist in that she presents such a fresh and pure body of work, even as she utilizes an eye-catching, age-old tradition" (Nataraj 2009). According to Dr. Szanton's profile of the artist…

"Shalinee Kumari was born in 1986 in the village of Haripur Baxi-Tola, in the state of Bihar, India. Baxi-Tola is a rural village, yet is famous for producing religious scholars and intellectuals. Shalinee's father is an official of the Agriculture Department and her mother is a home maker who does not paint (contrary to the common misconception that most women in Mithila paint). Shalinee started painting in 2004, as part of the second group of students to attend the Ethnic Art Foundation's Mithila Art Institute in the town of Madhubani, some 12 miles from Baxi-Tola. Her teacher was

Santosh Kumar Das, who painted the Gujarat Series included in the renowned international traveling exhibition "Edge of Desire: Recent Art in India," organized by The Asia Society in New York. Shalinee has also been influenced by photos of paintings by Ganga Devi and Sita Devi, the two most famous painters of the Mithila tradition in the 1970s to 1990s. Shalinee's paintings have been exhibited in New Delhi and were the subject of a 2007 Symposium on Indigenous Images of Women's Empowerment at the Indira Gandhi Centre for the Arts in New Delhi.

Shalinee is the first artist of the Mithila region to tackle so many contemporary subjects from global warming, capitalism and terrorism to gender issues and women's empowerment. The Berkeley Art Museum, the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco, The Asia Society and Museum, The Philadelphia Museum of Art, Syracuse University, Oberlin College, and the Craft and Folk Art Museum of Los Angeles all collect and/or exhibit this unique painting tradition. Shalinee has recently finished an MA in Geography at Darbhanga University, and now intends to move to New Delhi to continue her painting and begin a PhD in Geography.

The editors of *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* are grateful to the artist for permission to reproduce her work, and to the Frey Norris Gallery (http://www.freynorris.com/index) and Dr. David Szanton for their roles in bringing her work to a wider public.

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Gathering Reactions on the Mumbai Attacks, India's '9/11' on November 26th, 2008

By Lotika Gulvadi, M.S.

(Editors Note: The following commentary by an Indian citizen living in the San Francisco Bay Area is representative of the deeply personal feelings held by many Indians after the Mumbai attacks. It was solicited by one of the editors of Asia Pacific: Perspectives in order to provide a non-academic and subjective reflection about a local incident with regional and global repercussions. The views of the author are hers alone, as is the title of the piece.")

It's difficult to reflect on such a great tragedy. As I try to gather my thoughts, I have also reached out to a few friends to contribute and share their feelings on the Mumbai attacks that started on November 26th, 2008 and held the historic Indian city, its people, and its soul hostage for four long days.

Typical of the day before Thanksgiving holidays in America, the office where I work was abuzz with talks of dinner menus and family traditions.   Contently buried in my Master's in Marketing coursework at Golden Gate University in downtown San Francisco California, I was anxiously looking forward to the four-day holiday break. It was when my friend, Nitin, asked me to "check the news and call home" that everything came to a crashing halt. My first reaction was to call my mother's family living in Mumbai, frantically trying to reach the younger cousins and relatives who I knew would be out at night with their friends. Though not from Mumbai myself and having lived abroad for five years, it is still hard to be detached when people from your country are attacked and precious lives are lost. I could not help but feel their pain, many time zones away.

During those tortuous four days and in many days after, I reached out to fellow Indian friends here in San Francisco for emotional support and to try and make sense of this nightmare. Everyone we spoke to in India and abroad were confused about the motive behind this slaughter and were filled with pain and tears. It was chilling to see images more appropriate for horrorifying terror movies come to reality. Bollywood movies have for a long time focused on strained relationships between India and Pakistan. Some western movies too show brutal killings by terrorists. Watching videos and narratives of how the terror operations were carried out, as well as listening to the rescued people from the hotel tell their story, reminded me of something I would see in a movie but could not imagine happening in real life. Even harder to believe was that human beings were capable of such atrocities. I kept asking, "What kind of person could kill a pregnant woman"? With the global media giving detailed, sometimes gory, up-to-date information with graphic pictures and rich details, I could not help but break down in tears and frustration.

One of my close friends told me:

"My first reaction was a feeling of outrage that a terrorist attack happened again in my country. I couldn't take my eyes off the online news channels for the next couple of days as the drama unfolded. Watching the loss of innocent lives and the pain of the victims' relatives was heart-rending. I was looking for some retribution from the Government and was angered that no immediate action was being taken."

Nitin Ramamurthy, San Francisco, California, USA.

I left for India right after Thanksgiving to spend Christmas and New Year's with my family in Chennai (formerly Madras), on the southeastern coast of India. Mumbai, (formerly Bombay), is located on the western side of the sub-continent facing the Arabian Sea. As I landed in Chennai I could feel that there was gloom and despair all around though we were georgraphically thousands of kilometers away from Mumbai. Not surprisingly, December, a month usually marked with colorful multi-ethnic celebrations and festivities, was now a period of sad mourning for the whole country as citizens tried to brace themselves to the reality of what had just happened. Out of respect and as a sign of our solidarity in tough times, people all over India, including hotels and some restaurants, cancelled Christmas and New Year's Eve celebrations as we remembered every one of those people, both adults and young children, who lost their lives in vain.

The Mumbai incident sparked many strong feelings within the youth of India as people finally woke up to the fact that despite India progressing at a rapid growth rate and so much hooked into globalization, we still have a dysfunctional political and security system. It seems that this lack of leadership and foresight from politicians and bureaucrats cost many lives. According to reports that followed on NDTV News and IBNlive.com, the Indian government had been warned previously that attacks of this nature are likely to occur. Unfortunately, national, provincial, and municipal authorities did not take this security threat seriously and thus resulted in the tragedy that the world witnessed in great detail.

Lauding the resilience of Mumbaiites is no longer justified; people have no choice but to go on with their lives. Nearly eight months after the attacks, nothing has been fully resolved. I still read in the internet news and watch on TV of the drawn out trial of the one terrorist that was captured and the unending dialogue between India and Pakistan that is leaving many Indian citizens both in India and abroad restless and increasingly impatient. Pakistani citizens are also in the doldrums. Political tensions between India and Pakistan go back more than fifty years, ever since they have been fighting over the ownership of Kashmir. Despite evidence and statements from the captured terrorist, Pakistan still denies that these operations were conceived and carried out by terror groups in Pakistan. They have also not taken any action or been proactive about cracking down on terror groups in Pakistan. (Editor's note: this account was written before the extensive autumn 2009 Pakistan military campaign against insurgents in the remote tribal regions).

As I end this reflection, I am including thoughts from a friend who was in Mumbai at that time…

"There were two sights that are irreversibly etched in my memory and will remain with me for the rest of my life…..That of the Taj Mahal with its domes on fire…. I just couldn't help but think….'My baby sister could have been one of the several victims who were shot!'

"The second was the old man old man being rescued from Nariman Bhavan after over two days of being held hostage by the terrorists. The sight of the old man with his bag and a walking stick made me wonder what he had done to deserve this in the last few years of his life!

"Even talking about that dreadful four day period today, a full eight months after the attacks, brings tears to my eyes… thinking of the innocent lives that were lost, the trauma that the people of Mumbai went through, and the permanent damage that was caused to the Taj Mahal, one of the foremost symbols of Mumbai.

"The very day that the Taj re-opened its doors for guests….my family was there to support the heritage site that we all love so much. What we saw in the Taj evoked in us a sense of pride in Mumbai and its residents..The restaurants were all packed to capacity in collective support for the structure that had borne so much just a few days ago and the strong defiance against terrorism in the hearts and minds of the Mumbaiites."

Janhavi Kandalgaonkar, Mumbai, India

Lotika Gulvadi, an international student from Chennai, India, just completed her Master's degree in Marketing from Golden Gate University. Lotika started writing brief articles and journals while completing her Bachelor's degree in English Literature in India and since her time at Golden Gate University, has been contributing frequently to newsletters and reviews for the San Francisco American Marketing Association.