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Asia Pacific: Perspectives is a peer-reviewed journal published on average once a year in April/May. It welcomes submissions from all fields of the social sciences and the humanities with relevance to the Asia Pacific region.* In keeping with the Jesuit traditions of the University of San Francisco, *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* commits itself to the highest standards of learning and scholarship.

Our task is to inform public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent views and ideas that promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and the dissemination of knowledge unreservedly. Papers adopting a comparative, interdisciplinary approach will be especially welcome. **Graduate students are strongly encouraged to submit their work for consideration.**

* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

The Future of U.S. Relations with Japan and China: Will Bilateral Relations Survive the New American Unilateralism?

by Rita Kernacs, M.A.

Abstract

The following paper examines how America's bilateral relations with Japan and China may be affected by Washington's recent move towards an increasingly unilateral foreign policy. Immediately after the tragic attack on the United States on September 11th, it appeared that relations with Japan and China, as with many countries around the world, would grow stronger. Finding a common enemy in "militant Islam" did much to improve U.S.-China relations. But, despite the temporary warmth, issues related to Taiwan, a lack of trust regarding each nation's intentions for dominance of the region, the quest for oil, the increased likelihood of a regional arms race, and differences over how to guarantee human rights still served to cool the relationship.

In the case of Japan, relations between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi have been very strong. But with public opinion in Japan becoming increasingly anti-American, a situation exacerbated by the Iraq war, there are increased calls from the left and the right for Japan to distance itself from the U.S. Japan's growing right wing has advocated that Japan should re-militarize and become a "normal nation," play a more independent role in international affairs, and strengthen its multilateral relations in the region. With increasing trade and investment between Japan and China, some strategists have anticipated a new regionalism that would interlock the two nations economically and serve as a balancing force in the world.

After the attacks of September 11th, it was widely predicted that a new age of multilateralism would emerge. Washington seemed to want a coalition of friends throughout the world, especially in Asia, leading many to believe that Washington was genuinely committed to working with the international community to end terrorism. But just as quickly as the world banded together in the wake of the crisis, the coalition of sympathetic countries seemed to disintegrate. As the memories of 9/11 began to fade, many world leaders became less enthusiastic about banding together with the United States solely because of Washington's views on terrorism.¹ And as the Bush Administration began to expand its "war on terror" beyond Afghanistan to Iraq, many leaders around the world were caught trying to balance their anti-terrorist collaboration with the U.S. with rising anti-American sentiment, economic instability, and other domestic issues that threatened their nation's security.

America's war on Iraq signaled a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. Unlike other recent wars where it had the support of a coalition of countries, as in the case of Afghanistan, the first Gulf War and Bosnia, the U.S. now had almost no support in the world community save for Britain. Washington had to decide whether following a narrow unilateral

policy was worth the risk of alienating many of its allies around the world. Despite concerns that ignoring the world community would negatively affect U.S. foreign relations, the White House decided to bypass the U.N. Security Council and carry out a "pre-emptive" strike against Iraq based on the premise that Iraq had hidden weapons of mass destruction and might, in the future, pose a direct threat to the United States. Though opposition was fierce worldwide, public protests dissipated once the bombs began to rain down on Baghdad. But should one conclude that America's relations with nations around the globe would be unaffected? Long-term relations with many countries in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia will reflect this change in global politics. The following paper will examine how U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China relations will be impacted by President Bush's post September 11th foreign policy.

U.S. - China Relations Overview

The United States has always recognized the possible threat posed by China were it to grow economically and military to a point where it could eventually undermine America's position as the sole superpower. After President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger visited China in the early 1970's, Washington's China policy shifted from containment to engagement and relations were eventually normalized. The motivation for improved relations was the belief that the U.S. could help China develop economically and militarily and, in return, garner the favor of an emerging superpower. Bill Clinton wanted Beijing to help advance fundamental American interests and values. But, in order for this type of engagement to achieve its intended purpose, it is necessary to have a certain level of trust between the two nations. So is there a genuine trust and friendship between the U.S. and China? And if there is, will it survive the new U.S. move towards unilateralism?

"Realists" would generally deny that any true friendship could develop between the United States and China because of their belief that the two nations are destined for conflict due to their place in the world order, where the U.S. is a status-quo and China a revisionist power.² The realists would argue that the revisionist state is naturally dissatisfied with its position, which is determined by the status quo-state, and therefore, it will eventually challenge the status-quo power, resulting in conflict. The way to avoid such conflict would be to bring the revisionist state into the status quo-community. The goal of the United States, therefore, has not been to challenge China but to draw it closer to the international community. As was stated by President Bill Clinton's National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, America's engagement of China was designed to pull China "in the direction of the international community." Former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, put it this way: "We seek a China that embraces universally recognized human rights and global norms of conduct and one that works with us to build a secure international order" (Johnston).

As the status-quo power, America has focused on engaging China in an effort to bring it into the status-quo community. However, it is unlikely that a revisionist state

will relinquish its desire to undermine the position of the status-quo state through engagement alone. Engagement must be accompanied by a policy aimed at building mutual trust and respect. Clear evidence must be present to convince the revisionist state that the status-quo power is genuinely committed to allowing the challenger state a proper place in the status-quo community. One way to build such trust is through policies that engage the revisionist state in a consistent and transparent culture of diplomacy. However, in recent years, U.S. policy towards China has been less than consistent, and often even contradictory.

In the early part of his administration, President George W. Bush, for the first time, referred to China as a "strategic competitor" ostensibly reversing America's China policy from that of the previous administration, which preferred to view China as a strategic partner. Five months before September 11th, Bush declared his vision for the security of the Asia Pacific Region, which was based on America's "commitment to the people of Taiwan" and required that the U.S. continues to challenge China's rule in the name of the "universal values that gave our nation birth" (Schmitt). In addition, Bush increased U.S. support for Taiwan, approved one of the biggest arms deals to the island in years and, in April 2001, announced that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan's democracy (Kaplan). But shortly after September 11th, President Bush reversed U.S. China policy and turned to China for help with the new "War on Terror." In the administration's National Security Strategy, released a year later, "terrorism" replaced a "rising China" as the United States' primary strategic threat (Abramowitz and Bosworth 119). Just weeks after September 11th, the U.S. and China were sharing intelligence and making plans for how to fight their new enemy. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that the United States and China had both been victims of terrorist violence and faced a common threat from international terrorism (U.S. Interests in East Asia).

Islam: The Common Enemy?

September 11th helped solidify the U.S. and China relationship in that it helped define a common enemy: Militant Islam. The Uighurs, a Turkic people in Xinjiang province, are Muslim and have been trying, much like the Tibetans, to liberate themselves from Chinese control. In recent years, however, the movement in Tibet has been largely peaceful, while in Xinjiang province, it has become increasingly violent. In trying to suppress the separatist movement known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) China has been widely criticized by the international community and specifically the United States for its abuse of human rights.

But as part of the renewed friendship between Beijing and Washington, post 9/11, the U.S. State Department designated the "ETIM" a terrorist organization. Supporters of the designation maintain that there may be a link between the Uighurs and al-Qaeda while skeptics have pointed out that the Bush Administration's clampdown on the ETIM came as the U.S. sought to prevent a veto in a U.N. Security Council debate over Iraq. In any event, the designation has made it

easier for China to rule Xinjiang province with an iron fist and without interference from the outside world. In an effort to ethnically cleanse the region, according to Amnesty International, huge numbers of Han Chinese have been resettled in Xinjiang province, local language Islamic schools have been closed, illegal birth control measures have been instituted against Uighurs, and Uighur women have been pressured to marry Han Chinese (Pocha).

U.S.-China Collaboration on Solving the North Korean Crisis

One of the biggest accomplishments of the new friendship between the U.S. and China has been China's willingness to cooperate with the United States over the North Korean crisis. Despite China and Korea's historical friendship and military alliance, China has been careful not to appear partial to either North Korea or the United States. Helping to bring both sides to the negotiating table through high-level talks, such as the six-party talks in February 2004, was one way China worked to ease tension between the two sides.

China's ultimate goal for North Korea, however, differs from the U.S. plan. While the U.S. would prefer a total collapse of Kim Jong Il's regime, China would prefer a peaceful Northeast Asian security environment that includes a communist North Korea. Such an arrangement is essential for China to maintain its foreign investment inflows, which are necessary for China to meet its goal of \$3,000 GDP per capita by 2020. Other Chinese considerations include the fear that millions of refugees will flow into Manchuria upon collapse of the North Korean regime, eliminating the "buffer state" between China and South Korea where 37,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed, as well as the loss of South Korean investment in Northern China. In an effort to keep North Korea engaged, China has had to balance its condemnation of its long-time ally by blocking U.S. attempts to use the U.N. Security Council to censure North Korea for withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty and opposing sanctions against Kim Jong Il.

Despite the mutual desire to end the crisis on the peninsula, it is not likely that the U.S. and China can forge a long lasting relationship unless several philosophical and geopolitical differences can be overcome. Some of the most crucial issues that stand to cool the recent warmth in the relationship are the unresolved issue over Taiwan, a lack of trust regarding each nation's intentions for dominance of the region, the quest for oil, the increased likelihood of a regional arms race, and differences over how to guarantee human rights.

Taiwan

One of the most divisive issues pushing the two nations back to the politics of the Cold War has been the status of Taiwan. During a 2002 ASEAN regional forum, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan warned Secretary of State Colin Powell that China was "seriously concerned" about U.S. relations with Taiwan and called on the U.S. to stop military contacts and arms sales to the island (KMT Seeks U.S. Mediation). KMT Legislator John H. Chang also warned the U.S. about a

possible arms race between the U.S. and China and cautioned the U.S. against employing a Cold War mentality towards China.

Since relations were normalized in 1979, the U.S. position regarding Taiwan has been a type of "strategic ambiguity," whereby Washington has verbally supported Beijing's "one China" policy while continuing to provide weapons to Taiwan. This policy of strategic ambiguity has been labeled a success because it has avoided a military confrontation. But it may also have created an environment of mistrust that may adversely affect U.S.-China relations in the long run. One example of how a lack of clarity in U.S. policy concerning Taiwan caused deep-seeded distrust, and may thereby have increased the likelihood of armed conflict, was the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait confrontation.³

After the conflict, China continued to grow increasingly suspicious of the United States. Many in Beijing began to question whether the U.S. was moving towards a policy of "peaceful evolution," whereby Washington would eventually evolve its ambiguous policy into clear-cut support for Taiwan's independence. In an effort to assuage Chinese fear, President Bill Clinton announced on a visit to Shanghai in 1998 that there were no two China's, no independence for Taiwan, and no support for Taiwan's membership in the U.N. or other international organizations of sovereign states. Relations between China and the U.S. again improved and it seemed that the Taiwan issue could finally take a back seat to other important issues like human rights and weapons proliferation, which were of grave concern to the U.S. Though the Clinton administration was successful in maintaining the ambiguous status quo and winning back China's trust to a certain extent, it wouldn't be long before the next administration would swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. Chinese leaders were left wondering if perhaps the United States was improving relations and strengthening economic ties with the sole purpose of keeping its enemy under a watchful eye.

While the current Bush Administration has worked to restructure and strengthen Taiwan's military, it appears the plan may have created fear and suspicion not just in Beijing. Washington's plan may have actually backfired, negatively impacting the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and helping to escalate the Taiwanese movement towards independence. More than two years after the Bush Administration approved a \$20 billion to \$30 billion arms package for Taiwan, only a few weapons have been ordered and none have been delivered, due to Taiwan's shrinking defense budget. Many Taiwanese legislators are also asserting that U.S. policies concerning weapons sales are actually driven by business interests, resulting in "inflated prices or efforts to dump obsolete weapons on Taiwan" (Pomfret and Philip). Not being able to keep pace with China's military build-up by purchasing defensive weapons, some Taiwanese military officials are now advocating the acquisition of offensive rather than defensive weapons in an effort to intimidate China. In response to Taiwan's recent talk of holding a referendum on a new constitution in 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on Washington to stop sending mixed signals to Taiwan and

be very clear in opposing the use of a referendum or writing a constitution or all other tactics used by the Taiwan authorities to pursue a "separatist agenda."

A Lack of Trust

According to a recent congressional report published by the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, the U.S. and China "have sharply contrasting worldviews, competing geo-strategic interests, and opposing political systems." It goes on to say that increasing economic ties have not changed China's strategic perception that the U.S. is its principal obstacle to growing regional and global military influence (Donnelly). But it's not only the United States that is apprehensive about the relationship; it appears the feelings are mutual.

China has been growing increasingly leery of what it sees as growing American imperialism and a possible encirclement of China. In response to America's invasion of Afghanistan, Deng Hao, a Chinese strategist, proclaimed in a government-sponsored journal on international studies that America's presence in Central Asia will "remold the strategic configuration of the area, presenting a challenge to China's security and strategic interests" (Kaplan). Shortly after September 11th, China's longtime ally, Pakistan, with a host of other countries, joined the bandwagon to fight terrorism. And when it became clear that U.S. troops would be stationed indefinitely in Afghanistan, some saw this as America's "security noose" tightening around "Beijing's neck" (Schmitt). But China is concerned not just about a physical encirclement by the U.S. More importantly, there is a deep disapproval of American imperialism in the political, ideological as well as the geographical sense. For example, China vehemently opposes the violation of another country's sovereignty in most cases. While the U.S. has recently moved further from the notion of inviolable sovereignty, (interventions in Panama, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are examples) China has tended to stick to a more conservative concept of sovereignty referred to as "hyper-sovereignty" (Feigenbaum).

The Quest for Oil

Behind the U.S. and Japan, China is the world's largest oil consumer. And as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with GDP growing at a rate of 7% per year, China is becoming increasingly dependent on oil to sustain its economic development. According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, China's oil consumption is growing at 7.5% per year, seven times faster than the U.S. By the year 2010 China is expected to have 90 times more cars than in 1990. According to a report by the International Energy Agency, by 2030 Chinese oil imports will equal imports by the U.S. today.

And while China has sought to diversify its oil sources between the former Soviet Union, South America and North Africa, it is becoming increasingly dependent on Middle East Oil. Today, 58% of China's oil imports come from the Middle East; it is expected to grow to 70% by the year 2015. If Islamic fundamentalism spreads to oil producing countries, it would drastically increase world oil prices and threaten to undermine China's economic development. Hence China's seem

ingly cooperative approach to George W. Bush's "War on Terror" and a fairly restrained criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq. However, according to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, the feeling among many Chinese leaders is that America seeks to dominate the Persian Gulf in order to control its energy resources, thereby containing China's aspirations in the region. This alone makes the U.S. a critical threat to China's long-term energy security.

One way that China has guaranteed its access to Persian Gulf oil has been through cultivating relations with Saudi Arabia. Though the Saudis have been careful not to jeopardize their relationship with the U.S. by limiting their military purchases from China, according to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relations could drive the Saudis to end their reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of their regime's security and offer China an expanded role" (Luft).

China has also worked to strengthen its relations with other nations in the region, including a visit by a Chinese envoy to Syria last October followed by stops in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Israel (Liwen). In Damascus, Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Ittri and Chinese envoy on Middle East affairs, Wang Shijie discussed the strengthening of Syrian-Sino relations in the areas of economic affairs, culture and non-governmental affairs as well as bilateral relations. More recently, in January 2004, President Hu Jintao, on a state visit to Egypt, held talks with Egyptian President Mubarak where they discussed the strengthening of Sino-Arab relations, setting up a Sino-Arab cooperation forum, as well as encouraging peace and stability in the region through establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. According to Hu, in the past decade, the Sino-Arab trade has increased tenfold, totaling 25.4 billion dollars, an increase of 43 percent over the previous year (Liwen). China has also used military sales to forge closer links with the region. Today, many states attempting to offset Israel's military consider China the best alternative source for weaponry.

The Beginning of an Arms Race?

The War on Terror affected the U.S. China relationship by both strengthening and undermining the relationship. Finding a common enemy provided a needed boost to the relationship, but the lack of trust that American unilateralism inspired may be the spark that will ignite an arms race, which could seriously destabilize the relationship in the long run. It has been suggested that since the Bush administration's recent withdrawal from the 1982 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the increase in America's development of its missile-defense system and President George W. Bush's adoption of the pre-emptive strike doctrine, China has become determined to improve its defense capabilities. Realists, who believe that all nations are potentially a threat to one another, would argue that given China's growing economic strength an eventual arms race is inevitable. But even those who feel the realist argument warrants military preparedness, one must realize that increased U.S. hegemony will only intensify the scope and nature of the arms race. With both sides being

equally resentful of what they see as a potential threat to their security, we may be moving closer to conflict.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China imported arms worth a total of \$10.78 billion in 1990 dollars in the decade up to 2001, making it the world's largest weapons importer in 2000. And in March, 2002, Beijing announced that it was boosting military outlays by 17.6% to about \$20 billion for that year. But according to a Pentagon report released July 12, 2002, actual annual spending had reached \$65 billion. This would make China the second-biggest defense budget in the world besides the US, currently at \$399 billion. And while the Cold War is officially over, it seems that America's old Cold War adversary, in an effort to revive its own military power, may be reviving its strategic partnership with China. According to Russia's former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia's military-industrial complex can be preserved only by supplying military equipment and arms to China (Lague and Lawrence).

Peter Leitner, a senior strategic-trade advisor to the Department of Defense, writes that the Chinese military is pushing to produce a long-range cruise missile. As part of their power projection, they are trying to replicate the capabilities the U.S. has with the Tomahawk cruise missile (Korb). Most experts don't feel that the recent military build-up in China threatens the U.S. monopoly of military power, but they are becoming increasingly concerned about China's nuclear capabilities. According to intelligence reports, the Russians are helping China build a nuclear-fueled ballistic-missile submarine that could be in service as early as 2010 (Korb). China currently has 24 liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) but it is unclear if any are capable of hitting the U.S.

The Human Rights Debate

Another stumbling block haunting U.S.-China relations is the issue of human rights. The United States has almost every year introduced a resolution denouncing China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission and has pressured Beijing about releasing countless political prisoners. The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report regularly blasts China for its alleged human rights abuses, focusing on the lack of freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of religion.

But starting in 2000, the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC released its own human rights report on the United States. In the 2001 report, the Chinese document called the U.S. the only country where carrying a private weapon is a constitutional right; ranked the U.S. "first in the world" for its incarceration of more than 2 million of its people and declared life, freedom and personal safety in American society under "serious threat" due to the high rate of violence and crime. Every year, according to the document, the United States assumes the role of "world judge of human rights" and "distorts human rights conditions" in other parts of the world, including China, while ignoring its own human rights violations. The report concluded by urging the United States to "change its ways, give up its hegemonic

practice of creating confrontation and interfering in the internal affairs of others by exploiting the human rights issue." China's 2003 Human Rights Report criticized the U.S. for its "reckless use" of depleted uranium (DU) shells, cluster bombs and "Mark-77" napalm in the U.S. led war on Iraq.

Recently the Bush administration decided to introduce a resolution against China before the U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in April 2004 for what it calls China's failure to meet its human rights commitments made at the 2002 U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue and "backsliding on key human rights issues." It is clear that the two countries have deeply divergent views about what constitutes a human right violation, and as long as neither can define human rights abuse nor admit that each may be guilty of violations, U.S.-China relations will continue to be strained.

Japan

In many ways Japan is the antithesis of China when one considers its relationship with the United States. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. and Japan have generally had a solid relationship based on mutual trust and strong political, ideological, and military cooperation. But it would be a mistake to assume that this relationship will remain unchanged in the wake of September 11th. As Washington adopts an increasingly aggressive and unilateral foreign policy, there have been increased calls from Japan's growing right wing to re-militarize and become a "normal nation," play a more independent role in international affairs, and strengthen its multilateral relations in the region. Much of this is in response to growing anti-American sentiment. One might argue that most of these scenarios are unlikely in the near future, due to the history of U.S.-Japan relations, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and Japan's dependence on American military protection. But it is possible that, in the long run, Japan will gradually drift away from the U.S. in exchange for strengthening its ties with China, strengthening its multilateral relations through ASEAN and other regional forums, and ensuring its supply of natural resources through improved relations with the Middle East. The following are examples of areas that may, in combination with other factors, work to weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Is Japan Reasserting Itself?

In the postwar years, Japan accepted the fact that it would not become a major military power, so it focused instead on becoming an economic leader. By the 1980's, Japan had surpassed anyone's expectations for economic success and was leading nearly all of East Asia towards what would come to be known as the Asian Economic Miracle. And although a decade of miraculous growth was followed by more than a decade of recession and economic downturn, Japan is still the second largest economy in the world with one of the best-equipped self defense forces. Its defense budget ranges from second to fifth largest in the world and is predicted to increase steadily over the next several years.

Yet this seemingly powerful nation is dependent on the United States for much of its military protection. Some have described Japan as a semi-sovereign country in the area of

security because of the restrictions that were imposed on its military by the United States after World War II. For example, Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) are supposed to act only with the US Armed Forces and strictly in case of self-defense. It is because of this discrepancy in economic and military power that some realists believe that "the uneasy asymmetry between Japan's economic and military power will be broken sooner or later since historically no major economic power has remained such without transforming itself into a major military power" (Inoguchi).

Japan's Pacifist Core

What has kept Japan from pursuing the realist course from economic to military might has been its post-war constitution and a deep-seeded pacifist tradition that is engrained in the political landscape and public consciousness. Japan's military capability is restricted by Article 9 of the Constitution, which states: "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes." But in recent years, there has been a renewed sense in Japanese political and popular culture that perhaps their Constitution is outdated. Many right-wing Japanese politicians from Japan's leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have objected to Japan's post-war constitution. They believe it was imposed upon the Japanese people by the Occupation Authorities and does not reflect the needs of modern day Japan. These right-wing politicians would like a more independent role for Japan in its self-defense and view the dependence of Japan's military on the United States with skepticism. Left-wing politicians and the majority of the Japanese public are also becoming more opposed to increased military cooperation with the U.S. because they see it as an abandonment of Japanese pacifist policies, especially since the U.S. appears to them to become increasingly aggressive as was illustrated in the recent invasion and occupation of Iraq.

The Case Against Pacifism

Although they authored Japan's constitution, some Americans have encouraged Japan to abandon its pacifist politics and offer military support to U.S. operations in the region. Critics have called Japan a "free-rider" pointing out that it is the U.S.'s guaranteed military protection that enables Japan to maintain its pacifist policies and spend more of its resources on its civilian sector. It also allows Japan to further its pacifist image while cultivating different partners-many of whom the U.S. sees as security threats. Those in the U.S. government who subscribe to this view have been a major force in pushing Japan to do more to support the U.S. in international conflict resolution. The Bush administration has implied that it wants a substantial military partnership from Japan that would parallel relations with its European allies.

During the Gulf War, Japan was harshly criticized by the U.S. for not contributing to the first U.S. led war against Iraq. In response, Japan signed a Joint Security Declaration with the U.S. in 1996, outlining how the two countries would work together on defense policies in response to changes in the international security environment. In 1999, after nine

months of deliberations, Japan's Diet passed the "1999 Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan," which greatly loosened the restrictions on the conditions for dispatching the SDF. And just after the September 11th, terrorist bombing, Japan pledged its support for the U.S. and passed several similar laws, such as the "Antiterrorism Special Measures Law" aimed at allowing Japan's Self Defense Forces to provide more support to the U.S. and other armed forces. And while it expanded the criteria under which the use of military force was permissible, it did not permit Japan to send troops to fight alongside the U.S. military.

In March 2004, Japan sent 1100 non-combat troops to Iraq (the largest overseas dispatch since World War II) for the purpose of offering humanitarian assistance and helping to rebuild schools and other infrastructure. Despite massive public protests and accusations that the dispatch violated the constitution, Prime Minister Koizumi has pledged that the troops will remain in Iraq until needed.

LDP's Support of U.S. Policies

While Japan is currently unable to assist the United States in combat missions, the Koizumi administration has been increasingly supportive of the Bush administration's military endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq. Just after September 11th, Koizumi expressed his support for the U.S. and pledged to provide military assistance for the invasion of Afghanistan. While this was immediately seen as a major shift in its foreign policy, Japan apparently backtracked on Koizumi's plan and ended up contributing very little militarily to the Afghan war.

The reason for the lack of actual military contributions could be attributed to internal politics, specifically, Koizumi's own party the LDP, which vetoed the early dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Party leaders claimed that the policy of connecting the SDF to American war aims was not in Japan's best interest and worried that the LDP would suffer in the next election if the Self Defense Forces were dispatched. In the November 2003 elections, Koizumi's party was indeed weakened, likely as a result of dispatching the SDF to Iraq. While the ruling coalition managed to keep control of 275 of the 480 seats in the Lower House of Parliament, (a loss of 12 seats) Koizumi's LDP won just 237 seats, below the simple majority of 247 it had by itself before the election. The opposition won 205 seats, a total gain of 17. Despite the apparent divisions in the Japanese government as well as within the LDP, Koizumi has become even more supportive of the Bush administration and managed to do in Iraq what he couldn't do in Afghanistan.

Growing Anti-American Sentiment

While Prime Minister Koizumi's administration has been strongly pro American, there are growing signs that the Japanese public is growing increasingly skeptical of this relationship. While anti-American sentiment has been present in Okinawa, it seemed these sentiments grew more in the 1990's. In 1996, in the first-ever prefectural plebiscite, 53% of the Okinawan electorate voted for both consolidation and reduction of the U.S. military presence and a reform of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. In September 2002,

the *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper reported that 77% of Japanese polled in a telephone survey opposed a military attack against Iraq and only 14% favored it. According to the April 2004 polls conducted by Asahi, 70% of the Japanese public still believes that America's policy in Iraq is misguided. According to Professor Takeshi Inoguchi, an international-relations expert at the University of Tokyo, the country's hesitance to give all-out support for U.S. plans concerning Iraq reflects a change in Japanese perceptions of its place in international relations and its ties with the United States (Kakuchi).

Multilateralism

Japan has in recent years become more internationally minded and has therefore moved to expand its multilateral role in the region. Tokyo has secured Japan's position as leader of the Asia Pacific region by consistently giving money to its neighbors, even throughout the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Since 1991, Japan has been the world's top contributor of total ODA funds (Office of Development Assistance). Despite Japan's economic troubles, it has maintained its commitment to supporting peace and offering assistance to war-torn countries. Japan's contributions to Middle East Peace have won high praise from Israel and Arab nations. Japan's pledge of assistance for rebuilding Afghanistan (\$500 million over two years) was larger than that of the U.S. or E.U. As of 1999, Japan was paying 67% more in foreign aid than the U.S. and accounted for nearly 20% of the U.N.'s budget in 2001.

Japan takes part in several regional forums such as ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). These forums deal with regional political, territorial and trade disputes. Japan is also currently involved with efforts to create an Asia-Pacific multilateral security dialogue framework, possibly an extension of ARF, as well as building a Northeast Asian Forum that includes Russia. Japan is also involved in plans for creating an Asian Monetary Fund. At this point it is called the Network of Bilateral Swap Agreements. Whether or not the institution will come to fruition is uncertain due to opposition by the United States.

As Asians become apprehensive about American unilateralism, many are realizing that multilateral disputes involving nations of East Asia are best resolved by East Asian nations. There exists "no need for the U.S. to be policeman for the region, self-appointed or elected by default" (E. Olsen in Arase). Current bilateral and multilateral tensions include the conflict between North and South Korea and China and Taiwan; disputes over territorial claims by Taiwan, China and Japan over the Senkaku islands; between South Korea and Japan over the Takeshima Islands; between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories; and between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. All of these disputes have been or can be dealt with through multi-lateral dialogues in regional meetings such as the Asean Regional Forum, the Four Part Talks on Korea, the Tri-lateral Forum on the North Pacific, the North-east Asia Cooperation Dialogue, or the South Pacific Forum.

Japan-China Relations

For many years, U.S. presence in East Asia was welcomed by many nations (including Japan) because of a fear of China and the belief that U.S. power balanced Chinese power. During the 1990's China experienced continued rapid economic growth just as Japan's economy stopped expanding. Many Japanese became fearful that China's economic growth could eventually undermine Japan's leading role in the region. This, together with rising Japanese nationalism and unresolved issues over territorial and historical disputes, has strained Japan-China relations.

Beijing has also grown increasingly concerned about Japan's military capabilities, specifically the broadening of Japan's strategic role as a result of U.S.-Japanese agreements since September 11th. Chinese leaders are furious about what they see as Japan's disregard for the humiliation and victimization of China during WWII, as well as Japanese support of Taiwan and a decline in Japanese aid to China. Prime Minister Koizumi's numerous visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine add further insult to injury from a Chinese perspective. Despite this rivalry, however, it appears that Japan's economic ties and political relations with China are strengthening rather than weakening.

Some Japanese and Chinese strategists have anticipated a new regionalism that would lock the two in a financial partnership that could serve as a balancing force in the world. Though that may not come about for some time, it does appear that things are moving in the right direction. In 1998, China and Japan issued a "Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development." Since then, Japan has ranked as China's largest trade partner while China grew to rank as Japan's 2nd largest trade partner after the U.S. There are as many as 20,000 Japanese businesses operating in China, providing job opportunities to more than 1 million people. Also, Japan has not introduced any trade barrier to China's exports, as it had for the U.S. Tokyo has even permitted its leading companies to transfer important technologies to China, something that Japan rarely does for other countries, including the U.S. Some have even attributed Japan's recent economic rebound to a surge in exports to China, up 42% in September and 28% in October 2003.

This is not to say that all is smooth sailing in Japan-China relations, but it does show that there is increasing trust in the relationship and a level of economic interdependence that will serve as a balancing factor if the two nations do have political or territorial confrontations. In a 2002 interview, Prime Minister Koizumi stated firmly that he does not subscribe to the view that China is a threat. What's more important is that Japan and China are focused less on hegemony and more on the development of their countries, which requires a prolonged, peaceful, and cooperative relationship with their Asian neighbors and especially one another.

Conclusion

America's demonstrated ability to wage war with minimal international support and the reconsideration of its worldwide basing requirements has raised questions about

America's commitment to its long standing alliances in Asia and elsewhere. The Bush Administration was quick to marginalize two of America's oldest allies in Europe - France and Germany - by deciding to invade Iraq. This does not bode well for its allies in Asia. The two relationships that America should care for and cultivate with extreme care are those of China and Japan. The relationship with China is clearly the more difficult of the two to maintain due to the historically unfriendly relations and opposing world views of the U.S. and China. The tragedy of September 11th may have driven President Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin into each others arms, but a relationship that's based on a common enemy and without any genuine trust is one that can quickly fade.

As the Bush administration wages war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the issues that divide China and the U.S. will not be easily resolved. While Washington was encouraged by the PRC's vote in support of both UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the international use of force against Afghanistan following the September 11th attacks, it is unlikely that China would again vote in favor of such a resolution. This was the case with the Iraq war. Despite President Bush's declaration in 2002 that China stands "side by side with the American people," many Chinese still see the U.S. as their principal adversary.

The main sources of contention that continue to fuel the flames of distrust are China's worries about American imperialism throughout Asia and the Middle East, weapon sales to Taiwan, and human rights. And though the Bush administration has put much effort during the past two years into salvaging this fragile relationship through numerous high level talks and political deal making, this has not established any long-term trust between the two. For now, China sits quietly wondering if after Iraq, the U.S. will need to find new enemies, making China next on the list. In reverse, the U.S. wonders if China will challenge it for control of the Middle East or if China is selling weapons to states unfriendly to the U.S. Washington's worst fear is the possibility that Beijing is gearing up for a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits.

On the other hand, there is a much simpler relationship that needs tending to. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, believes that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remains the foundation of U.S. engagement in Asia. And because of the importance of Japan in helping the U.S. maintain its influence in the region, it is important to nurture the relationship with Japan and recognize that the future of the relationship is not as solid as it once was. Despite Prime Minister Koizumi's staunch support of the United States, it is inevitable that as Japan's public opinion becomes increasingly anti-American, these feelings will undoubtedly permeate the government in time. At this point, Japan might try to reassert itself as both a political and an economic leader in Asia. And as Japan improves its multilateral relations, perhaps it will turn out that America's unilateral approach is no longer welcomed in the region.

ENDNOTES

- One of the main reasons that the Bush administration is having difficulty maintaining support for its "War on Terror" is because "terrorism" is an elusive concept that has not been clearly defined by the U.S. or the United Nations. Without defining what constitutes terror, many in the international community fear that such an open ended war can be directed at any number of countries for political rather than security reasons. For a more detailed discussion, see: "The Tricky Art of Defining Terrorism" by Pat M. Holt, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 7, 2002: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0307/p11s01-coop.html>
Also, see "Terrorism: Theirs and Ours" by Eqbal Ahmad, Professor Emeritus of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies, Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts for a look at the politics behind who is or isn't labeled a "terrorist." <http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm#Eqbal%20Ahmad>
- Realism is a political philosophy based on the notion that power is the primary end of political action. Political realism assumes that national interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power. It also assumes that nations will advance their own interests at the expense of other nations; making for an inherently unstable international environment where every nation is for itself. Definition taken from the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/polreal.htm>
When using the terms "status quo" and "revisionist power," I am referring to the terms identified by A.F.K. Oganski and Jacek Kugler as quoted by Alastair Iain Johnston in "Challenges to Asian Security: Myths and Reality" *International Security*, Spring 2003. According to Johnston, Oganski and Kugler define the status quo states as the ones who design the 'rules of the game' and which stand to benefit from these gains. The "challenger" or "revisionist" states want a "new place for themselves in international society" and "express a general dissatisfaction" with their "position in the system."
- In 1992, the Bush administration, in violation of its pledge in 1982 to reduce the quantity of arms sales to Taiwan, sold Taiwan 150 F-16 warplanes. Wanting to send a strong message to the U.S. and Taiwan about what might happen if Taiwan moved towards independence, China began a series of missile tests and naval air exercises using high-tech submarines, destroyers and missile launchings near Taiwan between 1995 and 1996. In response, the U.S. sent two battle carrier groups to the waters east of Taiwan to show that it was ready to come to Taiwan's defense if it was attacked. The situation became extremely tense and many feared an all out war in the Straits, but China eventually ended the tests and the crisis subsided.

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