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CONTENTS

Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Hidden but Contentious Issue in US-Japan Relations During the Carter Administration (1977-1981)

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Abstract

This paper is a study of specific aspects of the relations between the United States and Japan during the Carter Administration, centering three subjects: [1] Jimmy Carter's relationship with the Japanese prior to becoming the President of the United States, [2] the Tokai Nuclear facility in Japan and its impact on U.S.-Japan relations during the first year of the administration, and [3] a look at the relation of these issues and nuclear non-proliferation in today's world.

Making substantial use of over 380 declassified documents obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration and the Jimmy Carter Library, the paper sheds valuable light on the obscure but important conflict over the Tokai nuclear facility which threatened the good relationship between the U.S. and Japan to the extent that then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda publicly referred to its resolution as a "life and death" issue for Japan.

Introduction

A diligent reader of former President Jimmy Carter's memoir *Keeping Faith* (New York, 1982), would probably be impressed with the many pages devoted to describing the Iran hostage crisis, the negotiation of the SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union, and the ill-fated plan to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea. US relations with Japan hardly appear in Carter's version of his presidency, almost as if they were nonexistent. The same can be said after reviewing *Power and Principle* (New York, 1983), the memoir of Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. But was this in fact the case?

In fact, long before the international confrontation between the US and North Korea in the 1990s over nuclear energy facilities and the related issue of reprocessing nuclear fuel into weapons grade plutonium, a political battle of a similar type was brewing between the new Carter administration and its counterparts in Japan. This conflict between allies pitted two vital interests against each other. Carter was committed to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and was not about to see one of America's key allies breach that precept. Japan's leaders, on the other hand, saw the need for rapid construction and use of nuclear power facilities as vital to the economic interests of their nation, having been reminded of their energy vulnerability by the Arab oil embargo of 1973. America's Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, recalled that Prime Minister Fukuda called the situation a "life or death" issue.[1]

Depending substantially on over 400 pages of highly sensitive recently declassified documents from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the Carter Library, this paper focuses on the issue of Japan's nuclear energy development, specifically the Tokai reprocessing facility and how it became a very contentious issue during the first year of Carter's presidency. This issue threatened to cause "irreparable damage"[2] between the new Carter administration and Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda.

The declassified documents reveal just how contentious the nuclear energy issue became, and how Carter was forced to work out a compromise with his Pacific ally on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation concerning the Tokai nuclear reprocessing facility in Ibaraki Prefecture near Tokyo. The US side eventually agreed to permit the startup or 'hot testing' of the new facility using US-origin fuel for a period of two years until 1979, thus satisfying Japan's need for the continued development and testing of nuclear energy as a viable alternative energy source for the entire country.

Based on the lack of information concerning Japan in the memoirs of Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, it appeared that the Carter Administration thought the relationship with the Government of Japan was a good one and, for the most part, it was. The declassified documents, however, tell a very different story.[3]

Some background information to help understand Carter's 'nuclear-mindset' is necessary to understand what occurred during the first eight months of Carter's presidency. While Governor of Georgia, Carter had a good relationship with the Japanese. He maintained strong ties in both the business and political arenas. Carter, a devoutly religious man himself, had a few close Japanese friends who had converted to Christianity. The first, Tadeo Yoshida, president of the YKK Zipper Company, was a well-known philanthropist who invested heavily in the State of Georgia while Carter was Governor. The second was Masayoshi Ohira, the Prime Minister of Japan beginning in 1979 and a member of the Trilateral Commission during the Tokyo Summit in 1975 when he first met Carter. Ohira would become one of three heads of state with whom President Carter would feel the closest personal ties (the other two were Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and President Omar Torrijos of Panama).[4]

In 1973 Jimmy Carter was chosen to be part of the Trilateral Commission to bring together business, political, and academic leaders from the three developed areas of the world—Western Europe, Japan and North America—essentially to foster dialogue and cooperation on common problems.[5] In May 1975 Carter was scheduled to attend a meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Japan. At this point he was already a candidate for the presidency; this trip was to be his only overseas trip during the campaign.[6]

In Japan Carter visited the Diet and was eager to meet with other Japanese government leaders, but they were not convinced it was worth their time to meet with him. Eventually Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Vice Premier Takeo Fukuda, and Prime Minister Takeo Miki received him. The most important aspect of the trip was the opportunity it provided for Carter to enhance his relationship with his fellow commission members.[7] It is evident that Carter had

built up a good relationship with high-ranking Japanese businessmen and officials prior to his presidency.

One of the first things Carter did as President was to send Vice President Walter Mondale on a trip to Asia. This was in line with the first goal of the new administration, namely to improve relations with Western Europe and Japan. This gesture of goodwill went a long way to improving the U.S. relationship with Japan that had stalled or derailed somewhat because of the Nixon shocks, the unilateral measures imposed by the United States on U.S. - Japan trade.[8]

One of the few references to Japan's nuclear energy policy in either Carter's or Brzezinski's memoirs is a reference by Brzezinski to a weekly report that he gave only to the President. In his weekly report of March 18, 1977 he mentions Japan and reprocessing: "I want to alert you to the extreme sensitivity of the Japanese over the impact of our nonproliferation initiatives. Our new policy has seriously complicated Japan's nuclear power planning and objectives."[9] Prior to this reference, however, the secret documents revealed that a number of important discussions had already taken place.
Beginning the Tokai dialogue

We begin discussion of the Carter documents in late January 1977, soon after Vice President Mondale was sent to Japan. In a secret document from the Department of State the memorandum of conversations between the Vice President and Prime Minister Fukuda begin the dialogue that would eventually threaten the good mutual relationship between the two countries.

During Mondale's first day of talks introductions and pleasantries were exchanged. Topics included economic issues and GNP as well as laying the groundwork for the two administrations to work closely together.[10] On the second day, however, one of the main issues was that of the security of the Korean peninsula and the withdrawal of ground forces. During his campaign, Carter had mentioned pulling troops out of South Korea. The Vice President reassured the Prime Minister that when the President spoke of the withdrawal of ground forces, he had always stressed that it would be done in the closest consultation with the governments of both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.[11]

Mondale goes on to say that in that second day of discussions there were several other points he wished to discuss. First, with respect to nuclear proliferation, he said the U.S. had pressed both Germany and France to exercise great care with respect to sales of sensitive materials and technologies, that reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons-grade material are "simply bomb factories."[12] This was a sensitive topic indeed, and given Japan's history, their decision to develop nuclear energy was made with great care. This decision, combined with their almost total dependence on foreign oil, meant that the Japanese had no choice but to develop alternate-energy sources; nuclear energy was the most viable source for their self-sufficient energy policy.

This decision marks the first time in the Carter administration's dealings with the Japanese that the subject of nuclear reprocessing emerged; one would think that the Vice President could have been more sensitive than to call the reprocessing plants "simply bomb factories." In making

reference to the Germans and French, the Vice President was laying the groundwork for further discussions by making reference to the goals of the nonproliferation treaty. This treaty and other attempts at arms control have since formed the basis of what has been an attempt by two nations, albeit a difficult one, to control the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Since the end of World War II nuclear arms control has revolved around three kinds of negotiations: controls on testing and development of nuclear weapons, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty; controls on the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that currently do not have them, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty; and ceilings on the numbers of weapons that the two superpowers deploy, such as Salt I, Salt II.[13] Salt I was signed on May 26, 1972. President Carter and Leonid Breznev of the Soviet Union would later sign Salt II in June 1979.

Prior to the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 a number of crucial events occurred related to the spread of nuclear technology. In December 1953 President Eisenhower announced the "Atoms for Peace" program at the United Nations, essentially permitting American corporations to sell reactors and fissile materials abroad. And as part of the plan, in 1957, the UN established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to attempt to account for the flow of fissile material in and out of each reactor, in order to make sure that it was not being diverted to make weapons. As might have been expected, by the mid-1960's, most European countries and a surprising number of Third World countries, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iran and Argentina, were all operating nuclear reactors.[14]

When the Nonproliferation Treaty was signed in 1968, the U.S, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed not to transfer technology that would permit the development of nuclear weapons in other countries. The other signatories of the treaty agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. France and China did not sign the agreement; neither Charles DeGaulle nor Mao Tse-Tung wanted to undermine their country's respective infant nuclear weapons programs.[15]

An incident which greatly influenced Carter's stand on nuclear energy occurred early in 1952 when a nuclear reactor at an experimental installation in Chalk River, Canada, suffered a meltdown and radioactive material escaped into the atmosphere. The Canadian government made an urgent request to the Atomic Energy Commission for assistance in disassembling the damaged nuclear reactor core.

> "Carter was a member of the team dispatched to the site. A duplicate mock-up of the reactor was constructed on a nearby tennis court, in which the men were able to practice each tedious step of the dismantling process. The intensity of the radiation at the core meant that each man could spend only ninety seconds in the reactor. In teams of three they descended far beneath the ground, where their work was monitored by closed-circuit television. Every time they removed a bolt or fitting, the equivalent piece was removed from the mock-up. Finally, Carter and his two colleagues descended into the reactor and worked furiously but methodically for their allotted time. Eventually the reactor was completely disassembled. The experience made a deep impression on Carter, perhaps more so than he knew at the time."[16]

Uncertainties of the Economies of Nuclear Reprocessing

On March 15, 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance briefed President Carter on his upcoming meeting with Japanese Ambassador Togo. One of the main topics to be discussed was the U.S. Nuclear Policy, in particular the issue of Japanese concern that emerging U.S. nuclear fuel reprocessing policy, and a possible moratorium on reprocessing, might restrict development of Japan's domestic nuclear energy program. A particularly urgent agenda for Japan was to assure US permission to begin operation of its US$200 million Tokai Mura nuclear power facility, then approaching start-up, which depended on fuel of U.S. origin.[17]

This memo contains the first mention of the Tokai nuclear facility included in the declassified documents. The Tokai Mura facility is located in Ibaraki prefecture, northeast of the Tokyo or Kanto region.[18] The Japanese administration was under considerable political pressure both at home and abroad not only to continue development of an alternative energy source, but to put the over US$200 million of invest-ment to work. They felt it was time to begin "hot testing" and that the US was beginning to contradict itself on its policy with Japan. Comments were also made suggesting that the Japanese were being treated differently from the Germans or French, both of whom already had facilities similar to the Tokai plant.

In another briefing dated March 20, 1977 Cyrus Vance prepared the President for upcoming discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda. He begins by saying, "Because of the extreme concern Japan feels for the possible shape of new U.S. policy toward nuclear reprocessing, Fukuda sent a special representative, Ryukishi Imai, to hold discussions with U.S. officials. Imai forcefully argued that the objectives of nonpro-liferation can be achieved by limiting access to reprocessing to the only four states which can justify a full fuel cycle (U.S., USSR, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan); that Japan signed the NPT (nonproliferation treaty) to obtain benefits under Article IV for peaceful development, which the U.S. now seems about to deny; and that Japan had developed its nuclear program, including the Tokai facility, following U.S. guidance and stimulus. Imai suggested that a sudden change of mind by the US would cause distrust and suspicion."[19]

The Tokai Mura issue was escalating and President Carter was due to make his first trip abroad as President to attend the economic summit in Great Britain. The prime minister of Japan, Takeo Fukuda, would attend as would the leaders of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy.

Just what was the Carter administration's policy? It appeared that not everyone in the administration shared the same understanding of U.S. nuclear policy and would, there-fore, make conflicting policy statements. Perhaps these were just misinterpretations, but nevertheless, the Japanese were beginning to get the feeling that the issue simply was not as pressing for the U.S. Government as it was for them. In April 1977 the Carter administration continued to look at how they should approach nuclear development issues and assembled a governmental team to explore possible resolutions. In a briefing for the President, Warren Christopher, a member of the Carter team, emphasizes that "the Japanese government faces severe and probably unacceptable embarrassment if the prototype facility cannot be used in some form. The Japanese media and the mass media view this issue as a nationalistic one in which resource-poor Japan is being denied energy self-sufficiency. We have therefore developed an approach which will explore with the GOJ [Government of Japan] the feasibility of operating Tokai on an experimental basis, with a modified process which does not produce separated plutonium."[20] Separated plutonium is the material used to produce nuclear weapons.

In May 1977 a telegram to the Secretary of State details a conversation in which Prime Minister Fukuda told Carter that resolution of the Tokai Mura issue was critical for him. In conversation Carter told Fukuda that he would tell the Department of State to re-examine the matter and see to it that the issue would not embarrass Fukuda. The telegram goes on to say, "Fukuda had been most impressed by Carter's statement on Japan at a press conference announcing a new U.S. nuclear policy on April 7, but then had been disturbed by statements made subsequently by lower level officials which contradicted the President's remarks."[22] The issue was beginning to cause friction and even mistrust in the less than five-month old Carter Administration.

What Were the Options?

In a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski dated May 27, 1977 the results of an options paper completed by the State Department were available and were being analyzed by the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). Among a series of options ACDA preferred Option 3 with a few caveats:

> "ACDA prefers Option 3 with respect to the use of Tokai, but believes that the U.S. should not offer the possibility of the U.S. providing plutonium for the next Japanese breeder reactor (the 'Monju'), nor should the U.S. agree to permit U.S.-origin fuel to be reprocessed for that purpose. We have calculated that the British-supplied 'Magnox' reactor at Tokai can provide sufficient plutonium to meet this Japanese breeder need. Since we have no say over the disposition of spent fuel from that reactor, the Japanese could send the fuel to the UK for reprocessing."[23]

What did this option mean politically for the Carter Adminis-tration? The memo goes on to detail additional reasons why this would be the best option, because it would:
— Avoid the appearance of the U.S. actively supporting foreign plutonium breeder work
— Avoid the transfer of Japanese fuel of U.S. origin for reprocessing
— Circumvent the need to make an advanced commitment on light-water reprocessing at Windscale (which is already functioning for Magnox fuel but not light water fuel)
— Treat the Japanese the same as the Germans, in that both were having fuel reprocessed over which we have no control.[24]

Were the Japanese not already being treated the same as the Europeans were being treated or did the Government of Japan have a gripe with the Carter Administration?

The Issue Reaches Extreme Levels

In late July and August of 1977 the number of declassified documents dealing with the Tokai issue increased dramatically and the pressure began to build for both the Carter Administration and the Government of Japan to come up with a negotiated compromise. It was evident from these documents that if things were not done quickly, the relationship between the two administrations would quickly sour, more so than appeared in the public arena. On July 12, 1977 a telegram from Ambassador Mike Mansfield begins with the subject line: "The Reprocessing issue and future U.S.-Japan relations."[25]

Appointing Mansfield as Ambassador to Japan was a good move for the Carter Administration as evidenced by the above-referred telegram sent only a few weeks into his ambassadorship. It was clear by the tone of the message that the issue was indeed one that threatened the U.S.-Japan relationship. Mansfield noted that high-level Japanese officials claimed that the U.S. did not understand Japan's extraordinary energy predicament nor its commitment to solely peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, in bullet item six, he commented that "the repercussions will be long lasting, severe, and widespread...to procrastinate longer will act to harden each side's position."[26]

FIGURE 1. Carter comments on the Mansfield memo dated July 12, 1977

Many of the secret documents contained notes and scribbled items from a number of people, but President Carter often wrote long notes as shown in the document below from the Mansfield memo. The note below is particularly interesting in that President Carter (JC) says that he will personally expedite the compromise decision.[27]

The Stakes Were High

Just what was at stake over what Prime Minister Fukuda publicly called "a life and death issue for Japan"? From a Japanese standpoint, nuclear energy was indispensable to the future of Japan and vital to the development of Japan's economy as a whole.[28] The U.S. standpoint tried to balance nonproliferation concerns and insure that pending nonproliferation legislation would not be impacted by a Tokai decision. The U.S. government also hoped to use this to rationalize reprocessing facilities for similar purposes in other countries.[29] One of the biggest risks was whether or not this type of facility could produce weapons-grade material that could be separated out as plutonium and ultimately be used in a nuclear weapon.

In a memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President on August 13 the Secretary puts the Tokai issue rather simply: "Tokai is bound to appear as an exception to our general standpoint against reprocessing. The key issue is thus how an exception can be made with as little damage as possible to our non-proliferation objectives. None of the technical options is very good from the standpoint of those objectives; the best—coprocessing—pushes the Japanese in a direction not regarded as promising on non-proliferation grounds. Limiting damage to non-proliferation objectives will depend on what political measures accompany any technical solutions."[30]

As pointed out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a memo dated August 3, 1977, "Whatever nonproliferation advantages would be obtained from coprocessing of blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium. (In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium may be separated out, possibly in a matter of days without much difficulty)."[31] The greatest risk was clearly the ability to produce separated plutonium. Another issue was, of course, financial; if modifications were to be made to the Tokai facility because of a policy change, who would pay for the changes?

Serious Negotiations Finally Begin

As the end of August approached both administrations began to negotiate a compromise agreement that would be mutually satisfactory and allow the facility to begin operation, at least in part without much delay. The conversion of part of Tokai to a coprocessing facility that would be incapable of producing pure plutonium would satisfy the U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

It appears from a series of memos detailing the final negotiations from the Japanese point of view, that the Japanese were willing to offer to delay construction of a plutonium conversion plant. The plant was one of the most critical items in the entire Japanese program for the utilization of

plutonium in advanced reactors. Without the conversion plant, the plutonium produced at Tokai could not be used as reactor fuel.[32]

Finally, on August 31, 1977 a secret memo from Brzezinski to the President outlined his and the negotiating team's final recommendations (supported by ACDA) to accept an agreement that "in essence, the Japanese (1) want to defer decision on coprocessing for two years, subject to R & D and INFCEP; (2) recognize that U.S. originated fuel will not be available beyond the two-year period unless they accept coprocessing; and (3) are willing to impose a voluntary deferment on the construction of their proposed plutonium conversion plant, despite their financial commitments to proceed."[33]

Conclusion

In the end, the Tokai Mura issue was resolved. The declassified documents show that the situation was indeed a serious one in the history of U.S.-Japan relations; they contain remarks and interpretations indicating that the relationship had been seriously at risk. Through careful negotiations the U.S. was able to negotiate a number of concessions acceptable to both sides which ensured a continuing good U.S.-Japan relationship throughout the Carter Administration.

Ironically, while President Carter and his top officials focused on issues such as nuclear proliferation and weapons grade plutonium, they neglected the issue of nuclear safety. Even more paradoxically, the accident at Three Mile Island occurred during Carter's Administration. The accident and subsequent leakage of radioactive material almost led to a total meltdown. The three Mile Island incident occurred in the middle of the Iranian revolution, which interrupted the world's oil supply and precipitated the energy crisis in 1979. Soon after Three Mile Island, Carter personally visited the accident site to assure the American people that nuclear safety was foremost in his thinking.

Tragically and coincidentally, the worst accident in the history of the Japanese nuclear industry occurred at the Tokai facility on September 30, 1999. Three workers received high doses of radiation in a Japanese plant that was preparing fuel for an experimental reactor. The accident was caused by bringing together an excess of uranium that was enriched to a relatively high level, causing what is called a 'criticality' to occur.[34] It is likely that more people were affected at Tokai; the 'official' estimates downplay the final degree of radiation and subsequent contamination that was released during the accident. The Carter Administration was ultimately trying to prevent an accident just such as this one.

As one of the most active ex-presidents in history, Jimmy Carter remains active in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and safety. He was one of the individuals most influential in negotiating an agreement with North Korea that ultimately— and unfortunately—failed. Human rights were a constant theme in the Carter presidency and Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 11, 2002 for his untiring commitment to human rights and peace in the world today.

As we have witnessed in recent months, countries such as North Korea may have, in fact, obtained the means to pro-

duce nuclear weapons, (perhaps in part because of nuclear reprocessing facilities at Yongbon). It appears that the Carter Administration had good reason to exercise caution in its negotiations on issues that could impact nonproliferation and the nuclear future of the world. The declassified documents discussed in this paper show that the Tokai Mura debate did, in fact, greatly impact U.S.–Japan relations. In the end though, the issue strengthened the U.S. and Japan relationship for the remainder of Carter's term.

ENDNOTES

1. NLC-98-273, Declassified documents. Document dated, August 13, 1977. Declassified on May 28, 1999.

2. NLC-98-273, (May 28, 1999).

3. The original idea for this paper began in the summer of 2002 after a visit to the Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia by Professor Uldis Kruze of the University of San Francisco. While consulting with an archivist there, he performed a search of recently declassified documents relating to Japan during the Carter Administration. Further research by the author, a graduate student in the Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies program at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim revealed that Professor Kruze's initial search explored only one-quarter of the declassified materials relating to Japan. The total number of declassified materials approaches 1800 pages. 400 of these earlier and now declassified documents were subsequently ordered from the Carter Library; this paper is based on these sources. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Kruze for making these resources available.

4. Bourne, Peter G., 1997. Jimmy Carter: A comprehensive biography from Plains to Post Presidency. New York, NY. Simon and Schuster. p. 392.

5. Bourne, (1997) p. 240.

6. Bourne, (1997) p. 266.

7. Bourne, (1977) p. 268.

8. Brzezinski, (1983) p. 289.

9. Brzezinski, (1983) p. 557.

10. NLC-96-182, Declassified 1/16/98. Memorandum of conversations dated January 31, 1977, from the Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's office, Tokyo, Japan.

11. NLC-96-182, (February 1, 1977) p. 1.

12. NLC-96-182, (February 1, 1977) p. 3.

13. Berkowitz, Bruce D., Calculated Risks, A century of arms control, why it has failed, and how it can be made to work. Simon and Schuster, 1987. p. 18-19.

14. Berkowitz, (1987) p. 173-174.

15. Berkowitz, (1987) p. 174.

16. Bourne, (1997) p. 74-75.

17. NLC-98-266, Declassified 5/24/99. Briefing from Cyrus Vance dated March 15, 1977, on the Presidents upcoming meeting on March 16 with Ambassador Togo.

18. "A profile of Ibaraki," http://www.pref.ibaraki.jp/bukyoku/seikan/kokuko/en/profile/pro_02.htm.

19. NLC-98-266, Declassified 5/24/99. Briefing from Cyrus Vance dated March 15, 1977 concerning the President discussions with Fukuda on Nuclear Reprocessing.

20. NLC-98-266, Declassified May 21, 1999. Memo dated April 2, 1977, from Warren Christopher about Nuclear reprocessing questions with Japan.

21. NLC-98-269, Declassified May 25, 1999. Telegram dated May 1977, incoming telegram to the Secretary of State.

22. NLC-98-269, (May, 27, 1977) p. 2.

23. NLC-98-271, Declassified February 16, 1999. Memo dated May 24, 1977, from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

24. NLC-98-271, (May 27, 1977) p. 1.

25. NLC-98-269, Declassified May 25, 1999. Telegram dated July 12, 1977, from Ambassador Mansfield to Secretary Vance.

26. NLC-98-269, (July 12, 1977) p. 3-4.

27. NLC-98-269, (July 12, 1977) p. 1.The secret documents containing this note and others have been included at the end of the paper, as an addendum. They provide a sample of the actual declassified documents that form the basis of this paper.

28. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Telegram dated August 26, 1977, from Prime Minister Fukuda to President Carter.

29. NLC-98-275, Declassified 2/10/99. Memo dated August 2, 1977, to Zbigniew Brzezinski concerning Tokai plant options paper.

30. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Memo dated August 13, 1977, from Zbigniew Brzezinski to The President.

31. NLC-98-276, Declassified 2/20/99. Memo dated August 3, 1977, to Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

32. NLC-98-274, Declassified 5/25/99. Telegram dated August 31, 1977, to Brzezinski from the Gerard Smith and Mansfield in Tokyo.

33. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Memo dated August 31, 1977, to The President, from the Zbigniew Brzezinski.

34. http://www.uic.com.au/nip52.htm, Tokaimura criticality accident. Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper # 52, June 2000.

Charles Costello holds an English degree from Santa Clara University, but he also studied at the University of Durham in Great Britain and at San Francisco's own Golden Gate University. An experienced technical writer and project manager, Charles worked for a number of the big names in the tech field, including IBM and TRW, before launching his own technical writing business. He is currently a student in the Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies program at the University of San Francisco.

An Interview with 2002 Kiriyama Chair Rosemary Foot on Human Rights, the United States, and the Asia Pacific

by Joaquin L. Gonzalez III, Ph.D.

Rosemary Foot is Professor of International Relations and John Swire Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of East Asia at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and at the time of the interview was Kiriyama Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim.

Joaquin L. Gonzalez III is Associate Professor of Public Management at Golden Gate University, Visiting Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco, a Kiriyama Fellow at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, and one of the editors of *Asia Pacific: Perspectives.*

Jay Gonzalez (**G**): *You are at the tail-end of your experience here at the Center, how would you rate your overall experience so far? How has it been useful to you?*

Rosemary Foot (**F**): I think it's been useful to me in two ways: first, having the time to do research. The support here has been very good, from very basic matters such as having a computer up and running right from the first day, virtually, and having a research assistant that I could use for up to 10 hours a week or more. And, even if the library doesn't have everything that I want, you can get material from other libraries reasonably quickly. The electronic databases are also useful for the sorts of projects that I'm working on at the moment.

I've also traveled, I've given talks about my main research project—the one you heard about in my lecture—at various places, up and down the West Coast, including Canada, and to different audiences—sometimes mainly faculty, sometimes mainly students. This has resulted often in surprisingly similar reactions, and so that makes it clearer where I need to do more work and where I'm more convincing in my arguments. The research has, then, generally gone well. I've also had the time to finish off some other papers that needed to be completed.

Secondly, however, it has been useful to me on the teaching side because it's a long time since I taught in a university other than Oxford. The students at USF came from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, were somewhat older than those I normally teach at Oxford and some of them were working full-time. They didn't have as much time to devote to the class readings, so I tried to think very hard about how to make the material interesting, challenging, but not overwhelming. I enjoyed it very much. I felt I got to know the students quite well. I also redesigned the course to make it more focused on the post Cold War era, and that again has been useful for me because I'm going to incorporate some of the sections I've redesigned into the teaching that I do back at Oxford.

G: *So it's been mutual, since we benefited from having your inputs into redesigning the curriculum, and it seems that you're going to use your lessons here, too.*

F: That's right: to re-jig my course back at Oxford and to try some of the questions that I tackled here over there; so it's been very valuable from that point of view. It's also a good location to meet other people…

G: *Scholars from similar or related endeavors.*

F: Yes.

G: *On the teaching, we've received interesting feedback from the students. Of course, initially, they were adjusting to the style that you brought from Oxford into USF, but eventually they appreciated it, and they actually enjoyed it very much.*

F: I hope so. They certainly have been very kind to me; they've been very generous and very welcoming. Yes, I hope they did enjoy it. Obviously, I made some mistakes. I think I started with some reading that was too abstract. But once we got over that, I tried to explain why I used that particular piece of writing, and what the author was trying to do. I think after that it went reasonably well. Of course, I did set a lot of reading. It's very hard, and I'm sure you find the same thing, but it's hard to teach and get real debate going unless you give students a range of arguments, a range of different viewpoints. Particularly when one works on contemporary topics, there's still a real and often inconclusive debate going on in the literature. In order to introduce students to that debate, you've just got to give them a range of reading, but that can amount to quite a lot in any one week. And when you're also expecting them to write papers and so on, it's a lot to cope with..

G: *It takes a while for them to situate themselves in that debate even after reading the materials you've assigned.*

F: It does. Several times students have said to me, well, those arguments are convincing and so are those, so how do I distinguish between them? And my reply has been that we are always in the position of having to weigh opposing arguments. The only thing you can do is try and follow the logic of what is said and look at the evidence that has been brought to bear on a particular question. And it takes time of course, but it's the only way we can develop critical faculties. We are often faced with opposing arguments; trying to weigh them is part of the whole academic endeavor.

G: *Let me return to the research question. Could we go back to what is the overall purpose of some of the research questions you came with before you began as Kiriyama Chair? Could you give us something of an intellectual autobiography?*

F: At the most general level, I've always been interested in the processes and material interests that shape behavior in the international system -- the behavior of the most important political actors of interest to us in IR. I'm not referring solely to state behavior. It can be bureaucracies, it can be social movements, it can be NGOs, and so on. So at the general level, one could think of it as an interest in global diplomacy.

To be more specific about my interests, for a long time I had worked on international relations in the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on security questions. But partly because the way that scholars thought about security began to undergo change in the last 10-15 years—what do we mean by security, who is secure, what are we trying to secure—I started to change my thinking too. I began to be interested in human rights issues in particular, and to think about the ways in which those issues related to ideas of personal security.

I was also interested in how different states reacted to the international human rights regime. Obviously the region that we both work on is made up of a variety of different kinds of political regimes, some of which are very attuned to international norms on human rights, and others which are much more resistant. And yet they get drawn into this discourse about human rights whether willingly or reluctantly. So I was interested in understanding how and why states get drawn in.

This involved an interest in the strategies that various global actors apply in order to draw states into support for these norms -- or at least rhetorical support of these norms. And that led me into this work on the global community and China's human rights discourse. In the course of doing that work, having studied mainly the security and foreign policy literatures in the past, I realized that I would have to immerse myself deeply in literature on human rights. What is the human rights regime? How has it evolved over time? What degree of consensus does there exist about the central elements in that regime? Having looked at what had happened, particularly in the post 1945 period to the current day, I had a clearer sense of the limits and also achievements of the human rights idea.

Then there was the major shock of September 11th. The discussion among international relations scholars started to revolve around questions about the extent of the transformation of the security environment, and claims were made that we had returned to an era very reminiscent of the Cold War period. The US administration post September 11th started to set a new security agenda and I was interested in investigating whether this left any room for human rights matters: hence the topic of my Kiriyama lecture.

As is usually the case with me in the way I approach research topics, I started with a question. It's very important to me to have a single relatively sharp question in my head and from that, I then take off (or don't take off). That's generally the most productive way for me.

G: *So the narrow question this time was?*

F: What has happened to America's external human rights policy post September 11? The idea that is often expounded is that we treat policy areas as though they are in hierarchical order: there's security, there's trade, there's human rights, there's this, there's that. The assumption was quickly made that security concerns were being given overriding priority and human rights concerns had gone right down the list in terms of their importance. I still haven't reached hard and fast conclusions about where I stand on this debate, partly because it is a difficult intellectual problem, but also because it is a current issue…

G: *It keeps moving, you can't step back and see.*

F: Exactly; but I think that makes for quite an interesting lecture and I think it makes for a relatively interesting short piece of writing which I'm planning on doing next. Maybe over the longer term I might just keep tabs on the debate and then find the moment when I can actually step back and write something longer and deeper. My intention at the moment is not to rush into a book, but to write shorter pieces, and then decide what I want to do.

G: *I know you expounded on it in your Kiriyama lecture, but can you tell us about some of the things that you've discovered which you found especially challenging with respect to the question you set in your lecture?*

F: I think some of the most difficult matters to sort out in my mind are the extent to which discourse constrains and shapes policy. I put quite a lot of store by discourse, by what is said, and the way in which policymakers in democratic and open societies can be trapped by statements they have made in the past. But set against that are some other very important political signals. If I could give you a China example, then an Indonesian one: there's a lot in the rhetorical record obviously that indicates persistent levels of criticism by US governments of China's human rights record. But set against that discourse —which as I say I've always taken seriously—is other behavior such as the meeting at the Crawford ranch between Bush and Jiang. Human rights questions were also discussed, but the signal that's also sent by inviting Jiang to this highly prized meeting at the family home, can lead to the understanding on the part of outsiders that US concerns over China's human rights record will in no sense constrain this relationship. So it's trying to weigh those things and convince myself and others that I can still put some store by my arguments about discourse and entrapment.

With Indonesia, again American officials are on record as stating that they can't restore ties with the Indonesian military because there has not been a full accounting for the military's role in past human rights abuses. And yet it's quite clear from conversations I've had with various people now about Indonesia that the Indonesian military feels that it's not under any obligation to do very much, that US pressure for an accounting actually has diminished. The military are not listening to the words; they're looking at something else. From that something else they're taking signals that they don't have to take the criticism about the human rights record very seriously. That's the message that was given to me in interviews. The TNI really do feel less under attack for their behavior in this new era. In a way, I'm less optimistic about my original argument now, after interviewing in Washington, than when I gave the Kiriyama lecture in mid October. I don't think the original findings are wholly wrong, but I think they need to be made less strongly. I think there's more of a struggle than I indicated in the lecture.

G: *So you're basically saying that it is important to weigh both the effects of discourse and of action; that there are a complex range of factors that are shaping behavior?*

F: Yes. The other area that I'm still puzzling about—as you know my three cases were China , Indonesia, and Malaysia—now, Indonesia and Malaysia are much more critical to the struggle against terrorism than is China. The rhetoric about human rights is stronger in the case of China than it is in the case of the other two.

G: *Indonesia and Malaysia...*

F: One could explain that by saying, well, problems are much greater in China, actually, than they are in Indonesia and Malaysia. But you could also explain it by the fact that the struggle against terrorism is much hotter in Indonesia and Malaysia than in China. In the case of China, if it does house terrorists at all, they're relatively few in number and the power of the state is so great that they're not likely to be a major global threat, certainly not much of a threat to the US. But the issue of terrorism in Indonesia is more important. I am referring to such matters as the presence of terrorist cells, the Bali bombing, all of these things. Malaysia has also been the site of terrorist activity and planning. These Southeast Asian countries are referred to as the second front in the struggle against terrorism. The US rhetoric on human rights may well be lower simply because the terrorist threat is graver in these two countries, in as far as the Bush administration interprets it. Or it may be because US domestic interest in human rights abuses in Malaysia and Indonesia is lower than is the case with China. There are competing explanations which I need to think through and to try to weigh.

The third issue I'm thinking about with relation to, not the lecture, but to the larger piece of writing, is whether to move beyond these three examples—to consider again the matter of case selection. I am thinking about adding to my cases in order to try to make a more generalized argument and also to try to make a better attempt at sorting out the issues I've just raised. That's really what's been going on in my head in the six weeks since I gave the lecture and also since I spent a week in Washington conducting interviews. That week has been very important in making me think about the issues again.

G: *You were saying you were thinking of adding countries. What countries were you thinking of beyond China, Indonesia, and Malaysia that would somehow fit in and reinforce?*

F: Not reinforce: I think there are some countries that would make it harder for my argument, harder for my original argument. If I'm beginning to think about this as countries in the front line, or the second line, with China as a third front country in the struggle, then I do need to turn to that frontline struggle and perhaps look at some of the Central Asian states and Pakistan.

G: *When I was reading the announcement for your talk on "Human Rights, US, and the Asia Pacific", I immediately thought: Is Rosemary suggesting a significant paradigm shift after September 11?*

F: I partly chose that event and the title of the lecture in order to provoke interest. If I answered my question in the affirmative, I would have been saying that the normative evolution that we recognize as the post 1945 movement towards the establishment of an international human rights regime, and greater attention to human rights, had been stopped in its tracks. And that would have been an important finding – as is the reverse conclusion. I was also wanting to use the lecture as a vehicle for arguing that the evolution of the human rights idea has been accompanied by an evolution in the idea of security. One thing we have to recognize is that human rights and security are no longer de-linked in the way a question like that contained in my lecture title implies. So I was using the lecture as a vehicle for introducing, not a new idea, not my idea, but as a way of introducing or repeating the idea that actually human rights and security shouldn't be thought of as opposing propositions anyway. Those were the main conceptual drivers for the lecture.

G: *I like your approach when you said you prefer to start with a narrow question and only later on make decisions about whether a book will derive from that question, or an article – or indeed, no writing at all!*

F: Exactly. Some of the questions raised at the lecture—yours on migrant labor, Professor Rule's on refugees, among others—have given me ideas about how I might expand my investigation. I'm intrigued too about some of the reasons why I didn't pay a bit more attention to these issue areas in the lecture.

G: *Yes, the refugees, the movement of labor, and all that, because they are part of this.*

F: Yes, there are a variety of conventions that relate to the matter of human rights protection even if we tend to focus primarily on the two International Covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. I need to think about a broader definition of rights than the one I used —implicitly—in my lecture.

G: *So there has been quite a lot of rethinking going on since the lecture?*

F: There certainly has—which demonstrates the value of being given the opportunity "to think out loud". I'm grateful for that opportunity and for the questions that have been raised.

G: *Thanks for giving us your thoughts – both in the lecture and today.*

Persistence of Interlocking Institutions: Big Business Policy Under the Kim Dae Jung Government

by Jiho Jang, Ph.D.

Abstract

Based on historical institutionalism, this study argues that there is continuity in institutions, emphasizing the constraints created by existing structures and institutions. This study assesses the Republic of Korea as a case study analyzing big business policy under the Kim Dae Jung government. The result found in this study is that there is no rapid disappearance of institutional pattern of state activism in Korea. This study examining four institutions: 1) state-led ideology; 2) centralized and personalized power of the president; 3) bureaucratic system as a function of policy implementation; and 4) the state-advised financial sector. This study demonstrates that whereas formal institutions collapse or are dismantled, informal institutions such as operating procedures persist to shape the behavior of political actors. Institutional structure is so integrated that it cannot be easily divided into separate parts for the new regime in order to produce different or 'efficient' solutions to industrial restructuring.

Introduction

There is a significant variation in the policies adopted by various governments even during the neoliberal era. As an example of a country in which neoliberal policies have been significantly limited, this study treats South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) as a case study encompassing approximately three decades of state activism vis-à-vis corporations. Since the 1980s, the Korean state has adopted several deregulation policies in which the state attempted to "globalize" its economic structure. The rhetoric of bureaucrats and political actors has made them sound like free-market liberalizers. Moreover, the collapse of the economy and the apparent inability to regain economic momentum in 1997 strained the Korean government's role in economic processes, perhaps to its limits. However, state activism vis-à-vis big businesses (hereafter the chaebol) in Korea has been persistent. Actors in the Korean state apparatus, government policies and regulations, and politics generally have attempted to play a role in what, when, and how firms emerged and developed.

Contrary to conventional wisdom in which globalization invites or forces countries to converge on a universally superior pattern of organization and economic behaviors, this paper emphasizes the constraints created by existing structures and institutions. This analysis is based on a number of considerations: 1) the interlocking nature of institutions and thus difficulty of transforming them; 2) the persistence of attitudes, values, and practices that sustain and put those institutions in place; and 3) the way in which institutions reinforce the values, attitudes, and practices that created them in the first place.

Theoretical Considerations

A growing body of literature in the discipline of social science, in the name of new institutionalism, has conceptualized the relationship between institutions and individual behaviors. Individuals have mixed motives and thus existing institutions constrain their behavior and point them in certain directions in ways a rational choice assumption cannot capture. Historical institutionalism directs analysis to explore the manner in which the legacy of a former system is likely to shape any process of policy formation in certain directions, while militating against change in others. The value of historical institutionalism is that it explains persistence of policy patterns from continuity in institutions and places an emphasis on the constraints by existing structures and institutions.

Because institutional contexts vary from one country to another, they are embedded in their broader societies. Therefore each state differs in its responses to common challenges. Rather than focusing on an 'efficiency' assumption, historical institutionalists emphasize the character of interlocking institutions. Changes in one area that leave the other components of these national systems untouched do not bring about convergence. Even countries wishing to adopt the business practice presumed to be most efficient or effective can incorporate only those that are "consistent with the prevailing institutional logic" (Biggart and Guillen 1999, 726).

Moreover, historical institutionalists regard institutions as the legacy of a concrete historical process. They emphasize that previous choices have a strong influence over the subsequent behavior in that later decisions cannot reverse the previous ones. In other words, prior institutional choices condition future options and institutional capacities are a product of choices made during some earlier period. Once established, patterns of politics and institutional rules would often produce self-reinforcing dynamics.

Empirical Considerations

The 1997 financial crisis hit Korea, the eleventh largest economy in the world. In response to the crisis the IMF organized a rescue package of $57 billion, the largest in the history of the Fund. When the IMF provided a substantial rescue package for the crisis, state activism in Korea was condemned heavily as one of the culprits of the financial crisis because of its heavy-handed intervention in the market and its collusive ties with the private sector (KDI 1998). To receive the IMF reform packages, across-the-board structural changes were required including comprehensive dismantling of the old financial system, setting the stage for corporate restructuring, improving corporate liberalization and reforming labor market (IMF 1998 *World Economic Outlook*, May and October).

Based on these bailout programs, the Kim Dae Jung government, upon its inauguration in 1998, disclosed an extensive economic reform program. The Kim government accelerated capital market liberalization: introduction of a free floating exchange rate, abolishment of interest ceilings, easing restriction on long-term foreign borrowing, allowing foreign

banks and security firms to establish local subsidiaries, and permitting foreign banks to merge with or acquire Korean financial institutions (Ministry of Finance and Economy 1999). Under the situation of severe international pressures, the main question is whether the implementation of reform plans under the Kim government (following earlier liberalization moves) would erode state activism in Korea and its traditional relations with big businesses. The conventional wisdom among skeptics of the state's economic role was to suggest that the crisis signaled the end of state activism in Korea. The crisis, mediated by the IMF agreement, is expected to alter directions of the state's economic policy in Korea. According to Moon (2000), the Korean experience lends powerful support to the convergence thesis, in which the crisis pushed Korea closer to the American form of free market. He argues that global standards, which are set by Western ideas, values, and norms, have dominated in discourses on crisis management, resulting in the "triumph of Anglo-American capitalism" and putting an epitaph to the Asian value and Korean capitalism (Moon and Rhyu 2000, 97).

Nonetheless, this study does not agree with the rapid disappearance of national diversity. Contrary to the globalization /convergence thesis, this study finds a significant variation in the state's role vis-à-vis the private sector, i.e. the extent to which the state is involved in the businesses of private firms. Understanding the different mechanisms for sustaining institutional persistence is the key to understanding why common international trends frequently have such different domestic consequences. Employing a 'historical analysis,' this study traces patterns of various policy measures of Korean government towards the chaebol and examines the continuity of interlocking institutions.

Conceptual Considerations:
Four Institutional Constraints

Does the Korean state maintain its involvement in private corporations in spite of international pressures and political transitions? In order to examine empirical facet of this question, this study utilizes the concept of institutions. According to historical institutionalists, institutions are defined either as the (formal) products of constitutions, laws, etc., or as the (informal) result of values that are more diverse in origin, springing from historical practice and repeated interaction among actors who produce stable expectations over time. Similarly, in this study, institutions encompass state structures such as executive/bureaucratic branches, sets of formal rules such as those pertaining to the financial system, time-sanctioned standard operating procedures, and norms that are a product of custom and precedent.

This study examines four institutions: 1) state-led ideological orientation; 2) personalized presidency; 3) centralized bureaucracy; 4) financial control. The list is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; instead, these four aspects constitute a useful framework for analysis.

State-led Ideological Orientation

Ideology for the state includes perceptions, models, and

values of how the state shapes and understands its economy and political situation. The role of ideology is considered as an important factor in determining the nature of policy, in that ideology constrains the limits of acceptable action of the state. Particularly, the ideology tends to provide a set of ready solutions for policy problems. The first institutional feature of state activism in Korea is state-led ideological orientation: the belief that the state should play a purposeful role in industrial structuring. While Koreans have heard a lot of propaganda supporting deregulations of private sector, the state's ideological orientation of control over industrial structure remains essentially intact. The sense of duty and resolve of executives and economic bureaucrats determined to steer the nation's economy in the right direction remain as strong as ever.

When the economy was in trouble, regimes in Korea have often attempted to solve problems by relying on the state-led ideology of selective support or pressure for specific industries. At several points in the past, attempts have been made to force companies onto a new path. In the 1980s and 1990s, in the name of structural readjustment and industrial specialization, private big businesses were forced to give up particular subsidiaries and to choose main business areas. Table 1 shows that diverse types of industrial rationalization had been carried out under the coordination of the Korean government: company rationalization and industrial rationalization under the Park government of the 1970s; heavy industry adjustment program under the Chun government of the early 1980s; and core business specialization under the Roh and Kim Young Sam government of the 1990s. The state's industrial coordination programs are regular, resurfacing repeatedly as subject for state activism toward the chaebol. In the process of forcefully implementing industrial adjustment, cooperative companies have been compensated with preferential treatment such as privileged loans and tax exemptions.

Table 1. **Major Cases of State-led Industrial Coordination**

Case	Content
Company Rationalization (1969-1971)	112 insolvent firms in the PVC, automobile, steel, chemical and textile industries were liquidated or acquired by other chaebols
Industrial Rationalization (1972)	61 firms, including 30 in heavy industries, 8 in chemical industries, and 10 in light industries, undertook capacity adjustment, business specialization, subcontract system improvement, and M&As through state financial and tax support
Investment Readjustment of Heavy Industries (late 1970s-early 1980s)	The electricity generating, heavy construction equipment, automobile, and diesel engine industries were restructured by state-led M&As with bail-out financing and interest rate subsidies
Business Specialization (1990s)	Indirect inducement policy aimed at specializing two or three main core industries of the big 30 chaebols through easing bank credit limits and other preferential treatments

Source: J.W. Lee (1999, 254) and Jwa and Seo (2000, 330)

Kim Dae Jung's government also implemented the Big Deals program, which was based on familiar state-led ideology. The Big Deals program involves massive mergers and swaps of companies and business lines among the five largest chaebols including Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG

and SK. Considering over-diversified business areas and excess productivity capacities as the major problem in the low profitability of the chaebol and in the less competitiveness of the nation's economy, the Kim government forced the five largest chaebols to focus on a few specialized businesses through mergers of their subsidiaries.

Table 2. **Progress in the Bid Deals, as of the end of December 2000**

Type of industry	Targeted firms	Details	Status
Aerospace	Samsung Aerospace Industries, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Hyundai Space & Aircraft	Establishment of Korea Aerospace Industries through the merger among three companies	Completed- Delay of foreign capital attraction and difficulty in raising working capital
Automobile	Samsung Motors, Daewoo Motor	Daewoo Motor takes over Samsung Motors	Aborted- After the Daewoo bankrupt, Samsung Motors sold to a foreign auto-maker
Oil-refining	Hyundai Oilbank, Hanhwa Energy	Hyundai Oilbank takes over Hanhwa Energy's oil-refining business	Completed- Foreign capital attraction in the form of equity participation in progress
Petrochemical	Samsung General Chemical, Hyundai Petrochemical	Foreign investment in progress for the company by the merger between Samsung and Hyundai	Aborted- Failure of the merger deal due to the hesitation of the Mitsui concerning equity participation in the merged company
Power plant	Korea Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries, Hyundai Heavy Industries	Assets of Samsung Heavy Industries and Hyundai Heavy Industries transferred to Korea Heavy Industries	Completed
Railway vehicle	Hyundai Precision, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Hanjin Heavy Industries	Hyundai, Daewoo, and Hanjin invested on a 4:4:2 basis establishing the Korea Railway Vehicle Co.	Completed- Failure of additional investment by partners and delay of a debt reduction plan
Semiconductor	Hyundai Electronics, LG Semiconductors	Merger between Hyundai Electronics and LG Semiconductors	Completed- Hyundai takes over LG Semiconductors, but suffers from the low profitability
Ship engine	Korea Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries	Korea Heavy Industries takes over Samsung Heavy Industries' ship engines business	Completed- Privatization of Korea Heavy Industries earmarked

Source: SERI (2000), Chosun Ilbo (September 18, 2002)

On July 1998, there was an agreement on the Big Deals among the top five chaebols at a meeting between president and the chaebol's leaders (Y.R. Lee 1999, 91-97). Immediately after the meeting, the Federation of Korean Industries, an association of the chaebol, announced a sweeping business swap plan among 17 companies belonging to the 5 largest chaebols in the seven industrial sectors of aerospace, oil refining, petrochemicals, power plant equipment, railway vehicles, semiconductors, and ship engines. However, the Big Deals did not go forward due to disputes among those chaebols that were reluctant to give up their business or were not satisfied about the selling price of their business. On December 1998, again, an agreement between government and the top five chaebols was made for a speedier implementation plan for the Big Deals (Y.R. Lee 1999, 219-234). The final decision was composed of 16 companies belonging to the top five chaebols, excluding SK, and three non-top five chaebol companies, Korea Heavy Industries, Hanhwa Energy, and

Hanjin Heavy Industries. The revenue size of those targeted companies under the Big Deals was 7.4 percent of the national GDP in 1998 (*Joongang Ilbo* February 20, 1999). Table 2 lists the major Big Deals proposed and the results to date.

The Kim government officially announced that the Big Deals in the private sector should be implemented based on market rules and mutual agreements between involved companies. For example, when he met the U.S. Trade Representative, the chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), Chun Yun Chul, said that "Big Deals in Korea have been done under market principles and government had not intervened in the process" (*Korea Economic Daily*, October 15, 1998). However, government exerted a strong influence toward the Big Deal since its early stage. For example, the Minister of Industry and Resources, Park Tae Young, determined that the semiconductor industry was an over-invested sector, which needed to be restructured (*Chosun Ilbo*, November 12, 1998). Rather than leaving the discipline of market mechanism, government identified a number of target industries.

Such a deep-rooted state-led ideology has two manifestations in Korea. First, the chaebol have only limited popular support. The average Korean citizen believes that the chaebol are too big and a source of corruption (Cho 1997, 217-224). Additionally, they believe that the chaebol are responsible for bringing on the current crisis. A 1999 Korean Gallup survey commissioned by *Monthly Joongang* (February 1999) revealed that 45.3 percent of the public approved the direct use of state intervention in the restructuring the chaebol while only 28.8 percent agreed with market-based reform and 22.4 percent with indirect control via financial institutions. Furthermore, the chaebol's owners and their family members tend to be ostracized by society, which takes it for granted that the state would intervene in the personal affairs of chaebol families, admonishing them for their extravagant life-style and mediating in conflicts between family members over the issue of inheritance. This kind of public attitude highly pressures the state directly intervening not only in the business but also corporate structure.

Next, the economic provisions of the Korean Constitution grant government virtually unlimited authority and control, to such an extent that all economic policies pursued by the state can be legally justified (*Weekly Donga* December 9, 1999). With the exception of Section 1 of Article 119, Articles 119 to 127 provide government with the power to guide and control the economy for specific national purposes. Particularly, Section 2 of Article 119 indicates "government may regulate and coordinate economic affairs for the balanced growth and stabilization of national economy, maintenance of fair distribution of income, prevention of market domination and abuse of economic power, and the democratization of economy through the coordination between economic bodies" (Yang 1994, p.962). Despite nine constitutional amendments, the underlying nature of the Korean Constitution in terms of advocating control of the economy has changed little since 1945. The nationalization of banks, preferential treatment through financial support and taxation, licensing and granting approval for market entry are all

authorized and justified under the Constitution. The example of the Big Deals policy shows that Kim Dae Jung's government was also trapped with ideology of state-led industrial coordination, resulting from general public attitude and the Constitution. In the Big Deals, the government guided and forced swaps among the chaebol, determining the acquiring and acquired companies in advance and giving them the guidelines and deadlines to be met. Despite all the liberalization and deregulation slogans, the Korean state has not replaced its ideological orientation of state-led industrial structuring with a non-interventionist based on unfettered market force. The government retains the ideological manifestation in that over-competition can lead an economic harm.

Personalized Presidency

The next institutional constraint is the basic organization of the state—the executive branch. Impact of the nature and structure of political system (including the administrative division of responsibility government) on socioeconomic policies has been explored by a variety of scholars. Ideas or ideologies do not acquire political force independently of the constellation of formal institutions. The Korean political system is characterized by a highly personalized presidency.

The executive branch (and ultimately the president) exercises the most power in Korea. Policy arrangements are often recognized as being personality-driven in that the president determines the direction, priority, and objectives of economic or social policies by relying only on an inner circle of advisors around the presidential office (called the Blue House) who assist the president in planning and executing policy strategies. At the same time, government often uses autocratic force to impose its decisions. Presidents have been able to mobilize the power apparatus, such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS, previously the Agency for National Security Planning), the Attorney General (AG), the Chief of Police Bureau (CPB), and the Office of National Tax Administration (ONTA) at their discretion, to deal with his political opponents and to force through their economic agenda. Although the economic transformation and democratic transition since the late 1980s largely undermined presidential power by setting institutional constraints on the president and bringing the presidential office under democratic rules, the president himself has remained the single most important institution. Particularly, major policies around the chaebol still remain in the hands of the president. For instance, certain chaebols have been politically punished. Kukje, one of the 10 largest chaebols at that time, was destroyed in 1986, allegedly, for not supporting the president. Hyundai was punished in 1993 with freezes on financing when its founder ran for presidency. SK and Samsung were punished in a similar way for remarks made by their owner-chairmen.

In addition, Kim Dae Jung's government prefers informal arrangements in which the rule of law is compromised even if its measures are not legally biding. For examples, after the series of aircraft accidents of the Korean Air Line (KAL), the President Kim stated that the KAL, the subsidiary of Hanjin, should be managed by professional staff, not as a family run business and concentrate on providing an efficient and safe

service for its customers (*Chosun Ilbo*, April 21, 1999). Some critics argue that the President's calling for a management reshuffling at KAL was inappropriate intervention in private business, overstepping the bounds of his authority, and that there is no relationship between ownership structure and 'an efficient and safe service.' However, President Kim's order was faithfully executed after the ONTA announced the imposition of 541.6 billion won penalty against subsidiaries of Hanjin, including KAL, and their management for evading taxes and amassing a number of secret slush funds (*Chosun Ilbo*, October 4, 1999). The owner-chairman of Hanjin, Cho Jung Hoon, resigned and the family management of KAL's daily operations ended.

Another example is Blue House talks between the President and the chaebol's owner-chairmen, which are often used to lay out reform programs with businesses at each phase and to verify progress on these programs. The President often used his supreme power at these meetings to dissolve deadlocks among the chaebol, banks and the government. The first meeting, in January 1998, laid out the five reform targets concerning the chaebol. The meeting in August 1998 put pressure on the foot-dragging chaebol. The meeting in December 1998 was used to settle the big deals among the five largest chaebols. The meeting in April 1999 was used to determine whether or not the reform agreements of state-business were proceeding as planned. The meeting in August 1999 was used to reach the contractual agreement of three new reform targets. The sequence of the Blue House meetings clearly shows that informal administrative guidance and the personalized presidential system in Korea.

Although there is no question that the Kim Dae Jung government is democratic, President Kim has maintained a commanding position in the process of chaebol policy implementation. Accordingly, some criticize the policy style of President Kim Dae Jung. In spite of democratization since the late 1980s, politics in Korea is still characterized by the personality-dominated system that articulates the interest of its top leader.

Centralized Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic system has played a powerful role in policy implementation organization. Career bureaucrats are not in a position to make strategic choices since they occupy a constitutionally subordinate position and lack the legitimacy of elective office holders. Even the bureaucracy, identified as a strong institutional presence by political analysts, has been structurally dependent on presidential prerogative while being vulnerable to presidential caprice (Chung 1989). Yet, the bureaucrats in Korea enjoy certain assets that allow them to influence economic policy. For one, they are often the source for technical information or information requiring a degree of expertise in a subject. Thus, the presidency cannot implement policy measures without the existence of an organizational capacity in the bureaucracy that not only commands a wide range of incentives through extensive control over production resources, but also possesses substantial information resources. As a regulating institution, the bureaucratic system remains intact both in terms of size and function. The only

change in recent years is that the balance of power among the various ministries and officers has shifted slightly. The Economic and Planning Board (EPB, merged into the Ministry of Finance and Economy, MOFE), the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), the Office of Bank Supervision, and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) are some ministries which exhibit the organizational capacity of the state vis-à-vis the chaebol. The existence of a stable and cohesive bureaucratic organization allows the executive branch to discipline the private business sector by taking advantage of a wide variety of policy tools such as credit, tax, regulation, and administrative guidance.

In particular, the Kim Dae Jung government empowered the FTC with new institutional provisions such as the right to look into bank accounts of the chaebol and the right to look into the internal financial transactions among a chaebol's member firms to take heavy punitive measures in the case of infringement. Thus the FTC launched investigation three times into illegal internal transactions among the five largest chaebols and imposed a total 100 billion won in surcharges (*Joongang Ilbo* August 12, 1999). The FTC is also charged with monitoring the swaps to prevent delays in restructuring. The chaebol consider as the serious pressure, statements made by high-ranking officials of FTC or FSC in which they said that government would take a knife to the chaebol, and administrative sudden decisions to investigate subsidiaries' internal dealings (*Chosun Ilbo*, 1998, May 8).

Financial Control

The final institutional feature is government-advised financial control. Whereas financial institutions are subject to a variety of regulations, not only in Korea, but also in most other countries, direct regulations such as the credit controls for financing specific industries and firms that prevailed in Korea in the 1970s are not a common practice in other countries (Amsden 1989, Fields 1995). Indeed, "government control of the banks is …the single most important economic factor explaining the distinctly subordinate position of the private sector" in Korea (Jones and Sakong 1980, 122). But, when commercial banks were privatized in the 1980s, the state acting as a financier seemed no longer possible. Moreover, the chaebol's increased investment in such non-banking financial institutions as insurance companies provided the capital that enabled the chaebol to become more financially independent from the state.

However, the financial system remains credit-based and subject to government-advisement. Liberalizing the financial sector was further complicated by the fact that the banking system had not adequately dealt with the losses it had suffered during the earlier periods of more pervasive state-directed lending. Despite their newly 'privatized' status in the 1990s, commercial banks had only limited discretion over lending policy. They could not survive without financial support from the central bank, the Bank of Korea, which is still controlled by government. Moreover, during the financial crisis of 1997, the government not only increased regulatory power over financial institutions but also gained influence as shareholders of the financial institutions that were bailed out

with public funds. Kim Dae Jung's government used its control of banks to force the chaebol to improve their financial structure and streamline their business activities.

To improve the chaebol's financial structure, the Kim government recommended that a financial institution sign an agreement with its partner chaebol. The informal recommendation eventually developed into formal agreements, which were made between main creditor banks and 57 subsidiaries of the chaebol owing more than 250 billion won for capital structure restructuring. The main context of the agreement was the reduction of the chaebol's debt-to-equity ratio to 200 percent by the end of 1999, their business restructuring, and a clause for banks' overseeing of chaebol's new investment. Officially, the agreement between banks and the chaebol was voluntary, but it left no doubt that the state was deeply involved. The state set a deadline, namely the end of 1999, for the chaebol to lower their debt-to-equity ratios to below 200 percent, which applied to all chaebols without exception. To induce the chaebol to reduce outstanding debt, creditor banks directed them to either sell some of their member companies and assets or to attract foreign investment. In case of failure, the government and banks warned the chaebol that they would be punished with the withdrawals of existing loans or the refusal by their main banks to provide new loans. For example, President Kim himself directly threatened the chaebol that creditor banks would not stand by if the chaebol did not abide by the agreements; failure to do so would result in punitive action on the part of the banks (Chosun Ilbo December 14, 1998).

As main creditors, banks backed by government now have enormous power over the chaebol. They can virtually bankrupt firms by cutting off their creditors. We can see an explicit example in the case of Daewoo's collapse, which was dissolved into 12 major firms under the workout program in 1999 (Kawai 2000). On the other hand, although innumerable points of conflict occurred between the state and the chaebol, the government never allowed a complete breakdown of the big business structure. The Kim government followed a pragmatic approach toward any particular industry and chaebol, considering them as the backbone of the nation's economy. Current preferential loans for Hyundai are a good example of state support for a preferred chaebol.

While government officials have repeatedly stressed their willingness to allow creditor banks to determine the fate of terminally ailing companies by market principle, government-advised banks have continually extended preferential loans to keep Hyundai's subsidiaries afloat (*Chosun Ilbo* March 21, 2001, *Korea Herald* November 28, 2001). The government seemed to fear that Hyundai was simply too big to fail and its collapse could touch off a chain-reaction of economic havoc. The Ministry of Finance and Economy highlighted that "there would be no more bankruptcies of the chaebol like Daewoo's fall in 1999" and "the liquidity crunch of Hyundai was not serious" (*Chosun Ilbo* July 23, 2000). Another official of the Blue House said, "Hyundai is different from Daewoo. Its semiconductors and construction are Korea's backbone industries. These firms hold large market shares of their industries and these businesses are deeply linked with other

domestic companies. Thus, these firms should not be sold off just to follow market principles" (*Joongang Ilbo* January 16, 2001). However, several editorials of various newspapers compared the government's repeated financial support to Hyundai to 'pouring water into a bottomless jar' (*Chosun Ilbo* March 11, 2001, *Hankuk Ilbo* March 12, 2001, and *Joongang Ilbo* March 12, 2001).

Furthermore, as the largest shareholder in many banks, the state participated in the personal decisions made by banks' top executives (Heo and Kim 2000, p.501). In a *New York Times* interview (November 10, 2001), Wilfred Horie, who is the first foreign national to run one of the largest commercial banks in Korea (the Korea First Bank), remarked that "the Korean governing establishment had indirectly influenced government-owned banks to extend loans to failing companies… There was quite a lot of pressure. There is probably indirect pressure." When a high-ranking official calls the bank's president several times requesting the resume of a particular person, the bank's president is actually being signaled to promote the person in question (*Shin Donga*, July 1999). This indirect pressure becomes more direct when government installs ex-bureaucrats in key executive positions of financial institutions. Kim Dae Jung regime consolidated the financial sectors in terms of "parachute appointments" or the career movement of ex-bureaucrats to high positions in various financial sectors upon retirement from the central bureaucracy. Between 2000 and May 2001, out of a total of 27 officials who retired from the MOFE, the FSC, and the FSS, 18 officials landed new jobs in financial institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and brokerages (*Chosun Ilbo* June 25, 2001). For instance, Kim Sang-hoon, former assistant deputy chairman of the FSC, became president of Kukmin Bank in March 2001 (*Donga Ilbo* March 9, 2001).

In the wake of scandals involving officials of the financial watchdog agency, the state amended The Public Servants Ethics Law in May 31, 2001 in order to ban the practice of "parachute appointments." According to the revision, retired, high-ranking officials of the FSC and the FSS are prohibited from being re-employed in financial institutions for two years following the retirement (*Weekly Chosun* April 26, 2001). However, a top official in the FSS interviewed by the Korea Herald, said "it is still considered as 'heartless and disrespectful' to let go of 'honorable' top officials without securing them new jobs" (*Korea Herald* June 27, 2001). Even after the revision of the law, ex-bureaucrats became full-time inspection commissioners of 14 commercial banks, 12 securities companies, the Korea Securities Finance Corporation, and other specialized banks such as the Industrial Bank of Korea, and the Export and Import Bank of Korea (*Chosun Ilbo* July 29, 2001, November 9, 2001, February 11, 2002, and *Donga Ilbo* June 3, 2000). Finally, directors of commercial banks are not accustomed to autonomous decision-making on important issues and tend to rely on state officials (*Joongang Ilbo* February 29, 2000, and *Korea Herald* February 11, 2001). They often seek government intervention and ask the government to control the process of economic liberalization. Consequently, 20 years after their privatization, banks, in many respects, still function like state-owned institutions.

Conclusion

Institutions, once formed, are hard to change and tend to endure. Institutional change is "sticky" and episodic rather than continuous and incremental since the costs of uncertainty act as a countervailing force against institutional change. Institutions shape politics by conditioning preferences and options available to political actors and are considered to be a dominant factor in encouraging political and economic transition along a unique path. Viewed in these theoretical terms, state activism developed in Korea as a specific institutional design to control and guide the private business sector. Even when faced with the current trend towards globalization, the state activism (already traveling a path that provides positive returns in terms of economic growth in Korea) continues to rely on historically-developed institutions. At each point along the path of a nation's development, whether it be rebuilding after a war, or maintaining economic and social stability during external crisis, state activism generates a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity where continuing on a particular institutional path is more attractive than deviating from it.

This study argues that formal and informal institutional characteristics of the Korean state, such as state-led ideology, the centralized presidency, the consolidated bureaucratic system, and the state-advised financial sector, are interlocked. Such interlocking features are embedded in history, social, economic and political situations and, thus, cannot easily be detached from one another. During restructuring processes under the crisis era, the Kim Dae Jung regime desired to select only what was desirable from past practices and institutions. Nevertheless, parts of the institutional structure are so integrated that they cannot be easily divided into separate parts for the new regime in order to form efficient solutions to the economic crisis.

Under the Kim government, corporations' restructuring processes still have depended upon the government. With an ideology based on state-led industrialization, President Kim Dae Jung has negotiated directly with the chaebol over the restructuring plans, and the bureaucratic system such as FSC, FTC, and MOFE has pushed corporate governance reforms or debt restructuring through the control of financial institutions. When implementing chaebol reforms, the Kim government has often used informal administrative guidance with an implicit threat of sanctions.

This study argues that institutions are the key to understanding how and why state activism persists. The legacy of the developmental state has created regulatory administrative systems that do not bode well for the creation of Anglo-American market economies as opposed to the Franco-German models on the European continent. This study provides an analytic lens, which can be applied to other developing countries, which have been experiencing similar economic restructuring. Like many other countries of Asia, Korea has experienced political and economic changes. What role do domestic factors play in this process? If the determining factor in industrial reforms is domestic in nature even in such a small country as Korea, then domestic factors will most likely be the deciding consideration when other coun-

tries attempt to transform their economies. Moreover, this study helps in understanding similar interventionist tendencies elsewhere. These states, like Korea, profess a commitment to the free market, yet state involvement in the economy continues.

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Shifting Boundaries: The Double Life of Walls in Beijing, 1949–1965

by Duanfang Lu, Ph.D. candidate

Abstract

The essay analyzes the persistence of the "wall" as a building typology in the contemporary Chinese landscape despite state condemnation and through successive political changes. Historically China was a society of walls with Beijing typifying this model. While the city wall used to be the most important symbol of the city, upon the consolidation of socialist control in 1949, however, its utility was called into question. As the new government struggled to create a material reality commensurate with their ethical aims, the city wall was seen to represent the old society and was officially condemned. At the same time it was attacked politically, the city wall was also considered the physical hurdle for urban modernization by the public at large. Yet as the era of the city wall in Chinese culture ended, a new one began. By the mid 1960's work units were constructing walls to define their extents. Many of them were doing this to protect themselves from the potentially malevolent rural areas and the invasion of state upon their real estate under a vague socialist property right system. Hence the "wall" was resurrected as a functional and symbolic element in a new socialist Chinese landscape. Through an investigation of the transition from the city wall to the unit wall as a progression of symbolic importance from one regime of power to the next, the essay characterizes "tradition" not simply as "handed down" but as constantly deconstructed and constructed in a fast-changing society.

The work unit (*danwei*, the employer or organization to which a citizen is assigned) is the principle socio-spatial form which organizes the newly-built areas of the Chinese city since the socialist revolution in 1949 (Parish and Parish, 1986; Lu and Perry, 1997). One of its most striking spatial characteristics is that the work unit often integrates housing, workplace, and the provision of social services within a walled compound (Gaubatz, 1995). The wall was, and still is, the most impressive and most essential physical part of Chinese employment. Up to today, approaching any unit from the outside, the wall is the first structure that one sets eyes on, and one has seldom seen a workplace of any size in China which does not have a brick or concrete barrier around its territory. No matter how small the unit, however plain its buildings, however simple and crude its supporting facilities, the walls are there, and, as a rule, kept in better condition than any other structures within the compound. The wall creates a clear-cut differentiation between the unit and its surroundings, a visible expression of workplace identity, and a boundary protecting its property and social facilities from outsiders' use (Bjorklund, 1986).

Because in traditional China almost every important ensemble of spaces was a walled enclosure, one would easily attribute the continuity of tradition as the cause of the ubiquity of unit walls in contemporary China. As geographer E. M. Bjorklund states,

> [W]hen a new danwei is started, wall-building is the first step in construction, not the last as is common in North America. …From the Chinese point of view, the enclosure of place makes it proper and secure—conducive to effective social interaction and to organization of activities within. Enclosure does not signify negative associations common to walled places in the west. Walls are regarded as a positive and expected way of organizing people. This is the same design, in principle, followed for many centuries for important places (*Ibid.*, 21).

Yet an investigation into the wall-building practice in contemporary China reveals that, while tradition was a contributory predisposition in the rise of the unit wall, it would be a mistake, however, to think that the latter was simply the result of the continuity of the convention. As in traditional China, walls constitute the skeleton of the contemporary city, but the new framework was born out of new social conditions and possessed a spatial pattern significantly different from its precedents.

My analysis starts with the demolition of the city wall in Beijing during the early years after the socialist revolution in 1949. While historically the city wall was the most important symbol of the city, its utility was called into question upon the consolidation of socialist control. As the new government struggled to create a material reality commensurate with their ethical aims, the city wall was seen to represent the "feudalist" tradition and the division between the urban and the rural. At the same time it was attacked politically, the city wall was also considered the physical hurdle for urban modernization by the public at large. In fact, the old walls satisfied a much-needed source of raw materials as the city was transformed into a new modern capital. Yet as the era of the city wall in Chinese culture ended, a new one began. By the mid 1960's work units were constructing walls to define their extents. Many of them were doing this to protect themselves from the potentially malevolent rural areas and the invasion of state upon their real estate under a vague socialist property right system. Hence the "wall" was resurrected as a functional and symbolic element in the new socialist Chinese landscape.

"Tradition" in its barest sense, according to Edward Shils, means "simply a traditum; it is anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present" (Shil, 1981, 12). Through an investigation into the unmaking and making of the wall-building tradition as a progression of symbolic importance from one regime of power to the next, however, the essay characterizes "tradition" not simply as "handed down" but as constantly deconstructed and constructed in its daily reproduction. It is in this on-going process that the same tradition is rehistoricized, appropriated, and transplanted. With a capacity of renewing, while tradition may be held back temporarily in successive political and social changes, it does not disappear easily but tends to reappear in a new context.

This research is mainly based on archival materials available at Beijing Municipal Archives. In the following, I shall first offer a brief history of wall-construction practice in traditional China. I shall then give an account of the demolition of the city wall and the construction of the unit wall in Beijing. The final section provides a discussion of the transition from the city wall to the unit wall.

Walls in Traditional China

Walled enclosure was one of the most basic features of the traditional Chinese landscape (Boyd, 1962, 49). Walls not only physically bounded various kinds of spaces—cities, villages, gardens, temples, houses—they also symbolized the manner of classification in an ordered Chinese environment. The variety and significance of walls can be shown by the fact that the Chinese devoted a number of words to describing their different forms and meanings: high walls around courtyards were called *qiang*, which connoted what was used to shield oneself; house walls and part walls, *bi*, which connoted what warded off and resisted the wind and cold; and low walls, *yuan*, which connoted what one leaned on and thus took as his protection, to take just a few examples (Xu, 2000, 197).

In particular, the importance of the city wall transcended that of other types of walls. Symbolizing authority, order and security, the wall was so central to the Chinese idea of a city that the traditional words for city and wall were identical, the character *cheng* standing for both (Wheatley, 1971, 221). The city wall and the local center of imperial administration were institutionally and conceptually inseparable; an unwalled urban center was almost as inconceivable as a house without a roof. Like city walls in many other societies, those in China were built essentially to protect the city against pirate invasion and peasant rebellion. In fact, before the introduction of modern artillery, Chinese city walls, which were ordinarily surrounded by a moat, were almost indestructible. Their solidity made any attempt to breach them a difficult task, and their height, ranging from five to fifteen meters, made scaling hazardous (Chang, 1977, 77). And similar to the walled cities of the Middle East, the walls around many riverine Chinese cities had the additional function of defense against the floods that were a continual menace in many lowland areas (*Ibid.*, 79).

Besides these practical functions, Chinese elite had attached rich symbolic meanings to the city wall since Zhou times. For the earliest city, the construction of outer walls signified the establishment and maintenance of an ideal order that could be kept in accord with the order of the cosmos, a symbolism in conformity with the circumstances in which individual states strived for power against its rival counterparts. Under the socio-political conditions of imperial China, however, the emphasis of the symbolism shifted from the city being treated as the center of the cosmos to the loyalty of the region to the emperor residing in the imperial capital, the centrality of the imperial government, and the social order that it had established (Xu, 2000, 240-41).

The Mongols interrupted this tradition; few walled cities were constructed under the Yuan dynasty (1280-1368), whose Mongol founders, pastoral in origin, were unsympathetic to the wall-building tradition (Chang, 1977). In order to display their power, at one time the Mongols even forbade city-wall construction throughout China. As walls that predated the Mongol conquest deteriorated during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, they needed repair badly by the time the Mongols were overthrown. In fact, the first half of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) witnessed the advent of "the great age of Chinese wall building," which restored "the primarily

psychological function of reaffirming the presence of the Chinese state" and reestablished proper social order after a cen-tury of Mongol rule (Mote, 1977, 137). Perhaps because of this new significance, while early city walls were simply pounded earth ramparts, Ming engineers now faced them with bricks, ceramic blocks, or stones.

Intensive wall construction practice continued into the Ching (1644-1911), the last dynasty of imperial China, and a new function of city walls arose under the specific social circumstances of this period. The Manchus, in the wake of their conquest of China in the seventeenth century, were concerned to preserve the ethnic identity and military prowess of their troops stationed at key central places. To this end, they appropriated for exclusive Manchu residence entire sections within the walls of many cities and sometimes built a partial wall to create an enclosed site for a Manchu quarter. In a few instances they built a completely separate enclosure within a short distance of an existing Chinese city. About 34 twin cities were created by the Manchus in North and North-west China to achieve ethnic segregation (Chang, 1977, 92).

Another type of walls of particular interest here was the ward wall within the city. Since Zhou times (c. 11th century-256 B.C.), a nor-mative principle of city planning had been established both as a symbolic nature and as a pragmatic function of residence control. That is, the city was divided into residential wards, market quarters, and enceintes exclusively occupied by local government offices, each being enclosed by walls and separated by streets (Xu, 2000, 163). This system reached its maturity by the Sui (581-618) and the early Tang dynasty (618-907) and had tremendous impacts on daily life in the city. For example, Chang'an, the Sui-Tang capital city, was divided into large enclosed wards by extraordinarily wide streets. Houses of commoners were confined to the interior of the wards, and there were guard posts at the junctions of the avenues (Heng, 1999). Unless a permit was issued by the county officials or the ward headman's office, no one was allowed out in the avenues at night (Ibid., 24). The main streets were devoid of commercial activities, which were restricted to the city's fortress-like East and West Markets during certain hours of the day (Ibid.).

It was during the late Tang and the early Southern Song period that cities witnessed the beginning of the collapse of the strictly controlled ward system. As the strong, autocratic grip that the Sui emperors had over their capitals was replaced by that of a bureaucratic government of practical scholar-officials, the enclosed marketplaces and the walled residential wards were gradually substituted by the free street plan in which shops could be opened anywhere within the city, and former spatial distinctions of residential, commercial, and administrative functions were blurred (*Ibid.*, 205-07). This period coincided with the early stage of the gradual growth of commercial suburbs outside the city gates caused by the intensification of a market economy, the increase in urbanization, and the slackening of commercial controls and urban regulations. Because city gates channeled all traffic to and from a sector of the city's hinterland, the areas immediately outside them became favored sites for markets and businesses.

By the nineteenth century, suburban development outside at least one gate was common in many walled cities, and in some cases, built-up areas in the suburbs even exceeded those within the walls (Chang, 1977, 99). Concern for the security of the suburbs sometimes led to the construction of an outer wall which encompassed the entire or partial suburban areas; yet in most cases, no efforts were taken to enclose the commercial suburbs. Quite a few researchers of Chinese history hence maintain that cities in late imperial China were largely open institutions, and the basic political, social, and cultural cleavages, unlike that of the pre-modern European city, were those of class and occupation rather than those between the city and the countryside (Skinner, 1977, 269). As F. W. Mote suggests, "city's people [during the Ming and Qing dynasty] probably had no sense of themselves as forming a cohesive and self-perpetuating urban group" (Mote, 1973, 54). In his study of Nanjing during the early Ming, Mote considers "Neither the city wall not the actual limits of the suburban concentration marked the city off from the countryside in architectural terms. Nor did style of dress, patterns of eating and drinking, means of transportation, or any other obvious aspect of daily life display characteristic dichotomies between urban and rural" (Mote, 1977, 116). Such urban-rural continuum was physically manifested in the fact that what was urban was not spatially separated by the city walls from what was rural during the late imperial period.

The Fall of the City Wall

Historically the meanings and functions of the city wall went through various shifts under the tide of social and political transformation. Yet spiritually, the city wall represented for the traditional Chinese what was seen as constant in the vicissitudes of life. In many poems and articles writers portrayed the city wall as part of the timeless universe in contrast to the incessant change of things. In a story told by Tao Qian (ca. A.D. 372-427) in his *Sou shen houji*, for example, when Ding Lingwei, a person who turned into an immortal crane after having studied the *dao* of immortality for a millennium, flew back to his home place and lamented on the transience of human life, he sang that "city walls are as ever but [people] are not the same" (Tao, 1981; Xu, 2000, 126).

This sense of eternality attached to city walls, however, melted into air with the advent of a new socialist era. When the Chinese civil war finally ended in 1949, socialist builders were left with the task of rebuilding the war-ravaged Chinese city into the new city. Although they had no sense of what exactly constituted a socialist urban environment, many agreed that in order to create a world approximating the modern life imagined for the new society, certain traditions had to be overthrown. The argument about the city's socialist future brought many of the most ostensible vestiges of traditional China under assault. Due to its important role in shaping the urban morphology of the capital, the city wall of Beijing served as the focus in this discussion.

Beijing was a city of walls within walls. There were two parts of city walls: outer walls, the walls of the Chinese City, and inner walls, the walls of the Tartar City; within the inner walls were the walls of the Imperial City; and finally, within these were the rust-red walls of the Forbidden City. The main city was accommodated within inner walls; initially constructed in the Yuan dynasty and revised in the Ming era. They measured 6,650 meters east-west and 5,350 meters north-south and had nine gates (Sit, 1995). The outer walls were a later addition of the mid 16th century, built to accommodate the prosperous southern commercial suburb. While they should have circumscribed the whole inner city in the original plan, due to a shortage of funds only the southern outer area was enclosed and shaped like a cap adjoining the main city (Ibid.). In the Qing dynasty the conquering Manchus drove most of the native population from the main city into the southern suburb surrounded by outer walls, so the inner city was then commonly known as the Manchu or Tartar city, and the outer city, the Chinese city (Ibid.). The city walls and their attached gate-towers were of massive scale but of flawless proportion. As Osvald Sirén described them in *The Walls and Gates of Peking*:

> Of all the great buildings of Peking there is none which can compare with the walls of the Tartar city in monumental grandeur. At first sight they may not be as attractive to the eye as the palaces, temples and shop-fronts of those highly coloured and picturesquely composed wooden structures which still line the old streets or hide behind the walls, but after a longer acquaintance with this vast city, they become the most impressive monuments—enormous in their extension and dominating everything by their quiet forceful rhythm.

> …On the outer side of the walls this rhythm is accentuated by the powerful bastions which follow one another at regular intervals though somewhat varying in size. On the inner side the movement is slower and more irregular on account of the extreme unevenness of the joints between the sections and of the bends and bulges resulting from the pressure of water and tree-roots. This slow rhythm is suddenly quickened and changed into a powerful crescendo at the gates, where double towers rise triumphantly above the long horizontal lines of the battlements, the 35 larger of these towers resembling palaces on high terraces. The corner towers, massive and fortresslike, form a magnificent finale of the whole composition (Sirén, 1924, 24-25).

The destruction of the walls, however, already started at the time when Sirén was conducting his research. With the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Beijing was no longer an imperial capital but the rival ground for political ambitions of warlords. Hence there was no authority to protect its precious legacy. Carved shop-fronts and old-fashioned court-yards were destroyed every year to make room for modern multi-storied brick buildings. A few parts of pink wall around the "Imperial city" were torn down in order to construct electric streetcar lines. Observing these shifts, Sirén asked at the end of his book: "How long will they still remain, these wonderful walls and gates, these silent records of Peking's most beautiful and glorious past?" (*Ibid.*, 219)

If changes had taken place since the time of the Chinese Republic (1911-49), their pace increased dramatically after the socialist revolution. In 1949, Beijing was made the national capital of a new People's Republic, and the city government proclaimed the guiding principle for urban construction within the city as "to serve the masses, to serve production and to serve the Central Government" (Sit, 1995, 91). Beijing

entered into an era of rapid development: population and the number of institutions and factories increased rapidly, and the demand for all types of buildings and housing multiplied. While city walls were torn down in cities like Guangzhou during the republic period, Beijing was still very much confined by its walls, which were now considered by many the physical and symbolic barrier to the modernization of the city. As planners were eager to shape the city into a modern socialist capital, how to deal with the city wall became an urgent issue. Greatest divergence came with the issue of whether walls should be demolished or preserved.

One group argued that the city wall should be torn down to make room for both political and economic reasons. For this group of people, ideologically, the city wall was the relic of ancient emperors, the symbol of the "feudalist" tradition, and the sign of the division between urban residents and peasants. As "The Preliminary General Planning Proposal for Beijing Urban Construction (Draft)" stated:

> The city of Beijing was built during the Feudal times; its construction was thus limited by the low productive force. Because it was built under the social condition characterized by antithesis between classes, its construction principle was to meet the needs of feudalist rulers. The most important buildings in the city were the palaces and temples; layers of city walls were built centering on the palaces, which reflected the feudal emperors' overweening idea of protecting feudalist domination and preventing peasant uprising.[2]

Practically, this group maintained, the city wall was ancient defense work, and it had now finished its "historical task." In the new age of socialist development, the persistence of walls blocked traffic, limited urban development, and wasted land. Hence it was not only useless but also harmful to keep these walls. If they were torn down, a large amount of bricks could be obtained for new construction projects, the land they occupied could be made into wide streets, and the city was then able to establish an integrated modern transport system.

The other group, however, insisted that it would be a big mistake to demolish the city's great heritage; they wanted the city wall to be preserved and put into modern use. Various ways of taking advantage of walls were raised: some proposed to build high-speed streetcar system on the walls, some suggested to remodel the gate towers into museums, and others thought to connect city walls and their adjacent areas into greenbelts. The last idea was supported vigorously by architectural historian Liang Sicheng, who wrote extensively on the preservation of Beijing's cultural legacy during the early 1950s. In his 1950 article entitled "Discussion on the Issue of the Conservation-or-Demolishment of Beijing's City Walls," Liang suggested that the city wall and the moat should be redeveloped into a "three-dimensional" park (Liang, 1986). Flowers and grass could be planted on the top of the walls; with a width of more than 10 meters, the terrace would be a perfect place for people to stroll and enjoy a distant view of the city. The dozens of gate towers could be refurbished into reading rooms or teahouses. By diverting water from the Yongding river water into the moat, the latter would allow people to go boating and fishing in the summer, and go skating in the winter (*Ibid.*, 46).

Yet Liang's proposal, together with his other ideas on historical conservation, was considered nostalgia in the mighty torrent of the socialist development surging forward toward modernity. During an era in which historical materialism achieved its triumph, most decision-makers judged things in accordance with the roles that they played in "the progress of social history." Thus Hua Nangui, a key petitioner on many urban construction issues, considered the removal of the city wall inevitable due to "[t]he evolution rule of society." He maintained that "the yearning for the past cannot prevent the society from making progress" (Hua, 1956). In addition, during the early phase of planning Beijing, the influence of the Soviet model was explicit. Soviet experts were invited to review the plans, and their weight often defeated local attempts at historical conservation. When the general plan of Beijing was drafted in 1953, Liang argued that the administrative center should be put outside the old city to the west of its wall in order to preserve the Imperial City intact, while the Russian experts insisted that time and cost considerations dictated the demolition of old structures in and around the southern part of the Imperial City for the headquarters of the national administration. Apparently the latter's opinion became dominant; later when the government approved the new general plan "Draft Plan on Reconstructing and Expanding Beijing Municipality," one of its six planning principles spoke directly against the idea of conservation: "The major danger is an extreme respect for old architecture, such that it constricts our perspective of development" (Sit, 1995, 94).

While hot debates about the city wall still reverberated in the general public, the piecemeal demolition conducted by individual work units had already started due to the constant shortage of construction materials since the early 1950s. As planners continuously raised the magnitude of investment, the gap between the production and consumption of building materials was widened. Construction projects were often interrupted due to inade-quate supplies of materials (Chao, 1968). This had made the city walls a desirable source of bricks and earth. In December 1956, for example, Beijing Planning Bureau reported that city walls were excavated by individual work units in a chaotic way: some demolished the inner walls, and some torn down the outer walls. Those who only needed bricks peeled the brick facing off the walls and left the inner earth standing alone, while those who only wanted earth inside the facing left crushed bricks all around.[3] The bricks and earth taken by work units were used for all kinds of projects; the Planning Bureau even received requests from some suburban agricultural production co-ops who hoped to use the bricks to build pig houses.[4]

By 1959, the outer walls had almost been completely demolished except the part south to Tiantang, and the inner walls had been partly dismantled. As the brick facing of most parts of the walls was gone, the remaining soil began to wash away in the rain. Under this circumstance, the municipality decided that the remaining city walls should be removed completely.[5] The city of Beijing has since burst through its walled enclosure and burgeoned outwards in every direction. In the place of the city walls were wide well-paved boule-

vards. What remained unchanged were the names of the old city gates, which were now nothing more than the picturesque reminders of a legendary past.

The Rise of the Unit Wall

Ironically, while city walls had been torn down in Beijing, work units were constructing walls throughout the city. In fact, during the 1950s and the early 1960s most work units were built without walls; for those that did need some kind of physical confinement, more often than not only barbed wire entanglements or wattle walls were erected. It was not until the mid-1960s that many work units started to think about building permanent walls. This, however, was not encouraged by the state; in fact, wall-building activity was strictly controlled due to the severe shortage of construction materials. To ensure that major construction projects within the national plan would not be interrupted by inadequate supplies of materials, the planning department kept strict control of the consumption of building materials by minor projects. Considering wall-building as a waste of resources which were already in short supply, the Planning Bureau was generally reluctant to approve work units' wall construction projects except for certain crucial institutions such as military-related research units. The application procedure was made complicated and time-consuming; successful applicants not only had to demonstrate that they had reliable source of the building materials for construction, but were also required to specify why the walls were absolutely necessary.

In order to obtain endorsement, each work unit showed its special prowess. Some stressed that they would use construction materials with substandard quality or made of waste materials. According to a 1964 document, for example, in order to build walls with a length of 850 meters the College of Nationality claimed that it had made coal cinder bricks for the construction.[6] Because the brick was one of the construction materials that were in constant short supply, quite a few applications proposed to build metal-railing fences rather than brick walls. In early May of the same year, for instance, the municipal government of Beijing issued a circular which required that no brick walls should be constructed; in response to this constraint, some work units requested to build fences instead.[7]

Despite the strict control of the planning department and the municipal government, work units were nonetheless eager to build walls. During the short period of time between May 22 and July 23 of 1964 alone, 51 local work units submitted wall construction applications to the Planning Bureau of Beijing.[8] The main reason for this wall-building enthusiasm was the security concern. The report submitted by the Chinese Scientific Council, for example, described the difficulties in maintaining safety in its residential district without walls:

> Because there are no walls, it is impossible to manage. Accesses are available in all directions, people are free to come and go, and venders are hawking everywhere. This has not only been disturbing, but has also made security a big issue. According to an incomplete estimation, there were 11 cases of burglary in 1963, among which there were seven cases of bicycle stealing and four other cases.[9]

Most newly established work units at the time were located in suburban areas; there always was a tension between the units and the peasants. Without other means available, unit leaders considered the wall separating their territories completely from the rural hinterlands the only solution to solve the contradiction. According to the application submitted by Miyun Water Electronic Power Factory in 1964, for example, peasants not only herded pigs and sheep in the factory's office and residential areas, but they also developed family vegetable plots within the unit.[10] Another application submitted by the Fifth Branch of the Automobile Repairing Factory detailed the conflicts between the unit and nearby peasants.[11] Located on the old site of the Shiye Timber Factory, the factory was sandwiched between two residential districts, while bordering the Sun Palace People's Commune on another side. Factory leaders complained that because of the ineffective management of the previous tenant, residents in the vicinity developed a habit of coming to the factory to pick up leftover materials. When the factory tried to stop the practice, the mass became angry and spread complaints everywhere. In addition, while the previous tenant allowed more than 300 households in the vicinity to share electricity, the factory decided to cut off the supply. The sudden power failure caused great "misunderstanding" from locals. In two occasions, hundreds of people gathered in the factory and protested. The crises were solved only with the assistance of the Public Security Bureau and the Electricity Provision Bureau, but the relationship between the factory and local residents had since broken up. Later, when unit leaders decided to build a new power distribution house on the roadside, they considered that building walls would be the only way to protect factory property.[12]

Second to the security function, unit walls played an important role in defining boundaries. In particular, this purpose had to do with a specific urban land property-right system adopted in China that was not ordinarily found in a market economy. Soon after the founding of the People's Republic, most urban land under the ownership of the former Kuomintang government, foreigners, and some large private landowners was confiscated by the state (Yang et al., 1992). Socialist reform of private industrialists and businessmen launched in 1956 further changed the ownership of private real estate by means of "joint state-private ownership" and by state management of leases. By 1958, the bulk of urban land was converted to state ownership, and land profit and land rent had disappeared from the Chinese economy (*Ibid.*)

However, while it was clear that urban land in China belonged to the state, what remained vague was the relationship between the state and the urban land user. Whether the requisitioned land had actually turned into the property of the urban land user (hence the state provided only a permit for land requisition) or the property of the state (hence the urban land user obtained only the land use right) was never clarified in government documents or theoretical writings. In reality, the principle was "those who used the land would man-age the land," but there was no clear legal protection for users' right. As a result, although there was no time limit set for the land use of work units, the state might take back the

land anytime. During the 1950s, for example, because the General Institute of Iron and Steel Research needed expansion, the state required its neighboring work unit, the Institute of Agricultural Scientific Research, to yield its experimental farmland to the former. As it took several years to build up that farmland, the transaction caused a great loss for the latter.[13] Without law protection, walls became important in safeguarding land use rights through their very physicality. In fact, to avoid waste, once the walls were there, the Planning Bureau often hesitated to order demolition and was thus forced to admit the "established fact" of property rights.

In addition, the limited power of work units in the formal process of land disposition made wall-building a desirable way to acquire additional land. Because they did not have to pay for land use, work units were inclined to occupy more land. In fact, since the early 1950s the state had expressed greatly concern towards the misuse of land resources among work units. In the document "On the Situation of Wasting Construction Land," for example, the Beijing Planning Bureau reported that in 1955 land that had been distributed to individual work units while not in use reached 10,160 acres, which accounted for 9.6 percent of the total acquired land since 1949, and this did not include the land that was used improperly.[14] A survey of 39 work units in May 1955 estimated that misused land reached 7,600 acres, which was approximately half of the total land occupied by the work units under survey. The serious situation of land waste and misuse raised great alert within the central government; *People's Daily*, the official newspaper, published a dozen of articles related to the issue in 1957 alone.[15]

While it was always desirable to acquire as much land as possible, work units generally had little say in the urban land disposition process. Without market mechanism, land disposition was largely an administrative allocation process under the general investment plan. When an investment plan was approved, the application for land use was simultaneously approved; the state determined land allocation by using a ratio between the construction project and its land use acreage. In this disposition process the government played a determining role, while the direct users of land had little influence. Once a work unit was set up, even if the unit had the incentive to expand its production capacity, therefore generating a new demand for land, it could not acquire land freely. In most cases, only those whose new production investment plans were approved would be allowed to acquire additional land (Yang, 1992).

Under this circumstance, constructing walls beyond the given planning redline often became a preferable way to occupy more land. The document reporting the survey of wall construction by Beijing middle and elementary schools detailed the situation.[16] In 1964 the Planning Bureau approved a total of 105 wall construction projects for middle and elementary schools for security purpose. Among 73 projects that had been completed, the Planning Bureau found that in 33 projects the location of walls exceeded the given boundaries. The walls constructed by the Attached Middle School of Beijing University, for example, had exceeded the scope of land distribution on its east, south, and west sides,

and its north wall, if built according to the unit's construction plan, would circle the six acres of agricultural fields that belonged to the neighboring Dazhongsi Production Team.

As unit wall construction was gradually established as a norm, the wall has become the most essential physical part of Chinese employment. When a new work unit is built, the wall is the first structure in construction. Every work unit is a walled enclosure or, if large enough, a cluster of several walled enclosures. The wall, in most cases made of brick ranging from two to three meters height, sets the work unit physically apart from its surroundings. There are usually several entrances on the wall from the main road, each of which is staffed by security personnel and equipped with heavy wrought-iron gates. A small janitor's room is flanked on one side of the gate; with a large window facing the gate, the guard can easily watch the coming and going of pedestrians and vehicles from the room. The level of control of entrance varies from unit to unit. Some institutions, such as the major administrative and military-related units, may subject all persons to identification procedures. Others are relatively easy to enter; only those apparently not belonging to the work unit would be stopped by the guard, who is often shrewd at evaluating pedestrians' status by their looking and manners, for an identity check-up. The gate is closed at midnight and open in early morning. Once it is closed, the entrance and exit for both unit residents and outsiders become very difficult. Access can only be obtained by waking the guard up and the latter would only open the door, apparently unhappily, for those who he recognizes as unit members.

Like other architectural elements, the wall has rich sociological implications beyond its purely physical property. For some it has a pivotal role as the very originator of domesticity and society. L.B. Alberti, for example, claims in his *On the Art of Building in Ten Books* that it was the roof and the wall which first drew men together and gave rise to society (Alberti, 1988). But for people who are excluded from the wall's confinement, the wall has a sinister parallel in the attempts to divide people. The unit wall indeed bears both effects. On the one hand, the wall, with its controlled accesses and related buildings facing inward, helps to create a close community atmosphere within the unit. On the other hand, the wall serves to prevent outsiders from taking advantage of social facilities and other properties of the work unit. The segregation effect is most striking in the case of the work unit located in the countryside, where the well-equipped unit space is surrounded by rural hinterlands which barely have any modern utilities and social facilities. As local peasants desire to use the services available in the work unit but are denied the accesses, conflicts, sometimes violent ones, are often generated from the encounters between the two (Lu, 2003).

Conclusion

As we have seen, the persistence of the "wall" as a building typology was not simply a result of the "handed-down" convention. Instead, the tradition was initially condemned by the planning department as wasteful and

unnecessary; its persistence was a result of returning after being repressed rather than that of continuity. My study highlights two major reasons behind the construction of unit walls: one was a safekeeping issue in conflicts with neighbors, and the other was a property security issue in conflicts with the government. Most newly established work units were located in suburban or rural areas, the conflict over safety between the work units and peasants drove the work units to build walls to separate themselves from the rural hinterlands. Because the relationship between the state and the urban land user was vaguely defined and there was no clear legal protection for land right, wall construction not only played an important role in securing the land use rights, but also became a preferable way to occupy more land.

The wall-building practice hence revived; whereas the Chinese city as a whole was no longer walled, it achieved a geography consisting of many close units circled by walls. At first glance, this cellular landscape bore certain similarities to that of Sui-Tang cities. With walled wards turning themselves off from the street, both were very much like a collection of semi-autonomous cells separated by wide avenues traversing between the high walls. Yet a closer look into the process of the construction of the unit wall reveals that the enclosure of the work unit was not a sign of the revival of tradition or an immediate application of the long-established practice; instead, as my study reveals, it was born out of a series of peculiar contradictions generated by new socialist conditions. If in the *traditional* definition of tradition is "the transmitted thing," this wall story, however, reveals that the past, rather than simply being passed on, is ceaselessly restructured in the course of making the present. Tradition is a product of the ongoing process of deconstruction and reconstruction, and it travels by returning at the new site after being repressed at another.

Behind this shift from the "city wall" to the "unit wall" as the framework of defining the Chinese landscape was a new set of associated regimes of power. While from the very beginning the state assumed the responsibility of feeding the unemployed and providing full welfare for the urban population, rural residents were responsible for feeding themselves and practiced self-reliance in every aspect of their lives. The enlarged gap between the city and the countryside was immediately sensed; many cities were swollen with rural migrants during the 1950s. In order to maintain a neat socialist urban order devoid of any city ills such as unemployment and hunger, controls were taken step by step to block the "blind" influx of rural people into the city. A full-blown population regulation system came into being in 1958, when migration was moving towards its peak at the height of the Great Leap Forward (Cheng and Selden, 1994). The 1958 document, "Regulations on Household Registration in the People's Republic of China," formally established a *hukou* (household) system which divided the whole population into two groups—urban and rural residents—based on whether they were members of work units or their place of residence (*Ibid.*). Once classified, membership in either group was inherited from the mother and could not be changed except under special circumstances. The division, together with

comprehensive policies on employment, transport and food and housing supply, served to constrain people to their current places of residence.

The result is a rigid, hierarchically segregated landscape. During the Maoist period (1949-76), individuals and families were either born into or bureaucratically allocated to relatively closed units; there was little free movement of people and information across unit boundaries. The units were highly differentiated in terms of material conditions, income, services and opportunities based on their locations in the bureaucratic system (Whyte, 2000). In particular, the contrast between the urban and rural units was striking. Urban work units featured paved streets, modern concrete buildings, electricity, running water, sewage systems, and a wide range of social facilities. Unit members were guaranteed a variety of provisions, including permanent employment, retirement pension, public housing, and inexpensive medical care, and so on. In rural villages, residents still lived in wooden or traditional earth dwellings, where infrastructure and social service system were extremely primitive. Peasants were excluded from social benefits urban residents enjoyed even if they managed to leave the countryside and began to reside in the city. In a subtle way, the unit wall had an effect of legitimizing the differentiation. If the urban and rural worlds were juxtaposed side by side without the walls, it would be surprising to see the striking difference between the two. Yet with the mediate of the walls, it was much easier for one to accept the dissimilarities and to take them as something natural and eternal.

There is indeed more than a little irony in this transition: while the city wall was charged as a symbol of the urban-rural contradiction in state condemnation, in fact during the late imperial period what was urban was not spatially separated by the city wall from what was rural; the city at the time, different from the pre-modern European city, was an "open institution." Such a tradition, however, disappeared ironically at a time when the urban-rural inequality was considered one of the social ills to be eliminated by socialism. It turned out that the unit wall was both the product of and the symbol for the division between the work unit and its surroundings. In particular, in the case of the work unit located in the countryside, the unit wall came to represent a strict segregation between the urban and the rural. Hence in the end, what was ended, in addition to the era of the city wall, was the era of urban-rural continuum.

ENDNOTES

1. This article is a revised version of the chapter "From the City Wall to the Unit Wall" in my dissertation *The Spatial Unconscious: Modernity and the Making of the Chinese Work Unit, 1949-2000.* The research was supported by Social Science Research Council International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship, U.C. Berkeley Humanities Research Grant, and U.C. Berkeley Chancellor's Fellowship for Dissertation Research.

2. "Beijing chengshi jianshe zongti guihua chubu fang'an (chao'an)" [The Preliminary General Planning Proposal for Beijing Urban Construction (Draft)], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category No. 131, Content No. 1, Vol. 56.

3. "Guanyu chengqiang chaichu wenti de qingshi" [Petition on the Issue of Demolishing City Walls], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category 131, No. 1, Vol. 271.

4. "Guihuaju guanyu weixian bufeng chengqiang chaichu de yijian" [The Planning Bureau's Opinion on the Demolishment of Some Dangerous City Walls], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category 131, No. 1, Vol. 271.

5. Ibid.

6. "Guanyu jianshe danwei xiujian weiqiang wenti gei chengjianwei de qingshi baogao" [Report to the Committee of Urban Construction on the Issue of Wall Construction by Work Units], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category 131, No. 1, Vol. 491.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Interview with a member of the General Institute of Iron and Steel Research in Beijing, 2000.

14. "Guanyu jianzhu yongdi de langfei qingkuan" [On the Situation of the Waste in Construction Land], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category 131, No. 1, Vol. 244.

15. For example, "Zai jiben jianshe zhong jieyue yongdi" [Save on Land in Basic Construction], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Mar. 31, 1957, B1; "Jieyue jiben jianshe yongdi" [Save on the Basic Construction], Land, Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Aug. 6, 1957.

16. "Guanyu jianshe danwei xiujian weiqiang wenti gei chengjianwei de qingshi baogao" [Report to the Committee of Urban Construction on the Issue of Wall Construction by Work Units], Beijing Municipal Archives, Category 131, No. 1, Vol. 491.

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North Korean Realities

by James McAdam, M.A.

Abstract

Despite the promise for constructive diplomatic engagement with the North Koreans so prominent only months ago, the political future of the Korean Peninsula today remains as unpredictable as it has been at any time since the end of the Korean War. While the eventual outcome of the current diplomatic stand-off between North Korea and its East Asian neighbors—and the United States—remains in doubt, a successful resolution is undoubtedly of critical importance to the geopolitical stability in East Asia, and to the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula   The most pressing need—a negotiated solution—seems to remain frustratingly beyond the limits of compromise amongst all concerned.

And yet lost amidst the rhetoric of North Korea's nuclear provocations and repeated defiance of diplomatic accords, is the unimaginable daily struggle for survival facing the North Korean people—victims of chronic food shortages, insufficient medical services and a repressive blanket of political isolation. The need for international assistance to mitigate this growing humanitarian crisis becomes painfully apparent to those foreigners permitted to travel within North Korea. This paper details my own perceptions over the course of nearly two years of commercial engagement with the North Koreans, including three expeditions north of the DMZ.

My first impression upon breaking cloud-cover several miles above North Korea—my face pressed hard against the dusty window of the Russian-made North Korean Air Koryo aircraft- was a view eerily similar to approaching Denver's new international airport--a vast and barren landscape, punctuated by the occasional tree, intermittent scruffy shrubbery, a distant mountain range and very little else. Only when I began to comprehend what was missing from the terrain below did I realize that I most assuredly was not in Colorado! Absent were the telltale signs of modern civilization— no buildings, houses or roads – no power lines or telephone poles— no farm animals, or any sign of human existence. Suddenly, we were taxiing down the runway at Pyongyang's international airport—parading past the display of 1970's vintage Russian-made military aircraft that comprise North Korea's aging aviation capability—aircraft identical to the 30-year old craft that had transported our business delegation on the two-hour flight from Beijing.

Our flight had landed, but I don't recall the touchdown— completely absorbed in the realization that after nearly 12 months of complicated visa negotiations with my New York-based North Korean sponsors, my adventure to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea—the DPRK—was about to become a reality. Slowly deplaning from the mobile stair platform—no fancy air-conditioned enclosed boarding ramp in sight—my awareness level switched into extreme sensory perception: armed guards posted in the hidden recesses throughout the airport—a sudden request for senior customs agents to process the unexpected American passport holders—x-ray inspection of all accompanied baggage and a final

search for cell phones—especially those that possess a global positioning device—and then, in the distance, the smiling faces of my sponsor-delegation waiting beyond the arrival lounge, accompanied by some not-so-friendly "tour guides"—undoubtedly members of North Korea's intelligence service.

After a 30-minute drive through pastoral farmland, past villages built of sod-homes and mud-framed dwellings, we approached the outskirts of Pyongyang. Traveling in an official government motor pool, we were whisked past the city's border guards and permitted to enter the "Model City." Magically, the images of the Great Leader—the late Kim Il Sung—appeared everywhere; atop a replica of the Arc de Triomphe, a giant bronze statue in his image guarding the entrance to Kim's burial mausoleum and eventually past the equivalent of North Korea's "Red Square" and on to our private guest house which was to be our "supervised residence" for the duration of our visit.

Over the course of the next 18 months, I would make three separate journeys to North Korea in an effort to establish a containerized ocean transportation infrastructure to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid shipments on behalf of the United Nations World Food Program and American President Lines, the company that I represent from our headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. The WFP Distributes food aid to more than 167 counties in North Korea—and only to those locations that allow independent monitoring, an effort to insure that food-aid is not diverted to military interests or brokered for hard currency. The WFP's work is vitally important to the health and welfare of the North Korean people, without which famine and chronic food shortages would likely reach unimaginable proportions.

My journey to the DPRK has been a fascinating experience and undoubtedly one of the most challenging of my career. Throughout the nearly three weeks that I have spent in country, I have been allowed almost unrestricted access to nearly all of the locations I requested to visit—including remote villages deep within rural North Korea—places where few, if any, Americans have likely traveled since the end of the

Korean War. Our delegations have been received by senior-level ministerial representatives in Ministry of Trade, including an official reception at the Peoples Parliament in Pyongyang. Members of North Korea's diplomatic and commercial organizations assigned to coordinate our delegations were generally experienced international business people who spoke exceptionally good English—most of whom had been posted to DPRK embassies in former Stalinist-states such as Cuba, or in Eastern Europe, and, surprisingly, Malaysia. Doing business with the North Koreans is not without risks—nor without obstacles—but our experience to date has been quite rewarding and productive--apart from the financial aspects of our relationship, our efforts in support of the WFP are making a real difference in the lives of the North Korean people.

	North Korea	South Korea	China	Russia	Japan
Population (m)	22.3	47.7	1,270	144.2	126.5
GDP (us$bn-mkt.ex)	15.7	422	1,200	310	4,100
GDP Growth (%-Q2)	3.7	6.3	8.1	4.1	-0.7
Per Capita GDP (US$)	706	8,870	910	2,140	32,705
Trade Balance (US$bn)	-1,021	9.9	29.1	42.6	86.5

Yet today, only 9 months since my last visit, North Korea has once again become embroiled in a web of geopolitical events that have decimated the constructive political capital that was achieved in the years following the fragile accords of the Clinton Administration, which culminated in Secretary of State Albright's visit to Pyongyang in 1999. Gone are the headlines proclaiming a renewal of diplomatic relations with the European Union, along with several major Western democratic nations—replaced with well-publicized incidents of trafficking in illicit narcotics, missile exports, the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and most ominous, the North's recent admission of the renewal of its clandestine nuclear weapons ambitions.

Despite the promise for constructive diplomatic engagement so prominent only months ago, the political future of the Korean Peninsula is today as unpredictable and uncertain as it has been at any time since the end of the Korean War nearly 50 years ago. While the eventual outcome of the current political and diplomatic challenges confronting relations between the DPRK and their East Asian neighbors—and the United States—remains unresolved, a successful conclusion is undoubtedly of critical importance to the geopolitical stability in East Asia, and to the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula. I would like to share my personal observations from my commercial engagement with the North Koreans in the hope that they might provide some insight into the seemingly insurmountable political differences that separate the DPRK from most of the world's developed economies. I will begin with a brief overview of North Korea's political structure—as it may help to put recent

geo-political events into their proper perspective, and then follow with a perspective on the social and economic conditions confronting the North Korean nation, and conclude with a summary of the most critical issues that continue to impede progress in US-North Korean relations.

North Korean-Political Ideology

The initial leg in our quest to secure approval for a US-delegation to visit North Korea began in an unlikely setting--a formal meeting with the DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. After a review of our trade objectives and desired itinerary--and what I presume were exhaustive background checks on the members of our proposed delegation-- we were invited to apply for visas to visit the DPRK. The visa process is complicated and opaque—often taking 3 months or more to secure an initial "verbal" approval from your KOMT sponsors. However, a formal visa for American citizens can only be issued by the DPRK's embassy in Beijing, a risky proposition for first-time travelers who may have reservations about the credibility of a North Korean verbal commitment.

Our delegation decided to take the risks and made plans to regroup at the DPRK's embassy in Beijing the following week. When I arrived at the consular section in Beijing, I encountered a scene right out of the movie "Casablanca"—with dozens of delegations of various nationalities simply "waiting, waiting and waiting" for the promised final visa approval. Ultimately, many travelers were disappointed, their visa approval process having broken down within the dysfunctional bureaucracy of Pyongyang. This can be a very expensive lesson in the commercial realities of dealing with the nascent North Korean market-oriented economy.

More surprises awaited us as we moved on to the Air Koryo Beijing office, where our air-tickets to Pyongyang supposedly awaited our arrival. Only those who survive the visa process are permitted to purchase and confirm seats on the once-a-week flight from Beijing to Pyongyang—and with tickets on a first-come first-served basis, there is no assurance that your reservation won't be given to someone who only 10 minutes before had been standing in front of you in the long queue at the DPRK Beijing embassy.

For the fortunate few who successfully secure both a visa and a plane ticket—and survive the two-hour flight to Pyongyang in a 1970's vintage Russian aircraft—conditions improve dramatically upon your arrival in North Korea. Our North Korean sponsors were very attentive to our travel needs, having arranged for all of our hotel, food and transport arrangements before our arrival. We discovered almost immediately that North Korea operates on a "cash-now" basis. Our hotel arrangements required 50% up-front deposit, in US hard currency. The concept of a debit-card is still a long ways away for the North Korean economy! Later, as we tallied our out-of-pocket expenses for the five-day excursion, we were shocked to find that our accommodations came to nearly $US 1,000 per day. Ultimately you are responsible to pay for everything that is provided during your stay, from gasoline for transportation, to the obligatory nightly banquets with your hosts, all hotel and communication expenses, and

the various obligatory "welcoming-gifts" purchased for your DPRK sponsors from the Beijing duty-free shops. Fortunately, we had been forewarned and arrived with an ample supply of crisp US$100 bills—not surprisingly, there was not an ATM to be found in Pyongyang!

If everything goes according to plan, your delegation will conclude its mission and return fuve days later to Beijing. On our final night in Pyongyang, our sponsors hosted a farewell dinner and presented each of us with the official " Kim Il Song lapel-pin", a memento of an economically promising initial meeting and a sign that we had obeyed the ground-rules during our first delegation. Stories abound of delegations that go dangerously amiss, with deportation the most desirable option for foreign offenders.

American citizens are reminded that there are no U.S. consular or diplomatic services available, aside from rudimentary support provided by the Swedish embassy for Americans who become ill or are imprisoned. But Americans' business interests are eagerly sought by the North Koreans, despite the fact that the US retains numerous commercial sanctions limiting bi-lateral trade with the DPRK, most of which were imposed immediately following the Korean War. The temporary thaw in diplomatic relations during the Clinton Administration eased a number of the commercial sanctions between both countries, including a resumption of permission for US commercial ocean and air carriers to make direct calls in the DPRK, and an allowance for US firms to resume exporting products to the DPRK. US exports must still conform to US Commerce Department licensing requirements, and avoid designation as "dual-use" commodities"—

items which could be modified to support military initiatives or weapons programs. Severe penalties are imposed on US firms found violating these provisions; our delegation went to great lengths to insure that our activity within the DPRK was within the scope of permissible activity for American citizens.

Life in Pyongyang; Survival in the Countryside

Pyongyang, the capital-city of North Korea, is best described as a controlled-access cultural façade constructed as a home to three million of the most fortunate North Korean citizens. Within it is a high-security enclave reserved for the families of North Korea's intellectual and military elite, who enjoy a life-style unimaginable by their countrymen living beyond the cities armed-border crossings. Despite its contrived normalcy, Pyongyang is an unexpectedly clean, orderly and disciplined city. It is a "sports-crazed" environment, with enormous "purpose-built" facilities for nearly every sport imaginable—from bowling to archery to gymnastics and table-tennis—including the grandest of all, the 150,000-seat "May-Day" Stadium. Architectural testaments to North Korea's military ambitions are impressive, as are the separate control centers for its various military and government ministries—including the Ministry of Trade, where many of our official meetings took place—complete with three story-high portraits to Marx and Lenin adorning its façade.

The citizens of Pyongyang live in modern apartments and condominiums, they appear well fed, dress in modern clothes, and enjoy the conveniences of electric street-cars and subway trains—at least until the power "black-outs" which happen quite regularly and then everything comes to a grinding halt. At sunset, the city's skyline virtually disappears—as electric power rationing darkens the landscape, leaving only candlelight visible in the windows of most homes and office buildings, or the solitary headlight of the lone automobile or city-bus still in operating condition, and permitted an extended curfew.

Memorials to the Great Leader Kim Il Song are everywhere—it is not unusual for visitors to be asked to make a mandatory visit to the enormous bronze statue of the Great Leader and lay a bouquet of flowers in his memory, or to visit his mausoleum and observe his preserved remains. Our delegation elected to politely decline both invitations. But beyond the carefully preserved artifacts of a more prosperous time in North Korea's troubled history, the city morphs into a contradiction of political ambition vs. economic reality. It transitions into an unnatural coexistence of human potential overshadowed by political repression: although there are numerous well paved streets and boulevards, there are few private automobiles and even fewer bicycles; there are modern apartment buildings, yet few stores or restaurants; several well manicured municipal parks, yet no office workers off on a mid-day stroll nor street vendors selling their wares; there are no pets nor animals visible, competition perhaps for the North's non-existent food stocks.

For the more than 85% of the population prohibited from entering Pyongyang, life in rural North Korea is considerably less comfortable, a constant struggle for survival amidst the ruinous economic experiments of the last decade. Beyond the

gates of Pyongyang is where starvation and malnutrition is most severe, especially during the spring months when food-stores are most depleted following the harsh Korean winter. Here, the people often subsist on less than the minimum daily food ration—roughly 300 grams of grain or rice—with "wild foods" such as roots, bark and grasses often an unpalatable but unavoidable mandatory supplement to the daily govern-ment rations.

The WFP estimates that nearly 50% of school-aged children in the countryside are chronically malnourished. Most of the North Koreans that I encountered living outside Pyongyang were in obvious poor-health, clearly impover-ished and unaccustomed to the sight of well-nourished Westerners. Our delegation was obviously a rarity—judging by the nervous crowds of onlookers that mysteriously congregated whenever we stopped to inspect a port facility or check on road and transportation infrastructure. Our hosts reminded us repeatedly that unauthorized interaction with foreigners is a severe offense in the countryside—with, I suspect, unimaginable consequences for the innocent offend-ers.

Daily life for those surviving outside of Pyongyang is a monochrome of hard labor and endless work-mobilization, supervised under the direction of the military and the Korean Workers Party—the ideological political power-base of the Kim Jong Il regime. Throughout my travels in the country-side, I witnessed numerous "work parties" engaged princi-pally in agricultural tasks—planting and harvesting grain—and heavy construction infrastructure projects such as road construction, irrigation projects and the demolition of Stalinist-era outdated factories and power generating facili-ties. Work parties are often comprised of people of all ages and sizes, from young school-aged children to the elderly. Primitive tools accompanied each work-group—shovels, picks, and buckets; heavy equipment machinery such as tractors or mobile cranes were nowhere to be seen, usually abandoned long ago due to a lack of fuel and spare parts. It is not uncommon to see wood-burning trucks and lorries line-up in the port city of Nampo awaiting the arrival of humani-tarian aid shipments. It is difficult to imagine a more primi-tive economic infrastructure anywhere in the world—especially considering that South Korea, now the 11th largest economy in the world, is less than a one-hour drive from the worst of North Korea's depressed communities.

The mandatory structural and commercial improvements that must be achieved before the DPRK can advance its economy can only be secured through a complete rebuilding of the country's devastated physical infrastructure. Such an undertaking is beyond the financial capabilities of any single nation, and too expensive for the private debt markets to adequately finance. The direct involvement of the World Bank and its subsidiary agencies will be necessary before the DPRK can make a credible entry into the 21st century.

However, World Bank funds have been denied the North Korean government, in part on the insistence of the USA, due to the DPRK's labeling as a country sponsoring "state terror-ism"—a designation that is well deserved, yet until recently appeared to be one that the North was trying to disassociate

itself from through constructive regional political engage-ment. Access to World Bank funding will come only follow-ing constructive engagement with the United States and its East Asian allies. Pyongyang must realize their dilemma, yet so far has not demonstrated a willingness to accept uncondi-tional dialogue with the United States as a prerequisite to unlocking the funds necessary to rebuild their country.

Regional Geo-Political Implications and the Search for an East Asian Solution: South Korea

Given the heightened tensions surrounding North Korea's recent revelations of its nuclear ambitions, regional geo-political relationships between the DPRK and its East Asian neighbors have become critically important in achieving a meaningful and lasting resolution. While the United States wrestles with the challenges of forging a diplomatic agenda for disarming the DPRK, the consequences of the threat of North Korea's military ambitions lie at the doorstep of its East Asia neighbors. Ultimately, a regional approach to contain-ment of the DPRK will likely be fostered through the political objectives of those nations within launch-range of the North's most destructive weaponry.

Of the four nations surrounding North Korea, none is more important than its neighbor on the peninsula itself—South Korea. Both countries share the most heavily armed border in the world—with more than 1 million North Korean troops within the sight-lines of an estimated 700,000 South Korean Army soldiers and more than 37, 000 American military personnel. For more than 49 years, diplomatic relations between the two nations remained at a dangerous standstill, with no lasting diplomatic progress until President Kim Dae Jung's historic visit to Pyongyang in the summer of 2001. Kim's "Sunshine Policy" initiatives have moved both nations far closer to a constructive reconciliation of post-war disputes, in the process earning Kim the Noble Peace Prize in the same year.

However, consistent with earlier expectations of a speedy roadmap to reconciliation, the Sunshine Policy was con-fronted with a series of diplomatic blunders that followed each positive proclamation. A series of Inter-Korea Ministe-rial-level meetings recently concluded in 2002, promised renewed commitments to increase family reunions, the development of cross-border industrial zones and economic funding to repair inter-Korean rail links that have remained severed since the end of the Korean War. Recent cultural exchanges have included allowing North Koreans to visit Seoul and Pusan to participate in the Asian Games. The North reciprocated by welcoming South Koreans to Pyongyang in the summer of 2002 for the Arirang Festival—a commemora-tion of the Kim Il Song legacy by an estimated 130,000 North Korean gymnasts participating in a mass choreography that combines military exercises with modern-dance—an event that I had the opportunity to witness during my most recent visit to Pyongyang. As the Arirang Festival drew to a close, a deadly naval gun battle erupted between the two Koreas off the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula, leaving several

South Korean sailors dead and both governments with yet another embarrassing diplomatic predicament.

Second only to the importance of inter- Korean relations is the growing influence of China, whose diplomatic persuasion is becoming increasingly apparent on the political and economic policy-making of the North Korea government and its engagement with the outside world. China shares the longest border with North Korea and has long been a commercial and military ally. A series of recent summit visits by Kim Jong Il to China, including a tour of Shanghai's growing industrial complex and a stop at General Motors' Shanghai industrial complex, may have led to Kim's decision to initiate a rudimentary form of economic liberation in the DPRK. Kim's China trip was quickly followed by an official visit by China's Jiang Zemin to Pyongyang and an inspection of the DPRK's less-developed manufacturing centers.

China's direct assistance may eventually force the DPRK into confronting the necessity of accepting a political compromise over nuclear arms in return for continued economic and humanitarian assistance. The DPRK desperately needs China's transfer of technology and capital investments in order to strengthen its primary industries—namely agriculture, electric power generation and its antiquated transportation networks. In return, China will seek visible signs that the DPRK is moving faster towards a restoration of inter-Korean relationship and a termination of its nuclear and weapons programs. It should not be surprising, therefore, to see China assuming a prominent diplomatic role in the current round of ministerial meetings underway between the United States, South Korean and DPRK governments.

Since the inception of the North's independence, Russia has had a major impact on the development of the North's political and economic policies. However, Russia's influence has waned considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union and following the death of Kim Il Sung. Bilateral trade has fallen, as has direct economic aid and assistance that the North had become reliant upon to sustain its economic infrastructure. Russia shares a small border with North Korea on its North Eastern frontier which includes access to the Rajin special economic zone, but the economic focus is visibly shifting west to China and south to the ROK.

Recently, there are indications of renewed interest on the part of both nations to rekindle an economic and political relationship. As with China, Kim Jong Il has visited Russia several times in the last few years, and Russia's President Putin has recently concluded a summit meeting in Pyongyang. At stake is a role for Russia in the development of the Inter-Korea rail restoration project—a project which Putin has been quoted as stating could be worth several billion dollars in annual user fees to assist the underutilized Trans Siberian railway, and offer new markets to North Korea via the TSR's connecting corridor to central and eastern Europe.

Japan's interests lie principally in restoring regional stability and the promise of eliminating the last remaining cold-war relic as a threat to Japan's population and its economic recovery. Efforts to restore official diplomatic relations have been underway since the early 1990's, but with only minimal progress, hindered in part by a lack of progress

in resolving the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean Army, and also war reparations that the DPRK insists remain unpaid.

Japan has historically been one of the largest donors of humanitarian cargo to the DPRK, and helped to broker the Agreed Framework between the US, South Korea and the DPRK. Japan continues to provide economic support to the KEDO project --The Korean Peninsula Development Organization—having already invested over $3 billion to assist in the construction of two light-water reactors agreed on in exchange for promises from the DPRK to freeze further development of its nuclear testing program at the Yongbang Nuclear facility. Amazingly, construction of the KEDO reactors continues despite the revelations by the DPRK of their on-going efforts to develop nuclear weapons and their brazen noncompliance with the KEDO principles.

At present, diplomatic relations between the DPRK and

Japan are best described as delicate, if not completely unraveling. The DPRK remains deeply embittered by the horrors and atrocities committed during the 40-year Japanese occupation. I am frequently reminded by my North Korean hosts of the stories told by their parents of life under Japanese occupation, and reminded that the number of North Korean citizens "kidnapped" by the Japanese during WWII is far greater than that claimed by Japan against North Korea. Not surprisingly, North Korea has long demanded more than US$ 10 billion in war reparations for Japan's past colonial rule—all the while continuing military aggression of its own via missile testing in the skies above Japan and the constant naval probes of the Japanese coastline. What seemed to have been the start of a promising détente between both countries immediately following last year's visit by Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi, has now deteriorated into an almost obsessive fear within Japan of the possibility of a preemptive strike by the DPRK against Japan's industrial centers; Tokyo and Osaka both lie a mere 1200 kilometers from Pyongyang, well within the range of the DPRK's missile capabilities. It is becoming increasingly apparent that a lasting resolution to the DPRK military build-

up will necessitate gaining some measure of closure to the century-old bitter emotional divide stemming from Japan's military occupation of the Korean peninsula, a treasure-trove of nationalistic sentiment amongst the North Korean people that Kim Jong Il continues to manipulate when its revival suits his political ambitions.

The Future

There is reason to be cautiously optimistic that the democratic free world will be successful in their efforts to resolve the escalating military tensions now threatening the Korean peninsula and somehow devise a strategy to integrate North Korea into the global community in the 21st century. For the people of the DPRK, there is no other pragmatic alternative. The twin evils of political desperation and mass starvation will eventually sow the seeds of the inevitable internal rebellion necessary to achieve political and economic transformation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the DPRK's neighboring countries will tolerate a return to the nuclear ambitions of the Kim Jong Il dictatorship once a resolution of the current diplomatic stand-off is achieved. There can be no return to the past for North Korea—political and social change, even if imperfect—must commence from this point forward.

Almost lost in the debate surrounding the North's resumption of its nuclear weapons programs has been the substantial progress made in promoting improvements in inter-Korea diplomatic and cultural relations. I have been present when two Korean citizens from opposite sides of the DMZ meet for the first time –and watched as awkward and suspicious introductions gave way to deep and mutual respect in just a few days time. The cultural bonds amongst the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ are not divisible by the geographic restraints of the 38th parallel. I also believe that there has simply been far too much productive inter-change between North Korea and its East Asian neighbors for

this work to go to waste; the pace of economic activity within the DPRK today is perhaps more rapid than at anytime in the last two decades, involving the Chinese, the Russian, South Koreans and even the Japanese. Yet continued progress depends upon how and when the nuclear issues are resolved

Future dialogue between the DPRK and the international community will likely become more difficult in the short-run—and "promises" from all parties will be more closely monitored, with higher political stakes and potentially military consequences for those found to be in violation of their obligations toward achieving a lasting peace. Moreover, the military situation must be defused, and this will require a delicate balance between economic growth and broader social freedoms—ultimately evidenced by a more evenly balanced distribution of this new wealth to all North Korean citizens.

While the obstacles confronting North Korea today may seem insurmountable, recent experience in China, Russia, and Vietnam has proven that it is possible to achieve a nonviolent transition from a Communist-controlled central economy to one where wealth creation and private enterprise are openly encouraged. The fact that these former bastions of Communist ideology have buried their hammer and sickle and moved to embrace the new global economy is an achievement that has not been lost on the political consciousness of the senior political leadership within North Korea that I have often engaged during my journeys throughout the DPRK. I am eager to return to Pyongyang and ask them how long they are prepared to wait before they too accept that political isolationism and military repression are no longer synony-mous with social liberation and victory of the oppressed. As the final resting place of Stalinist-communist ideology, the DPRK must one day accept that the international community will no longer tolerate the existence of this repressive regime, especially now that examples of a more sustainable social democracy are readily visible just across the border with China, Russia, and most significantly, the Republic of Korea.

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Asian American Mental Health Issues

by Michael Menaster, M.D.

Abstract

Asian Americans issues are becoming more and more relevant particularly given this populations increasing numbers in American society. Issues American Americans must face include the "model minority myth," discrimination, standards of attractiveness and self-esteem, and challenges coping with medical and mental illness. The "model minority" myth affects the demographics of HIV transmission and discussion of safer sex activities within the Asian American community. Asian Americans also tend to seek Eastern Medicine treatments with or without Western Medicine services. Although mental illness is considered a stigma, psychiatric disorders such as major depression may be more prevalent among Asian Americans. Explanations for this higher prevalance are offered. Non Asian Americans may misinterpret health-seeking behaviors adversely, while Asian Americans may misinterpret health care providers' interventions. Asian Americans may also respond to lower dosages of medications yet be more sensitive to medication side effects.

Introduction

Asian Americans are becoming an increasingly large minority in the US (Bureau of the Census 1996). This article addresses mental health issues facing Asian Americans, including the model minority myth, psychosocial factors, and diagnostic and treatment challenges.

The Model Minority Myth

Since the 1960s Asian Americans have been considered the model minority. Asian American students are believed to outperform their peers, while Asian American workers seemingly surpass co-workers in productivity (Au 2000, Sy 1998, Takaki 1998, Zia 2000). A 1993 survey found that most American voters perceived Asian Americans as receiving "special advantages" rather than enduring discrimination (Polner 1999).

Several journal articles reinforce these stereotypes. Compared to Caucasians, Chinese American parents and students have more positive attitudes toward the sciences, while these parents help their children learn science (Chen 2001). Perhaps due to more stable families and less peer and family pressure, as a group they tend to smoke fewer cigarettes and use alcohol and drugs less frequently than Caucasian Americans (Au 1997, Harachi 2001, Lew 2001, Thridandam 1998). Among adolescents, Asian Americans have the lowest alcohol use rates; this may be due in part to biochemical differences in Asian Americans (Edwards 1995). Asian Americans tend to have an alcohol dehydrogenase variant associated with lower rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol dependence (Luczak 2002).

In Los Angeles County, Asian American adolescents were diagnosed with mental illness less frequently than Caucasian Americans (Kim 1993). The "model minority" myth may explain this diagnostic bias. Among adolescent groups, Asian Americans have the lowest rate of insomnia (Roberts 2000).

The model minority myth impacts Asian Americans in other ways. Whereas intravenous drug use is the most common risk factor for HIV in Caucasians, homosexual contact is the most common risk factor for HIV among Asian American men, with a 79% prevalence (Wortley 2000). Taboos over talking about sex preclude some Asian American women from discussing safer sexual activities with their partners (Chin 1999, Jemmott 1999). The rate of new AIDS cases among Asian Americans has increased from 1989 to 1995; the "model minority" myth resulted in denial of HIV vulnerability among Asian Americans (Sy 1998).

Other Psychosocial Issues

In contrast to the model minority myth, negative stereotypes of Asian Americans abound. Anti-Asian American attitudes (the so-called "Asian invasion") and even hate crimes against Asian Americans are prevalent (Menaster 2001, Takaki 1998).

Asian Americans may experience conflicts between American culture and their native culture, fear of failure, having to work instead of staying at home, and job dissatisfaction (Eng 1999, Estin 1999, Hinson 2000, Lin 1999).

Discrimination in the workplace, even in academic medicine, reinforces job dissatisfaction (Fang 2000). Asian Americans tend to work in the secondary labor market, which has low wages and few prospects for promotions, or endure the "glass ceiling" as to career advancement (Takaki 1998). Other psychosocial issues include financial problems and role reversals with their parents (Lin 1999). In the Asian patriarchal family structure, parents remained influential in their children's marriages and child-bearing (Eng 1999, Ngan 1991). Parents experience difficulty relinquishing their roles as nurturers (Eng 1999). Dissonance, conflicts in role expectations, and delayed individuation in children results (ibid., Johnson 2000).

Caucasian standards of beauty and the poverty of positive Asian American role models in the mass media can negatively impact Asian Americans (Mok 1998, Mok 1998).

Limited Access to Health

The presence of health insurance and language barriers affect Asian American health seeking behaviors (Ray-Mazumder 2001, Ryu 2001). Asian Americans have high rates of being uninsured and having difficulty affording health care (Bolen 2000). Asian Americans, particularly men, are less likely to visit doctors and use preventive medical services (Lee 2000, Ray-Mazumder 2001). For Korean Americans, a lack of knowledge, fear, denial, and Confucian thinking were significant psychosocial factors in their failure to receive cervical cancer screening (Lee 2000). Asian Americans tend to be particularly reluctant to seek treatment for depression, in part because it is seen as a dangerous, out-of-control behavior, a sign of weakness, and a source of shame and embarrassment to their families (Estin 1999, Okazaki 2000, Whaley

1997). Greater acculturation is association with greater use of mental health services but lower rates of depresive symptoms (Shen 2001, Tabora 1997, Ying 1992).

When Asian Americans seek treatment, they typically initiate care with Eastern Medicine providers, such as acupuncturists, bone setters, psychics and homeopathic remedies, such as teas and soups; these motivations include cost savings and a desire to preserve modesty (Tabora 1997, Facione 2000, Lin 1999, Ray-Mazumder 2001). Typically, Eastern Medicine involves only one treatment session; this may create an expectation of patients that conflict with Western medicine treatments. Even when Asian Americans use Western Medicine services, they frequently continue to use Eastern Medicine treatments (Tabora 1997, Lin 1999).

Prevalence of Mental Illness

In contrast to the model minority myth, several studies have indicated significant mental health problems among Asian Americans. Some Asian American immigrants were refugees, endured trauma, such as concentration camp internment, and racism and discrimination in their countries of origin and domestically (Lin 1999). Depression and isolation are common among new immigrants, especially Vietnamese (Nemoto 1999). Studies of Indochinese refugees revealed high prevalences of PTSD, anxiety, dissociation, and depression (Carlson 1993, Kinzie 1990). One study found higher scale 9 (mania) on the MMPI-2 of Asian Americans that may be due to cultural biases in the test (Tsai 2000). Although substance abuse appears lower among Asian Americans, marijuana is the most common entry drug for abuse, followed by cocaine and crack cocaine (Nemoto 1999). A study of undergraduates found that Asian Americans were second in prevalence only to Caucasian Americans in heavy binge drinking (McCabe 2002).

Because Asian culture is family-oriented, health care becomes a family venture. Family members play an important role patient's mental health; they can support or undermine treatment. For instance, family members may accompany patients for doctor visits or call physicians with questions and concerns about patients. However, Western medicine downplays the role of the family (Lin 1999). American health providers unfamiliar with Asian culture may perceive this family support as intrusive and enmeshed. Moreover, doctor-patient confidentiality may be an issue under these circumstances (*ibid.*).

Among Chinese Americans in Los Angeles, the lifetime prevalence of a major depressive episode is 6.9%, dysthymia 5.2% (Takeuchi 1998). Mental illness in Asian Americans appear more severe and chronic in duration, perhaps due to delays in seeking treatment and only the most severely ill seeking treatment (Durvasala 1996, Lin 1999). My clinical experience with Asian American psychiatric patients supports this finding, particularly in that my patients multiple, co-morbid diagnoses, such as panic disorder and major depression. For instance, compared to Caucasian Americans, depression has a higher prevalence among Chinese Americans (Tabora 1994).

Diagnostic and Treatment Challenges

Assessing Asian American patients can be challenging for health care providers. Because Asian philosophy professes the unity of mind and body, some Asian Americans emphasize physical symptoms over emotional symptoms, and physical disorders over mental disorders (Lin 1999, Torsch 2000). Some Asian Americans view depression as a stigma and may minimize their symptoms. Out of deference to the physician-authority figure, Asian Americans may respond, yes when they do not really understand a question.

Mental health providers may interpret Asian American decreased eye contact or silence as signs of depression or lying, rather than cultural deference to authority figures (Estin 1999). Determining an Asian American patients' mood and affect can be challenging for non-Asian American clinicians. In patients who do not speak English, assessing for abnormalities in fluency, rate, and volume of speech is difficult. A skilled interpreter is essential in these situations. Countertransference issues surrounding the model minority myth may lead clinicians to underrecognize and underdiagnose Asian American mental illness, particularly eating disorders, mood disorders, and substance abuse.

Diversity exists within and between different sub-groups of Asian Americans and can impact diagnosis and treatment. Compared to Asian Americans, Asian immigrants feel less adjusted to American culture and maintain strong family ties (Handal 1999). Peer pressure is the most common motive for Chinese Americans to abuse drugs, curiosity and boredom for Filipino Americans, and depression and stress among Vietnamese Americans (Nemoto 1999). Filipino American drug users, in contrast to Chinese and Vietnamese Americans, inject drugs, have sex while on drugs, and have sex with IV drug users more frequently (Nemoto 2000). Filipino breast and prostate cancer survivors in Hawaii reported the worst quality of life among ethnic groups surveyed (Gotay 2002).

One study found lesbian and bisexual Asian American women having higher rates of behavioral risks and lower rates of preventive care than heterosexual Asian American women (Mays 2002). Among adolescents, steroid use was more common among Hmong; associated features were participation in sports emphasizing weight and shape, disordered eating, substance abuse, depressed mood, and suicide attempts (Irving 2002). As compared to other Asian Americans, Japanese American college students reported fewer conflicts in dating, marriage, and family expectations (Chung 2001). Between and even among Asian American groups, controversies and conflicts exist (Menaster 2000).

Mental health professionals must therefore be conversant in cross cultural issues and correctly assess these conditions, e.g. koro, an anxiety disorder that can be confused as a delusion. Lay press periodicals, such as San Francisco's Asian Week, are addressing Asian American health issues (Menaster 2000). Asian American clinicians preferentially treat other Asian Americans and Asians, although clinicians' bilingual skills do not completely account for this preference (Murray-Garcia 2001). Laboratory test results may differ between Asian Americans and Caucasian Americans (Korotzer 2000).

Concerning treatment, Asian Americans tend to respond

better to structured interventions, such as cognitive psychotherapy, than less structured modalities, such as psychodynamic psychotherapy (Lin 1999). In fact, they may interpret psychodynamic psychotherapists' neutrality as rejection (Lin 1999).

Regarding medications, Asian Americans tend to be more sensitive yet more responsive to lower dosages of medications (Frankewicz 1997). They may experience more frequent and more intense side effects from standard dosages of medications. This underscores the need for a thorough informed consent for medications, particularly in disclosing the poverty of studies in Asian Americans and risk for more frequent and intense side effects. Theories of this sensitivity surround differences between Caucasian Americans and Asian Americans in liver enzymes, such as the Cytochrome P-450 (Lin 1999). Asian Americans may also need lower than normal doses of lithium for manic-depressive illness (ibid.).

Asian Americans face numerous psychosocial and mental health challenges, including dealing with model minority myth, discrimination, and diagnostic and treatment problems.

Case Illustration

Ms. A is a 25 year-old Chinese American, second year medical student who presented with a long history anxiety in interpersonal interactions. Her father was excessively critical and controlling of Ms. A throughout her childhood and adolescence. After Ms. A saw me driving on the freeway, she became fearful that I would label her as "a typical Asian driver." She met DSM-IV criteria for avoidant personality disorder and social phobia. When SSRIs were discussed as a part of her treatment plan, Ms. A became anxious, expressed concerns as to whether she was "really crazy," and declined medications. Two years of weekly cognitive psychotherapy, which addressed her irrational thoughts and issues with scrutiny, shame, and self-expectations, improved her ability to socialize without disabling anxiety.

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Christian Higher Education: A Case for the Study of the History of Christianity in China

by Peter Tze Ming Ng, Ph.D.

Abstract

Christian Higher Education started in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in China. It began as part of the missionary movements in China, but gradually grown up to be an independent educational enterprise in China. There were already 13 Protestant universities registered with the Chinese government in the 1930s. In this paper, it is suggested that Christian higher education can be taken as a good case for the study of Christianity in China, especially in the analysis of the shift of paradigms in the mission history of China. Four shifts of paradigms were illustrated from the case of Christian higher education in China. Finally, it is concluded that Christian higher education in China could perhaps be another good case to study the interplay between the Western and Chinese cultures, or more precisely an interplay between the Western and Chinese understanding of Christianity and the Christian mission.

Introduction

In this paper, I would like to talk about the shift of paradigms in the study of mission history in China, using Christian higher education as a case for illustration. While studying the history of Christianity in China, one would easily locate it as part of the missionary movements in China, initiated by the Western countries, either by the Europeans or Americans in the nineteenth or earlier centuries. Hence, the 'Impact-Response' theory was put forward by John King Fairbank since the 1950s.[1] China would then become an object of the mission and the movement would end up to be what was known as 'The Occupation of China', a term used by the missionaries in 1920s.[2] As for resources, one would turn to the records from various mission boards as primary resources, and the correspondences and memoirs of the missionaries are significant tools for the understanding of any changes or patterns of the mission history.

However, scholars in China today are trying to move beyond the study of mission history and begin to see the history of Christianity in China as part of China's own history. Just as the study of American Christianity here. Few scholars in the country today would like to study the history of American Christianity as part of European mission history in America though it was so started since the missionaries came to America. American History can stand on its own, so is the history of American Christianity. The same is true to the history of Christianity in China. Especially when we think of higher education in China, Chinese education started long before the missionaries came. China has a much longer history of its own, more than 5000 years. Christian higher education only supplemented, or added some elements if it could, to the whole educational system of China.

The Christian colleges in China have long been taken for granted as missionary schools, being controlled by the mission boards and were preoccupied with evangelistic purposes. That was why Christian schools were often criticized as "means of cultural imperialism by Western powers in China".[3] Such perceptions have been undergoing rapid changes in the past two decades. The change was started in 1989, when Prof. Zhang Kaiyuan made a formal call to the Chinese scholars for a new approach to the study of the Christian colleges. He reminded scholars that it was the right time to draw clear distinctions "between the educational role of Christian colleges and its religious role" and "between the normal educational activities in Christian colleges and the imperialistic policies of the Western powers".[4] He suggested Chinese scholars to study Christian colleges as part of the history of Sino-Western cultural exchange in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[5] This may serve as a significant milestone in the development of research on the history of Christian higher education in China. Since then, there were great changes in the field and a shift of paradigms has been emerged. So, in this paper, I shall describe briefly some characteristics of the shift of paradigms and discuss its significance on the study of history of Christianity in China in the past two decades.

The Shifting of Paradigms in Christian Higher Education of China

From the Study of Christian Higher Education as part of Mission History to that of Chinese Social History

Francis C.M. Wei, one Chinese president of a Christian college had once said that in order that Christianity could take root in China, it must become part of the Chinese culture. Earlier studies have portrayed Christian higher education in China as part of Christian Missionary History in China, yet more recent studies turn to re-locate the study of Christian higher education to its contemporary Chinese social contexts. A number of scholars have made pioneering attempts such as Prof. Gao Shiliang, a retired Professor of Education at Fujian Normal University[6], Prof. Qu Shipei, a professor of the Institute of Higher Education in Peking University China[7], and Profs. He Xiaoxia and Shi Jinghuan, both at Beijing Normal University[8].

I have been working with a few other young scholars in the production of a series of books on "Christian Education and Chinese Society Series", to bring the social contexts alive again. The first book was written by Mr. Huang Xinxian, the chief editor of *Jiaoyu Pinglun* (*Educational Review*) in Fuzhou. The book entitled: *Christian Education and Social Change in China*, is a very fine work, being on the one hand free from the traditional Marxist view and on the other hand it portrayed an objective and comprehensive picture of Christian education in China in the 19th and early 20th centuries.[9] Huang made very positive and substantial remarks on the contributions of missionaries in introducing and promoting modern education in China.[10]

From the Focus On the Work of Missionaries to the Work of Chinese Christians

There has been a distinctive shift of focus from earlier studies which focused on the work of missionaries to the recent studies of the work of Chinese Christians in Christian colleges. Interesting to know, in most of the missionary archives, Chinese Christians were 'nameless' or sometimes recorded as 'Ah Wong', 'Ah Leung' etc.[11] To compensate that, scholars today are more interested in the study of Chinese Christians, especially on those Chinese presidents and professors who taught in Christian colleges in China.

For instance, there has been a conference held at Huazhong Normal University in 1993 in memory of Francis C.M. Wei, the first Chinese president of Central China University. At that conference, there were twenty papers presented on one single Chinese president which were for the first time ever happened in the history of Christian colleges in China. To mention a few of these papers, they included the followings: Jessie Lutz's "Dr. Francis Wei: A Christian, A Scholar and a Patriot", Ng Tze Ming Peter's "Christianity and Chinese Culture—As Francis Wei Sees It", and Zhou Hongyu's "Francis Wei's Educational Theories and Activities".[12] Besides, there were articles such as Xu Yihua's work on P.J. Pu Puhuaren, an alumnus of St. John's University,[13] and Ng Tze Ming Peter's work on Chan Shiu Paak, the first student of Lingnan University, Canton.[14]

Since 1997, a team of scholars including Peter Ng, Edward Xu and Hongyu Zhou launched a project entitled: "Outstanding Chinese Presidents in Christian Colleges in Pre-1949 China".[15] Ten Chinese presidents were chosen for intensive study,[16] and the research focused on the evaluation of their efforts in the development of Christian colleges into indigenous educational institutions and their responses and adaptation to the demands and needs of Chinese society. There are good reasons for these studies:

a. Firstly, as Chinese Christians, the educators under study were committed to the noble mission of searching the values and relevance of both their Chinese and Christian identities. Both identities had been taken so firmly that they could not be forsaken one way or the other as many outsiders have thought they could. As a matter of fact, most of these Chinese educators were found struggling hard to keep the two in good balance, so that they were not ashamed to be called 'Chinese' and 'Christian' at the same time. But, how could the two be integrated? The study of these Chinese Christians reveals a lively picture of the interplay between Christianity and Chinese culture. As Nicolas Standaert has said, "the history of Christianity in China is also… a history of defining the 'other' and the 'self'… As such the 'other' and the 'self' come into the light for both sides. This might be a new challenge for the study of Christianity in China."[17]

b. Secondly, as Christian professors working in higher education, they were bound to be facing two kinds of commitments, namely their 'professional commitments' and their 'religious commitments'. They had to strive for a balance between the two commitments, hence they somewhat resembled 'the fiddler on the roof'. The study of these Chinese presidents reveal a true picture of how Christian faith was working in the Chinese context.[18]

c. Lastly, these Chinese presidents were found facing even greater challenges in setting goals and objectives for their colleges. What should a Christian college be? Should it merely serve to provide pastors or clergymen for the missionary boards or churches as they had in the early twentieth century? Or should they also train good citizens and good leaders for the nation and society? Again, it would definitely not be a matter of either/or – either serving God or serving the Chinese community. It had to be a matter of both/ and how. The issue was vividly understood by Chinese presidents who were found pushing in many ways to keep a fair balance. The study of their work should be much illuminating.

Indeed, as 'melting pots' for the two cultures, Christian colleges can definitely be valuable resources for the study of the process of encounters, dialogues and exchanges between Christianity and Chinese cultures. The rediscovery of the activities of these Chinese presidents was a valuable effort. The research has certainly added more Chinese ingredients and brought the study of Christian colleges in China to a new horizon.[19]

From the Application of Missionary Archives to the wider application of Multi-Archival Materials

As Chinese scholars are now more accessible to the archival materials in China which have not been used before, there was a growing desire to employ these materials in the re-discovery of the history of Christian colleges, alongside with the use of the missionary archives available in the West. For instance, Prof. Tao Feiya and Ng Tze Ming Peter have attempted a joint research into the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia archives in the United States as well as the Christian colleges archives recently recovered in China. We worked together on the study of Chinese studies programs in Christian colleges. Seldom do people relate Chinese studies programs with Christian colleges, because Christian colleges were meant to be promoting Christianity and western sciences and technology. The teaching of Chinese studies could be in contrary to the cause of Christianity in China. However, it was found that Chinese studies programs had become a core program in Christian colleges, even as a missionary's tool to beat the other, national universities in China. Hence, we published a book on *Chinese Studies Programs at the Christian Colleges.*[20] Chinese scholars are now beginning to give more emphasis on comparative studies and multi-archival research in their effort to re-tell the story of Christian colleges in China. Besides, Prof. Leung Yuen Sang has written an article on Young J. Allen, the founder-teacher and Yun Chi-ho, a student-alumnus of the Anglo-Chinese College in Shanghai, setting an excellent example of how cross-cultural and multi-archival research could be done.[21]

From the Exposition of Missionary Perspectives to the Exploration of Alternative Perspectives

I have recently finished a book, working together with three other scholars on *Changing Paradigms of Christian Higher Education in China.*[22] We also attempted some ways for alternate perspectives. I may recall a couple of attempts as illustrations in the following paragraphs.

Attempt 1: The Impact-Response Theory Re-visited

John K. Fairbank has once introduced the 'Impact–Response' paradigm for the study of modern Chinese history, in which China was seen as one facing great impact from Western civilization, including Christianity, and she had responded to the Western impact rather slowly.[23] In my recent work, I attempted to revise this paradigm in the belief that cultural exchanges worked in both directions and changes took place on both sides. Since much work has already been done on China as the receiving end of the Western impact and on Christianity as the giving end, I turned to look at the history of Christian colleges from the other way round. Instead of seeing Christian higher education as a driving force and looking for her contribution to the process of modernization in China as many scholars did,[24] I studied Christian colleges as a receiving end and see the changes in Christian colleges as the Western response to the Chinese impact. It was found that Christian colleges in China have been under great pressure to adjust themselves to the Chinese context and consequently their curriculum had undergone drastic changes, including the followings:

a. Religious courses were no longer evangelistic by purpose, but rather seeking to be more academic and educational in nature; hence, the study of religion/ religions was offered as part of general education curriculum or as elective courses in universities in China;

b. The scope of religious studies was no longer confined to the study of the Bible or Christian theology, and due attention was given to non-Christian religions, esp. to the religious and cultural traditions found in the Chinese context, such as Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism.

c. Interdisciplinary approaches were introduced to the study of religion with courses such as 'Comparative Religions', 'Philosophy of Religion', 'Sociology of Religion', 'Psychology of Religion', 'Science and Religion'.

Religious education which was the core of Christian colleges, even in the United States in the early years of the last century, had to be shifted to the periphery of the university curriculum in China, just as what we find in most of the universities today. In the West, this process was called 'Secularization of Christian Academy', but in China we call it 'Modernization of Christian Higher Education in China'.[25] It is interesting to note that the study of religion, including the study of non-Christian religions as an academic discipline in universities was developed in the United States since 1960s, but such attempts have already been started in China in the 1920s, forty years earlier.

Attempt 2: The Cultural Knot of Christian Colleges in China

The missionaries had long been enforcing a challenge for Chinese Christians to choose between the Christian faith and Chinese culture as a choice between God and Mammon. This has become a cultural knot for many Chinese Christians. Must Christianity and Chinese culture be mutually exclusive? Why must a Chinese forsake his own culture in order to become a Christian? However, the very existence of Chinese Christians already suggested that the two needed not be mutually exclusive. For the Chinese Christians who were committed both to Christianity as their personal faith and to China as their beloved nation, it was by no means a matter of choosing one and forsaking the other. It is but a profound issue of how to embrace both and to work out a possible amalgamation of Christian faith and Chinese culture in real life.[26]

There was indeed many Chinese professors who were engaged in this task of keeping both their Chinese and Christian identities, such as Lei-chuan Wu, T.C. Chao, N.Z. Zia and Francis Wei. They were typical Chinese scholars who remained steadfast in their commitments to both Christianity and Chinese culture and they attempted various ways to integrate Christianity to Chinese culture. Wu and Chao wanted to show how Christianity could help enrich or transform Chinese culture, and how it could contribute to the re-building of the Chinese nation.[27] Zia worked at reinterpreting Christianity in Chinese terms such as 'searching for Truth, Good and Beauty in life'.[28] Wei claimed that Christianity and Chinese culture could be mutually transformed through interactions. All these were good examples of how Chinese intellectuals could work out possible ways to harmonize Christianity and Chinese culture. Although Samuel Huntington's thesis has been widely taken for granted that different cultures, like Chinese and Western cultures would clash with one another, we still can argue that the cultural knot could become driving forces for encounters and dialogues which would lead to mutual transformation of both cultures. That is precisely the case we find in Christian higher education in China. The cultural knot had become an impetus for Chinese Christians to attempt creative imaginations and the Christian colleges become excellent arenas for the cultivation of educational dialogues and discussions on this important issue of bridging between Christianity and Chinese culture.

Concluding Remarks

Some twenty years ago, Paul Cohen called for the awareness of the danger of studying Chinese history with a Western agenda. His new historiography, the well-known 'China-Centred Approaches' has been widely established in the field of the study of modern Chinese history. However, we still need to go beyond it if we want to see the interplay between the Western and Chinese perspectives. Prof. Daniel Bays has been a leading figure in the launch for the study of indigenous Christianity from the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries.[29] Jessie Lutz has reminded us that "the

Chinese Christians themselves had played a crucial role in propagating and interpreting Christianity".[30] Indeed, she called for new attempts to re-write the history of Protestant Christianity in China from a new perspective, "with greater attention to the Chinese side of the story".[31]

Scholars today are more aware of the local materials and the rediscovery of Chinese materials. One of my students, Tao Feiya has done an excellent thesis on Jesus Family Movement in Shandong Province in China. It was founded by Jing Dianying in a small village called Mazhuang in 1920s in China. It was one of the most indigenous Christianity in the rural area of China and the movement was so successful that it spread rapidly over northeast, northwest, east and south of China. It was reported to have 10,000 followers who gave away their properties and joined into the community of Jesus Family. Especially in view of the shift of paradigms evolved in the past two decades, we are looking ahead for more new approaches and new discoveries in the future years, not only in the study of Christian higher education in China, but also in the broader study of the history of Christianity in China. More interactive, more cross-cultural, cross-archival studies are anticipated.[32] This would be really good news to especially young scholars of Asian studies, as there will be more rooms for new challenges and new discoveries in the years to come.

ENDNOTES

1. See, e.g. Fairbank, John and Teng. *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

2. See, e.g. Staffer, Milton T.'s famous book, *The Christian Occupation of China*, Shanghai: 1922.

3. See e.g. Li Chucai (ed.) *Diguo zhuyi qinhua jiaoyu shi ziliao - Jiaohui Jiaoyu (Materials on the Educational History of Invasion of the Imperialism in China - Church Education)* Beijing: Science of Education Press, 1987

4. See "The Preface' in Zhang Kaiyuan & Arthur Waldron (eds.) *Zhongxi Wenhua yu Jiaohui Daxue*, (*Christian Universities and Chinese-Western Cultures*) Hubei: Hubei Educational Publishing House, 1991, p.3.

5. *ibid.*, p.4.

6. See e.g. Gao Shiliang, *Zhongguo Jiaohui Xuexiao shi (The History of Church Schools in China)* Hunan: Hunan Educational Publishing House, 1994 and Chu Youxian & Gao Shiliang (eds.), *Zhongguo Jindai Xuezhi Shiliao (The Historical Resources for Modern Educational System in China)* vol.4. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1993.

7. See Qu Shipei, *Zhongguo Daxue Jiaoyu Fazhan shi (The Historical Development of University Education in China)* Shanxi: Shanxi Educational Press, 1993.

8. See He Xiaoxia & Shi Jinghuan, *Jiaohui Xuexiao yu Zhongguo Jiaoxue Jindaihua (Church Schools and the Modernization of Education in China)* Guangdong: Guangdong Educational Press, 1996.

9. See Huang Xinxian, *Jidujiao Jiaoyu yu Zhongguo Shehui Bianqian (Christian Education and the Social Change in China)* Series No.3 of *Jidujiao Jiaoyu yu Zhongguo Shehui Congshu (Christian Education and the Chinese Society Series)* Fuzhou: Fujian Educational Press, 1996.

10. Besides, there are five other books published in the same series. They are:

   Tao, Fei Ya & Ng, Peter Tze Ming. *Jidujiao Daxue yu Guoxue Yanjiu (Chinese Studies Research in Christian Colleges in China)* Fujian: Fujian Educational Press, 1998.

   Shi, Jinghuan et al. *Jidujiao Jiaoyu yu Zhongguo Zhishi Fenzi (Christian Education and Chinese Intellectuals)*. Fuzhou: Fujian Educational Press,

1998.

   Xu, Edward Yihua. *Jiaohui Daxue Yu Shenxue Jiaoyu (Christian Colleges and Theological Education in China)*, Fuzhou: Fujian Educational Press, 1999.

   Ng, Peter Tze Ming (ed.) *Jidujiao Daxue Huaren Xiaochang Yanjiu (A Study of Chinese Presidents in Christian Colleges in China)*. Fujian: Fujian Educational Press, 2001.

   Zhu, Feng. *Jidujiao Daxue Yu Zhongguo Funu Jiaoyu (Christian College and Women's Education in China)*, Fuzhou: Fujian Educational Press, Forthcoming.

11. See the discussion in Philip Leung, "Mission History versus Church History – The Case of China Historiography" in *Ching Feng* Vol.40, No.3-4, September-December, 1997, pp.177-213.

12. See the collection of papers in Ma Min et al (eds.) *Kuayue Zhongxi Wenhuade juren (A Giant Bridging Over the Gap Between the Chinese and Western Cultures – A Collection of Theses at the International Symposium on Dr. Francis C.M. Wei)* Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press, 1995.

13. See Edward Xu, "*Puhuaren yu Zhongguo jiaohui (P. J. Pu and the Chinese Church*") in Zhu Wei-zheng (ed.) *Jidujiao yu Jindai Wenhua (Christianity and Modern Culture)* Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1994.

14. See Ng Tze Ming, "*Chenshaobai - Lingnan daxue diyiguo xuesheng (Chan Shiu Paak - The First Student of Lingnan University, Canton*") in *Journal of The Chinese Historical Society Taiwan*: the Chinese Historical Society, Vol.23, pp.139-148.

15. The project was funded by the Direct Grants for Research 1997-98, the Arts and Languages Panel of University Grants Committee, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

16. The Chinese presidents under study include the followings:

   a. Dr. Herman C.E. Liu, president of University of Shanghai;

   b. Dr. Francis Wei, president of Huazhong University;

   c. Xiang Bo Ma, president of Aurora University;

   d. Yuan Chen, president of Fu Jen Catholic University;

   e. Y.G. Chen, president of the University of Nanking;

   f. Dr. Lincoln Dsang, president of West China Union University;

   g. Dr. Yi-fang Wu, president of Ginling College;

   h. Dr. Lucy C.Wang, president of Hua Nan Women's College;

   i. Lei-chuan Wu, president of Yenching University;

   j. Dr. Zhi-wei Lu, president of Yenching University.

17. See Nicolas Standaert. "New Trends in the Historiography of Christianity in China", *The Catholic Historical Review*, vol.83, No.4, October 1997, pp.612-613.

18. See e.g. Chang Shing Wu, "*Tingfang Lew Zongjiao jiaoyu linian zhi shijian yu Zhongguo shehui bianqian*, 1891-1947" (*Timothy Lew's Idea and Practice of Religious Education and Social Changes in China, 1891-1947*). Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001.

19. The 10 chapters were finally compiled into a book just cited, see Peter Tze Ming Ng (ed.), 2001.

20. See Tao Fei-ya & Peter, Tze-ming Ng. *Jidujiao daxue yu guoxue yanjiu (Chinese Studies Programs at the Christian Colleges)*, Fuzhou: Fujian Educational Publishing House, 1998.

21. See Leung Yuen-sang, "*Zhongxi shuyuan lishide zhuixun: yige kuawenhua kuadangan de jingyan* (In Search of the Anglo-Chinese College: A Cross-cultural and Multi-archival Endeavor")), in Peter, Tze-ming Ng (ed.) *Zhongguo jiaohui daxue lishi wenxian yantaohui lunwenji (Essays on Historical Archives of Christian Higher Education in China)*, pp.555-570.

22. Ng, Peter Tze Ming et al. *Changing Paradigms of Christian Higher Education in China, 1888-1950*. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002.

23. See for reference, John Fairbank and Teng, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

24. See, for instance, Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, 3 volumes. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958-65 and Peter Chi-ping Lin (ed.) .*Zhongguo Jidujiao Daxue Lunwenji* (Papers of the Influence and Contribution of Christian Colleges/Universities in Modernization of China International Conference). Taiwan: Cosmic Light Media Center, 1992.

25. See for instance, George Marsden et al (eds.) *The Secularization of the Academy* New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; and my discussion in, "Secularization or Modernization: Teaching Christianity in China Since the 1920s" in *Studies in World Christianity*. Vol.5, Part1, pp.1-17.

26. There were, for instance, cases like Timothy Ting-fang Lew who was born into a Christian family, hence was born with both the Christian and Chinese identities.

27. Wu had indeed made significant contribution to the development of Chinese theology by interpreting Christianity as a vital force for the realization of Confucian virtues. Chao had a strong conviction that Christianity would contribute to China's national salvation by creating a new morality and he argued that Christianity would become the basis for social reconstruction of China. However, when he was kept in prison during the Japanese invasion, he became more aware of the sinfulness of human nature and his own inability. In his later writings, he began to expound this unique Christian message of the sinfulness of man and the saving grace of God. See, e.g. discus-sions in Chu Sin Jan. *Wu Leichuan: A Confucian Christian in Republican China*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1995 and Lam Wing Hung. The Theology of T.C. Chao Hong Kong: Tiandao Shulou, 1988.

28. Zia had a deep conviction that the search for 'Truth, Good and Beauty' could be the common ground for the Eastern and Western philosophies and that Christianity could be interpreted in terms of the Chinese culture. Zia attempted his new curricula of 'philosophy of religion' and 'philosophy of life' by harmonizing the Christian ideals into the Chinese philosophy of life. See the discussion in Ng Tze Ming Peter, "*Jidujiao yu Zhongguo Wenhua zhi Ronghe* (The Harmony of Christianity and Chinese Culture - the Insights from N.Z. Zia") in Zhang Kai-yuan and Ma Min (eds.) *Jidujiao yu Zhongguo Wenhua Congkan* (Christianity and Chinese Culture Series) Wuhan: Hubei Educational Press, 1996. pp.132-146.

29. Bays, Daniel (ed.) *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

30. See Lutz, Jessie. "China and Protestantism: Historical Perspectives, 1807-1949", in Stephen Uhalley, Jr. and Xiaoxin Wu (eds.) *China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, p.180.

31. *Ibid.*

32. For further discussion, see Ng, Peter Tze Ming. *Jidu Zongjiao yu Zhongguo Daxue Jiaoyu* (*Christianity and Higher Education in China*). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003.

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Comparing Democratization in the East and the West

by Doh Chull Shin, Ph.D. and Junhan Lee, Ph.D.

Abstract

This paper ascertains the differences and similarities of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia and Eastern Europe. To this end, this study focuses on the four important aspects of democratization: the modes of democratic transitions, the institutional choices after the transitions, the magnitudes and patterns of democratic development, and the levels and patterns of popular support for democracy. As a result, we concluded that the modes of democratic transition did not vary across the two regions, whereas there are remarkable differences in institutional choices, democratic progress, and attitudinal orientation toward democracy.

The current, third-wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Europe to Latin America and other regions in the mid-1970s. After over two decades of steady diffusion, it has now reached every region of the globe stretching from Central and Eastern Europe to South America and from Asia to Africa. How does the process of democratization differ across various regions? Do the differences really matter for the successful establishment of complete rule by the people and for the people? These questions have recently become a subject of increasing concern in the comparative study of democratization.[1]

To date, much of the cross-regional research on democratic transitions and consolidations has been devoted to comparing Southern Europe, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe.[2] In the literature on third-wave democracies, only a handful of cross-regional studies have attempted to compare and distinguish the Asian patterns of democratization from what has been noted especially in former Communist Europe.[3] Even these attempts are extremely limited in both breadth and depth. As a result, little is known about how the contours, dynamics, and sources of democratization in the Asian states differ from those in the former Communist European countries.

This paper is a first systematic effort to compare Asia and post-Communist Europe in terms of four important aspects of democratization. Specifically, the paper first compares the modes of democratic transition in the two regions. Then it focuses on the institutional dimension of democratization in these regions with an emphasis on governmental structure and electoral systems. This is followed by a comparative analysis of substantive democratic progress or retrogression in the two regions. Finally, this paper will identify regional differences in the general levels and patterns of popular support for democracy. In a nutshell, the present inquiry seeks to offer a comprehensive account of Asia-Europe differences and similarities in democratization during the mid-1980s and 1990s. To this end it examines not only the transition and consolidation phases of democratization, but also its three key dimensions featuring, respectively, institu-

tions, political rights and civil liberties, and pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian political orientations among the mass public.

In Asia a total of nine countries completed their transition to democracy during the mid-1980s and late-1990s. The nine countries are Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Pakistan has recently reverted to military rule and can no longer be considered a new democracy. In Eastern Europe seven countries ended decades of Communist rule, and joined in the current wave of democratization by the late 1980s and early 1990s; they are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Of the 15 member states of the former Soviet Union, eight still remain under authoritarian rule or are in a state of civil war. Only seven of those member states can be considered new democracies; they are: Estonia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. With the subsequent breakup of Czechoslovakia into two separate states, a total of 15 post-Communist European countries are under investigation, along with nine Asian countries in the third wave of democratization. All member countries of former Yugoslavia are not included in this regional comparison for the reason that the process of their democratization has been distinguished from that of their former Communist European peers by successive waves of violent ethnic cleansing.

Conceptualization

In the large body of the literature on third-wave democracies; there is consensus that democratization is a continuing process of change or transformation that proceeds in multiple directions and at different paces. Being a dynamic process, it involves a multitude of events and phases that do not necessarily evolve in a teleological fashion. To properly understand such a process, this present study rejects the notion that democratization, as a movement toward democracy, is a dichotomous or unidirectional phenomenon. Instead of focusing on one particular event or phase, such as the introduction or consolidation of democracy, this study seeks to examine upward and downward movements toward democracy. By examining where new democracies are coming from and where they are now, this paper plans to offer a dynamic account of those movements.

Democratization is conceptualized here as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Political scientists tend to equate democracy merely with free competitive elections and fail to examine the human meaning of democratic change, especially from the perspective of the masses experiencing it.[4] For the masses who have suffered a great deal of political oppression and injustice, democracy symbolizes much more than the abolition of repressive political institutions and the replacement of authoritarian political leaders. Democracy represents opportunities and resources for a better quality of life. It also represents "a more equitable and humane society."[5] Grounded in the substantive notion that democracy is rule for the people, the present study takes into account the extent to which those masses experience political rights and civil liberties in the wake of democratic regime change.

Democratization is also conceptualized as a multi-level phenomenon. It is a process of transformation taking place at the levels of the political regime itself, political institutions, and individual citizens. At the macro levels democratization involves the replacement of an authoritarian regime with a democratic one, and the installation of institutions that represent the interests and preferences of the ordinary citizenry. Various changes in the laws, institutions, and other formal rules, however, will not matter unless individual citizens broaden, deepen, and strengthen their support for democracy not only as political ideals, but also as political practices. To move toward the completion of democracy requires changes in the cultural values that those citizens uphold. Democratic support among the mass public is, therefore, considered in this study as an essential component of democratization.

Theoretically democratization is viewed as being shaped by the political and cultural legacies of the past. Path-determined theories of change suggest that new democracies reflect their differences in starting points, and take on different paths toward the completion of democracy.[6] The legacies of developmental dictatorship in Asia and post-totalitarian rule in Europe are hypothesized to have differentially shaped the process of democratization in the respective region. Theories of cultural uniqueness hold that fundamental differences in Asian and post-Communist European values make for regional variation in democratization.[7]

Databases

Several sets of data were assembled for the present comparative study of democratization across the regions of Asia and former Communist Europe. The divergent modes of democratic transitions were compared across the two regions with references of some earlier studies on this subject.[8] The regional difference in institutional democratization was explored primarily on the basis of the data compiled by the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm. Annual accounts of political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House (hereinafter FH) in New York served as the primary database for our regional comparison of substantive democratization. Finally, the third wave of the World Value Surveys (hereinafter WVS), conducted in 1995 and 1996, was the main database for ascertaining the regional difference in cultural democratization.

Modes of Democratic Transition

Huntington classified democratic transitions into three distinct modes: replacement, transformation, and transplacement.[9] According to him, the first mode of replacement refers to the transition in which opposition groups successfully oust the group in power and establish a democratic regime. The second mode of transformation takes place when the elites in power play the key role in ending authoritarian rule and establishing a new democratic regime. The third mode of transplacement involves both the ruling elites and opposition forces, whose joint actions lead to the installation of a democratic regime. This particular mode of transi-

tion is further distinguished in this present study from that of pacted transition in order to highlight the regional differences more precisely. While both modes feature joint actions between the two rival groups, it is the pacted mode that allows the ruling elites to make formal accords with the opposition groups before they step down. A pact may include an 'exit guarantee' for the old elites who have abused human rights or personalized national wealth. In pact bargaining, thus, the property rights of the old elites or the interests of the military are likely to be guaranteed. The outgoing leaders want to make sure that there would be no prosecution or retaliation against their wrongdoings at the exchange of power. Therefore, the political pacts are sometimes considered conservative and even reactionary in nature.[10] In the transplacement mode the ruling elites accept the opposition's demands first without formal agreements behind the scene or at a roundtable. In this mode the incumbents sometimes resign in response to the democratic demands made by the opposition forces. Then a serious negotiation takes place among the various groups of political leaders and ordinary citizens in order to draft a new constitution and establish the schedule for elections.

The first two columns of Tables 1 and 2, respectively, list the names of nine Asian and 15 post-Communist European countries in the third-wave of democratization, and the modes of their transitions to democratic rule. In Asia, six of nine countries (67%) brought about democracy by the mode of transplacement. They were Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and South Korea. Each of the other three countries ushered in democracy by a different mode, i.e., replacement in the Philippines, transformation in Taiwan, and pacted transition in Thailand.

Table 1. **Democratization in Asia**

Country	Transition Mode	Government Type	Pre-transition: combined rating*	2000-2001: combined rating	Difference	Pattern of Progress
Bangladesh	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.8: 1989-1990	3.5 (partly)	0.3	Fluctuating
Indonesia	Tranplacement	Semi-	6.25: 1996-1997	3.5 (partly)	2.8	Progressive
Mongolia	Transplacement	Semi-	2.5: 1991-1992	2.5 (free)	0	Stable
Nepal	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.3: 1989-1990	3.5 (partly)	-0.2	Stable
Pakistan	Transplacement	Semi-	3.8: 1986-1987	5.5 (not)	-1.7	Fluctuating
Philippines	Replacement	Presidential	3.5: 1984-1985	2.5 (free)	1	Fluctuating
S. Korea	Transplacement	Presidential	4.3: 1985-1986	2.0 (free)	2.3	Stable
Taiwan	Transformation	Presidential	4.0: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	2.5	Progressive
Thailand	Pacted	Parliamentary	4.3: 1990-1991	2.5 (free)	1.8	Progressive
Average			3.7	2.97	0.98	

Note: * Political rights and civil liberties were respectively rated on 7-point scales, from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). These ratings were combined and averaged into a similar 7-point scale. The combined ratings were then divided into three categories—free (1-3 points), partly free (3-5.5), and not free (5.5-7). Source: Handbook of Electoral System Design 1997. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

In former Communist Europe, ten of 14 new democracies (71%) came into being by the mode of transplacement. These include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Two new democracies, East Germany and Romania, were established through the mode of replacement. On the other hand, Poland is the only country in this area that took on the mode of pacted transition. Russia is also the only country in this region where democracy was established by

the mode of transformation in which ruling elites played the key role.

*Table 2. **Democratization in Former Communist Europe***

Country	Transition Mode	Government Type	Pre-transition: combined rating*	2000-2001: combined rating	Difference	Pattern of Progress
Albania	Transplacement	Parliamentary	5.3: 1989-1990	4.5 (partly)	0.8	Retrogressive
Bulgaria	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.0: 1989-1990	2.5 (free)	0.5	Fluctuating
Czech Rep.	Transplacement	Parliamentary	4.0: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	2.5	Stable
E. Germany	Replacement	Semi	3.8: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	2.3	Stable
Estonia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	2.8: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	1.3	Progressive
Hungary	Transplacement	Parliamentary	2.8: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	1.3	Stable
Kyrgyz	Transplacement	Presidential	4.5: 1991	5.5 (not)	-1	Retrogressive
Latvia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.0: 1991-1992	1.5 (free)	1.5	Progressive
Lithuania	Transplacement	Semi	2.5: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	1	Stable
Moldova	Transplacement	Semi	4.5: 1990	3.0 (free)	1.5	Progressive
Poland	Pacted	Semi	4.3: 1987-1988	1.5 (free)	2.8	Stable
Romania	Replacement	Presidential	6.3: 1988-1989	2.0 (free)	4.3	Progressive
Russia	Transformation	Presidential	5.5: 1987-1988	5.0 (partly)	0.5	Retrogressive
Slovakia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	N/A	1.5 (free)	N/A	Progressive
Ukraine	Transplacement	Presidential	3.0: 1990	4.5 (partly)	-1.5	Retrogressive
Average			4	2.6	1.27	

Note: *free (1-3), partly free (3-5.5), and not free (5.5-7). *FH scores were only available for the noted single year in the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Ukraine. Source: Handbook of Electoral System Design 1997. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

In the two continents the current wave of global democratization washed up on their shores by all four different modes of transitions. Across the two regions transplacement was the most prevalent mode of democratic transition, while transformation and pacted transition were the least popular mode. It is fair to conclude that Asia and post-Communist Europe differ very little in the way democratic political order was planted, each on their respective soil, although their cultural legacies and political histories were vastly different.

Institutional Democratization

Democratization, as a movement toward democracy, requires the restructuring of authoritarian institutions into democratic ones. This process of institution building necessarily involves the making of two important choices, one concerning the general form of democratic government, and the other dealing with the particular system of electing legislators.[11] What forms of democratic government are most and least popular in Asia and post-Communist Europe? What systems of elections are most and least popular in each of the two regions? This section addresses these two questions to determine how the two regions differ in the institutional makeup of democracy.

Forms of Government

Three forms of democratic government are considered to identify regional difference in governmental structure. They are generally known as presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism (or semi-parliamentarism). In the presidential form of government there is no fusion of executive and legislative powers. As a result, the president is elected directly by ordinary citizens, not by their legislators, to serve for a fixed term. In normal circumstances, the president cannot be forced to resign by the legislature. In the parliamentary form of government, executive and legislative

powers are fused in such a way that the head of the executive branch is selected by the legislature, and can be dismissed from office by its vote of no confidence. In the semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary form, there are two leaders of the executive branch, a president and a prime minister, who share executive powers. The president is elected directly by the voting public for a fixed term. His or her prime minister can stay in power only with the legislature's approval and support.

The third column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the distribution of these three forms across new democracies in Asia and former Communist Europe. In Asia nine countries are evenly divided into each of these three forms. The Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have adopted the presidential form, while Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand have done the parliamentary form. In Indonesia, Mongolia, and Pakistan, the semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary government has been chosen. From this distribution, it is clear that there is no prevalent form of democratic government in Asia.

In post-Communist Europe, however, nearly half (47%) of new democracies have adopted parliamentary government.[12] Of the 15 countries in this region, this form of government has been put in place in seven countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. The semi-presidential system has been adopted in four countries, including East Germany, Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland. The presidential system has been adopted in another group of four countries: the Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

While there is no prevalent form of government in Asia, parliamentary government is preferred to the other two forms of government by a large margin of nearly two to one in post-Communist Europe. In addition, the pre-democratic governmental structure remains, by and large, intact in Asia. In the former Communist region, however, such structure has been largely altered after transition to democracy in order to prevent the concentration of power. These are two notable regional differences in institutional democratization.

Electoral Systems

Three principal forms of parliamentary elections are considered to identify regional differences in electoral systems.[13] They are: (1) pluralist and majority system that includes the first-past-the post and block vote formulae; (2) proportional system that includes the party list and mixed member formulae; and (3) semi-proportional system combining pluralist and proportional systems. As in the forms of government, the distribution of electoral systems significantly varies across the two regions.

In Asia plurality (or majority) is the most popular system of electing legislators. This system has been adopted in six of nine countries (67%). The first-past-the post formula of the pluralist system has been used in Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, and Pakistan, while its bloc vote formula has been used in the Philippines and Thailand. The semi-proportional system has been used in South Korea and Taiwan. The proportional system has been adopted only in Indonesia. In striking contrast, the proportional system is the most

popular electoral system among new democracies in post-Communist Europe. Nine out of 15 (60%) countries have adopted this system, in one form or another. Its party list formula is currently used in seven countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The mixed member formula is used in East Germany and Hungary. Next to this system of proportional representation is the semi-proportional system used in four countries—Albania, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The majority system is used in two countries, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova. None of the new democracies in this region has adopted the pluralist system, which is most popular in Asia. The electoral system that has been dominant among new democracies in Asia has not been adopted by their peers in post-Communist Europe. The system that has been dominant in the latter, on the other hand, has been avoided by their peers in the former. In electing their parliaments, the two regions are diametrically opposed to each other. Undoubtedly, this is another notable regional difference in institutional democratization.

What institutional models of democracy are most and least prevalent in the two regions? In Asia, the parliamentary form of government, combined with the plurality system, is most prevalent. Three of nine Asian new democracies (30%)—Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand—feature this model of democracy. This model is the one avoided by all new democracies of post-Communist Europe. Most prevalent in this region is the parliamentary form of government combined with the proportional system, which exists in six of 15 countries (40%)—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. This particular model is the one rejected by all new Asian democracies. Institutionally, new democracies in the two regions are the opposites of each other.

Substantive Democratization

Democratization involves much more than the election of governors and legislators. Substantively it refers to enacting legislation and implementing public policy in response to the changing preferences and demands of the citizenry. It also refers to the expansion of political rights and civil liberties that the masses can exercise as citizens of a democratic state. Using the combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties annually compiled by FH, this section seeks to compare substantive democratization in the two regions. Each year's ratings are reported in the following year's January/February issue of its *Freedom Review* since 1973. In this annual report, first political rights and civil liberties are, respectively, rated on a 7-point scale ranging from a low of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). These ratings are combined and averaged into a similar 7-point scale. Then, the combined ratings are divided into three categories: being free (1-3 points), partly free (3-5.5 points), and not free (5.5-7 points).

Level of Democracy

How do Asia and former Communist Europe compare in terms of the current levels of substantive democratization? This question is explored with the combined ratings for the

year 2000-2001 (see the fifth column of Tables 1 and 2).[14] The country ratings for new democracies in Asia are 1.5 for Taiwan, 2.0 for South Korea, 2.5 for Mongolia, 2.5 for the Philippines, 2.5 for Thailand, 3.5 for Bangladesh, 3.5 for Indonesia, 3.5 for Nepal, and 5.5 for Pakistan. These ratings indicate that five of nine third-wave democracies in Asia are free, three are partly free, and one not free. In this area less than two-thirds (56%) of those democracies are currently rated as being free.

In post-Communist Europe, the combined averaged ratings are 1.5 for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia; 2.0 for Romania; 2.5 for Bulgaria; 3.0 for Moldova; 4.5 for Albania and Ukraine; 5.0 for Russia; and 5.5 for the Kyrgyz Republic. According to FH's verbal scale, 10 of the 15 European new democracies are free; four are partly free; and one is not free. In post-Communist Europe, free countries account for 66.7 percent. When this average figure between 2000 and 2001 is compared with the one for Asia as a whole, it is fair to conclude that the general levels of freedom or substantive democracy are higher in post-Communist Europe than in Asia. In other words, the average combined rating of 2.60 (free) in post-Communist Europe is better than that of post-authoritarian Asia (2.97, free).

Magnitude of Democratic Change

How do the two regions compare in terms of the extent to which freedom or substantive democracy has progressed in the wake of democratic regime change? To explore this question, the extent of changes in the level of freedom is estimated for each country by subtracting, from its average rating for the 2000-2001 period, the one for the two years prior to its transition to a democracy. The timing of democratic transition is measured by the year when a founding election was held in each country. A founding election is the first democratic election after political liberalization.[15] Although we do not fully follow Shumpeterian minimalist notion of democracy, there is no doubt that founding election provides a good and universal measurement of when democratic transition genuinely occurred by forming a new democratic government.[16]

In five of nine Asian countries (55%) political rights and civil liberties have been expanded to significantly greater degrees (see column 6 of Table 1). In the wake of their transition to democracy, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have been transformed from partly free to free countries, and Indonesia has been transformed from not free to partly free. Their increases in the general level of freedom averaged 0.98 points on FH's 7-point scale, which suggests a meager progress in the general level of substantial democracy between the periods of pre-transition and 2000-2001. Of these four countries Indonesia has experienced the greatest degree of increase with a difference of 2.8. Bangladesh, Mongolia and Nepal, by and large, remain where they were during the pre-transition period.[17] Pakistan is the only country that has experienced a significant decrease in the overall level of freedom. Democracy simply no longer exists in this country in the aftermath of a successful military coup in October 1999.

Before its transition to democracy in 1988, the country was rated as partly free.

In former Communist Europe, the Kyrgyz Republic has experienced such a major setback from partly free to not free at the turn of the millennium. Only four of 14 countries (29%) have achieved no substantive progress (see column 6 of Table 2). Albania, Russia, and Ukraine remain partly free, as they were before they joined the family of third-wave democracies more than a decade ago. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, remain free, as they were a couple of years before they held the founding election.[18] Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Moldova, and Poland have improved their standing from being partly free to free states.

In terms of the magnitude of progress six countries (43%) have made significant advances. Included in this group of advancing democracies are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Moldova, Poland, and Romania. Especially, three countries—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania—have gained the greatest degrees of progress in expanding freedom with more than 2.5 points on the same scale. These post-Communist societies achieved greater degrees of democratic progress (1.27), on average, than their counterparts in Asia (0.98). This is partly resulted from the fact that Communist regimes in Europe were more repressive than authoritarian regimes in Asia. In fact, the average rating for the pre-transition period in the nine new Asian democracies is 3.7, which is lower than that of their counterparts (4.0).

Patterns of Democratic Change

Democratization is not a unidirectional phenomenon. Like many other political phenomena, it can evolve in a multitude of different directions and at different paces.[19] To compare the dynamics of substantive democratization in the two regions over time, this study has ascertained four distinct patterns by examining how the general amount or level of freedom available to the ordinary citizens has changed in a country since its transition to democracy a decade ago. First, the pattern of democratization becomes steadily positive or upward when the aggregate level of political rights and civil liberties increases on a continuing basis. Second, with continuing decreases in its aggregate level, the pattern becomes steadily negative in nature or downward in spiral. Third, with a combination of upward and downward changes in the freedom level, the pattern becomes erratic or fluctuating. Finally, the pattern becomes neutral with little or no significant change to the level in either upward or downward directions.

In Asia three of nine countries (33%)—Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand—have been steadily upward in their journey toward a greater democracy. In the case of Taiwan, for example, the general level of freedom has improved steadily from 5.0 in 1990, to 1.5 in the year 2000, on FH's 7-point freedom scale. Its current level of political rights and civil liberties compares favorably with those of consolidated democracies in Western Europe. A group of three countries (33%)—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the freedom level has been fluctuating considerably with upward

and downward movements during the past decade. The fluctuation in FH ratings is especially most severe in Pakistan, which finally returned to a military rule. Another group of three countries (33%)—Mongolia, Nepal, and South Korea—have been on a stable course with little change in either direction, positive or negative. FH ratings for these three countries have remained virtually identical since 1993. None of the nine Asian new democracies has been moving steadily downward toward a lesser democracy.

Among 15 post-Communist European countries a group of five countries (33%) has steadily become more democratic over the past decade. They are Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia. Of these steadily improving democracies, Romania has achieved the most impressive record of democratic progress. The country's freedom rating has changed for the better from 7.0 in 1990, to 2.0 in the year 2001. Another group of five countries (33%), on the other hand, has changed little for the better or the worse. Included in this group of stable new democracies are the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland. In four other countries (27%)—Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, and Ukraine, significant decreases have occurred in the levels of freedom. Bulgaria is the only country in the region where the fluctuating pattern of democratic change has occurred.

There is no single pattern representing much of the dynamics of democratization in each of the two regions (see the far right column of Tables 1 and 2). Nonetheless, there is one notable regional difference in the pattern of democratic change. It concerns the incidence of backward democratization, i.e., democratic retrogression. While one-quarter of European new democracies have steadily regressed from what they were a decade ago, none of their Asian counterparts has experienced such steady downward movement.[20]

Cultural Democratization

Numerous surveys have documented the levels and origins of support for democratization in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.[21] These surveys offer a couple of valuable insights that will assist us in comparing popular support for democracy cross-regionally. First, as empirical research has recently revealed, there is a significant gulf between these two levels of democratic support: normative and empirical levels.[22] To ordinary citizens, who live most of their lives under authoritarian rule, democracy at one level represents political ideals or values to be fulfilled. At another level, democracy refers to a political regime, and the actual workings of the regime itself, which governs people's lives on a daily basis. The normative level deals with democracy-in-principle, while the empirical level is concerned with the various aspects of democracy-in-practice.[23] A full accounting of democratic support, therefore, can be made only when both levels of support are considered together.

Second, democratic support, especially in new democracies, involves more than favorable orientations to democratic ideals and practices. To their citizens with little experience and limited sophistication in democratic politics, democracy or dictatorship fails to offer a satisfying solution to many problems facing their societies. Under such uncertainty, many

of these democratic novices, more often than not, do embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently. A growth in their pro-democratic orientations, moreover, does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their anti-authoritarian orientations and vice versa. Popular support for democracy in emerging democracies, therefore, depends on a majority of their citizenry, who not only accept it, but also reject its authoritarian and other non-democratic alternatives.[24]

To compare the levels and patterns of democratic support in the two regions we analyzed data from the WVS III conducted during the period of 1995-96 (see Appendix for the wording of these questions). In Asia the survey data are available for Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. In former Communist Europe they are available for Bulgaria, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that all the survey items to be explored in this section are not available for Pakistan and Poland.

Support for Democracy-in-Principle

To what extent do individuals prefer democracy-in-principle to other types of political systems? To explore this question we chose a pair of WVS items designed to tap one's absolute and relative preference for democracy. Affirmative responses to these two questions were jointly considered to estimate the general level of democratic system preference. In every country only a minority showed no attachment to both the absolute and relative preferences for the democratic systems. As Table 3 indicates, the proportions in Asia averaged 3 percent. They varied from 1 percent for Bangladesh, to 6 percent for the Philippines. In contrast, the average of the post-Communist countries were 10 percent (see Table 4). It ranged considerably from 2 percent for East Germany, to 31 percent for Russia. Those not at all in favor of democracy as a political system were, as a whole, more than three times higher in the post-Communist states than in the Asian states. On the other hand, those fully in favor of democracy were, as a whole, slightly higher in the latter (81%) than the former (75%). Moreover, the absolute and relative preferences for the democratic systems were higher in Asia (86% and 87%) than in the post-Communist European countries (83% and 72%), respectively. When these four ratings were considered together, it is clear that support for democracy-in-principle was generally higher among the Asian countries than those of the post-Communist states.

Among those who lived all or most of their lives in an authoritarian or totalitarian system, preference for democracy-in-principle does not necessarily mean a complete rejection of non-democratic rule. To what extent do individuals in the two regions oppose non-democratic rule in principle? To explore this question we chose another pair of WVS items: one concerning a civilian dictatorship and the other a military dictatorship. In every country a minority remained fully attached to authoritarian rule by refusing to reject any of civilian and military dictatorships. The proportions of those authoritarians in Asia were, on average, 16 percent, whereas those of the post-Communist countries were 7 percent, while

Table 3. *Support for Democracy in Asia*

Levels and Patterns of Support	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Philippines	S.Korea	Taiwan	Mean
System Preferences						
Absolute	98.10%	68.10%	84.40%	84.60%	93.10%	85.70%
Relative	97.4		76.9	91.6	83.5	87.4
None	0.9		5.9	2.6	2.9	3.1
Both	96.6		67.6	78.7	80.2	80.8
Antiauthoritarianism						
Civilian Dictatorship	93.3	38.5	34.6	68.2	59	58.7
Military Dictatorship	93.2	59.8	46.7	94.9	84.4	75.8
None	1.3	28.6	34.7	3.8	10.9	15.9
Both	88.5	26.9	15.9	67.3	54.8	50.7
Average Index	3.9		2.4	3.4	3.2	3.2
Institutional Confidence						
Political Parties	70.8	31	45.2	24.9	35.6	41.5
Parliament	84.3		60	31.1	39.2	53.7
None	11		34.6	65.8	47.8	39.8
Both	66.4		39.9	21.9	29.6	39.5
Procedural Efficacy						
Managing Economy	88.5		55.1	77.9	73.7	73.8
Maintaining Order	82.6		50.6	77.1	66.3	69.2
None	7.6		31.1	13.4	15.1	16.8
Both	79.4		36.7	68.5	55.5	60
Average Index	3.3		2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4
Types of Support						
No Support	0.9		34.7	10.7	10.7	14.3
Normative Support	17.2		28	63.4	51.3	40
Empirical Support	0.9		17.6	3.2	8.7	7.6
Full Support	81		19.8	22.6	29.3	38.2
(N)	1525	733	1200	1249	1452	

Source: World Value Surveys III. The WVS III did not cover post transition politics in Indonesia.

anti-authoritarians of any kind accounted for almost the same proportion in the two regions (51% vs. 50%). In Asia anti-civilian-dictatorship was, as a whole, higher (59%) than in the post-Communist countries (51%); anti-military-dictatorship was higher in the latter (90%) than in the former (76%). Perhaps the experience of the military-backed totalitarian regime pulled the post-Communist Europeans away from the military authoritarianism far more than the Asians.

Both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian orientations were considered together in order to ascertain differences in the overall levels and patterns of support for democracy-in-principle or normative support for democracy. To compare such differences in the patterns of normative democratic support, we singled out those who were fully pro-democratic and fully anti-authoritarian in regime preference as *genuine supporters* of democracy-in-principle. Genuine normative democrats constituted 51 percent of the Asians and 43 percent of the former Communist Europeans. On the other hand, the proportions of such true democratic believers were significantly higher for Aisa than for its counterpart. On the other hand, the proportion of post-Communist Europeans who were fully anti-democratic and fully pro-authoritarian was three times larger than that of the Asians (1.6% vs. 0.5%). Therefore, from a normative perspective, the Asians were more ardent in supporting the democratic systems than the post-Communist Europeans.

Nonetheless, the normative democratic support appears not to be a serious problem threatening the fate of new democracies in either region, which is suggested by the average of the combined index for democratic support. An index of normative democratic support was constructed by summing up the values of two 3-point scales (0-2), tapping democratic system preference and anti-authoritarianism, respectively. On this index, ranging from a low of 0 (no support) to a high of 4 (full support), the Asian countries averaged 3.2 and the former Communist countries 3.1. When these percentage figures are compared across the two regions,

the overall levels of support for democracy-in-principle exceeded the mid-point of a 5-point index, a score of 2 in the mid-1990s.

Surprisingly enough, it is Bangladesh that demonstrated the most positive features of normative support for democracy in Asia. Bangladesh people showed the highest proportions of democratic system preferences as well as anti-authoritarianism.

Table 3. **Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe**

Levels and Patterns of Support	Bulgaria	E. Germany	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Mean
System Preferences										
Absolute	85.90%	95.20%	88.6	86.60%	87.60%	85.10%		57.60%	80.20%	83.40%
Relative	80.6	92.3	89.7	83.4	90.3	72.6	88.40%	58.9	76.5	71.7
None	9	1.9	3.6	6.3	3.7	9.1		30.7	11.8	9.5
Both	78.6	89.3	83.3	77.4	84.3	68.3		49.9	72.2	75.4
Antiauthoritarianism										
Civilian Dictatorship	37.3	82.3	62.5	53.9	36.3	42.8		49.6	45.5	51.3
Military Dictatorship	83.2	97.9	95	94.8	94.2	89.1		79	88.2	90.2
None	11.9	1.4	3.7	3.8	4.3	8		14.1	8.5	7
Both	35.4	81.7	61.8	53.3	35.6	39.8		44.5	45	49.6
Average Index	3	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.1	3		2.5	3	3.1
Institutional Confidence										
Political Parties	29.2	10.2	23.2	10.3	14.4	17.6	12.8	19.4	20.2	17.5
Parliament	45.3	16.7	43.8	25	26.5	40.9	34.5	22.6	37.8	32.6
None	51.1	80.3	54.7	73.4	71.9	54.9	64.8	70.8	60.3	64.7
Both	25.4	6.5	21.2	8.3	10.5	13.5	10.7	11.9	17.5	13.9
Procedural Efficacy										
Managing Economy	55.3	77.1	77	72.4	57.6	47.9	53.3	39.9	56.9	59.7
Maintaining Order	54.6	77.4	67.5	49.5	62.4	48.3	24.3	29.1	45.1	50.9
None	34.2	12.4	17	21.9	29	37.5	44.6	56	37.5	32.2
Both	45.9	66.4	61.7	44.6	51	34.2	23.2	26.3	40.7	43.8
Average Index	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.6
Types of Support										
No Support	20	5.5	10.9	16.7	16.6	24.3		46.8	27.2	21
Normative Support	44.2	79.4	53.5	67.1	63.9	54		40.7	53.4	57
Empirical Support	2.8	0.5	2.4	1.6	1.7	2.6		1.5	2.4	1.9
Full Support	33	14.7	33.2	14.6	17.8	19.1		11.1	17	20.1
(N)	1072	1009	1021	1200	1009	984	1153	2040	2811	

Source: World Value Surveys III.

parties or parliament, respectively. As many as every two in five Asians (40%) had confidence in neither democratic institution; about the same proportion expressed the very opposite opinion. In addition, the confidence of the post-Communist Europeans in political parties (18%) was the lowest across all the categories as well as across the

two regions, which was followed by their confidence in parliament (33%). A majority (65%) of these Europeans had confidence in neither institution, and only 14 percent expressed their confidence in both political parties and parliament. As in normative support, the Asians offered, on average, a bit more positive assessment of institutional confidence than the former Communist Europeans.

With respect to procedural efficacy, a majority of the citizens in Asia, as a whole, perceived democracy as the method of governance that was capable of managing economic affairs (74%) and maintaining social order (70%). Only 17 percent did not endorsed democracy's capacity to tackle those two most important tasks of governance, whereas 60 percent offered the full endorsement of democratic governance. In addition, 60 percent of the post-Communist Europeans endorsed the idea that democracy was capable of managing economy and 51 percent did so about managing order. While nearly one-third of people (32%) in the post-Communist countries dismissed democracy outright as incapable of handling any of its economic or social problems, 44 percent believed democracy capable of managing both economy and order. Generally, the Asians were more likely to endorse the procedural efficacy of democracy than the post-Communist Europeans.

Confidence in representative democratic institutions and endorsement of the efficacy of democratic government are considered together to compare the overall levels of support for democracy-in-action or empirical support for democracy across the two regions. As in the case of normative democratic support, two 3-point scales of institutional confidence and governmental efficacy were combined into an index of empirical democratic support. On this 5-point index, ranging from a low of 0 (no support) to a high of 4 (full support), the Asians averaged 2.4, whereas the post-Communist Europeans averaged 1.6. Evidently the Asian new democracies registered greater levels of empirical democratic support than their

tarianism. Also, genuine democrats accounted for 87 percent and die-hard authoritarians 0.1 percent in Bangladesh. The average index reached the highest 3.9. In sharp contrast, the Philippines showed the smallest proportion of full democratic support (68%) and the largest proportion of no democratic support (6%). In addition, the proportion of anti-dictatorship of any kinds was the smallest (16%) and the proportion of fully authoritarians was the largest (35%). The supporters of democracy-in-principle accounted for the smallest 10 percent.

In the former Communist countries East Germany and Russia were located at the both extreme ends of the spectrum. In East Germany genuine democrats constituted 76 percent and die-hard authoritarians 0.3 percent. These percentage points were the most positive among its fellow post-Communist European countries. In addition, the average index revealed the highest 3.7. By contrast, 30 percent of Russians claimed to be genuine democrats, while 6 percent still identified themselves with die-hard authoritarians. The average index was the lowest 2.5.

Support for Democracy-in-Action

To what extent do the citizens of the new democracies support the actual workings of the regime in power? To measure and compare the levels of support for democracy-in-action across the two regions, another two pairs of items were selected from the WVS. The first pair concerns popular confidence for political parties and parliament, the two key institutions of representative democracy. The second pair deals with the perceived efficacy of government agencies to tackle economic and social problems by the democratic methods or procedures.

Tables 3 and 4 suggest that institutional confidence was quite low in every country. In fact, the category of institutional confidence commonly revealed the most negative features in the new democracies. Only 42 percent and 54 percent of Asians felt, on average, confident in either political

counterparts. In none of the Asian new democracies was the overall level of empirical democratic support lower than the midpoint of the 5-point index, i.e., a score of 2, but only Estonia (2.1) among post-Communist European countries passed the midpoint. This finding suggests that new democracies in post-Communist Europe lacked a great deal in support for democracy-in-action.

As in the normative support category, citizens of Bangladesh distinguished themselves from their fellow new Asian democracies by endorsing institutional confidence and procedural efficacy by a big margin. The South Koreans, however, revealed the worst confidence in democratic institutions and the Philippines showed the worst evaluations about the procedural efficacy of its political system. Likewise, the ordering of the post-Communist European countries changed in the category of institutional confidence. The confidence in democratic institutions was the highest in Bulgaria; it became the lowest in East Germany. Yet East Germany regained the most positive status with respect to procedural efficacy and Russia showed again the most negative features.

Types of Overall Support for Democracy

The general levels of normative and empirical democratic support are considered together to explore regional differences in the quality of democratic support. To this end, 5-point indices of normative and empirical democratic support were first dichotomized into low (0-2) and high (3-4) categories, using the midpoint as a cutoff. Those two categories of normative and empirical support were then considered together to identify four distinct types of democratic support. The most negative type of *non-democrats* includes those who support democracy neither normatively nor empirically. The most positive type of *fully committed democrats* includes those who support it both normatively and empirically. Between these extreme patterns are two other types of *partial supporters of democracy*, i.e. those who support democracy-in-principle only and those who support democracy-in-action only.

Fully committed democrats in Asia (38%) were found, as a whole, twice more frequently than in post-Communist Europe (20%). The proportions ranged from 20 percent for the Philippines, to 81 percent for Bangladesh in Asia. Among the post-Communist Europeans the proportions ranged from 11 percent for Russia to 33 percent for Estonia and Bulgaria. By contrast the general level of unqualified commitment to the political ideals as well as political practices of democracy was higher in post-Communist countries (21%) than in post-authoritarian Asia (14%). The proportions of the non-democrats in Asia ranged from 1 percent of Bangladesh, to 35 percent for the Philippines; their counterparts in the post-Communist countries ranged from 6 percent (East Germany), to 47 percent (Russia). Generally speaking, self-identified democrats were more numerous in Asia than in post-Communist Europe.

Another noteworthy is that normative support was far greater than empirical support in both regions. On average the Asians offered normative support five times more than the empirical support (40% vs. 8%). Likewise, post-Communist Europeans endorsed support for democracy-in-principle

about thirty times more than support for democracy-in-practice (57% vs. 2%). In principle citizens of new democracies in the two continents offered support, and they were eager for democracy after decades of non-democracy, but they were disappointed by or dissatisfied with the actual performance of new democratic regimes.

Overall 81 percent of citizens in Bangladesh identified themselves as fully committed democrats, while only 1 percent identified themselves as non-democrats. These figures were the most impressive throughout the countries under investigation. At the other extreme end is Russia. Almost half of Russians (47%) identified themselves as non-democrats; only 11 percent subscribed to democracy from both normative and empirical perspectives.

Summary and Conclusions

This study has compared the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia and former-Communist Europe. In terms of the prevalent mode of transition, the two regions differ very little; a majority of their new democracies were instituted by joint actions between the ruling and opposition forces, i.e., the transplacement mode. In contrast, transformation and pacted transition were commonly the least popular mode in the two regions.

A greater difference between the two regions concerns the makeup of political institutions. The parliamentary structure of government formed by the proportional system is the most common form in post-Communist Europe. This particular model of democratic institution has been rejected by all new democracies in Asia. The presidential form of government elected according to the pluralist system, which was rejected by all of post-Communist European democracies, was and is most popular in Asia.   As far as the institutional dimension of democratization is concerned, the two regions have very little in common.

The two regions differ considerably in the extent to which their citizens have lived in freedom in the wake of democratic regime change. On the whole, a larger proportion of new democracies in post-Communist Europe exist as free states, and they have made greater progress in expanding freedom on a steady basis. It is also in this region where a greater proportion of those countries became less free states during the past decade. On the contrary, none of their Asian counterparts has experienced such steady downward movement, while the democratic progresses made in the new Asian democracies, on average, during the same years, measured by FH, appear to be smaller as compared to the European peers.

The most notable difference has to do with the cultural dimension of democratization. In the two regions, a majority of the masses is yet to embrace democracy as the most preferable regime or a lesser evil. The people who remain unattached to democracy, either normatively or empirically, appear after years of democratic rule to vary a great deal across the regions. In the two post-authoritarian East, non-democrats comprise a very small minority. By striking contrast, they constitute a substantial majority in the two post-Communist states. In the Eastern world of new democracies, one or the other type of democrat, constitutes a large

majority. Such inference may be inconclusive to be generalized in the context of the East and the West. Hopefully, future research will expand this across many other countries in the two continents with the WVS IV (1999-2000).

What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these findings? On the whole, a regional difference in democratization is more likely to emerge in the phase of consolidation than that of transition. During the consolidation phase regional difference is more likely to persist with the unwillingness of the masses to embrace democracy as the most preferred political system rather than the inability of their political system to guarantee political rights and civil liberties on an increasing basis.[25] The legacies of Communist rule have been conducive to the destruction of the old government structure designed to maintain one-party dictatorship. Those Communist legacies of the West, however, appear to be more detrimental to the growth of democratic legitimacy and the maintenance of a free state rather than the authoritarian legacies of the East. These regional differences are likely to affect the ultimate fate of the current wave of democratization in each region.

ENDNOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001.

1. For instance, Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (August/September 2000); Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, *Disaffected Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2. See, for example, Valerie Bunce, "Can We Compare Democratization in the East Versus the South?" *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (July 1995); Valerie Bunce, "Regional Differences in democratization: The East Versus the South," *Post- Soviet Affairs*, 14 (July/September 1998); Ruth Berlins Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe C Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Go?" *Slavic Review*, 53 (Spring 1994).

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4. Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997).

5. C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

6. Collier, 1999; Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, "Democratization Backwards: The Problems of Third-Wave Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science*, 31 (April 2001).

7. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

8. For example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Carl Goldstein, "KMT Power Grows Out of a Holstered Gun," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 132 (May 8, 1986); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* XLIII (1991); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave: Democracy and Dictatorship in the Post-Communist World," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001; Munck and Leff, 1997; Henry Kamm, "Thousands of Hungarians March to Commemorate Revolts in 1988," *New York Times*, (March 16, 1989), A12; Ghia Nodia, "How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?" *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (October 1996); Serge Schmemann, "1000,000 Protest in Leipzig in Largest Rally in Decades," *New York Times,* (October 17, 1989), A12; Christopher Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization: A Comparative View of Gorbachev's Reform," *World Politics*, 45 (October 1992).

9. Huntington, 1991.

10. Thailand's regime transition in 1992 well portrays what the pacted transition is. Upon the military strongman Suchinda's inauguration in April 1992, opposition leader Chamlong Srimuang, the former Mayor of Bangkok, went on a hunger strike. His protest was followed by popular demonstrations to demand the former general's resignation. The snowballing protests made Suchinda declare a state of emergency on May 18 and the military troops cracked down on protesters, which resulted in a blood-shedding tragedy. Since Suchinda attempted to stick to the hard line stance and the pro-democracy movements never stopped their demonstrations, the king met with Suchinda and Chamlong on May 21 in order to stop further bloodshed. The king understood an amnesty offer would encourage Suchinda to resign. Upon receiving the king's grant of clemency, Suchinda stepped down on May 24.

11. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

12. Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," *World Politics*, 49 (January 1997).

13. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDE), *Handbook of Electoral System Design* (Stockholm: IIDE, 1997).

14. Ali Piano and Arch Puddington, "The 2000 Freedom House Survey," *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (January 2001).

15. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986.

16. For some former Soviet republics, the other possible option may be the year of independence as suggested at the panel where an earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001. But the independence is not always equivalent to democratic transition, as in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Moreover, the independence is not compatible with many other democratic transitions in Asia and post-Communist Europe.

17. This is primarily because political liberalization took place a couple of years before their democratic founding elections.

18. As in some Asian countries, some of the post-Communist states took considerable time before their founding elections. Therefore, it should be noted that the average ratings for the pre-transition period are lower than expected in some cases. Moreover, these new independent former Soviet republics do not have FH scores until their independence in 1990 and received lower FH estimates since the independence.

19. Richard Rose, "Where are Postcommunist Countries Going?" *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (July 1997).

20. The Pakistani case does not reveal such steady downward movement in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, it shows a severe fluctuation, although Pakistan recently returned to a military authoritarian rule.

21. Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "Africans' Surprising Universalism," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001); Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, "Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001); Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Marta Lagos, "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (January 2001).

22. John Mueller, *Capitalism and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Richard Rose, Doh C. Shin, and Neil Munro, "The Tension between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South Korea," in Pippa Norris, eds., *Critical Citizens*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Shin, 1999.

23. See David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965); Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Shin and McDonough, 1999.

24. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998.

25. Ralph Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990).

APPENDIX

SURVEY QUESTIONS

A. Democratic System Preferences

V157. For having a democratic political system, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Absolute Preferences)**

V163. Could you tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly with the statement: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. **(Relative Preferences)**

B. Antiauthoritarian Orientations

V154. For having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Anti-Civilian-Dictatorship)**

V156. For having the army rule, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Anti-Military-Dictatorship)**

C. Institutional Confidence

V143. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in **political parties**: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

V144. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in **parliament**: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

D. Procedural Efficacy

V160. People sometimes say that in a democracy the **economic system** runs badly. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with them?

V162. People sometimes say that democracies aren't good at **maintaining order**. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with them?

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Zebra Crossings: Perspectives on Pedestrian Safety in China

by Yu Qingling, Zhang Qiao, Wang Min, and Yan Jun, M.A. candidates

Abstract

Regulations pertaining to pedestrian safety and the enforcement of these regulations in China are far from satisfactory even if they have played an important role in protecting pedestrians in the past. With China's entry into the World Trade Organization and Beijing's hosting of the 2008 Olympics, the country can expect more visitors; it is normal that the foreign guests want to be safe when crossing the street. The large peasant population, some 800 million people, also deserve safety as do all citizens of China including the elderly, the disabled, and the very young. The authors, having consulted sources in the US and Japan, offer three suggestions that are based on the general goal of traffic harmony more than on the notion of rights per se. The suggestions to achieve traffic harmony include expanding laws concerning pedestrian safety, providing more facilities, and improving pedestrian and driver awareness.

Introduction

What are zebra crossings? They may be a name for crosswalks, but they have another meaning to some people. Please do not think it is a joke if someone answers that they are a place where one can die with the government paying for the funeral. Sadly, it is our understanding that there are those who hold this idea—at least in parts of India. Near Kottayam in India, people believe that if they die in a zebra crossing, the government will pick up the tab for their funerals (Roy, 1997). It turns out that there are no zebra crossings in Kottayam, but some people from Kottayam, visiting Cockin, a two-hour drive away, have seen from a car or bus window these stripes in the street, meant to be places for pedestrians to cross, and apparently they have heard about the government paying for the funerals of victims of fatal accidents.

The story may be an extreme, but people do get killed in zebra crossings in all parts of the world, including China. Our investigation shows that the current traffic situation in many cities of China is far from a satisfying one. With China's rapid economic development, the number of motorized vehicles has increased tremendously over the past few years. However, road construction and the development and implementation of regulations and sanctions for violators are lagging. Statistics suggested that by the end of 2000, the number of motorized vehicles in the country would reach over sixty million. The rapid increase in the number of vehicles has challenged the existing system of antiquated roads, resulting in high accident rates in many areas; some of these accidents occur in urban zebra crossings. In 2000, there were about 617,000 road accidents, killing 94,000 people and injuring 420,000. These figures are up 46 percent, respectively, from the previous year (Wu, 2002). Then what follows is the problem between drivers and pedestrians, since a significant number of the 94,000 people killed were in zebra crossings.

In many cities of the world, a place that can well reflect traffic civilization and education is the zebra crossing. It would seem that a basic requirement for drivers is to give pedestrians going across roads priority. It would also seem that a basic requirement for pedestrians is to use zebra crossings when crossing roads. In China, however, neither motorists nor pedestrians tend to observe these conventions. Many foreigners share the opinion that it is dangerous to cross roads in China. In their countries, it would be a most natural thing for drivers to give way to pedestrians on roads, not just at zebra crossings. In China, drivers tend to ignore pedestrians; they seem to have no the idea of what it means to respect pedestrians' rights by giving them priority. With pedestrians, there is a similar negligence; many foreigners wonder why pedestrians in China go across roads, sometimes even against a red light as if they do not see it.

China is a large country with a huge population, and as a result, China's traffic is characterized by a large number of pedestrians on roads. How to address the traffic problem concerning pedestrians is a key development issue our country must face. Fortunately there is growing interest by policy makers to ensure pedestrian safety. Underlying this policy interest is the notion that pedestrians have the right to cross the street without being hit by motor vehicles. We have decided to delve deeper into this public concern from our collective perspective as Chinese women, one of whom has a background in urban planning and all of whom are concerned about the safety of our fellow citizens and visitors to our country. Some may tend to place our discussion in the context of pedestrian rights; it is possible to say that there is a growing awareness of the need to protect pedestrians. But we suggest that the paper is not so much about rights as it is about achieving traffic harmony. Pedestrian rights are valid in the sense that they play a role in obtaining the desired traffic harmony. The issue is a general one, but it is acknowledged more at the level of government in terms of regulations than by the ordinary people who only seek to be able to cross the road without being killed. That is our wish as well, that our countrymen and countrywomen and our foreign guests may safely move about on foot as cars move about on wheels; we seek a balance that would bring about traffic harmony.

Investigation

We look at the problem of pedestrian safety by examining traffic regulations, traffic facilities, and people's awareness.

Traffic regulations

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government has formulated a series of rules and regulations to tackle the nation's road traffic and guarantee the safety of pedestrians. The Regulations for the Administration of the Road and Traffic of the People's Republic of China issued by the State Council in 1988 is the most recent document. It was formulated on the policy fundamentals of its predecessors. The laws regulate activities of pedestrians as well as movements of vehicles. In this set of regulations, there are altogether eight codes concerned with the safety of pedestrians. These codes represent rules for drivers and

pedestrians to follow for the purpose of safeguarding pedestrians. After being put into effect, these regulations have played an important role in reducing injuries to and deaths of pedestrians and have effectively ensured the smooth flow of traffic.

Using statistics available to us, we observed that during the period from 1987 to 1993, the pedestrian death rate in traffic accidents remained at a relatively low level, accounting for eight to nine percent of the total number of the deaths due to traffic accidents. But as society develops, we anticipate that weaknesses in regulations regarding pedestrians will emerge. Firstly, there are only two codes, Code 63 and Code 64, directly regulating pedestrian action. What they stipulate is very general (see Appendix). For example, Code 63 says only that when a pedestrian passes through a crosswalk without a traffic sign, he or she must pay attention to passing vehicles and not run across. But it does not say what a pedestrian should do if the traffic is very busy; it does not address what the pedestrian should do if he or she cannot find a chance to cross the road. Most of us have had the experience of standing on one side of a road intending to cross it but not finding the opportunity to do so. What we end up doing in such circumstances is, with all our courage, cross the road weaving through the fast-moving cars as we worry about our safety.

Secondly, there are too few regulations confining drivers' actions; most of the regulations place limits on pedestrian action. Only Code 41 confines driver action for the sake of pedestrian safety. It stipulates that when there is a pedestrian crossing sign allowing pedestrians to pass, the driver is required to stop the vehicle or slow it down and let pedestrians cross the road. When passing a crosswalk without a traffic sign, the driver is required to exercise caution to avoid hitting pedestrians. There are no rules requiring drivers to guarantee the safety of pedestrians who cross a road without a crosswalk or who walk along a road without a sidewalk. The only existing code then has some problems. It says that when passing a crosswalk without a traffic signal, the driver must carefully avoid hitting pedestrians. This code is only weakly enforced; in our daily life we often see cars speeding across crosswalks. Pedestrians must take care when they step into a crosswalk. Even when they enter the crosswalk, it seems so dangerous for them to maneuver through the cars racing by.

Thirdly, there are no clearly stipulated sanctions for the drivers or pedestrians who violate the regulations. Drivers and pedestrians do not know how they will be punished if they do not follow regulations. The department that executes the regulations cannot find a consistent standard to use against violators. That brings serious difficulties for the implementation of the regulations.

Fourthly, because this set of regulations was formulated in accordance with the situation of cities, there is no regulation to guarantee the safety of pedestrians in rural areas. It ignores the fact that China, with a rural population of more than 800 million people, is an agricultural country. Farmers constitute the majority of Chinese people. With the developing economy, more and more roads are being built in rural areas. Most of these roads do not have sidewalks or overpasses. The countryside, in fact, is the place that has the highest occurrence of traffic accidents. To safeguard pedestrians in rural areas is becoming more and more urgent in China.

Lastly, this set of regulations shows no concerns for disabled people; it does not provide any special measures to ensure their safety. We all know that the blind, the deaf, and those in wheelchairs, have great difficulty crossing roads. They should be afforded special attention.

Besides these five weaknesses, what we notice is that this set of regulations was issued by the State Council instead of the People's Congress, so it was not a set of laws. It does not have the legal power of a law (in China, only the People's Congress has the right to issue a set of laws). Because of the rapid extension of roads and the increase of the number of vehicles, the guarantee of the safety of pedestrians is becoming more and more important and urgent. The rules that guarantee pedestrian safety must be written into laws. In this way pedestrian safety can receive more attention and be better assured. We see that there is intent to guarantee pedestrian safety in China, but the regulations are far from perfect. There is much room for improvement.

Traffic Facilities

In this part, Chongqing, one of the four municipalities controlled directly by the central government, is picked out as a typical example.

The application of urban planning theory plays a key role in resolving traffic problems. In terms of commercial streets, to set up a system that separates automobiles from pedestrians--mostly shoppers--is an effective measure to ensure pedestrian safety. Many commercial malls of modern style have emerged in many cities in China.

However, as to traffic facilities, the situation is not always so comfortable. In some points just before a turn in the road, there is not a single warning sign, the absence of which is dangerous for drivers, pedal cyclists, and pedestrians. Many pedestrians still walk in traffic lanes though they are supposed to walk on the sidewalk. They have to do so because the sidewalk is too narrow to accommodate many people. In addition, what worsens the situation is that there is no sidewalk at all on some streets of old cities. When zebra crossings exist, they often need repainting. In others places where people on foot frequently need to cross the road, there are no apparent zebra crossings. Much work remains to deal effectively with traffic problems besides putting urban planning theory into practice and improving traffic regulations and facilities.

Public Awareness

"The pedestrian always has the right-of-way. That is, drivers must yield to pedestrians," David Young, an American civil engineer, told us. Traffic rules of China also include such regulations to secure pedestrian safety. In China, as in other countries, one must study traffic rules from a booklet and take a test to obtain a driver's license. Drivers are expected to know the regulations well. But do they really respect these regulations? Some drivers do very well in driving and abiding by the regulations. However, there are

also others who totally ignore the regulations. In some streets without traffic officers, there are scenes of pedestrians waiting helplessly to cross the road. At one end or the middle of a road, there may be a zebra crossing, without traffic signals, that automobiles speed past. Of all the reasons for injury road accidents, motorist error accounts for most of the proportion (Wang, 1995), as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. **Proportions of Reasons for Road Accident by User Type: 1987 to 1993**

Year	Term	Sum	Drivers	Pedal cyclists	Pedestrians	Others
1987	Deaths	46141	28971	6414	5310	5446
1987	%	100	62.8	13.9	11.5	11.8
1988	Deaths	54683	34078	7821	6360	6424
1988	%	100	62.3	14.3	11.6	11.8
1989	Deaths	50183	31229	7158	5910	5886
1989	%	100	62.2	14.3	11.8	11.7
1990	Deaths	49305	31110	6575	5863	5757
1990	%	100	63.1	13.3	11.9	11.7
1991	Deaths	53117	33417	6591	6353	6756
1991	%	100	63	12.4	12	12.6
1992	Deaths	58319	38089	6678	6459	7093
1992	%	100	65.3	11.4	11.1	12.2
1993	Deaths	63646	43151	6098	6418	7979
1993	%	100	67.8	9.6	10	12.6

Although the proportion of peasant deaths in all road traffic accident deaths fell by10.6 percent from 54.9 percent in 1987 to 44.3 percent in 1993, those in the countryside are the ones most vulnerable to traffic accidents (Wang, 1995).

Table 2. **Proportions of Occupations of People Killed in Road Accidents: 1987 to 1993**

Year	Term	Sum	Driver	Worker	Peasant	Student	Soldier	Others
1987	Deaths	46141	2637	8725	25322	3663	153	5641
1987	%	100	5.7	18.9	54.9	8	0.3	12.2
1988	Deaths	54683	3501	10044	29859	4397	151	6731
1988	%	100	6.4	18.4	54.6	8.1	0.3	12.2
1989	Deaths	50183	3181	9431	27169	3847	125	6930
1989	%	100	6.3	18.8	54.1	7.7	0.3	12.8
1990	Deaths	49305	3198	9354	26377	3543	155	6678
1990	%	100	6.5	19	53.5	7.2	0.3	13.5
1991	Deaths	53117	3642	9409	28920	3767	139	7240
1991	%	100	6.9	17.7	54.5	7.1	0.3	13.5
1992	Deaths	58319	4918	10645	29568	3904	194	9090
1992	%	100	8.4	18.3	50.7	6.7	0.3	15.6
1993	Deaths	63646	5881	11629	28194	4088	182	13672
1993	%	100	9.2	8.3	44.3	6.4	0.2	21.3

The number of deaths from road accidents is increasing. This is a result of the increasing number of automobiles combined with poor and inadequate roads. Public awareness of the traffic rules may be the most important factor.

For example, we interviewed twenty ordinary citizens of Chongqing on four major points. They included workers and teachers. The first question was "Are you familiar with or ignorant of all the traffic rules?" The results show that regarding the whole body of traffic rules, more than 80 percent of the interviewees claimed knowing something, while less than 20 percent of them indicated that they were ignorant on the subject. The second question was, "Do you know that slowing

the automobile at the sight of a pedestrian and showing respect for pedestrian safety are essential requirements of drivers?" About four-fifths of the interviewees answered negatively; they are not drivers, and we suggest that their not being drivers is one reason for their lack of awareness of these matters. Another one-fifth of the interviewees, the ones who are motorists, know that drivers are supposed to slow down for pedestrians. Some of them confess that, on most occasions, they neglect to slow down unless there is a traffic supervisor present. The third question was, "Do you know that you should walk on the zebra crossing when you cross the road? If you are a pedal cyclist, do you know that you should get off and walk cross the road? "All the interviewees are familiar with these regulations, but about half of them said that they did not always abide by them. The fourth and last question was, "Do you know how to decide when to walk at zebra crossings? How do you decide to go or to stop according to the direction of signal lights? As a pedestrian, are you careful to respect automobiles by not chasing after your companion or running fast?" All the interviewees were familiar with the rules and claimed that they had always strictly followed them. We found out that the awareness of traffic rules of the interviewees is almost on the same level regardless of their occupation or their educational background. A professional who is a specialist in some field may be as ignorant as an ordinary shopkeeper (see Table 2). That is not a pleasant result, and it can really indicate the reasons for those unpleasant scenes of pedestrians waiting in the middle of a zebra crossing for the speeding vehicles passing in some other cities of China and the statistics of injury mentioned above by Wang Jianyong. It sounds a severe warning that awareness of traffic rules, especially those concerning the priority and safety of pedestrians, should be widely publicized throughout our country. At the same time, more efforts should be made to improve awareness among peasants. More measures should be taken to regulate the behavior of drivers to get them to respect the priority and safety of pedestrians.

A chief traffic official said that, with regard to pedestrian safety, the actual situation is not optimistic; his view conforms with what we described above. What is important is that the government has already noticed the problem and has taken measures to better the traffic environment, such as changing traffic regulations into traffic laws--in China, laws are more formal and authoritative than regulations—with more details including pedestrian safety, the building of traffic facilities, and publicizing traffic rules to improve people's awareness especially the awareness of those in countryside (Wu, 2002). After all, China is a populous country. We cannot depend mainly on traffic officers to maintain traffic order. "The safety of everyone is very important," our US correspondent told us. Everyone should bear these words in mind and abide by traffic rules in daily life.

The Way Out

There is no denying that China's traffic condition is not really well developed. Feasible measures should be taken to improve it. Special attention must be paid to pedestrian safety to guarantee a safe and congenial environment for the general

public. Opinions about how to improve pedestrian safety may vary from person to person. After careful study, the authors of this paper offer three general suggestions. They include expanding laws concerning pedestrian safety, providing more facilities, and improving pedestrian and driver awareness.

Provide Traffic Laws to Protect Pedestrians

As previously stated, the most recent regulation for the administration of the road and traffic of People's Republic in China was issued in 1988 by the State Council. It regulates pedestrian and driver behavior. Facts show that it has worked out successfully, and we are encouraged to have recently learned from traffic officer Wu Laiwen of the plans for the State Traffic Department to present in the fall of 2002 a proposal for changing the current traffic regulation into law. But we still find that the set of regulations is not a pedestrian-oriented document. Our suggestion is that we may borrow some practices of merit from foreign countries. Necessary compliments and sanctions should be included. China always emphasizes punishment but neglects to compliment the good behavior of citizens. Ling Mu, a Japanese professor, tells us that to build up the confidence of general citizens and cultivate responsibility, his government gives certain compliments to those who always obey the traffic rules. Introduced in Japan is the Safe Driver (SD) Card. Cards with different colors may be given to drivers with different performance levels. If a motorist has had no incidents for ten years, he or she is entitled to a golden card. The motorist who has had no incidents in the past four to nine years is awarded a blue card. Ling Mu says that drivers in Japan have a sense of pride when they carry such a card; it is proof of their driving ability and responsibility. They can receive a discount at the gas station with the card. This encourages good driving habits (Ling Mu, 1999). As far as we know, the death rate from car incidents has decreased in Japan, and the adoption of SD cards has contributed to the decrease. We suggest that the Chinese government also adopt such a system. It may bring a satisfactory result.

As for punishment, one thing worth mentioning is that pedestrians should assume some responsibility for incidents in which they involved. It may lead to the balance of the respective responsibility of drivers and pedestrians.

Provide Basic Facilities

Since so many facilities are in poor condition, a number of facilities need to be constructed. Investing transportation funds in pedestrian facilities and safer streets should be a high priority. The Chinese government has begun to realize the importance of traffic conditions. The funds the government provides are still not enough to build basic facilities, especially in rural areas, such as flyovers and underpasses. Non-government investments are also encouraged. As long as every Chinese citizen realizes the essential meaning of pedestrian safety and makes contributions, improvements that we might call miracles—hyperbole intended—can happen.

Another fundamental step toward improving pedestrian safety is to collect more information about pedestrian facilities

and injuries, the effectiveness of pedestrian safety measures, and even how much is spent on pedestrian facilities. Some government records are incomplete, a situation that cripples the attempt to improve pedestrian safety.

Local government and citizens each have a key role to play, by identifying areas unsafe for walking. Doing so may contribute to a more complete solution of the traffic problems After the funds and information have been collected, we need to direct money into pedestrian safety efforts by focusing on some of the most critical needs. They include providing signs at turns and placing traffic lights at intersections in downtown areas. Special attention should be given to commercial areas with large numbers of pedestrians. If financial support is limited, zebra crossings should at least be installed for pedestrian safety.

We should also pay attention to the reconstruction of old facilities. In our research, we found that many zebra crossings are worn out and are hardly recognizable. There are streetlights that have been broken for a long time without being repaired. We suggest that departments concerned with traffic safety repair them in a timely manner.

Consideration could be given to business zones. Due to the development of the economy, business zones of large scale are being constructed. We suggest that some business zones may be designed as vehicle free. Vehicle-free zones not only guarantee pedestrian safety, but they also stimulate business. During our research, we were told by many people that they like shopping in vehicle-free zones. They hope that more vehicle-free zones will be created to link cafés, pubs, historic buildings, scenic points, and pretty villages.

We must show our concern for the people with disabilities by providing them with a convenient and safe environment. Xiong Jiageng, a distinguished professor in Southwest Traffic University, pointed out that in some foreign countries there is an alarm accompanying red lights in the pedestrian crossing. The alarms can de identified by blind people. We suggest our government also adopt facilities of this kind. Electric eyes are coming into use in some large cities in China. They have proven to be an effective supervisor of drivers. Always set in the crossroad, they record all the vehicles that do not stop at red lights. A driver caught speeding pass red lights is surely to be punished. If more high technology aids are employed in cities, pedestrian safety will improve.

Improve Public Awareness

Improving public awareness of pedestrian safety can curb car accidents and reduce the number of causalities of pedestrians and drivers. The main means are using media to inform general public, and conducting appropriate education for special groups, including little children, aged people, and peasants.

The media have become important parts in the daily life of people. Television, radio, journals, newspapers, and the newly-emerged internet serve to provide people with important information. Since most Chinese have little awareness of the rules of pedestrian safety in the overall scheme of traffic safety, the media should be charged with raising consciousness of this matter. It turns out, however, that articles about

pedestrian safety are rarely seen in the *Journal of the Traffic University*. The focus of this publication is railway transportation. Similarly, there are few television programs concerning pedestrian safety. We offer the suggestion that experts should do more research about the use of the media to improve conditions for the general public.

The radio should by no means be neglected. There are more than 800 million peasants in China. Some of them are living in remote areas in which television is a luxury. The radio functions as the main tool to keep them informed. So we suggest that editors of radio programs include traffic safety and arrange some programs that appeal to our peasant population.

While the traditional media are still the most relevant, the internet begins to catch more attention from people, especially the youth. We hope that officers of traffic science will share their knowledge of traffic safety and reach young people through the internet. There should be wide use of the internet in their routine work with the inclusion of traffic knowledge, including pedestrian safety.

More than informing the general public is needed to promote pedestrian safety. Some special groups are to be emphasized. They are children, old people, and peasants. Children are pure and easily shaped, hence the important role of schoolteachers and parents. During our investigation, we found that children's education about traffic rules is still lacking. Children can fluently recite sentences of traffic rules, but they are puzzled about their use in daily life. We think teachers should lead children in making more practical observations. In this way children can put what they learned in books into practice. Parents are also a molding factor of children's minds. Unfortunately, we observed that some parents force their children to obey traffic rules, but they themselves seldom obey rules in daily life. Traffic policemen on the streets have been known to reprimand parents with children in their arms. There is no doubt that the tender hearts of the children are sometimes polluted by bad examples. Parents should be more responsible and self-disciplined. Only in this way, can children's conception of traffic rules be well cultivated.

Frankly speaking, some senior citizens are confused by traffic lights and traffic rules. Some of them know nothing about crossing roads. To inform them is the best way to protect them from being hurt by cars. Since a lot of Old People's Clubs are well developed in China, the elderly can help each other. That is to say, some well-educated senior citizens can be chosen as leaders and encourage others by sharing their own opinions and talking about their own experience. Seniors may be able to work out ways of avoiding traffic problems.

There are millions of peasants in China. Most of them live in remote rural areas. Many are seeking jobs in cities. They have little formal education. They seldom know the traffic rules, let alone the rules concerning pedestrian safety. Education programs should also target them and be conducted to improve their awareness of pedestrian issues. In rural areas, college students are undoubtedly the main ones in charge of the education of peasants. In recent years, the government

has conducted a movement called "college students go to rural areas during holidays." The students bring to backward rural areas not only agricultural knowledge but also new technology which may benefit peasants. The knowledge they deliver is welcomed by peasants. The college students need to adjust their focus and deliver more information about traffic rules. By taking advantage of their ability, they can impart knowledge by telling stories of traffic incidents and their life experiences by drawing pictures about traffic rules. Then peasants may at least get some general knowledge of traffic rules.

Some peasants seeking their fortune in cities cause many problems due to their ignorance about traffic rules. Traffic policemen are in the best position to solve these problems. Punishment is definitely not the best way to improve the behavior of the newcomers to the city. We think traffic policemen should call for the help of the general public. Companies with large numbers of workers who come from rural areas and the neighborhood unit in charge of the residents can help. Peasants can be organized to attend classes designed for workers who come from rural areas. Some delicate and instructive compact discs can be dedicated to them. In this way, peasants who once knew little about traffic rules may have access to this kind of knowledge.

Last but not least, everybody should keep in mind that we must be self-disciplined and cultivate good habits. The promotion of awareness of pedestrian safety needs the help of every member of society for strength.

Conclusion

We all know that in the year 2000 China attracted the world's attention because of two important events. One is its entry into the World Trade Organization. With the entry, China's society is sure to be affected in many ways. China will need to improve its traffic situation. Because China is gradually being integrated into the world economy, more and more people will come to China for doing business. If China cannot provide foreign business men and women with a good traffic situation, they may not like to stay in China, invest in China, or conduct their business dealings in China. "Repair roads first, get rich next" is a popular saying in China.

The second major event of the year 2000 was Beijing's winning the bid for the Olympic Games in 2008. Greatly inspired by this, China is determined to hold the best Olympic Games in history and, in order to fulfill this goal, Chinese people all around the nation are doing their best to help their government. They know well that convenient transportation and traffic safety are critical to China's successfully hosting the Olympics. The whole nation, gradually realizing the importance of traffic safety, is seeking traffic harmony, and all of society is acting now though there is much to be improved. China is continuing its efforts to improve pedestrian safety and reduce accident rates by all means, such as improving traffic regulations and upgrading road quality. We are of the full conviction that with the people's support and special attention from policy makers, pedestrian safely in China will be improved, and a good future is reserved for China. As for the question we put forth at the beginning of this paper—

what are zebra crossings?—we hope that, in China, or in any part of the world for that matter, no one will again answer that they are places to die so that the government will pay for the funeral.

APPENDIX

English version of traffic codes concerned with the safety of pedestrians in the Regulations for the Administration of the Road and Traffic of the People's Republic of China. (issued by the State Council on the 9th of May in 1988)

Chapter 1. General Rules
Code 7. Vehicles and pedestrians must use their own lanes. When a vehicle has to be driven in a pedestrian lane, it must yield to the pedestrians who are walking in it. And when a pedestrian walks on a road, he or she must yield to the vehicle driven on it.
Code 10. Traffic lights
a. When the green light is on, vehicles and pedestrians are permitted to pass. But the vehicles that make turns are required not obstruct the vehicles that go straight, and pedestrians are permitted to pass.
b. When the yellow light is on, vehicles and pedestrians are not permitted to pass, but the vehicles that have passed the stopping line and the pedestrians who have entered crosswalks can continue.
c. When the red light in on, vehicles and pedestrians are not permitted to pass.
d. When the green arrow-shaped light is on, vehicles are permitted to go in the direction the arrow points.
e. When the yellow light is twinkling, vehicles and pedestrians can pass on the premise of ensuring the safety of themselves.
Code 12. The Traffic Light for Crosswalks
a. When the green light is on, pedestrians are permitted to pass.
b. When the green light is twinkling, pedestrians are not permitted to enter the crosswalk, but the pedestrians who have entered crosswalks can continue to walk.
c. When the red light is on, pedestrians are not permitted to enter crosswalks.
Chapter 6. The Driving of Vehicles
Code 41. When a vehicle passes a crosswalk, and the traffic light permits pedestrians to enter the crosswalk, the driver must stop the vehicle or slow it down. When a motorist drives a vehicle past a crosswalk without the control of traffic lights, he or she is required to take care to avoid hitting the pedestrians who are walking in the crosswalk.

Chapter 7. Pedestrians and Passengers
Code 63. Pedestrians must obey the following rules:
a. Pedestrians must walk on sidewalks, and if there is no sidewalk, they must walk on the roadside.
b. Pedestrians must use a crosswalk to cross a road. And when they use crosswalks under the control of traffic lights, they must follow the direction of the traffic lights. When they use crosswalks without the control of traffic lights, they must pay attention to moving vehicles and not run or chase. When there is no crosswalk, pedestrians must cross the road straight, and not cross the road suddenly in vehicle traffic. If there are overpasses or pedestrian tunnels, pedestrians must use them to cross the road.
c. Pedestrians are forbidden to cross or sit on the railings of roads, sidewalks, or openings of railways.
d. Pedestrians are forbidden to jump aboard, chase, or stop moving vehicles, or hit moving vehicles with any object.
Code 64. When people walk on sidewalks in groups, there can be no more than two people in a row. Children's must proceed on sidewalks. Adult groups can walk close to the right side of roads.
When crossing a road in a group, people must cross the road quickly in a crosswalk, and, if there is no crosswalk, they must proceed straight across. If necessary, a large group may find their crossing the road interrupted for a while.

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