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# Asia Pacific: *Perspectives*

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# Asia Pacific: *Perspectives*

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## The Contemporary Global Political and Economic Context for Interreligious Dialogue including China and India

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### ABSTRACT

The recent political and economic advances of China and India, and their changing relationships to each other and to the rest of the world, constitute the most crucial long term national adjustments necessary in the current international system. The differences among religions of the book, religions of meditative experience, and religions of public life make it extremely difficult to use any understanding of religion in itself as the focal piece for such dialogue. *Religion and Politics in the International System* (2006) identified the following five interreligious dialogues as particularly significant for global integration: 1. Among religions of the book, focusing on the developing world and its relationship to the developed world; 2-3. The multi-religious dialogues centered geographically and culturally on China and the Indian subcontinent; and 4-5. Multi-religious North American and European dialogues between the religious traditions long held in these regions and those of new immigrants. This paper recommends three additional issue dialogues among religious leaders as particularly promising prospects for integrating the international system: [1] On human rights and shared sovereignty; [2] On structuring webs of global understanding and cooperation; and [3] On restructuring the world economy, including global business ethics.

The recent political and economic advances of China and India, and their changing relationships to each other and to the rest of the world, constitute the most crucial long term national adjustments necessary in the current international system. The new relationship between Beijing and New Delhi, and the relations between these capitals and other states, international organizations, and other global actors will continue to have greater and greater significance in the development of the twenty-first-century political, economic, military, and communication systems. The Chinese and Indian national interreligious dialogues will also, quite naturally, increasingly influence future world developments. Religion and globalization thus exhibit both codependence and codetermination in these two crucial cases. World religious traditions, Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, and Marxist, continue to influence each other globally, and especially in Asia, while remaining very distinct in their basic ideologies and organizations.

In linking these political and economic changes to interreligious dialogue, this paper employs the theoretical framework of *Religion and Politics in the International System Today*.<sup>1</sup> That book proposed an international paradigm of the political, economic, military, and communication interlinked global systems interacting with religious-political events at the individual, local, national, regional, and global levels. Religion, however, does not constitute a global system like the above four because of the uniqueness of the various faith traditions. Indeed, the collective noun “religion” tells us very little politically, economically, or even religiously, so we have to pay close attention to the special characteristics of each religious tradition in its various local, national, and regional manifestations. The four global systems,

on the other hand, are each tied together by common realities, e.g., international bureaucracy and law; the global exchange of currency, products, and workers; offensive and defensive capabilities; and media penetration, for example, by satellite and Internet.

This theoretical approach is presupposed, but it is not the topic of this paper. Rather, the paper seeks to pursue contemporary policy analysis in focusing on the current political and economic roles of China and India in international affairs, hoping to generate recommendations for interreligious dialogue that reflect the specific characteristics of each religion at the global level and in its Chinese and Indian contexts. Religion does not exist to serve politics and economics, but it does exist within specific political and economic contexts. In the Catholic tradition, then, this paper is an attempt to understand what Vatican Council II called “the Signs of the Times.” As such, the paper is divided into five sections: 1. Global Affairs; 2. China; 3. India; 4. Sino-Indian Relations within the International System; and 5. Recommendations for Interreligious Dialogue. In each section the paper will first discuss the contemporary political, economic, military, and communication systems and their interaction. Then it will describe the major characteristics of religion in these contexts. Recommendations will be saved for the last section of the paper. Each recommendation, of course, carries its own opportunity costs. Each time a religious person or institution decides to undertake some task, it decides not to do something else. Listeners who point out theoretical and/or factual considerations that would have been more helpful in deciding which dialogues to pursue will be very much appreciated. The basic orientation of the paper remains: How would interreligious dialogue be best organized to achieve the optimal mutual cooperation to pursue human rights in the political system; growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability in the economic system; order and peace in the military system, and healthy personal and social identities in the communication system? This paper attempts to present contemporary global analysis in a balanced way so that certain issues become more significant. The author believes that in the twenty-first century the most significant issues can only be solved by multilateral cooperation in the international system. Beijing, New Delhi, Brussels, and Washington are all in the same boat.

## **I. GLOBAL AFFAIRS**

### **A. Political**

The first challenge in global political analysis is to describe the global system itself with its various types of organizations. Certainly, the Westphalian sovereign nation state remains the principal actor. However, the twentieth century witnessed the progressive rise of international, intergovernmental, non-governmental and transnational organizations, all of which interact with that nation state. Sassen described these changes in her prescient lectures *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*<sup>2</sup> which employed immigration<sup>3</sup> as their primary case. As Sassen points out, renationalization of politics and state control of borders has run straight into transnationalization of economic spaces and human rights regimes. Both territoriality and sovereignty have thus lost some of their former underpinnings. This paper will follow Sassen’s analysis in employing economic relations and human rights as two focal issues. In both International Business Law and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, Western approaches have so far received the most emphasis, but this is changing as a result of recent U.S. and E.U. comparative economic decline and the successes of China and India.

From the perspective of nation states, the post-Cold War world combines a reduced singular leadership role for the United States with the rise of previously middle-level powers like China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, Iran, Turkey, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea. The European Union, Japan, and Russia continue to play the major roles that they had achieved by the end of the 1960s. At the United Nations, the Big Five maintain their veto power in the Security Council, thus strengthening their national interests, with both the Secretary General<sup>4</sup> and the General Assembly more important in “soft” public opinion than in “hard” power politics. The West continues to control international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Zakaria<sup>5</sup> described the current global system as “The Rise of the Rest.”

The election of Barack Obama gave the U.S. “a new start” in repairing its leadership role, but it is doubtful that the world will ever again be such a small pond that it has only one big superpower frog as in the immediate post-World War II period and in the immediate post-Cold War period. Decreased national state power through increased international regulation on issues like human rights, the global economy, the environment, and nuclear proliferation remains a more likely long term scenario, but mature regulatory systems will probably not evolve until from fifty to one hundred years from now after some, hopefully not definitively destructive, crisis. The current downturn opens the way for both chaos and significant progress in the global economic system. As the Chinese character for “crisis” expresses, all crises remain both dangers and opportunities.

## **B. Economic**

Zakaria was writing before the recent global financial meltdown. Especially since this event, the role of world economic leadership is passing from the Group of Eight to the broader-based Group of Twenty. There are just too many crucial economic interests to be covered by the G8 and the debacle happened on their watch. The major issues to be solved involve restructuring the global economic system for both growth and environmental sustainability while increasing the welfare of the poorest, especially in those countries termed “the Bottom Billion.”<sup>6</sup>

## **C. Military**

The contemporary military system exhibits the biggest changes since the structured tension of the Cold War. With less political-military control from Moscow and Washington, nuclear proliferation has developed into a bigger concern, conventional and civil wars abound, and non-state terrorism has become a significant challenge for all. Military crises proliferate across the system with few organizing principles other than the projection of force. Only the United States can project force worldwide, but even Washington cannot afford two full-scale conflicts at the same time. The world economic crisis means that much less money will be available for both military buildups and peace initiatives, for example, on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The economic downturn also adds significant stress in most developing countries. It is not a pleasant view, except that the economic system may

starve some military initiatives, even as it adds to the temptation to initiate them.

Recommendations come from organizations as diverse as the United Nations Security Council and the Stockholm Peace Institute. All religious traditions have certainly added to such conflicts, as demonstrated by Juergensmeyer.<sup>7</sup> Why not aim to keep interreligious dialogue separate from military and peace issues? Wouldn't the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be easier to solve without religion? This paper treats John Lennon's "and no religion too" future as impossible, and unwise since attempting it would leave religion and conflict to just those forces that would be most negative. The paper thus follows conflict resolution specialist Marc Gopin,<sup>8</sup> who shows that a lack of grassroots understanding between Israeli and Palestinian leaders did not give them the necessary political space to make the hard compromises during the Oslo Process. On the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the lack of inclusion of the North-West Frontier Province's religious coalition, the MMA, between 2002 and 2007 hurt U.S. policy and the prospects for peace in the region.<sup>9</sup> Elsewhere I have written of the positive impact of the United States Catholic Bishops letter, *The Challenge of Peace*, during the early 1980s Reagan military buildup.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, most global conflict situations could be positively influenced by the expanding webs of trust advocated in the political section of this paper.

#### D. Communication

The "new media" of satellite television and the Internet offer both political advantages and disadvantages. Control of these new media remains problematic for national states, thus increasing public access to heretical political ideas and organizational support for human rights. But governments can also use the new media to control their publics and foster extreme nationalism, thus strengthening the state. The new world of instantaneous communication makes possible the new global economic system with millions of programmed trades happening across the world at the same time. However, the same system challenges national state control of this system, a point made strongly by Sassen.

The global communication system, like religion, can contribute to greater understanding and/or to greater conflict. Nationalism seeks to demonize the other, whether that other is defined by nationality, religion, class, or caste. Times of economic stress like the current economic crisis remain particularly dangerous in this regard. The unemployed always look for scapegoats to explain their suffering. When their political legitimacy is questioned, national governments are sorely tempted to shift blame to "the stranger." The European Union, especially countries like Italy and Russia, currently face major challenges in this regard. Grassroots Christian-Islamic relations, as in those fostered by Rome's Sant'Egidio NGO,<sup>11</sup> can play a vital role in limiting the damage.

#### E. Religion

The global population in 2010 will be divided into approximately 86.5% religious adherents and 13.5% agnostics and atheists. The four largest religions will be Christianity (33.5%), Islam (21.5%), Hinduism (13.4%), and Buddhism (5.8%).<sup>12</sup> Christianity (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism) and Islam (Shia, Sufi, Sunni) exhibit significant religious and political divisions. In terms of the global system, religion remains important at the international, regional, national, local, and indi-

vidual levels. Examples of such influence at these respective levels would be the global Christian-Muslim dialogue,<sup>13</sup> the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Tibetan autonomy, public security in Baghdad, and the political roles of Ali al-Sistani, Desmond Tutu, Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama, and Benedict XVI. From the foregoing examples it is obvious that the various levels affect each other.

## **II. CHINA**

The first thing to notice about any global analysis of China is that its East Asian context, especially Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, remains much more globally influential than India's deteriorating South Asian context of Afghanistan, Pakistan,<sup>14</sup> Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. So we must pay close attention to East Asia as a whole as we analyze China. In many ways the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen is tied more closely to Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul, and even the gigantic port of Long Beach, California, than to the villages of rural Gansu. Despite historical connections, however, religion has played a different role in Japan than it has in China. Reischauer has described how Japanese society has been influenced by neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, the postwar new religions, and Christianity, but only in a limited manner.<sup>15</sup> Only one-fourth of today's Japanese consider themselves religious, and only four percent regularly visit a shrine, temple, or church.<sup>16</sup> Japan remains a global economic pillar, but it still has not found the recipe for a return to sustained growth. The greatest danger to global peace in the case of Japan would be the resurgence of Japanese nationalism tied to a military crisis on the Korean peninsula. The Japanese Catholic bishops and many others have opposed prime ministers visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Those visits anger people and governments throughout Asia. Japan's degree of nationalism makes a potential difference militarily, of course, because Japan could "go nuclear" with the technologies already present in its civilian power and space programs. North Korean nuclear and missile testing worries Japan more than any other country.

South Korea (ROK) constitutes one of the postwar world's great political and economic success stories, along with the European Union. The ROK and Taiwan democratized peacefully at the end of the 1980s, and both have become economic powerhouses. Both Buddhists and Christians have played a significant role in democratization in both countries and in the partial reconciliation of the South with North Korea. Seoul's Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou Hwan<sup>17</sup> was the most prominent expressive leader of the decade's democracy campaign and Catholic President Kim Dae Jong won the Nobel Peace Prize for his opening to the North. Korean Christianity continues to flourish, and the country is the world's second largest source of Christian missionaries. Korea has always perceived itself politically and culturally between its more powerful Chinese and Japanese neighbors, and thus can continue to serve as the mediator between Beijing and Tokyo. The ROK also continues its discussions and joint projects with North Korea. The East Asian context is important globally, and China is the major rising power.

### **A. Political**

From the political perspective, how will the Chinese Communist Party manage its transition to the next stage of political development, finding a new source for a stable political legitimacy? Hu Jintao and the Politburo Standing Committee are



correct in judging that such legitimacy depends first and foremost on implementing a “scientific development concept,” which includes a “harmonious socialism” that will narrow the significant socio-economic gap between the urban and rural sectors of the country. This urban-rural gap reinforces the increasing social stratification between those middle-class citizens who have benefited from Deng Xiaoping’s modernization and those who have been left behind in areas like rural Henan, which are poor in all ways.<sup>18</sup> Since the demise of Maoist ideology, roughly from the death of Lin Biao in a plane crash in September 1971, the country has modernized despite a spiritual vacuum which no party-sponsored ideological campaign<sup>19</sup> has been able to address. China has thus recently witnessed a great expansion of all types of religious activity that has attempted to fill the ideological void. But the success of the government’s approach will paradoxically and simultaneously demand greater central control of the regions and more local acceptance of individual sacrifice in terms of some overarching ideology, especially with the recent economic downturn. Those who follow the often passionate arguments in cyberspace know that elite Chinese students still feel their national responsibility, but there is certainly no consensus about the nature of that responsibility.

### **B. Economic**

The great economic challenge for China is to continue economic growth while narrowing social stratification and improving the environment. The circumstances of the “floating population” of the cities remain dire, especially with recent layoffs and particularly in rust belt areas like Manchuria and Sichuan. At the global level, economic expansion requires that the country ensure its resource bases in countries and regions like Australia and the Middle East. As the PRC becomes more and more active in international economic affairs, NGOs can be helpful in assisting the Chinese to find their equilibrium in the global economic system and in international civil society. In this, a strong Chinese presence in economic supranational and non-governmental organizations would be a good start. Chinese business interests already exhibit concerns about whether or not a global consensus on right economic behavior and business ethics might allow Chinese multinationals to take “their rightful place” in the international political and economic systems.

### **C. Military**

The PLA remains a basically regional army, with the focal issue being Taiwan.<sup>20</sup> However, the resources for global military projection could be available in future years if the global situation turns ugly or China is threatened in its above economic resource bases. Whether or not China embraces a strong military posture also depends on the degree to which the country adopts a strong nationalism as its state-sponsored ideology.<sup>21</sup> To keep its options open for force projection, it has continued its naval buildup, even considering constructing its first aircraft carrier.<sup>22</sup> Force projection will also become more important for protest supply lines for raw materials and access to markets across the globe.

### **D. Communication**

For the Chinese, the modern communication system facilitates economic growth and political control. It can also be an instrument of foreign policy, so Chi-

na is considering new global network initiatives, a la the Al-Jazeera 24-hour news channel, from state and party owned or sponsored outlets like CCTV, Xinhua, the People's Daily, and the Shanghai Media Group.<sup>23</sup> However, international outlets would have to be less heavy-handed to gain viewership, and domestic ones can enable entrepreneurs and activists to evade government scrutiny, e.g., the circulation of Charter '08 on the Internet. Dissident groups like the Falun Gong also used these media to transmit their messages.

### **E. Religion**

Accurate numbers on Chinese believers are notoriously hard to ascertain, both because of traditional government regulation and because Chinese have traditionally viewed as natural combining aspects of various religions in their practice. There is a consensus, however, that since the above demise of ideological support for Maoist Marxism, many religious traditions have spread into the vacuum. The government maintains its traditional system of penetrating, regulating, and controlling all religious institutions.<sup>24</sup> Believers must belong to the government-approved organization or face pressure, even persecution. Han Buddhism fits this general dynamic, but both Tibetan Buddhism<sup>25</sup> and Islam in Xinjiang Province remain nationality issues for the Chinese government. The party has responded to protests in both cases by toughening its policy.

The Chinese state has always only tolerated those religious organizations which allow their institutions to be penetrated, regulated, and controlled by the state.<sup>26</sup> So Chinese State-Catholic Church negotiations over the naming of bishops or other leaders generates religious-political tensions analogous to the investiture controversies of the Middle Ages. And prior persecutions, for example, during the Cultural Revolution, have caused splits in some areas between those Catholics allied with Rome and those allied with Beijing, leading to great local variation. The Vatican has urged reconciliation among all Catholics, and hopes eventually to reach an understanding with the government. But the traditional Confucian state suspicion of independent religions remains strong.

## **III. INDIA**

### **A. Political**

The primary political challenge in India is nation-building, constructing state legitimacy among the world's most culturally diverse nation with its twenty-two official languages. Following independence from Britain, the victorious Congress Party, led by Jawaharlal Nehru ("secularism, socialism, and democracy") and his family, served that role.<sup>27</sup> Since 1989, India has been led by coalition governments in which the spoils of rule have been more important than ideological orientation. The parliamentary system of the world's largest democracy remains the world's most culturally diverse, with the same voter possibly casting her vote on the basis of Congress's dynastic secularism, religion, caste, class, or region. Analysis of the role of Hinduism in Indian identity, and its relation to minority traditions, thus takes political precedence. In the 2009 national election the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) came within ten seats of a majority. Congress itself won 205 seats, with the BJP dropping from 138 to 116 seats. But the election was even a more dismal failure for the leftist Third Front, which had set itself up to be a "king-

maker” between the two major coalitions.<sup>28</sup> Even with the victory of Congress and the return of Singh as Prime Minister, the result will continue to be a coalition of many parties.<sup>29</sup>

### **B. Economic**

In 1991, Prime Minister N. Rao, supported by his then finance minister and now prime minister, the Sikh economist Manmohan Singh, responded to the country’s grave economic crisis by opening the national economy to the world market. Thus began the Indian economic miracle just over ten years after China’s opening. The results have been similar. India, like China, must figure out how to maintain economic growth while taking care of its grievous social stratification, particularly between the urban and rural areas, and environmental damage. India’s partial “fiscal shield” against the global economy has proved an advantage in the recent downturn.<sup>30</sup> Instead of the growing independent protests throughout the Chinese countryside, India faces a significant Naxalite Marxist revolt which has affected as many as 172 of the nation’s 600 districts.

### **C. Military**

In 1998 both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, setting off increased bilateral tension which nearly resulted in a major war during the Kargil conflict of 1999. Pakistan remains the major focus of the Indian military buildup, and vice-versa. The November 2008 attack on Mumbai has also added to Indo-Pakistani tensions. India, like China, is beginning to acquire the hardware and software to project its military muscle, at least far enough to protect their lines of resource supply, and to fight Pakistan if necessary. India, of course, has a long history of political and military ties to Russia and Iran in addition to a recent rapprochement with the United States.

### **D. Communication**

Cell phones and satellite television are necessary for India’s integration into the world economic system, especially as India leads the world global service sector, but these media are also being used for beneficent social goals like attacking rural poverty and the spread of AIDs. The Indian communication system uses many more languages than China, and the parliamentary system of government means that the central authorities do not have authoritarian China’s option of tightly controlling their use.

### **E. Religion**

The last 2001 Census reported the country as 80.5% Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, and 1.8% Other. Hinduism, however, remains extraordinarily diffuse,<sup>31</sup> so the battle for the interpretation of the Hindu tradition makes the major political and economic differences.<sup>32</sup> A linked issue is Hindu-Muslim relations, especially the definition of the role of Hinduism in the national culture, and the role of Islamic shari’a in the legal framework for Muslims. Since partition in 1947, religious riots have been staples of political and social conflicts.<sup>33</sup>

#### **IV. SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

##### **A. Political**

From the political perspective, both Beijing and New Delhi face enormous strains in fostering state political legitimacy while solving basic economic issues of growth, equity, and the environment. In both countries, increasing economic stratification has placed enormous political pressures on the unity of the national states as expressed by their respective parties and governments. Both civic-political and socio-economic rights remain at risk, whether from government security forces in China, or from rampaging religious mobs in India. From the bilateral Sino-Indian perspective, both governments will increasingly compete for scarce global resources, but they desperately need good relations with each other and their other neighbors to attain the domestic stability necessary for the above political-economic progress. The global economic debacle has demonstrated the importance of the United States market for both Chinese consumer goods and Indian business services. The difficult geographical conflicts of Tibet and Kashmir might get ameliorated under more creative national and global approaches to the issue of sovereignty. Strong religious traditions, present in both cases, predispose the populations to accept such shared sovereignty. If a people have already adjusted to different types of authority, it is easier to accept the division of any one type of authority.

##### **B. Economic**

At the global economic level, both countries will rightly play expanded roles in the new regulatory fiscal architecture. In fact, both countries have done better than others in the current downturn. While their GDPs per capita may remain modest, the overall size of the two economies will demand major seats at the table for world decision making. There is plenty of work to be done in this area. The United States, Chinese, and Indian business communities have all suffered major corruption scandals recently, from U.S. real estate loans and investment banking to Chinese tainted milk and pollution damage to accounting fraud from one of India's largest outsourcing firms. Solving global and national economic problems is the most serious challenge, and this is the global ethical dialogue with the greatest untapped interest in all three countries.

##### **C. Military**

Here is the sphere most influenced by regional events and global alliances, like the recently improved Indo-American ties. Absent national political victories of hard line nationalism, Chinese and Indian military buildups should reflect rational calculations about global threats and opportunities. A more successful amelioration of global political and economic threats from nuclear proliferation, conventional wars, and terrorism will allow the two countries to save significant resources for their economic agendas which remain more crucial to state political legitimacy. Each country has its own regional military obsessions along its border, but a rational calculation would only demand that their army be strong enough to prevent change, not impose their will. For example, as long as Taiwan does not declare its independence and Kashmir or terrorism like the Mumbai attack does not explode Indo-Pakistani relations, the military system should not preempt national political and economic affairs.

#### **D. Communication**

While the technology is very similar, the political, economic, and religious aspects of the communication revolution are unique to each country. Media remain important to both political and economic issues, but the characteristics of their significance are different in China and India. At the global level, the principal communication threats come from the economic-communication issues out of the developed world and military-communication issues out of the developing world.

#### **E. RELIGION**

##### **Religion:**

The respective most politically powerful religious traditions, state Confucian Marxism and Hinduism, constitute very different forms of religion, in China a religion of public life (Confucianism, Maoism) and in India a religion of meditative experience (Hinduism, Buddhism). If we think about interreligious dialogue among China, India, the European Union, and the United States, we must add a third type, religions of the book (Christianity, Islam, Judaism). The differences in the three religious types means that it will be extremely difficult to use any understanding of religion in itself as the focal piece for such dialogue. Such discussions are possible, e.g. in the Parliament of World Religions, but they tend to be diffuse because of the very different nature of different types of religions. In terms of this general international interfaith dialogue, German ecumenical theologian Hans Küng<sup>34</sup> has sketched out a worthwhile approach based on four common ethical principles of respect for life, honest and fair dealing, speaking truthfully, and respecting and loving one another.

But not all interreligious dialogue should be global and/or include all the various religious traditions. In terms of the political importance of more limited geographically interreligious dialogue, Religion and Politics identified the following five in this order: 1. among religions of the book, focusing on the relationship between the developed and the developing worlds; 2-3. the multi-religious dialogues centered geographically and culturally on China<sup>35</sup> and the Indian subcontinent;<sup>36</sup> and 4-5. multi-religious North American and European dialogues between the religious traditions long held in these regions and those of new immigrants.

In between the general world interreligious dialogue and the five above more limited ones, the fifth section of this paper will propose an additional two global political and one global economic dialogue based on Chinese and Indian expansions in the global systems. These latter dialogues would interact with the five more localized ones and the one international one (see accompanying chart). Interreligious dialogue works much better if the participants are focused on a common problem, not just the commonalities and differences among their religious traditions in themselves. Religious groups can contribute four special types of expertise on political and economic issues: in relating rights and responsibilities; in limiting extreme nationalism and war; in maintaining dialogue in both favorable and unfavorable circumstances; and in building grassroots support at the local level. Common problems also foster full participation by the non-religious 13.5% of the world's population.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THREE GLOBAL INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUES

Based on the above analysis of China and India and their current role in the global political and economic systems, this paper recommends three additional issue dialogues among religious leaders as particularly promising prospects: 1. on human rights and shared sovereignty; 2. on structuring webs of global understanding and cooperation; and 3. on restructuring the world economic architecture, including global business ethics. Successes and failures at all three levels of interreligious dialogues (global, global issue, and regional) affect each other. For example, the amelioration of immigration issues in North America fosters confidence-building in the global economic dialogue and even partial successes in any of these regional and global issue dialogues make it possible for the leaders of very different traditions to see each others as brothers and sisters at the most general international conference.

### A. Shared Sovereignty and Human Rights

If we start with the current global crises points like Kashmir, Taiwan, Tibet, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ameliorated ones like Northern Ireland and German-French relations in the twentieth century, it is obvious that no even moderately peaceful solutions to such crises are possible without developing some common notions of shared sovereignty and human rights. The extreme nationalism of Westphalia no longer works. Such discussions of shared sovereignty and human rights also have the advantage of quickly relating to religious questions of “ultimate concern,” (what types of rights adhere in what levels of political sovereignty? Which rights and responsibilities belong to individuals?), thus introducing the very essence of the various religious traditions.<sup>37</sup> What contributions would Chinese and Indian religious thought have to such a discussion?

On human rights, Chinese credibility would be strengthened by progress on Tibet and some internal democratization. Henry Rosemont suggests that China can approach such issues without using Western human rights language.<sup>38</sup> Rather, a Confucian perspective might start with the criterion that groups should be evaluated by their record on enabling personal growth and by focusing on societal relationships, not individual moral judgments. The right of petition, which began in the Ming dynasty, still exists, but a whole apparatus has grown up around blunting its use.<sup>39</sup> In the case of India, Nehru’s secular socialism proved insufficient. The crux lies in the strengthening of Gandhi’s pluralistic approach to ethics and religion in general rather than focus on the Hindutva tradition. Hindu-Muslim, Hindu-Christian, and Hindu-Sikh relations will always serve as special human rights markers in Indian society. The world’s largest democracy also constitutes its most challenging multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multilingual context. This first politically-based global issue dialogue would draw on the specifically Chinese and Indian cultural and societal ones above, and on the immigration relationships in the United States and the European Union.

The Chinese and Indian dialogues will depend on progress toward an international climate that enables Beijing and New Delhi to strengthen national legitimacies while recognizing the just demands of other societal levels, from individual rights and responsibilities to global concerns like immigration and the environment. No common progress on questions of shared sovereignty means

little progress on global human rights. Given positive international changes, both the Chinese and the Indians could then provide expanded leadership in religious dialogue from the Chinese and Indian perspectives. Both nations offer pluralistic religious backgrounds and a long history of developing religious thought.

There are multiple human rights issues that could receive global attention. Recommendations for short term (one year), middle term (three-five years) and long term (ten years) global emphases should be sought from Human Rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.<sup>40</sup> Then a council of twelve personages (six religious leaders with extensive political experience, e.g., Bishop Tutu, and six political leaders with extensive ethical experience, e.g., Mary Robinson) could meet at least every six months to articulate short, medium, and long term goals according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>41</sup> Part of this global dialogue will be recommendations about the gradual restructuring of postwar international institutions like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund to reflect current realities.<sup>42</sup>

## **B. Structuring Global Understanding and Cooperation**

At the regional level, the world needs new pathways for alliance linkage, both within and among regions, to replace the Cold War bipolar system. It is useless to call for international action in world politics if there are not the “grassroots” inter-country alliances and confidence-building measures to support global cooperation. Without such bi-national and multi-national “webs of trust,” the global political dynamic ends up as the shifting relationships of the nearly two hundred disparate nations in the U.N. General Assembly, each pursuing its own independent national agenda by fleeting alliances of convenience.<sup>43</sup> Even if only some nations constitute the most significant military and economic influences, such a “pan of sand” (Sun Yat-sen on Chinese society) continues to send us back to the period preceding World War I, only with twenty-first-century weapons and economies. The United Nations, while it has a special world legitimating function, remains too large and too diffuse to structure global political cooperation. My proposal is to bring together an Asian dialogue as a counterpoint to the Atlantic alliance, the cooperative relationship of the United States and Europe. Southeast Asia would serve as the indispensable locus of dialogue for both the creation of the Asian pole and for its interreligious dialogue with the West. This paper will first discuss the Atlantic alliance and then the Asian dialogue.

Despite recent Euro-zone economic difficulties, the great political-economic success story of the last fifty years in regard to trust and cooperation among nations is the formation of the European Union. The current global situation, however, requires “deeper” and “broader” E.U. links with North America and with the “Big Three” E.U. outsiders, Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine. That’s what made Benedict XVI’s trips to Turkey (November 2006) and to Cyprus (June 2010), both focused on dialogue with Orthodoxy and Islam, so important.<sup>44</sup> Europe faces extraordinary internal and external linked challenges in bringing together traditionally secular [laïcité], Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim political cultures, and keeping the resulting relationships linked to the United States. Ironically and maybe helpfully for Turkish accession, laïcité is a both a French and a Turkish state value. To appreciate the internal challenges of these cultural dialogues in an

extreme case, one can read the Dutch reporter Ian Buruma's book on the murder of provocative movie maker Theo van Gogh, which explores the Dutch social dynamic and asks whether orthodox Muslims can integrate into this very secular culture. Buruma adopts an affirmative response, identified with Amsterdam Jewish mayor Job Cohen, in stating that the mayor "should be given the benefit of the doubt." In addition, Buruma states, "it is hard to see how an official attack on the Muslim faith would help to solve this problem."<sup>45</sup> The only possible solution to the European Union's major political issues, however long it takes because of the current downturn, also involves Ankara, Moscow, Kiev, and Washington. And would not such a comprehensive vision help inspire the next generation of European youth to make their contribution to global peace and justice? Communities can only build internal strength with visions that include external vocations.

There is no substitute, therefore, for this first Atlantic pole of influence in restructuring global dialogue. And any successful coming together within this geographical area will necessitate religious dialogue among the above secularists, Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Such dialogue can be categorized at four levels: the dialogue of life, the dialogue of action, the dialogue of religious experience, and the dialogue of theological and philosophical exchange. All four types of dialogue, those of the people, of the activists, of the religious adepts, and of the theologians and the philosophers, build upon each other.<sup>46</sup>

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Asia constitutes the principal expanding power center in global politics. China, Japan, and India should all have their seats on the Security Council, and the Republic of Korea constitutes a most important country for global mediation. It is no accident that the ex-ROK foreign minister has been chosen as U.N. Secretary General. The rising economic, military, and political power of Asia, however, does not automatically explain how such a diverse continent could come together to form a second pole for global political dialogue. Japan, for example, tried to build its Co-Prosperity Sphere on military might and still suffers from regional suspicion on that account. Certainly, the antagonistic Asian regional history of the first half of the twentieth century has proven more difficult to overcome than the European one. But as iron and steel helped to bind the European Union, economic interchange has increased in East Asia, and with the ASEAN countries.<sup>47</sup> One aspect missing is some greater ideological approach like that of Christian Democracy in postwar Europe. A multi-layered dialogue among the region's religious traditions might help to fill that need.

When looking at East Asia as a whole, the principal interfaith dialogue would focus on the dynamic between Confucian-Marxist state ideologies and Buddhist-Taoist-Christian local practice. The minority East Asian Catholic Church<sup>48</sup> can employ the comparative advantages of its minority, less powerful status to engage both groups. Korean Christianity remains central to this dialogue, with Taiwan's engaged Buddhist<sup>49</sup> and longtime Presbyterian traditions extremely important. With such a pursuit of common values in the service of humanity, East Asia can take a spiritual and ethical role in the global system that begins to match its political and economic one.

For the Indian subcontinent, Christianity, like Buddhism, plays a minority broker's role in the predominant Hindu-Muslim dialogue. Within India, as in Japan,<sup>50</sup> the Catholic Church<sup>51</sup> has been active in opposing religious cultural nationalism



and working for social justice. In India this religious nationalism is concentrated in the more conservative sectors of the Indian political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which occupied the prime minister's position from 1998 to 2004.<sup>52</sup> The Japanese Yasukuni Shrine is matched as a national flashpoint by the Ayodhya mosque which was demolished in 1992 and remains a stumbling block today. Although a tiny minority, Catholics have served at high levels of government, for example, the first dalit president, K.R. Narayanan.

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, unites ten countries, but six are especially suitable for interfaith dialogue: Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Human Development Index lists them as one high and five medium human development countries, with the lowest, Indonesia, twenty-five places above the low human development category. Medium human development constitutes an advantage for dialogue, as do more than two religions. ASEAN nations include significant religious representation from Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana; Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant; Confucianism; Hinduism; Islam, Sunni, Shia, and Sufi; and Marxism. Just three of these countries, Indonesia (Muslim majority, Christian minority), the Philippines (Catholic majority, Muslim minority), and Vietnam (Marxism, Buddhism, Catholicism) are projected to have 440 million population between them in less than ten years. ASEAN nations thus remain extraordinarily significant globally in terms of themselves politically and economically and in terms of their potential contribution to interfaith dialogue and world peace. Finally, East Asian and South Asian economic development means that both Atlantic and Asian poles will affect the rest of the world, Latin America, Africa, and West and Central Asia. The Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences covers this entire Asian area, so it is a very fine location for Catholic initiatives within the region and toward the Atlantic pole. Australia and New Zealand are also natural cultural bridges between the two poles. Mutual understanding is helped by recent Chinese moves to improve their relations with both India and Russia.<sup>53</sup>

Religious dialogue is already a shared project of both Muslims<sup>54</sup> and Catholics in Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, in August 2003 more than one hundred ulama, bishops, and Protestant ministers met in Pasay City under the sponsorship of the Bishops-Ulama Conference of the Philippines. The final declaration stated that "our faiths, Islam and Christianity, are religions of peace which worship the One Merciful and Almighty God."<sup>55</sup> Peace building was the focus of a similar meeting in the southern Philippines in 2006.<sup>56</sup> Cardinal Julius Darmaatmadja of Jakarta has praised the anti-corruption campaign of the two giant Indonesian Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.<sup>57</sup>

Focusing on the Atlantic and Asian poles to structure global society does not mean devaluing Latin America, Africa, and West and Central Asia. The three areas include vibrant concentrations of Christians (Central and Southern Africa, Latin America) and Muslims (North Africa, West and Central Asia), underlining the significance of interfaith dialogue and North-South connections between both religions. Success in the linking of the Atlantic and Asian poles will naturally strengthen these areas in global society as they link them more tightly to the two poles and to their own regional organizations like the Organization of American States and the African Union. Furthermore, any reform of the U.N. Security Council should

provide for these three areas guaranteed seats. Leaders from these countries will continue to receive disproportionate numbers of the highest international leadership positions, as in the cases of, for example, Secretary General and elder Kofi Annan and martyr Sergio Vieira de Mello. For Christianity and Islam, the world's plurality religions, these areas combine the principal ethical challenge of addressing social justice within the global economy with religious evangelization of their organizations. Christians and Muslims throughout the world should constitute significant sources of aid to their fellow religious in all these areas, and the linking of the areas should foster global religious tolerance.

### **C. Restructuring the Global Economic System and Business Ethics**

Recent economic events have convinced many that a new world economic architecture is needed, both in terms of a new regulatory structure and in terms of a global business code. The current global economic system exhibits a great deficit of credit and trust, growing socio-economic stratification, and increasing environmental damage. From the religious perspective, then, economic dialogue should foster the triple goals of growth, social justice, and environmental preservation.

Focusing on a new and fairer regulatory structure and a global business ethical code would also have the advantage of bringing together all the relevant global stakeholders: national states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and transnational organizations like multinationals and churches. The religious and ethical dialogue on these issues, however, could start with a working group of American, European, Chinese, and Indian church leaders, business association leaders, religious ethicists, and academics with connections parallel to the above developing political dialogue between the Atlantic and Asian poles and the above discussions at the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and other international and intergovernmental organizations on restructuring their institutions.

The most crucial bilateral tie in the world economic system is between China and the United States, called "Chimerica" by Niall Ferguson.<sup>58</sup> The long term co-dependency of Beijing and Washington led to massive imbalances in the global system, but no one wanted to question the arrangement when it seemed to benefit both parties. China attained strong export growth and financial stability. The United States received cheap imports, thus keeping down inflation, and low-cost loans to stoke its economic expansion. Those critics who questioned the relationship were told that the huge trade imbalances would naturally even out over time. The economic situation was made even worse by the contrasting ideological proclivities on each side. The Chinese dedicated their authoritarian party control to focus single-mindedly on export growth which seemed the principal guarantee of political stability. United States economic administrators professed a nearly blind faith in the market which would somehow correct all mistakes. Beijing and Washington remain joined at the hip, but adjustments will have to be made slowly or greater damage will befall both countries. The U.S. will continue to need Chinese financing for its deficits and stimulus packages and the Chinese economy has already been hurt by the U.S. downturn, but it would be hurt more grievously by an American economic collapse. If Chinese and American leaders ever were in a situation of mutual dependence, it is now. These two countries have to lead the re-

structuring of the global economy, with strong representation from India, Europe, Japan, and the other members of the Group of Twenty.

This is not just a question of aggregate GDP growth, but also of social equity and of environmental sustainability. None of the three questions get solved without progress on all three. On the growth issue, nations tend to be important in relation to their aggregate domestic output. On the question of social equity, China, India, and Brazil, especially under Lula, all have special perspectives that need to be factored into any solution. The United Nations has already given us a general framework in the Millennium Development Goals.<sup>59</sup> On sustainability, Europe has taken the global lead, but U.S. business in areas like Silicon Valley has started to gear up. And no proposals will be possible without strong participation from developing countries like China, India, and Brazil. While Europe, the United States, and Japan may be able to provide entrepreneurial and technological leadership, success and failure depends on implementation in the developing world. Finally, the cultural challenges to mutual cooperation on the global economy are staggering. It is here that India, the most diverse of all nations, may be able to make its biggest contribution. The success of India in integrating its many peoples, linguistic groups, and religious traditions could be the great demonstration case for the global communication system.

### **CONCLUSION**

Unlike the twenty-four-hour news cycle in the global communication system, interreligious dialogue can maintain stability in the face of constant and instantaneous change. Traditional spirituality and liturgy focus people on things of lasting value which supersede the anger and turmoil of current crises. Interreligious dialogue, therefore, provides a backdrop of stability and personal and societal identity, uniting us with our sisters and brothers in other traditions. If religious leaders, insulated from the 24-hour news cycle and periodic elections, cannot hold constant in their vision of a better world, few other leaders will. Ironically, however, religious leaders serve best precisely by subordinating all political, economic, military, and communication goals to their personal unity with "the Other"<sup>60</sup> and their societal unity with all humankind. What is most striking about the current international order is how closely connected are the successes and the failures in the global political, economic, military, and communication systems and among the various geographic regions. Religious traditions can play a vital role in bridging these divides. Wisdom constitutes making the best possible choices from a multitude of problems and relationships to move the entire world in a positive direction. It is the long term work of all of us and of many generations of our descendants.

### **ENDNOTES**

1. Eric O. Hanson, *Religion and Politics in the International System Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
2. Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
3. *Religion and Politics* is dedicated to late close family friend Padre Pascual Ramirez who left his small village in Michoacán, joined the Mexican Highway Patrol, and eventually became a saintly pastor in California's Oakland Diocese.

4. For religion and UN Secretary Generals, see Kent J. Kille, ed. *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). There are separate chapters on Secretary Generals from Trygve Lie to Kofi Annan.
5. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007).
6. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
7. Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). See also the article in this volume.
8. Marc Gopin, *Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
9. Joshua T. White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier* (Arlington, VA: Center on Faith and International Affairs, 2008).
10. Eric O. Hanson, *The Catholic Church in World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 285-301.
11. R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), especially 155-64.
12. World Christian Database. (Brill, 2007), cited in Todd M. Johnson, "Global Religious Trends: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* (Fall 2008): 43-45. The challenges to adequate data on such religious affiliation, of course, are significant, from the religious desire to hide from unfriendly governments to the simultaneous practice of various religions among single adherents to very different levels of practice. These figures, then, provide only a general approximation. See also the website [www.adherents.com](http://www.adherents.com) for extended discussions of such points.
13. *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* (Winter 2008) devotes the entire issue to "Islam and Pluralism," including a roundtable on the Islamic statement "A Common Word Between Us and You." Drew Christiansen, S.J., "The Context of the 'Common Word,'" pp. 49-52, constitutes a superb explanation of the various structural considerations in pursuing this dialogue.
14. For politics and religion along the Pakistani-Afghan border, see Joshua T. White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier* (Arlington, VA: Center on Faith and International Affairs, 2008).
15. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity* (Cambridge, MA: Belnap, 1988), 203-15.
16. Maria A. Toyoda and Aiji Tanaka, "Religion and Politics in Japan," in Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: the One, the Few, and the Many* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 283.
17. When the beloved Cardinal Kim passed away on February 16, 2009, more than 400,000 people came to pay their last respects. The two Kims, president and cardinal, represented fine national moral leadership.
18. The Chinese leadership knows the gap constitutes a major social problem. When the Central Committee met in October 2006, it emphasized the necessity to take care of the social and environmental damage from breakneck economic growth. *Wall Street Journal*, October 12, 2006. The global downturn, however, has hurt such balancing. See Guoguang Wu, "China in 2009: Muddling through Crises," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January-February 2010): 25-39. The recent economic crisis has also strengthened the crackdown on dissidents like Liu Xiaobo and those associated with the Charter '08. See, for example, *New York Times*, December 24, 2008.
19. For earlier Chinese Marxism as a religious analogy, see C.K. Yang, "Communism as the New Faith," in the classic *Religion in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 378-404.

20. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
21. Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). With China, the great danger is a clash with resurgent Japanese nationalism. For Shinto in the latter, see John K. Nelson, *A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 223-5.
22. *New York Times*, December 24, 2008.
23. *New York Times*, January 15, 2009.
24. Hanson, *Religion and Politics*, p. 111-19. Confucian-Catholic dialogue has a long tradition, beginning with the great Jesuit Matteo Ricci. See, for example, Jonathan Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).
25. For Tibetan opposition at New Years 2009, see *New York Times*, February 26, 2009.
26. For the religious policies of Confucian and Marxist states, see Eric O. Hanson, *Catholic Politics in China and Korea* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1980).
27. See Ranbir Vohra, *The Making of India: A Historical Survey*, 2nd ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 185-216.
28. After the Mumbai attacks, Congress still won in Rajasthan (coalition), Mizoram, and the city-state of Delhi. The BJP won in Gujarat, with the hard line N. Modi returning as Chief Minister, and Chhattisgarh. In India, as in Tip O'Neill's America, all state politics are local. For the April-May 2010 national election, see Shalendra Sharma, "India in 2009: Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival," *Asian Survey* Vol. 50, No. 1 (January-February 2010): 139-56.
29. See Dietmar Rothermund, *India: The Rise of an Asian Giant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
30. *New York Times*, March 2, 2009.
31. Kim Knott, *Hinduism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
32. See the Epilogue in Maria Misna, *Vishnu's Crowded Temple: India since the Great Rebellion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 435-49.
33. For a summary of "riot production systems," (Paul Brass), see Dietmar Rothermund, *India: The Rise of an Asian Giant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 10-13.
34. See, for example, Hans Küng, *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic* (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1991).
35. Nayan Chanda, *Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 113-19, covers the expansion of Buddhism throughout Asia. Also see Chanda's article in this collection.
36. See Francis X. Clooney, S.J., *Hindu God, Christian God: How Reason Helps Break Down the Boundaries between Religions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The book includes a reply, pp. 185-95, by Hindu scholar Parimal G. Patil, Emory University. The exchange is an excellent example of the very different forms of religious traditions.
37. For my discussion of the definition of religion and of politics, see Hanson, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 70-76.
38. Henry Rosemont, Jr., "Civil Society: A Commentary," in Daniel A. Bell, ed., *Confucian Political Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 46-57.
39. *New York Times*, March 9, 2009.
40. Nayan Chanda, *Bound Together* begins his Chapter Four on "Preachers' World" by narrating the Human Rights Watch's intervention on Darfur. His classification as these NGO operatives as "the new missionaries" points to the close relationship between religious and human rights activities. See also his article in this volume.
41. For the discussion of such an international "primary ethical broker," see Hanson, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 321-22.

42. See, for example, analysis by James Traub, author of *The Best of Intentions*, in January 4, 2009 *New York Times*.
43. The author agrees with international relations theorist Scott Thomas that successful international relations require more than enlightened national self-interest. They also require at least the beginnings of a gemeinschaftlich community rooted in a common self-identity. See "The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Changing Nature of International Politics," in Max L. Stackhouse with Diane B. Obenchain, eds., *God and Globalization: Christ and the Dominions of Civilization* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), pp. 110-38.
44. British diplomat Michael Emerson has stated that the European Union must include Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine to attain stability. Michael Emerson, *Redrawing the Map of Europe* (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's, 1998). For the role of the United Kingdom, see Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York: Random House, 2004).
45. Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 246. The Netherlands serves as an excellent test case because of the extreme secularization of the country during the 1960s, an influential Jewish community, and the presence of very different Moroccan and Turkish immigration patterns.
46. For the characterizations of these types of dialogue, see "Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue," Decree Five of the 34th General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, [www.jesuit.org/sections](http://www.jesuit.org/sections).
47. ASEAN, of course, does not have the economic structure of the EU or NAFTA. The Beijing-Tokyo rivalry, the prevalence of bilateral trade agreements, and the regional significance of the United States and European markets weaken larger regional structures. For this paper, however, it should be noted that there do exist at least intermittent negotiations on ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, Korea) and ASEAN plus Six (add India, Australia, New Zealand) agreements, plus other regional arrangements.
48. With the exception of the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam, the size of Catholic populations in this area does not rival Church interests in Africa or Latin America. However, East and South Asian Catholics remain more influential than their numbers in interfaith dialogue and in international politics.
49. See, for example, C. Julia Huang, "The Buddhist Tzu-Chi foundation of Taiwan," in Christopher Queen, Charles Prebish, and Damien Keown, eds., *Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 134-51, and the rest of the collection's articles. The prior volume is Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King, *Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1996).
50. On the modern general challenges to Shinto ethics, see the conclusion of John K. Nelson, *A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), pp. 223-25.
51. Mathew N. Schmalz, "The Indian Church: Catholicism and Indian Nationhood," in Paul Manuel, *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State*, 209-26. Hindu nationalists have sought to portray the Catholic Church as a foreign body. See the above and the Gujarat Jesuit anthropologist Lancy Lobo, *Globalisation, Hindu Nationalism, and Christians in India* (New Delhi: Rawat Publishers, 2002).
52. For the rise of the BJP, see Thjomas Blom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
53. See, for example, "India and China Become Friendlier Rivals," *New York Times*, November 21, 2006. China and Russia have been cooperating on Central Asia in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization.
54. For the spread of Islam into Asia, see Chandra, *Bound Together*, pp. 128-36.
55. *Asian Focus*, August 29, 2003, for the entire text.
56. *Asian Focus*, September 1, 2006.
57. *Asian Focus*, November 21, 2003. For global corruption ratings, see [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org). For the latest Chinese variant, Beijing has recently tightened visa restrictions from South

China to Macao since so many cadres have been caught embezzling funds to gamble in the ex-Portuguese colony. *New York Times*, January 15, 2009.

58. Niall Ferguson, *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World* (New York: Penguin, 2008), pp. 332-40.
59. Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin, 2005). If I could recommend three books on social equity in the world economy, they would be Collier (above), Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). All three authors, plus Thomas Friedman and Paul Krugman, are always worth a reader's time, whether or not they are right on a particular issue, e.g., Friedman's *The World Is Flat* focuses too much on economics and remains too optimistic in places.
60. For this use of "the Other," see Bruce Lawrence, *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 21.

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