Volume XIII: Spring/Summer 2015
Spring/Summer 2015
Article
Using Geospatial Data to Study the Origins of Japan’s Post-Occupation Maritime Boundaries
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Introduction
Despite taking place in a period some fifty years past, and within an early Cold War environment which differs from the current political and security reality of contemporary East Asia, the topic of seizures of fishing vessels by Japan’s neighbors can be highly illustrative when studying current tensions in the region. For example, all three of Japan’s current major territorial disputes have their origins in this era and the politicization of these disputes, including their connection to national identity and nationalism, also arguably first occurred at this time. Other elements of the contemporary disputes over resource management and the limits of territorial sovereignty in the region also have direct roots in this era. Finally, the postwar use of fishermen as proxies, and of paramilitary maritime arms as instruments of the enforcement of territorial claims in the region, likewise begin here.
This competition between Japan and its neighbors over the economically and politically valuable maritime space connected to the contested islets and their fisheries persists. The interplay between the value and costs of such contested resources are complex, as Manicom’s recent study notes.2The complexities surrounding the current confrontations over these contested zones are further revealed by looking at what Paul O’Shea terms the “sovereignty game” existing between Japan and its neighbors, “in which both sides employ various resources and techniques in order to exercise sovereignty over the disputed territory and/or prevent the other state(s) from doing the same.”3 One of these “techniques” is the use of fishing craft as proxies to assert or challenge claims over disputed space. The alleged “cabbage strategy” of the PRC “of consolidating control over disputed islands by wrapping those islands, like the leaves of a cabbage, in successive layers of occupation and protection formed by fishing boats, Chinese Coast Guard ships, and then finally Chinese naval ships” as noted by Ronald O’Rourke, provides interesting and seemingly direct evidence of the use of fishing craft in such a way, albeit in the South China Sea, rather than the East China Sea.4
Whether organized, as the “cabbage strategy” concept implies, or “spontaneous,” i.e., involving fishermen acting independently, competition and confrontation between fishing vessels and their countries’ paramilitary maritime arms certainly form a part of the current contests of control of maritime space in East Asia. Hence any examination of the origins and course of Japan’s present territorial disputes would certainly benefit from further study of the origins of this level of the sovereignty game.
Despite the potential usefulness of fishing vessels in staking/disputing claims, is it important to also note the potential for fisheries to be part of potential solutions to such confrontations. As has been mentioned by Chisako Masuo, joint scientific management of fisheries can result in a de-escalation of confrontation and can act as a route to sustainable and mutually beneficial results.5 A recent example of this potential for co-operation is the 2013 Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement.6Alongside this recent rapprochement, it is important to note that much of the latter half of twentieth century saw relatively peaceful and cooperative relations between Japan and its neighbors over fishing rights, albeit with occasional use of the issue for political ends by all states involved. As noted in this article, the influence of nationalism inside the political discourse of the states, and power politics between the states involved, can derail mutually beneficial arrangements.
Alongside its relevance for today’s tensions, the history of fishing disputes around Japan in the early postwar period also links to wider trends in the historiography of Japan and the region. Increasing in focus among these, as it is in the current scholarship on many regions, is the role of maritime space and maritime affairs. Since Masataka Kosaka’s seminal work on Japan as a maritime state, various studies have looked at Japan as a maritime power and the sea’s influence upon Japanese history and there has been a recent revival in this area of the historiography of modern Japan, offering new and interesting interpretations of Japan and its modern history.7 For example, Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes in relation to the era examined by this paper that the once unified space of movement existing under the Japanese Empire fractured along often imposed ethnic and political lines during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952), especially in relation to the seas around Japan.8 This idea also interweaves with William Tsutsui’s argument that the Japanese Empire can be seen as an oceanic enterprise that was just as focused on maritime space as it was on “terrestrial” space, much in the same way as the British Indian (Ocean) empire is currently viewed by some historians, as noted by Eric Taliacozzo.9
A central element of this “pelagic empire,” as Tsutsui terms it, was the exploitation of maritime resources, especially through fishing. This paper examines the postwar collapse of this “empire,” which occurred much in the same vein as Japan’s “terrestrial” empire, but also the recovery and later expansion of its central agent—fishing craft. These craft and their often hostile interactions with Japan’s neighbors form a lens through which the changes Japan went through in this era can be viewed, and one which gives us a new perspective on modern North East Asia’s territorial disputes.
The study of the revival of the fishing industry and the consequences it had on Japan’s relations with its neighbors also has direct bearing upon interpretations of Occupation era Japan. An initial area of note is that GHQ policy towards the fishing industry seems to directly contradict the now already-questioned “reverse course” narrative, in that with the fishing industry GHQ stressed recovery before reform and that such efforts did not reduce or change direction significantly in the latter Occupation years.10 In contrast, a hybrid approach of revival within constraints (literally with the MacArthur Line in this case) was pursued from the start.
Despite not conforming to some elements of the “reverse course” narrative the revival of the fishing industry did connect to the internal and external Cold Wars confronting Japan, as noted below.11The fishing disputes, especially with the PRC and USSR, did form Cold War frontiers between Japan and its communist neighbors, and the captures themselves also influenced the strengthening of Japan’s maritime security arms and the deployment of US military units to counter potential captures.
A potential further key impact on the historiography here is the influence of Japan’s food security upon broader GHQ policy. As well as helping to maintain the health of the Japanese population, and hence Japan’s political stability, the importance of the revival of the fishing industry, arguably at the expense of Japan’s neighbors, has broader implications for studies of the period. For example, many current studies, notably Kimie Hara’s work, suggest the deliberate lack of clarity on the side of GHQ over the status of key areas of later dispute (the Pinnacle Islands in particular) was motivated by Cold War concerns.12 A potential significant impact of the data presented here could be to support an argument that the emergence of the disputes was equally influenced by the imperative of obtaining additional food for Japan’s malnourished and rapidly expanding population. The pressures of fishing inside a constrained and already over-exploited zone arguably pushed many fishermen into waters claimed (sometimes seemingly subsequently) by Japan’s neighbors, increasing tensions, necessitating a response, and arguably opening play in the sovereignty game.
As well as the potential contributions to the scholarship mentioned above, this paper also takes an original approach to the issues discussed here by linking the emerging trend in maritime history to the use of geospatial data as a tool of analysis and a new form of evidence for historians. By employing archival sources both as documentary evidence and also as a source of geospatial data to map, literally, the limits of the vestigial pelagic empire of Japan, this paper provides an entirely new perspective on this issue. This method provides a more measurable set of data with which to understand the fluid but as yet largely unexamined phenomenon of the capture of Japanese fishing craft. Furthermore, by using the positions of the captures as a method to chart the actual practically enforced limits of the control of the states involved, new insights into the actual behavior of the actors concerned, the limits of their capabilities, and the practical realities of the situation denuded of its surrounding political rhetoric and bluster, can be attempted.
The preceding analysis is presented below, first in an initial section contextualizing the issue of the fishing boat captures in relation to Japan’s pre-war fishing industry, the policy of GHQ, and the position of the Japanese government after 1945. This is followed by a section discussing the geospatial mapping process of the capture data including a commentary on the level of accuracy of the data itself. The article concludes with a final section offering a brief initial analysis of the data’s impact on our understanding of the captures and their influence on Japan’s ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors.
Japanese Fishery Operations before 1945
Japan lies in zone where the cold northern Pacific meets the warm water of the Japan Current.13These conditions allowed Japanese fishermen to productively fish close to shore for millennia and marine products became a central feature of both the Japanese diet and Japanese food culture. In the early modern era expansion of the fisheries and maritime production also offered a way to expand Japan’s resource base, supplementing a terrestrial base restricted by the Edo Bakufu.14With the Meiji Restoration and the adoption of western technology, Japan’s fisheries entered a rapid era of modernization and expansion. Japan’s fisheries rapidly grew sometimes alongside, and sometimes in advance of, empire, both on the high seas and within the coastal waters of other states and territories. Japan’s fishermen ranged far and wide, expanding from their coastal waters to the near seas fringing their newly won empire, and later towards a truly global reach, with fleets sent to fish across the Pacific, southern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf, and Antarctic waters.15
This range and scale of operations has led many to label Japan as “the world’s greatest fishing nation prior to WWII,” although this greatness came at a cost.16 The willingness of Japanese fishermen to use their technological advantage alongside diplomatic and military pressure in waters far from Japan earned them an aggressive and predatory image in the minds of some of the local fishermen they displaced and many in the wider international community.17 As is noted below, this image persisted even after 1945 and contributed to the management of the “MacArthur Line” and GHQ’s broader policy towards the Japanese fishing industry.
With expanding territory on land and a growing domestic population, Japanese fisheries made a significant contribution to feeding the Japanese empire. Around 85 percent of animal protein consumed in Japan in the immediate years before the Second World War came from the approximately 4.5 to 4.8 million metric tons of fish and shellfish caught on average by Japan’s fishermen every year.18 Alongside the production of the home islands and the imports from the empire, this source of protein helped make the Japanese empire theoretically self sufficient in food supply prior to 1941.19
The fishing industry was also a major employer, directly providing work for over 1.5 million people. Around half of these were farmers who engaged in fishing as a secondary or supplementary form of employment, often on a seasonal basis. For example, as John Stephan notes, seasonal demand just in the Kuriles provided 20,000 to 30,000 jobs.20 This seasonal employment provided a welcome source of extra food and income for many, particularly in the economically depressed rural Japan of the 1930s.
The fisheries also provided a substantial source of export income for Japan. Canned salmon and crab from the waters off Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands and canned tuna from the waters south of Japan sold very well in Europe and the United States.21 Alongside other exports stemming from fishing and whaling such as fish meal, whale oil and vitamins, export of marine products generated considerable amounts of foreign exchange and made such exports one of Japan’s top three export commodities.22 These foreign currency earnings were highly valuable in purchasing the materials needed to feed Japan’s war effort on the Asian mainland from 1931 onwards, such as scrap iron, iron ore, rubber, and oil. As such, the economic dimensions of the industry became a primary national focus in the pre-war years and the fishing industry was given generous government support to expand and improve its operations.23
Despite these remarkable successes, like its terrestrial counterpart, Japan’s pelagic empire began to disintegrate rapidly after the tide of conflict turned against it. Alongside the general push for greater self-sufficiency by Japan from 1937, and spurred by US and European embargoes, Japanese fishermen began to reduce the range of their expeditions and focus more on domestic and imperial waters.24 This refocusing on local production was further necessitated after the outbreak of hostilities with the Western Allies in 1941. This return to local waters brought a sharp but short-lived increase in local production.
From 1942 onwards production rapidly declined due to various factors. First amongst these was the loss of craft to widespread Navy requisitioning. Added to this were the Allied air, surface fleet, and submarine attacks which ultimately cost Japan 90 percent of its merchant marine during the war.25The impact of the latter on the fishing industry was substantial, contributing (alongside shipwrecks) to Japan losing approximately 300,000 fishing craft of various types, including all Japan’s large factory ships and 95 percent of its otter trawlers by 1945.26 Many fishermen were also lost in such sinkings, and their colleagues’ mass conscription into the armed forces further reduced the numbers available. Wear and tear on the vessels and equipment which survived and the impossibility of providing replacements due to shortages of material such as hemp and cotton for making nets as well as the critical scarcity of oil and fuel, were also major contributors to the rapid collapse of the once proud industry after 1942.27
GHQ’s Fisheries Policy
The Allied Occupation thus took responsibility for an industry ravaged by years of conflict and fisheries under pressure from unsustainable exploitation. Although later heavily supportive of the industry, the Allied authorities initially confined the fishing fleet to harbor to ensure the security of the landings of Occupation personnel.28 Security formed from this point on, alongside the economic recovery of Japan, one of the two key elements of GHQ’s fisheries policy. The fishing zone permitted to be used by the Japanese was gradually expanded, first to coastal waters only, then further out into the Pacific and Sea of Japan in late 1945, and again in 1946, and finally further south and east in 1949 and 1950 (see Figure 1).29 At each point the security of both US personnel and the Japanese fishermen was taken into account, clearly influenced by the captures noted below. Security factors also played a significant role in the later intensification of the captures during the Korean War, when small craft off the Korean coast were involved in smuggling, supplying the communist forces and laying mines, resulting in a strict UN blockade of the coast and more stringent treatment of Japanese craft crossing the permitted fishing zone’s outer limit (the so called “MacArthur Line”).30
Figure 1. SCAP Authorized Fishing Areas (1945-1952)31
Alongside the need to maintain the security and safety of both the US forces and Japanese fishermen (in that order), the second principal core of GHQ’s policy was that of assisting the economic recovery of Japan. Unlike many other Occupation policies and in direct contradiction of the now-challenged “reverse course” theory, support for the revival of the fishing industry under GHQ preceded attempts to reform its practices and patterns of ownership. The central reason behind this was largely one of necessity, due to Japan’s severe food shortages in the immediate wake of the war.32 Supporting the revival of the fishing industry helped not only provide desperately needed foodstuffs, but also gave a boost to the economy and helped provide work for some of the millions of impoverished repatriates returning from Japan’s former empire.33Thus GHQ sought to promote the revival of the industry and the expansion of the area within which it could operate, first by expanding the MacArthur Line and later by encouraging the industry’s international expansion through the resumption of Antarctic whaling, and finally by rehabilitation through measures such as membership of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (which at the same time secured US and Canadian coastal fisheries).34
Despite this policy of the revival, rehabilitation, and managed expansion of the vestiges of Japan’s pelagic empire, unfortunately for Japan and its neighbors, GHQ left the status of certain key islets and rocks in arguably ambiguous circumstances with regard to sovereignty. This happened partially due to circumstances beyond its control, and also due to the needs described above. Furthermore, as is noted below, GHQ also did not do enough to discourage the assumption by Japan’s neighbors that the MacArthur Line represented the limits of Japanese post-Occupation territorial waters, further contributing to subsequent territorial problems. This situation, and the subsequent global evolution in the practice of the laws of the sea in relation to access to maritime resources and exclusive economic zones, greatly enhanced the importance of formerly obscure stones in the seas of Northeast Asia.
Japan’s Fishing Industry
Japan’s fishermen received assistance in reviving their industry, albeit under both financially and territorially constrained conditions. Fishermen benefited from the expansion of the areas they were allowed to fish, although unfortunately these mostly consisted of many of the most previously overexploited fisheries around Japan. Nevertheless the government provision of assistance to revive the industry alongside the simultaneous GHQ prioritization of the industry in terms of supplies and funds contributed to a substantial revival. As such, many former fishermen and new entrants to the industry operated within Japan’s fisheries zone.
The relatively high price of foodstuffs in general and fish in particular induced many to enter or re-enter the industry. Good catches could provide a good return, sometimes running into millions of Yen for larger boats, but the increasing competition from those entering, or returning to, the industry also contributed to the overfishing of the zone around Japan and the desire to push beyond that on the part of some fishermen.35 Knowledge of the rich fisheries just out of their reach which they had fished until just recently, including the so-called “Ginza Sea” off Cheju Island; the rich salmon, trout, saury and crab waters around the Kuriles; and the yellow croaker, mackerel and other fish available in the East China Sea, proved temping for many.36 Brief forays into the forbidden zone were also a seemingly effective way to increase the likelihood of substantial catches when facing the fierce competition inside the line.37 The costs and benefits of crossing the line were also likely obvious to many fishermen, with the boat and its crew only at risk for the often brief period they were over the line and with the catches being untraceable (and often quickly consumed) after returning to Japan. Aside from the motives noted here, the very thin spread of Japanese inspection vessels (see below) also provided an opportunity for those willing to take the risk of crossing the line.
For those willing to take the chance, many adopted various ruses to minimize their risk of capture during such forays, including operating at night without lights, operating without markings, and possibly in one encounter, providing only the Japanese versions of identity documents, or even unrelated documents in Japanese, when boarded by US sailors.38 Another common tactic employed by those violating the line was to misreport their position to the Japanese and US authorities as being well inside, whilst operating deep in forbidden waters, a practice which may have an impact of the reliability of some of the capture data examined below. Of course much of the confusion over the position of vessels was down to the limited navigational aids present on most vessels, although the presumably deliberate misreporting of locations certainly took place in many instances. The misreporting of position also extended after the event in many cases of capture too, with boat crews often claiming they were not outside the permitted fishing zone in order to avoid admitting their guilt, and hence, further punishment.39
The violation of the line was seemingly widespread and some in GHQ believed it was also occasionally organized en-masse, with one alleged attempt to violate the line by twelve boats working together being discussed in a meeting in early April 1951.40 It seems that economic concerns, or even mere subsistence, formed the principal motivations behind such behavior. A desire to defy GHQ rules and restrictions similar to that noted by Matthew Augustine amongst Okinawan fishermen may have also played a secondary role in some cases.41 The clear desire of many fishermen to operate beyond their permitted zone despite the risk of capture can be illustrated in the UK Foreign Office comments on the events immediately following the end of the MacArthur Line on 25 April 1952: “the removal of this restriction on the movements of Japanese fishing fleets was greeted with a wholesale stampede to the hitherto prohibited areas . . . this has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of Japanese fishing vessels seized by Soviet patrols.”42
Aside from illegal and clandestine tests of the boundaries of the fishing zone, and in a further clear indication of their desire for a larger zone, the fishermen, their unions and those Japanese politicians willing to assist them, regularly pushed for extension of the MacArthur Line. A notable example of lobbying by the fishing industry was the 1,000,000-signature petition presented to MacArthur and Dulles by former Minster without portfolio in the Katayama cabinet, Hayashi Heima.43 The petition, given to Dulles during his visit to Japan in early 1951, asked for unrestricted fishing rights which Hayashi argued would reduce friction with Japan’s neighbors, provide food for its increasing population, and would help Japan “earn its living.”44 The British Foreign Office took a slightly more cynical position on these demands, stating the true wish of the industry was to have “as much scope as possible in its encroachments upon the near-territorial waters of other countries in the Far East.”45 In this case, the petition made little difference and the MacArthur Line remained unchanged until the end of the Occupation. However, the application of pressure by the fishermen, their families and the unions did have a catalyzing influence on GHQ when dealing with the capture and imprisonment of Japanese fishermen, sometimes speeding actions to secure their release from custody.46
The Japanese Government
Within this context, as it often did during the Occupation, the Japanese government found itself between a rock and a hard place. With GHQ limits on the size of the fishing zone imposed from above and vociferous demands from below from the fishing industry for expansion, the Japanese government found itself in a thankless position. The necessity of increasing food production and the much-needed economic boost maritime products provided (especially in terms of the dollar exports that canned crab, salmon, and tuna earned) also increased the pressure on the Japanese government. A final factor influencing the Japanese government was the impact that the seizures had on Japan’s relations with its neighbors, especially if the Japanese government were to be seen to not be doing enough to restrain its fishermen, or even worse, tacitly encouraging the fishermen to stray beyond the MacArthur Line. The fact that Japan was not fully sovereign and had no formal diplomatic contact with foreign governments further complicated this situation.
In order to mitigate GHQ’s ire at a perceived ambivalence to infractions by the fishermen and to provide some of the protection the industry demanded, the Japanese government established a fisheries monitoring patrol fleet in 1949. This operated alongside the coastguard, Maritime Safety Board (MSB), and US air and sea patrols in policing the line. However, due to budget restrictions, Japan could only afford to maintain eleven monitoring vessels (two for the Pacific coast and nine for the Japan Sea coast) for the entirety of its extensive coastline and fishing zone. Furthermore, these vessels were unarmed, not permitted to cross the line themselves, and at least initially, had no judicial power beyond that of mere observation.47 Unsurprisingly these meager resources produced little in the way of discernible results. The highly limited success of this effort raises the question as to whether the Japanese government took a deliberately ineffectual approach towards policing the line. This could certainly be argued, but the fact that Japan imposed severe penalties on those caught crossing the line (large fines and up to ten years in prison) could also indicate a genuine desire to control the fishing fleet. Furthermore, the dire economic conditions in Japan, and hence paucity of available funds, meant a more substantial patrol fleet was out of the question. Together these two factors would seem to suggest the Japanese government genuinely attempted to do the best it could with the highly limited means at its disposal, albeit with negligible success.
Notable Trends in History of the Captures
North—The Kurile Islands/Hokkaido
As noted above, the waters around the Kurile Islands and those close to the northern coast of Hokkaido had long provided Japanese fishermen a rich source of trout, salmon, saury, atka mackerel, crab and cod.48 However, with the capture of the islands in August 1945 much of this important source of foodstuffs and export commodities was lost to the Soviet Union.49 This rich source of catches just beyond the MacArthur Line, the proximity of the islands to coast the of Hokkaido, and Soviet proactive enforcement of their differing interpretation of the limits of Japanese fishing waters led to a significant number of seizures of fishing boats in this area.50 This situation led to one of the largest incidences of captures of Japanese vessels by any of Japan’s neighbors occurring off the coast of Hokkaido. Coupled with this was a distinct militarization of this frontier as the reality of the Cold War set in, with US, Japanese and Soviet vessels closely monitoring each other and gathering intelligence from the fishermen caught by, and between, them. This situation saw the increasing incidence of the internment and interrogation of Japanese fishermen by the Soviets, and the deployment of MSB and US Navy vessels to the area to monitor Soviet activity near the Japanese coast and more actively discourage the capture of Japanese vessels.51
West—The Korean Coast
An interesting element of the captures attributed to South Korea is this era is that for most of the period examined by this study, South Korea was either occupied by the US (1945-1948), and hence not fully sovereign, or the Korean Navy was under US (nominally UN) command (1950-1953). This complicates any argument presented over territorial claims challenged or protected by these captures, in that they were made by one occupied territory against the fishermen of another, while both were under the aegis of the same semi-connected US occupation.52 The interplay between the Koreans, Japanese and their respective occupations (the US military government in Korea [USAMGIK] and GHQ) are also of interest. The initial assumption by USAMGIK that the MacArthur Line demarcated the limits of Japanese and Korean territorial waters was a point of lasting significance.53Despite being told by GHQ this was not the case and subsequently adjusting the behavior of the Korean patrol and naval craft under its command, the underlying assumption that the line marked a maritime boundary was internalized or adopted by the South Korean government and formed the basis of the later unilaterally declared “Rhee Line.” Alongside clearly indicating one of the origins of the current territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, this also indicates a new unexplored dimension in the historiography of GHQ itself—that of disputes between it and its interconnected neighboring occupation: USAMGIK.54
A further interesting element of the history of the fishing boat seizures, and one which relates to the current territorial dispute, is that of the use of the dispute for political purposes in South Korea. Sung-Hwa Cheong argues that the Rhee regime first employed the captures and misplaced (and manipulated) fears of expansion of the MacArthur Line closer to Korea as a political tactic to stir nationalism at home to assist him during a difficult period of his leadership in 1949.55The fact that the issue was not brought up by the Rhee regime until then is highlighted by Cheong as evidence of its essentially manufactured political nature. Following this first instance, the use of this dispute and others in the region for nationalist political purposes by state and non-state actors on all sides is clearly in evidence in contemporary North East Asia.
South—The East China Sea
Relatively speaking, the captures conducted by the Republic of China (ROC) were the least problematic for GHQ and the Japanese government. While initially taking a significant number of craft, the ROC later shifted its attention and vessels to defense of the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, as the ROC became increasingly dependent on the US for its survival, it likewise became less willing to antagonize GHQ and increasingly willing and able to work through its diplomatic representative in Tokyo to return many of the Japanese crew it had captured.56
This position directly contrasted with that of the captures by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The captures by the PRC, which greatly increased from mid-1951 onwards, caused serious concern inside GHQ and the Japanese government, directly resulting in the Yoshida letter upon which the map data used in this paper is based. The reasons for this level of concern were numerous: first and foremost was the aggressiveness of the PRC vessels in the pursuit and capture of Japanese vessels. Japanese craft, both civilian and inspection craft, were directly fired upon and chased at length by PRC craft on several occasions.57 A further cause for concern was the fact that, at least initially, the PRC returned none of the crew or vessels it took. Later the crews were returned en-masse but most of the vessels were never recovered.58 An additional cause for concern with regard to the release of the captured boats and crew was that the Occupation (and by extension the Japanese government), unlike with the ROK, ROC and even USSR, had no diplomatic relations with the PRC. This made negotiations over return and prosecution of errant fisherman by Japan or GHQ almost impossible. The fact that the PRC was also fighting the US in Korea (albeit behind the façade of “volunteer forces”) further complicated this process and heightened fears by both GHQ and the Japanese government that the captures could perhaps escalate into what Shigeru Yoshida termed a “critical social and economic problem.”59 A final major cause of concern on the part of the Japanese government were the alleged claims expressed by the capturing PRC authorities to the Japanese fishermen that, in the words of Yoshida: “all the East China Sea belongs to the Chinese Communist Sovereignty [sic].”60 The fact that these alleged claims predate, and arguably contradict, the later 1953 Renmin Ribao article used by some to argue the PRC did not consider the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of its territory at this point is also highly significant.
Mapping the Captures
The Data
Of all the captures, those conducted by the PRC created the greatest concern in the Japanese government and were expressed by Yoshida in a 1951 letter to MacArthur accompanied by an exhaustive study of the captures by the Japanese government.61 This set of data included the records of 233 individual captures by the ROC, the PRC, USAMGIK/Republic of Korea, and the USSR from late 1945 to 17 February 1951. Each of the 233 individual capture records noted the co-ordinates/area in which the vessel was captured, which state/authority captured it, the vessel’s name, its mass, its engine size, the date it was captured, the status of its crew, whether or not its captors returned the vessel, and any other data judged to be relevant by the Japanese government (see Figure 2). This set of data is employed by this study to analyze the incidence and dynamics of the captures of Japanese fishing vessels by Japan’s neighbors.
Figure 2. An Example of a Data Entry Converted to Point on the Map
The Japanese government’s study clearly provides a rich source of data and hence is of great value in attempting to map and analyze the fishing boat seizures of this period, although questions must be raised, as with any source, over its accuracy and reliability. An initial point to note is that this is, of course, a Japanese government document and one which was produced to accompany a request from Yoshida to GHQ for greater protection for the vessels. This position could be used to question the validity of the data contained within it, and at the time concerns were expressed by GHQ’s Natural Resources Section (NRS), particularly over the data being “padded” with vessels taken as reparations. QHQ subsequently checked the data against its own records on the captures.62 Several discrepancies in the two sets of data were noted although these were not considered to be especially significant, as William Neville (then head of NRS’s fisheries section) noted in a memorandum to G3 in which he claimed: “In general NR’s check is in agreement with the list as submitted.”63
Despite the general agreement of NRS with the Japanese government data, one issue of note with this data set is that although judged to be generally accurate by NRS, the locations of many of the individual captures are approximate. Most fishing vessels fishing off Japan’s coasts at this time possessed at least some navigational aids but the provision of absolutely precise coordinates was impossible in most circumstances. Even GHQ suffered itself in this regard, for example giving a vastly differing set of coordinates for a one of the captures listed in the data (#10 Unzen Maru).64Most of these inaccuracies stem from input error or miscalculations in the base data, by both those on the scene and those recording the data in the Japanese government/GHQ. Indeed, an examination of the map produced to accompany this paper: “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951,” reveals some quite obvious errors in the base data, with one capture placed in the inland sea and another in the center of Hokkaido (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. An Example of an Error in the Data65
Alongside these reporting/transcription errors, another less straightforward explanation exists for the incidence of potential inaccuracies in the data—the risk of further repercussions for the boat crews involved. As noted at an April 1951 meeting between NRS and the other GHQ/US military arms, it was certainly not in the interests of Japanese fishermen to report that they had been fishing beyond the MacArthur Line, as by doing so they acknowledged their guilt and potentially opened themselves up to future prosecution.66 As such, it could be argued that the incidence of Japanese fishermen violating the MacArthur Line was even greater than the data set suggests. However, the very common presence of other vessels which witnessed the captures and the presumably accurate distress calls issued by the vessels as they were being captured could be used to argue that the co-ordinates given are largely accurate. This position could also be said to be strengthened by the fact that the data does not include vessels captured and released on the same day, although it could also be argued that those released so swiftly were unlikely to have crossed the line anyway. Of course, also unrecorded are the arguably more numerous group of vessels which crossed the line undetected and uncaptured.
A further notable point regarding the dataset is its timeframe. The captures recorded within it go up to 17 February 1951 and hence only cover the beginning of a phenomenon which persisted into the mid-1950s, arguably even intensifying after 1952. Furthermore, due to the chronological frame of the data itself, certain key events such as the Dai Ichi Daihōmaru Incident of 4 February 1952 are not included. Of course incidents like this would ideally be contained in the data but their absence does not in itself undermine the value of using the dataset to examine the period which it covers, and of course has no bearing on the accuracy of the data which is featured in the dataset. Furthermore as many of the subsequent captures took place in the same zones as those depicted in this dataset, their inclusion, although desirable, would arguably add little in terms of geospatial analysis.
A final shortcoming of the data is that some captures only give a grid reference as a location. These refer to the grid of 30 arcminute x 30 arcminute boxes GHQ used to divide the fishing zones around Japan. As each of these boxes covered a relatively large area, the position of captures giving only their grid reference as a location have been placed by the author at the center of the given grid, in order to approximate their actual position. Other vessels give their location of capture as “unknown” or give obscure geographical references. The latter groups have been estimated where possible, but those unable to be located, alongside the vessels whose capture location is given as “unknown” have been placed in ports know to have been used to store captured vessels, such as Pusan.
Despite these shortcomings and errors (errors discovered in the data to date account for less than 10 percent of the total), the data set can be of some use when examining the capture of the boats by the various states/authorities involved. Moreover, as each capture listed definitely occurred (and was confirmed to have taken place by GHQ and the Japanese government), any inaccuracies relate to the fine detail of the exact location of the capture. As such, a small amount of individual capture location data may be inaccurate to a minor degree but if, as this study does, a broader perspective is adopted, the larger trends within the captures can still be observed and analyzed, both in terms of spatial and chronological distribution.
The Maps
In producing the maps employed in this study, the Japanese government dataset discussed above was used, alongside a number of other pieces of geospatial data. Principal among these was the GHQ map of the MacArthur Line’s expansion, titled: “SCAP Authorized Fishing Areas” (see figure 4).67
Figure 4. SCAP Authorized Fishing Areas, 1950
This data was also supplemented with other points for reference including the co-ordinates of the 1952 Rhee Line, the UN naval blockade of Korea, the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) and the Pinnacle Islands (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands).68 Alongside these lines and points of interest, each individual capture was recorded with all available data as a single point in Google maps+ to produce the map “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951” (see Figure 5).69
Figure 5. Image of “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951”
In addition to the full static map produced using Google maps+, two further maps were produced using the same data within the online mapping tool CartoDB.70 The first of these is an animated map with individual captures flashing in date order at their capture locations and in colors representing the capturing authority.71 The 1946 position of the MacArthur Line was also included for reference (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Image from “Visualization: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951”
CartoDB was also used to plot the data on a final map showing the intensity of the captures in different locations.72 This map depicts the captured boats at the location of their capture, with all captures shown by individual orange dots. Where these dots overlapped, and hence the incidence of the captures was higher, the dots’ shade darkens to red (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951 (Intensity)73
Initial Analysis of the Data in Relation to Contemporary Territorial Disputes
The dataset described above and the two maps and visualization produced from it can be employed to examine the captures themselves, but also the current territorial issues which relate directly to them. This section presents some initial conclusions/interpretations of the data in regards to these disputes, upon which future research using the maps can hopefully be built.
The Pinnacle Islands (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)
The nearest capture listed in the data is 45 nautical miles (NM) (83.34 km) north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As the islands themselves were 25 NM (46.3 km) behind the MacArthur Line, the area around them could be fished legally and without interference. As such they seem very quiet in relation to other parts of the East China Sea in terms of captures. This seems to suggest that if the abovementioned alleged claims to “the entire East China Sea” by the PRC were genuine it seemingly lacked the willingness and/or ability to challenge Japanese/GHQ control over the islands, or at least this section of the MacArthur Line at this stage. Nevertheless, the fact that captures occurred deeper behind the MacArthur Line further north could also be used to challenge this hypothesis (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Captures Closest to the Pinnacle Islands74
The Kuriles and Hokkaido
The incidence of captures here indicates that the Soviet Union was, as the documentary evidence suggested above, arguably the most assertive in enforcing its interpretation of the limits of its own and, by extension, Japanese territorial sovereignty in the waters around Hokkaido. That the Soviets seemingly did not recognize the MacArthur Line, as noted by the MSB at the time, seems justified by the incidence of captures far inside the line, and in some cases within 0.6 NM (just over 1100 meters) of the Japanese coast (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Captures by the Soviet Union75
A further interesting point which can be perceived when viewing the visualization is that there are blooms of captures off the Hokkaido coast at certain times of the year.76 These correspond to the fishing seasons of certain key species caught in the region, especially salmon and saury.77 This incidence of greater captures corresponding to the peak fishing season for such fish strongly supports the argument presented above that economic motivations formed the principal reason for many fishermen to cross the line, especially in this region.
Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands)
Despite the vociferous protests instigated by the Rhee regime from 1949, and the interweaving of the Liancourt Rocks into the problem after 1952, it seems the connection to the capture of fishing boats at this juncture to the rocks is indirect. No captures seem to have taken place in the vicinity of Takeshima/Dokdo between 1945 and early 1951.
Figure 10. Captures around the Liancourt Rocks78
The closest definite capture was a relatively sizable 106 NM (196.31 km) south of the rocks. However as these captures were much deeper into the permitted fishing zone it could be argued that Korean claims and their willingness to stress their sovereignty by capturing errant Japanese vessels extended far deeper into the Japanese zone than the Liancourt Rocks. An alternative argument here could also be that as these captures formed the most northerly of all those taken by the ROK, the Liancourt Rocks themselves, sitting some distance further north, could have been uncontested by the either or both sides at this stage, with the rocks only taking on significance later as a boundary marker for the Rhee Line. A further interesting point here is that despite the current focus on the Liancourt Rocks, it seems that the area around Cheju was of much greater importance to Japanese fishermen, and Korean patrol vessels, in this era. With eight times as many captures (3 to 24) when compared to the Liancourt Rocks, the seas around Cheju seem to have been the principal contested zone at this stage. The prevalence of captures here also perhaps indicates the economic and food supply motivations behind the incursions by the Japanese fishermen, with the chance of sizable catches from the rich fishing grounds there perhaps seemingly being seen as justifying the risk of capture (see Figure 11). The waters around Cheju were a source of various types of fish, while those around the Liancourt Rocks were only famed for abalone, a less important and harder to harvest resource. It is therefore likely that the Japanese fishermen’s greater interest on Cheju rather than the Liancourt Rocks was motivated by the importance of the fisheries concerned, rather than pushing any territorial claims.79
Figure 11. Captures around Cheju80
Conclusion
This paper has presented, through the context of the seizures of Japanese fishing vessels during the Occupation era, the potential usefulness of historical geospatial data both as a medium through which to examine specific historical issues and, by extension, the territorial disputes of contemporary North East Asia. These conclusions, with their basis in geospatial data and their relation to a line originally intended to be unconnected to sovereignty, arguably more accurately represent the ebb and flow of the actually enforced territorial limits of the actors involved than other forms of documentary evidence employed to date. The data presented here alongside the documentary sources upon which it is based could said be to present evidence that concerns over the food and economic security of Japan by GHQ, the Japanese government and Japanese fishermen were at least as strong as, and arguably stronger than, concerns over maritime sovereignty in this era. As noted in the introduction, this interpretation of the evidence could be used to challenge the assumptions made in some studies of the origins over Japan’s territorial disputes.
It is hoped that the maps and visualization presented here will be further employed by researchers studying the topics discussed above in the future and that they can be enhanced and built upon with additional data, especially from Chinese, Korean and Soviet sources. By adding alternative, and potentially conflicting perspectives to the GHQ/Japanese viewpoint presented here, these contributions could greatly enhance the conclusions presented here, and add the perspectives of Japan’s neighbors on these disputes, possibly including their own “infractions” of their neighbors’ maritime territory.
Although it is something of an initial experiment in the field, it is hoped that this paper may also serve as an example of the usefulness (where coordinates, routes, or logs are available) of geospatial data within the discipline of maritime history, for example in tracking movement within maritime spaces, patterns of trade, and management and practice of resource gathering within the pelagic empires of other countries and regions.
Notes
1 This article is based on a paper first given at The European Association of Japanese Studies Conference, Kyoto University, 28–29 September 2013.
2 James Manicom, China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, Bridging Troubled Waters (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 15–37.
3 Paul O’Shea, “Playing the Sovereignty Game: Understanding Japan’s Territorial Disputes” (PhD diss., University of Sheffield, 2012), 67.
4 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 17.
5 Chisako Teshima Masuo, “Governing a Troubled Relationship: Can the Field of Fisheries Breed Sino-Japanese Co-Operation,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 14.1 (March 2013): 70.
6 Madoka Fukuda, “The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement Will Not ‘Contain China,’” AJISS-Commentary no. 179, June 19, 2013, accessed May 25, 2015; https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201306/19-1.html
7 Masataka Kosaka, Kaiyō Kokka Nihon no Kōsō [The Concept of Japan as a Maritime State], (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2008).
8 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29–33.
9 William M. Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire: Reconsidering Japanese Expansion,” in Japan at Nature’s Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power, edited by Ian J. Miller, Julia A. Thomas, and Brett L. Walker (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013); Eric Taliacozzo, “Review Essay: Underneath the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Asian Studies 67.3 (August 2008): 1–8.
10 For more on questions over the coherency of the “reverse course” narrative see Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (London: Continuum, 2002), 473.
11 For more on the “internal” and “external” Cold Wars see Thomas French, “Contested ‘Rearmament’: The National Police Reserve and Japan’s Cold War(s),” Japanese Studies 34.1 (May 2014): 25–36.
12 Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (Oxford: Routledge, 2007).
13 Tokyo Fisheries Agency, “Japan’s Fisheries at a Glance,” 3, last modified March 1, 2012; http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/kikaku/23zudemiru_en2.pdf .
14 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 274.
15 Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 22–26.
16 Tsutsui, “Landscapes in the Dark Valley: Toward an Environmental History of Wartime Japan,” Environmental History 8.2 (April, 2003): 294–311.
17 Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 26–27.
18 ESS (B) 2672–2677, GHQ/SCAP, “Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan, 1950,” 39; FO 371/99417, “Economic Report No. 9, December 1951,” January 11, 1952.
19 Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 24–25.
20 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
21 Norman Stanley Roberts, Japan, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Japan, Overseas Economic Surveys (London: Board of Trade, 1953), 22; Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 25.
22 Herbert Alexander Macrae, The Future Development of the Japanese Economy and the Opportunities for British Trade with Japan (London: Board of Trade, 1948), 7; Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 25.
23 Tsutsui, “The Pelagic Empire,” 25.
24 George Cyril Allen, Japan’s Economic Recovery (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 67.
25 John P. Bowen, The Gift of the Gods: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan (s.l.: Old Dominion Graphics Consultants, 1984), 5.
26 FO 371/99417, “Economic Report No. 9, December 1951,” January 11, 1952; Tsutsui, “Landscapes in the Dark Valley,” 294–311.
27 Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 371.
28 Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 28.
29 Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Occupation Policy and the Japanese Fisheries Management Regime, 1945–1952,” in Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society, edited by Mark E. Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 54; Hisao Iwasaki, Nihon Gyogyō no Tenkai Katei: Sengo 50 Nen Gaishi [The Development Process of the Japanese Fishing Industry: An Overall History of 50 Postwar Years] (Tokyo: Kajisha, 1997), 33.
30 NRS 1913, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, April 19, 1951. The phrase “MacArthur Line” is used interchangeably by scholars in reference to the various positions of the line itself.
31 This map appears in Historical Section, GHQ, “History of Non-Military Activities in Japan, 1945 through 1950, Volume XIV, Natural Resources—Part B, Fisheries,” Tokyo, GHQ/SCAP, 1951.
32 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 89–97; Chris Aldous, “Contesting Famine: Hunger and Nutrition in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17 (2010): 255; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 79.
33 Allen, Japan’s Economic Recovery (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 68; NHK Sangyo Kagakubu, Shōgen — Nihon Gyōgyo Sengo-shi [Testimony—The Postwar History of Japan’s Fishing Industry] ( Tokyo: Nihon Hosō Shuppan Kyokai, 1986), 32, 112.
34 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 310; Iwasaki, Nihon Gyogyō, 33.
35 NRS 1913, Katayanagi to SCAP, “Measures to Prevent the Violation of the Japanese Fishing Area Limitation,” August 10, 1948.
36 Tokyo Fisheries Agency, “Japan’s Fisheries at a Glance,” 5.
37 Sung-Hwa Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945–1952 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 23; Iwasaki, Nihon Gyogyō, 35.
38 Japan Times, April 24, 1951; NRS 1913, SCAP to Commander, “United States Naval Forces, Far East,” March 15, 1951; NRS 1913, Commander Naval Forces, Far East to SCAP, March 15, 1951.
39 NRS 1913, “Memorandum for Record: Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels,” April 17, 1951.
40Ibid.
41 Matthew R. Augustine, “Border-Crossers and Resistance to US Military Rule in the Ryukyus, 1945-1953,” Japan Focus 2906, (23 September 2008), accessed May 25, 2015; http://www.japanfocus.org/-Matthew_R_-Augustine/2906/article.html .
42 FO 371/99417, “Japan: Economic Report No. 5, Period May 1952,” June 16, 1952.
43 FO 371/92621, “Economic Conditions in Japan, January 1951,” February 9, 1951; “Appendix 5—Japanese Cabinets since the Introduction of the Cabinet System in 1885”; Janet E. Hunter, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
44 Japan Times, February 8, 1951.
45 FO 371/92621, “Economic Conditions in Japan, January 1951,” February 9, 1951.
46 Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment, 33; NRS 1912, NRS to DS, “Seizure of Fishing Boats off Nemuro Coast,” May 24, 1951; Japan Times, March 11, 1951.
47 NRS 1913, Katayanagi to SCAP, “Measures to Prevent the Violation of the Japanese Fishing Area Limitation,” August 10, 1948.
48 FO 371/110420, “Monthly Economic Report on Japan, No. 5,” May 1954; Mainichi Shinbun, January 19, 1951; Tokyo Fisheries Agency, “Japan’s Fisheries at a Glance,” 5.
49 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 81–83.
50 NRS 1916, Mita to CNFE, undated.
51 NRS 1911, G2 to NRS, “Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels by Foreign Craft,” June 8, 1951; NRS 1911, Stadtler to DS and NRS, “Checksheet: Release of Japanese Fishermen,” August 13, 1951; NRS 1911, “Memorandum for Record: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats off Hokkaido,” June 6, 1951.
52 For more on the transfer of ideas between the two occupations, particularly in regard to local security forces, see French, National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2014); French, “Contested ‘Rearmament’”: 25–36.
53 Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment, 24.
54 Some brief analysis of the initial struggles over ultimate authority over Korea between GHQ and USAMGIK appears in Takemae’s work, but there has been little more published on the relationship between the two. This is especially surprising when considering the voluminous amount written on, and importance attached to, the internal politics inside GHQ. See Takemae, Inside GHQ.
55 Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment, 25.
56 NRS 1911, “Memorandum for Record: Japanese Fishing Vessels Seized by the Chinese Nationalists,” July 28, 1951.
57 Japan Times, February 19, 1951; NRS 1913, “Memorandum for Record: Attack on Japanese Fisheries Inspection Vessel,” May 1, 1951.
58 NRS 1916, “Seizure of Japanese Fishing Boats by Chinese Communists,” October 11, 1951.
59 NRS 1912, Hirokawa to Schenck, “Capture of Japanese Fishing Boats by Chinese Communist Forces,” March 5, 1951.
60 Ibid.
61 NRS 1914, Yoshida to SCAP, “Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels,” March 9, 1951, “Annex I—Japanese Fishing Vessels Seized or Stolen in Near Waters.”
62 NRS 1914, Sullivan (DS) to G3, G2, NRS, “Seizure of Japanese Fishing vessels,” March 26, 1951.
63 The differences mainly related to a difference in time frame; NRS 1914, Neville (NRS) to G3, April 1951.
64 NRS 1914, Yoshida to SCAP, “Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels,” March 9, 1951, “Annex I—Japanese Fishing Vessels Seized or Stolen in Near Waters”; NRS 1915, DS to G2, “The 10th Unzen-Maru Captured by Chinese Ships,” January 16, 1951.
65 Note the presence of modern infrastructure and contemporary land borders, a further shortcoming of some geospatial mapping services/sites.
66 NRS 1913, “Memorandum for Record: Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels,” April 17, 1951. “Secret” meeting held April 9, 1951, Mitsubishi Shoji Building.
67 NRS 1913, “Map: SCAP Authorised Fishing Areas, 1950.” Map also appears in Harry N. Scheiber, Inter-Allied Conflicts and Ocean Law. 1945–53: The Occupation Command’s Revival of Japanese Whaling and Marine Fishing, Institute of European and American Studies (Taibei: Academia Sinica Press, 2001), 58.
68 The “Rhee Line” is depicted in Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 30; NRS 1914, “Memorandum for Record, Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats by Koreans,” April 3. 1951.
69 French, “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945–1951,” accessed September 1, 2014; https://www.academia.edu/8262601/MAP_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fishing_Boats_... ; Google maps+ available from: https://maps.google.com.
70 CartoDB is available from: https://carto.com/.
71 French, “Visualization: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945–1951,” accessed September 1, 2014. https://www.academia.edu/8263061/VISUALIZATION_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fish...
72 French, “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945–1951 (Intensity),” accessed September 1, 2014; https://www.academia.edu/8263129/MAP_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fishing_Boats_...
73 Again, modern infrastructure and contemporary land borders are displayed.
74 The light green and red lines respectively indicate the late 1945 and 1946 limits of the “Mac-Arthur Line.” The green diamond indicates the location of the Pinnacle Islands. Note contemporary ferry services and the position of un-locatable captures near Taipei.
75 Note error in base data (inland capture).
76 French, “Visualization: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945–1951,” accessed September 1, 2014. https://www.academia.edu/8263061/VISUALIZATION_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fish... .
77 Tokyo Fisheries Agency, “Japan’s Fisheries at a Glance,” 5, 28.
78 The light green and red lines respectively indicate the late 1945 and 1946 limits of the “MacArthur Line.” The light blue line indicates the 1952 “Rhee Line.” The green diamond indicates the position of the Liancourt Rocks.
79 Japan Times, April 24, 2013.
80 See note 78 for explanation of line colors.
Maps and Visualizations
French, Thomas. “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945–1951.” Accessed September 1, 2014. https://www.academia.edu/8262601/MAP_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fishing_Boats_... .
——. “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951 (Intensity).” Accessed September 1, 2014. https://www.academia.edu/8263129/MAP_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fishing_Boats_...
——. “Visualization: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951.” Accessed September 1, 2014. https://www.academia.edu/8263061/VISUALIZATION_Seizures_of_Japanese_Fish...
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